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As a crisis of representation challenges third wave democracies, two of its most 
salient indicators – weak party institutionalization and the underrepresentation of 
marginalized groups – have thus far been evaluated only in isolation. This dissertation 
contends that the two dynamics are related, and uses extensive variation within Brazil, 
the third wave’s most populous democracy, to analyze the relationship. Employing an 
original empirical database of 21,478 candidacies, 73 interviews, and field observations 
from throughout Brazil, I explain how voters, electoral rules, and parties interact to 
undermine women’s political participation and representative democracy. 
Despite socioeconomic progress, an effective women’s movement, an electorate 
increasingly receptive to female politicians, and a legislated gender quota, Brazil ranks 
poorly in global assessments of women’s legislative presence. Using mixed methods, this 
dissertation analyzes variation in women’s electoral performance across districts, 
electoral rules, parties, and women to explain the puzzle of women’s underrepresentation 
in Brazil. I argue that the weakly institutionalized and male dominant character of most 
Brazilian parties has undermined the quota while also hindering women’s political 
prospects and circumscribing their pathways to power. 
 x 
I subject the hypotheses of the women’s representation literature and my own 
arguments to empirical testing and find that Brazil’s female political aspirants are 
thwarted not by development level, electoral size, or ideology, but rather by the 
preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties. The analysis demonstrates that to 
effectively promote women’s participation in candidate-centered elections, parties must 
have the capacity to provide women with essential psychological, organizational, and 
material support and the will, heralded by the party leadership, to do so. 
The paucity of such support and persistence of traditional gender norms have led 
Brazil’s few female politicians to craft novel profiles;  by conforming to traditional 
gender norms as supermadres, or converting social, organizational, or professional 
experiences into political capital as lutadoras or technocrats, such women have 
nonetheless thrived in inhospitable electoral contexts. I conclude that reforms that 
strengthen parties while incentivizing the promotion of women’s participation within 
parties offer the greatest potential for mitigating Brazil’s crisis of representation, situating 
once more the goals of the women’s movement within the broader democratic reform 
agenda. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
Three decades after the third wave of democratization swept Latin America and 
Southern Europe, processes of democratic consolidation are still underway. While 
procedural elements of democracy and accountability have improved, the 
representativeness of government remains limited in many countries of the third wave. 
Indeed, respondents across Latin America in a 2006 Inter-American Development Bank 
survey indicated that a “crisis of representation” was one of the most serious challenges 
confronting democracy in the region (Berkman and Cavallo, 2006).  
This dissertation contends that two important manifestations of the crisis – the 
weak institutionalization of parties and party systems and the underrepresentation of 
women and other marginalized populations – which have thus far only been evaluated in 
isolation, are related. It uses the lens of women’s representation in Brazil, the third 
wave’s most populous democracy, to explain how weakly institutionalized parties 
undermine the representativeness of the formal political sphere in Latin America and 
beyond. It demonstrates that weakly institutionalized parties, which lack “value infusion” 
(Janda, 1980) and stability (Huntington, 1968) or “internal systemness” (Panebianco, 
1988) and are thus susceptible to personalist politics, are ill-equipped to provide the 
psychological, organizational, and material support necessary to mitigate the persistent 
gender gap in formal political power. In contrast, well-institutionalized parties operate as 
an organization, according to clearly defined rules of the game, and have at their disposal 
a host of material and human resources that they can marshal to cultivate, recruit, and 
support viable women candidacies. 
The enduring political marginalization of women and minorities despite 
widespread democratization has led to a burgeoning literature on the causes and 
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consequences of their underrepresentation. The literature, however, cannot fully explain 
the dilemma in Brazil, where a dearth of female candidates and deputies persists in spite 
of substantial socioeconomic progress, an effective and dynamic women’s movement, an 
electorate increasingly receptive to female politicians, and the 1996 implementation of a 
women’s quota law mandating that political parties reserve at least thirty percent of the 
spaces on their legislative candidate lists for women.1 Less than nine percent of Brazil’s 
federal deputies are female.2  
This dissertation explains the puzzle of women’s extreme underrepresentation in 
Brazil, illuminating how voters, electoral rules, and parties interact to undermine 
women’s political participation. I argue that while the gender quota’s poor design and 
enforcement certainly thwart its effectiveness, that fact alone cannot fully explain the 
paucity of female candidates and elected deputies, nor can it explain the variation in 
women’s prospects across parties. Rather, it is the weakly institutionalized and male-
dominant character of most Brazilian parties that has hindered women’s political 
prospects and bounded their pathways to power. I find that the intraparty competition in 
Brazil’s candidate-centered elections and the preponderance of inchoate parties have 
maintained women’s political marginalization, and conclude that to effectively promote 
women’s participation parties must have both the capacity to recruit and provide female 
political aspirants with essential psychological, organizational, and material support 
(forthcoming in well-institutionalized parties) and the will to do so (heralded by women 
in party leadership). 
                                                 
1 The Brazilian legislature adopted the electoral quota in 1996, with a 1997 amendment extending the quota 
from 20 to 30 percent. The law requires political parties to reserve at least 30% and no more than 70% of 
the spaces on their candidate lists for candidates from each sex (9100/1995, 9504/1997). A 2009 mini-
reform (12.034/2009) changing the language slightly will be discussed below. 
2 Ranked a lowly 116th (of 189 countries) in terms of women’s legislative presence, Brazil is outranked by 
the entire region, with the single exception of Panama, which had actually reached 16.7% women in 2004 
before falling to 8.5% in the 2009 legislative elections (IPU, 2012). 
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In this introductory chapter I briefly contextualize the puzzle of women’s 
underrepresentation in Brazil, and introduce the central research questions, research 
design, and data, and the relevance and contributions advanced herein. I then conclude by 
previewing the ensuing chapters. 
THE PERSISTENT GENDER GAP IN FORMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE 
The Women’s Movement 
Figure 1.1. “A Constitutional Assembly That Counts Must Have the Voice of Women.” 
Women and the Constitutional Assembly National Meeting, 1986. 
The continued underrepresentation of women in Brazil is particularly puzzling 
given the strength and breadth of the country’s women’s movement. Women were active 
participants in the Amnesty and the Diretas-Já (Direct Election Now) movements of the 
1970s and 1980s, and played a significant role throughout the (re)democratization 
process in Brazil (Alvarez, 1990). Their forceful and consequential presence in the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1987-88 led them to be considered one of “the most 
organized sector[s] of civil society” (Costa, 2008; Macaualay, 2006). Indeed, the 
bancada feminina (women’s caucus) unified female politicians and activists across party 
lines, achieving approval for an impressive 80% of the proposals laid out in the “Carta 
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das Mulheres aos Constituintes” (Women’s Letter to the Members of the Constituent 
Assembly) (Pinto, 1994). 
Preparation for and follow-up to the United Nations Conference on Women in 
Beijing in 1995 led nearly 800 Brazilian women’s organizations to coalesce under a 
“cohesive feminist platform” and advance the “Declaração das Mulheres Brasileiras à IV 
Conferência” (Declaration of Brazilian Women to the Fourth Conference) (Costa, 2008). 
In recent years, activists have rallied around the National Plan of Policies for Women 
(PNPM), a comprehensive set of objectives and specific proposals for advancing 
women’s rights. 
Figure 1.2. Second National Conference of Policies for Women, 2007. 
In 2007, with the participation of then President Lula, several members of his 
cabinet, and politicians and activists from throughout South America, 2,559 delegates 
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elected from over 600 local and regional councils advanced the Second PNPM, which 
was subsequently approved by executive decree on March 5, 2008 (Secretary of 
Women’s Affairs, 2010). Michel Temer, then president of the Chamber of Deputies and 
current Vice President of Brazil, declared, “The bancada feminina is one of the most 
active and present in political activity and knows how to defend its causes, make a 
presence, and make demands” (Temer, 2009, 3). In sum, women have enjoyed 
considerable success in both articulating and actualizing their demands, thus rendering 
quite conspicuous their absence from the highest echelons of political decision making. 
Socioeconomic Progress 
The near exclusion of Brazilian women from formal politics persists in spite of 
impressive progress on the fronts of education, literacy, and presence in the workforce 
(Htun, 2002). As of 2010, women are 59.76% of college graduates, have on average 1.1 
more years of schooling than men, and represent 43.59% of the workforce and 45% of 
the three lowest tiers of federal government posts (Secretary of Women’s Affairs, 2010). 
Moreover, the Order of Attorneys of Brazil (OAB) indicates that 44% of registered 
attorneys are women and gender parity is in the near future, with 51% of those recently 
registered in São Paulo being women and 52% of OAB interns also being female. Men 
still drastically outnumber women in political office, however, comprising more than 10 
times the number of federal representatives than women. As shown in Table 1.1, with 
less than 10% women in its national congress, Brazil remains stymied as Latin America’s 
second-most male-dominant legislature, behind only Panama (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union’s Women in National Parliaments Database, 2012).3 
                                                 
3 As noted above, in the elections after its implementation of a 30% candidate quota, Panama’s percent of 
women legislators increased from 9.7 to 16.7 percent. Yet in the 2009 elections, it dropped back to 8.5 
percent.  
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Table 1.1. Women’s Parliamentary Presence in the Americas (2012) 
Rank Country % Women in Lower House 
   9 Nicaragua 40.2% 
14 Costa Rica 38.6% 
17 Argentina 37.4% 
23 Ecuador 32.3% 
38 El Salvador 26.2% 
38 Mexico 26.2% 
39 Bolivia 25.4% 
42 Canada 24.7% 
59 Peru 21.5% 
62 Dominican Republic 20.8% 
67 Honduras 19.5% 
78 Venezuela 17.0% 
79 United States 16.9% 
89 Chile 14.2% 
93 Guatemala 13.3% 
98 Paraguay 12.5% 
100 Colombia  12.1% 
100 Uruguay 12.1% 
116 Brazil 8.8% 
118 Panama 8.5% 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012. 
Favorable Public Opinion 
Further confounding the extreme underrepresentation of women is the postulated 
support of the electorate. In recent public opinion polls, Brazilians have responded rather 
favorably to the prospect of female politicians. A nationally representative survey 
conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope) in February 
20094 found that 94% of respondents would vote for a woman, 83% believed that 
“women in politics and other spaces can improve politics and these spaces,” 75% agreed 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that these surveys were conducted prior to the emergence of Dilma Rousseff’s 
candidacy for the presidency. 
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that “true democracy exists only with the presence of women in spaces of power,” and 
73% concurred that “the Brazilian population wins with the election of a greater number 
of women.” When asked explicitly about the offices for which respondents would support 
female candidates, 66% of 2,002 respondents – male and female – indicated they would 
vote for a woman for any office or federal deputy in particular (Ibope, 2009).5 So while 
residual levels of machista bias do persist among both men and women, survey data 
demonstrate a postulated receptiveness to female candidates among most Brazilians that 
varies only slightly by respondent sex. 
Table 1.2 displays the percent of respondents who, in the 2005-2008 wave of the 
World Values Survey, agreed with the statement “men make better politicians than 
women,” in several nations around the world (WVS, 2005-2008). It also includes 2012 
data from the IPU on the percent of women in the lower house of parliament for those 60 
nations. As we can see in Table 1.2, public opinion on women in politics in Brazil 
suggests an electorate that is neither ideal nor determinatively hostile to women. Ranking 
23
rd
 of 60 nations (4
th
 of 10 in Latin America), many countries exhibit far more 
prohibitive levels of bias against women than does Brazil. Note that, with the single 
exception of Brazil, in every country where the level of women in the lower house of 
congress hovers at less than ten percent, a majority of the respondents agreed with the 
survey question on male political superiority. Clearly, while public opinion toward 
women is less than ideal, it cannot explain the striking underrepresentation of women in 
Brazilian politics. 
 
                                                 
5 The fact that 80.2% of those surveyed indicated only two questions later that they would vote for a black 
woman (who are included in the prior question) for any office or federal deputy in particular is suggestive 
of the social desirability bias likely at work in this survey (Streb et al., 2008).  
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Table 1.2. A Cross-National Glimpse at Voter Bias 
When asked about the particular gains a greater female presence would bring, 7 in 











1 Sweden 8.2 44.7 31 D. Repub. 41.1 20.8 
2 Andorra 9.7 50.0 32 Taiwan 43.6 
 
3 Norway 14.5 39.6 33 Japan 43.9 10.8 
4 Switzerland 14.9 28.5 34 Chile 44.5 14.2 
5 Canada 15.8 24.7 35 Poland 44.7 23.7 
6 N. Zealand 16.3 32.2 36 Bulgaria 47.4 20.8 
7 Peru 17.5 21.5 37 Zambia 49.7 11.5 
8 Netherlands 17.9 40.7 38 S. Africa 51.0 42.3 
9 Finland 19.1 42.5 39 Ukraine 51.5 8.0 
10 Italy 19.2 21.6 40 Thailand 51.5 15.8 
11 Germany 19.4 32.9 41 Rwanda 51.7 56.3 
12 UK 19.7 22.3 42 Moldova 52.3 19.8 
13 Uruguay 20.4 12.1 43 China 53.7 21.3 
14 Spain 20.9 36.0 44 S. Korea 54.6 15.6 
15 France 21.9 18.9 45 Romania 55.0 11.2 
16 Ethiopia 22.7 27.8 46 Vietnam 56.7 24.4 
17 Australia 24.5 24.7 47 Morocco 58.4 17.0 
18 Tr. & Tob. 25.5 28.6 48 Turkey 60.8 14.2 
19 US 26.7 16.9 49 Indonesia 61.0 18.2 
20 Mexico 28.1 26.2 50 Russia 62.0 13.6 
21 Colombia 29.2 12.1 51 B. Faso 62.6 15.3 
22 Slovenia 30.4 32.2 52 India 63.0 11.0 
23 Brazil 30.8 8.8 53 Georgia 68.0 6.6 
24 Argentina 31.9 37.4 54 Malaysia 68.3 10.4 
25 Guatemala 32.3 13.3 55 Ghana 78.3 8.3 
26 Cyprus 35.9 10.7 56 Iran 78.7 3.1 
27 El Salvador 37.0 26.2 57 Mali 79.0 10.2 
28 Hong Kong 37.0 
 
58 Jordan 81.3 10.8 
29 Venezuela 40.0 17.0 59 Iraq 90.2 25.2 
30 Serbia 41.1 32.4 60 Egypt 92.0 2.0 
Sources: IPU (2012); World Values Survey (2005-2008). 
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commitment to voters, the very traits that a majority of electors claimed to evaluate when 
choosing a candidate. Perhaps most striking is the finding that 55% of respondents 
strongly agree (with an additional 24% agreeing in part) that it should be mandatory for 
half of all legislative candidates to be women (Ibope, 2009). Moreover, in Brazil’s 2010 
presidential election, 66% of voters cast a vote for a woman, leading to the election of 
Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s first female president. Despite the propensity of the Brazilian 
electorate to support female candidates most visibly evidenced by President Dilma 
Rousseff, parties, as we shall see, have failed to stimulate their candidacies, leaving 
women woefully underrepresented. 
Gender Quotas 
Many are quick to dismiss Brazil’s underrepresentation of women as a result of its 
pairing of open-list proportional representation with a quota. While the combination is far 
from ideal, as I detail in Chapter 3, other nations with similar quotas, electoral systems, 
and cultural contexts have made significantly greater progress. In order to understand the 
failure of the gender quota – and indeed, to understand the successes and shortcomings of 
any institution – we must consider how they interact with the sociopolitical contexts in 
which they are embedded. Electoral rules do not exist in a vacuum, with the party system 
and historical tendencies of parties therein being particularly salient. I illustrate the 
inadequacies of the quota in detail in Chapter 3, but below quickly preview the 
background and explanation of its limitations.  
Seeking to emulate Argentina’s success with its groundbreaking gender quota,6 
and build on the international momentum surrounding women’s empowerment resulting 
from the upcoming Beijing Conference on Women, Deputies Marta Suplicy and Paulo 
                                                 
6 In 1991, women were 5.4% of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies; ten years after the full implementation 
of the quota they had reached 29.2 percent (Marx, Borner, and Camionotti, 2007). 
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Bernardo introduced a proposal to implement a gender quota in proportional elections. As 
will be discussed further in Chapter 3, the deputies foresaw the difficulties inherent in 
enforcing a gender quota in Brazil’s electoral context, and therefore proposed additional 
measures intended to facilitate its earnest implementation. Just two weeks after the close 
of the Beijing Conference, Brazil approved the law, but without the additional measures, 
resulting in a watered down version of the initial proposal (Araújo, 1999; Marx, Borner, 
and Camionotti, 2007; Suplicy, 1996) and a typical instance of layered institutional 
change (Thelen, 1999). 















Argentina Chamber 30% 6 34 +28 
 Senate 30% 3 33 +30 
Bolivia Chamber 33% 11 19 +8 
 Senate 25% 4 15 +9 
Brazil Chamber 30% 7 9 +2 
Costa Rica Unicameral 40% 14 35 +21 
Dominican Republic Chamber 33% 12 17 +5 
Ecuador Unicameral 50% 4 16 +12 
Mexico Chamber 40% 17 23 +6 
 Senate 40% 15 16 +1 
Panama Unicameral 30% 8 17 +9 
Paraguay Chamber 20% 3 10 +7 
 Senate 20% 11 9 -2 
Peru Unicameral 30% 11 18 +7 
AVERAGE   9 19 +10 
Note: Adapted from Htun, 2005, updated with http://www.quotaproject.org. 
Thus, in contrast to the experiences of neighboring countries, including others 
with open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections, Brazil’s electoral quota law 
and subsequent revisions (9100/1995, 9504/1997, 12.034/2009) have been unable to 
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mitigate the gender gap in political power. Table 1.3 depicts the average in percent 
women legislators in the years immediately before and after the implementation of 
women’s quota laws, demonstrating significant variation in the gains yielded by quotas in 
Latin America. The countries that have enjoyed the most success with women’s electoral 
quotas are those with closed-list proportional representation systems, which allow the 
parties to establish the list ranking with consideration of the electoral quotas and to 
alternate candidates by sex.7 In OLPR elections, because the electors rather than the 
parties decide the position of candidates on the lists, a party could advance a list with 
30% female candidates and not elect a single woman. Yet as I discuss in Chapter 3, 
Brazil’s ranks the lowest in women’s representation of all countries with OLPR voting. 
As I argue in Chapter 3, the structural flaws in the Brazilian quota law render it a 
poor fit for its electoral system, yet are only part of the explanation of its spectacular 
failure to induce genuine change. With the 6
th
 lowest proportion of women legislators of 
the more than 60 countries with legislated gender quotas, other factors are clearly at 
play.8 I contend that the preponderance of weakly institutionalized parties in Brazil has 
instilled a norm of non-compliance,9 facilitating an environment in which formal laws 
such as the quota are regularly flouted, with earnest compliance by parties with the quota 
stipulations remaining the exception.10 The failure of parties to reach the 30% threshold is 
certainly in part due to the language of the quota law, which until a 2009 “mini-reform” 
                                                 
7 There exists significant variation in the rules and enforcement of alternation. 
8 Two of these countries have low quota targets (Somalia – 12%, and Egypt – effectively 12.5%, with each 
party required to nominate at least 1 woman in each of the 64 8-member districts) (Quotas Project, 2012). 
9 To be elaborated in Chapter 2, this expectation of a norm of (non)compliance draws from the 
international organizations literature, which has found that states’ internal institutional constraints (or lack 
thereof) affect their probability of (non)compliance with rarely enforced international laws (Dixon, 1993; 
Simmons, 1998). 
10 Across all state parties contesting the 1998-2010 Chamber of Deputies elections, the rate of quota 
compliance was 16.1%, ranging from 5.6% (PP) to 39.0% (PC do B). Beyond the PC do B, the most 
compliant parties (meeting the quota target more than 20% of the time) were small leftist parties (PSTU, 
PCO, and PMN). 
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(12.034/2009), only required parties to reserve vacancies for women. But even with the 
institutional change mandating that parties actually fill 30% of their candidate lists with 
women11 – leading to a 51% increase in the overall percentage of female contenders in 
the 2010 elections (up to 19.1% from 12.7% in 2006) – a mere 25.4% of parties complied 
with the strengthened quota.12 After ten years of parties neglecting what was essentially a 
toothless quota law, it had become entrenched as yet another “lei que não pega” (law on 
paper only), particularly among those inchoate parties lacking a norm of compliance. 
In sum, although recent and significant accomplishments by women generate 
expectations to the contrary, the proportion of women elected to Brazil’s Chamber of 
Deputies remains near the global low, ranking 116
th
 out of 189 countries, with its nearest 
neighbors being Malta and Bhutan. As demonstrated in Table 1.1, this stands in sharp 
contrast to the regional experience with women’s congressional representation, with three 
Latin American democracies (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Argentina) currently ranking in 
the top twenty and the entire region (with the single exception of Panama) outranking 
Brazil (IPU, 2012). 
Despite comprising a majority of the electorate for more than a decade13 and 
considerable accomplishments in other spheres, Brazilian women remain severely 
underrepresented in all elected posts (see Table 1.4). Notably, women have attained their 
greatest presence – less than 15 percent – in the Senate, which has no candidate quota.14 
                                                 
11 In other words, the mini-reform requires that 30% of the candidates actually advanced were female. Prior 
to the reform, the language stipulated that they reserve—but not fill—30% of candidate slots for women. 
12 Despite credible threats of enforcement by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral in Brasília (Agência de 
Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010b; Coelho and Costa, 2010), several regional electoral courts chose not to 
enforce the quota (e.g., Agência de Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010a). For further discussion of the 
failure of the institutional reform, see Wylie (2011). 
13 In September 2011, women were 51.95% of the electorate, up from 49.76% in October 1998 (Tribunal 
Superior Eleitoral). 
14 This puzzle is the subject of Chapter 6. 
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Given the aforementioned progress on women’s rights in Brazil, why does the dearth of 
female politicians persist? What are the obstacles that hinder their effective political 
participation, and how have Brazil’s few female politicians managed to defy the odds?  




Governor Senator Federal Deputy* State Deputy* 
Candidates Elected Candidates Elected Candidates Elected Candidates Elected 
         
1994 9.7 3.7 7.3 7.4 6.2 6.2 7.2 7.9 
1998 8.1 3.7 14.0 7.4 10.3 5.7 12.9 10.0 
2002 9.9 7.4 11.9 14.8 11.4 8.2 14.8 12.6 
2006 12.7 11.1 15.2 14.8 12.7 8.8 14.2 11.6 
2010 11.0 7.4 13.3 14.8 19.1 8.8 21.1 12.9 





Councilor*     
Candidates Elected Candidates Elected 
    
         
1996 5.3 5.5 10.9 11.0 
    
2000 7.6 5.7 19.1 11.6 
    
2004 9.5 7.4 22.1 12.7 
    
2008 11.2 9.1 21.6 12.5 
    
 
Note: Values reflect Brazil’s percentage of women among candidates and elected. 
*Beginning in 1996, the candidate quota applies. 
  Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; Cfemea. 
     
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
This dissertation contends that the key to understanding women’s persistent 
underrepresentation lies in the inchoate character of most Brazilian parties. It uses party 
institutionalization as a lens through which the interrelated deficiencies of Brazil’s 
political system, particularly as they relate to women’s representation, come into view. In 
what follows, I illustrate how parties have been resistant to the gender quota and 
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therefore failed to transform women’s substantial societal progress into political 
presence, and how Brazil’s “entrepreneurial” electoral context (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 
2008) exacerbates the gender gap in formal political ambition and maintains women’s 
political marginalization. It subjects the central hypotheses of the extant literature on 
women’s representation to empirical testing with an innovative multilevel database of the 
21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate from 1994 to 2010, 
dispensing with many of the leading explanations regarding culture, development, and 
district magnitude, recasting the role of ideology as indirect, and advancing an argument 
that it is the interaction of party institutionalization and women in party leadership (which 
are more likely in leftist parties) that is most critical to women’s electoral success in 
Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. 
This study builds on the insights from the candidate-centric US case, where 
women’s underrepresentation is best explained not by socioeconomic development, but 
rather by strong incumbency bias and the necessity for “self-starting nominees in a 
decentralized party system” (Studlar, 2008, 65). Although the amorphous character of 
many Brazilian parties leads the Brazilianist literature to discount the theoretical 
relevance of parties for explaining electoral outcomes, this study brings parties to the 
center of the analysis and finds that parties play a crucial gatekeeping role through their 
(in)capacitation of female candidacies and are therefore essential actors in the political 
empowerment of women. I thus bridge the insights of the Brazilianist literature regarding 
the implications of Brazil’s often inchoate parties for democracy, with findings from the 
women’s representation literature heralding parties as the key gatekeepers of political 
power and party elites as one of the most foreboding obstacles confronting female 
political aspirants. 
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This dissertation illuminates how the preponderance of inchoate parties has 
bounded the profiles available to female political aspirants and draws upon case studies 
of women exemplifying three ideal types of electorally viable paths to power given the 
existing constraints – the lutadora, the supermadre, and the technocrat. While Brazil’s 
inchoate party system and candidate-centered electoral contests allow ambitious self-
promoters to parlay their individual resources into electoral success, wage inequities and 
traditional gender norms render such resources out of reach for the vast majority of 
women in Brazil. Women and other outsiders confronting similar discrepancies in 
elections around the world have come to power by working their way up through the 
party ranks of institutionalized parties. 
Yet that option remains rare in Brazil, where most successful female contenders 
have had to convert capital acquired in alternate spheres into the political capital 
necessary to thrive in the face of residual levels of machista voter bias in the Chamber of 
Deputies’ candidate-centered context rife with intraparty competition. When those 
constraints are alleviated, and women contest election in districts with negligible levels of 
voter bias against women, with the support of an institutionalized party with female 
leadership, women need not conform to the stipulated profiles, but are emboldened to 
pursue any path to power. The dissertation concludes that to effectively enhance 
women’s representation parties must have both the capacity to provide essential 
psychological, organizational, and material support on behalf of women (forthcoming in 
well-institutionalized parties), and the will to do so (signaled by party leadership). This 
approach illuminates how structures and actors interact to affect women’s representation.  
This study also works to elaborate the effects of gender on representation as a 
multilevel structure, including “cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro 
level, patterns of behavior at the interactional level, as well as roles and identities at the 
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micro level,” and as an ongoing process of expectations and consequences (Correll et al., 
2007, 3). In other words, it incorporates societal expectations deriving from traditional 
gender socialization and their effects on public opinion toward women in politics and the 
political ambitions of individual women with an explanation of how these expectations 
and the resultant male dominance in political party leadership have constrained women’s 
viable paths to political power. 
I find that the macro level pattern of women’s near exclusion from formal politics 
is the result of a series of micro level social psychological processes that have prevented 
women from acquiring the requisite formula for success in Brazilian politics – (1) a 
psychological affinity for self-promotion and thus aptitude to be an entrepreneurial 
candidate who self-nominates, (2) political interest and knowledge and the ability and 
desire to use this to ascend within the party organization, or as is more often the case, to 
thrive independently in the absence of any real party organization, and (3) individual 
political (or converted) capital essential in personalist politics. Those factors, however, 
are neither unique nor universal to women, with particularly the last two being applicable 
to any traditional outsider. Political parties hold the key to enhancing the representation 
of traditionally marginalized groups such as women because they can mitigate the effects 
of those compounding factors of exclusion, providing outsiders with the psychological, 
organizational, and material support they need to thrive in Brazil’s entrepreneurial 
system. 
RELEVANCE 
Mechanisms of exclusion/inclusion in democratic decision-making processes are 
inherently important for political scientists and constituents alike. A recent report card on 
women’s representation in the Americas reminds us that “[i]t is important for women to 
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be represented at all levels of the political spectrum and the decision-making process and 
we know why: because women’s political rights are fundamental in any democratic 
framework, because democracy isn’t complete without us, and because experience shows 
that women at high levels are more likely to bring changes and policies that improve the 
situation for other women” (Inter-American Dialogue, 2008, 2). That sentiment is echoed 
in survey data from Schwindt-Bayer, who found that women legislators were more likely 
than male legislators to “place special priority on women” and women’s groups, with a 
legislator’s gender influencing the way (s)he views organized constituency groups and 
his/her support for issues related to women’s equality and family and children (but not 
education or health) (2010, 67-81). With more women in legislatures, women’s voices 
and issues are more likely to be represented. As Lovenduski and Norris (1993), Phillips 
(1995), and others have asserted, truly democratic representation entails both a “politics 
of ideas” (substantive representation) and a “politics of presence” (descriptive 
representation). 
The full inclusion of women in formal decision-making processes is essential for 
truly representative democracies because female politicians bring the voice and often the 
interests of women to the legislative agenda. Empirical analysis has also demonstrated 
that the increase of women’s presence in politics is responsible for enhancing citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). With 75% of respondents across 
Brazil agreeing that “true democracy exists only with the presence of women in spaces of 
power and decision-making” (Ibope, 2009), and only 42% reporting that they are satisfied 
with democracy (AmericasBarometer, 2006), the representativeness of government and 
resultant quality of democracy bear utmost significance. 
In addition to broader theoretical implications regarding representation, 
satisfaction with democracy, institutional change, and the interaction of structure and 
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agency, this dissertation bears substantive implications for the lives of Brazilians. A 
startling 4 in 10 Brazilian women have been victims of domestic violence (Ibge, 2009). 
Six of 10 Brazilians know some woman who was a victim of domestic violence, with 
machismo being the factor a plurality of respondents (46%) indicated as contributing to 
this violence (Avon Institute/Ipsos, 2011). While only 9.7% of male homicides occurred 
in a domestic residence, 28.4% of female homicides occurred in the home (Desidério, 
2011; Waiselfisz, 2012). Every single day, Machismo Mata reports at least one and 
usually several new case(s) of a Brazilian woman being murdered – most often stabbed, 
shot, or strangled – by her male partner (http://machismomata.wordpress.com/). With 
4,297 female homicides in 2010, or 4.4 per 100,000 women, Brazil is the 7
th
 of 84 nations 
ranked by rate of female homicides (Waiselfisz, 2012). In five years, the “180” hotline 
for domestic violence against women – Central de Atendimento à Mulher – received 
nearly two million calls. In 72% of the cases of women reporting abuse, they are 
victimized by their husband (Desidério, 2011).  
The 180 hotline and the pioneering Lei Maria de Penha,15 which protects victims 
of domestic violence, were the fruit of collaboration among the women’s caucus of the 
2003-2007 Congress. Those are the kind of laws and changes in women’s lives that 
increased women’s political empowerment can bring. So while enhancing the political 
representation of women is important in its own right for furthering democratic 
representativeness, by improving and perhaps even saving the lives of ordinary citizens, it 
also wields an immeasurable practical value. 
                                                 
15 A law implemented in September, 2006, that raised the legal penalties for cases of domestic violence. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS 
In addition to posing an interesting empirical puzzle, the Brazilian case proffers 
several under-theorized and untested dimensions for the research agenda on women and 
politics. Despite recent acknowledgement of the methodological and substantive 
implications of a “Western” country bias for research on women’s representation (e.g., 
Salmond, 2006), the bulk of the literature is either based exclusively on Western Europe 
and the US or simply applies expectations developed in the advanced-industrial context 
to the developing world.  The drive to understand women’s representation outside the 
advanced-industrial context is, therefore, a principal enterprise of this research. 
A related limitation of the women and politics literature, derived primarily from 
Western Europe and the US, is the general assumption of the institutionalization of party 
systems. As demonstrated in the Brazilianist literature on electoral institutions and career 
paths, the weakly institutionalized character of the Brazilian party system renders many 
of the traditional assumptions (e.g., reelection, party discipline) untenable, often 
warranting important theoretical revisions. I build on the Brazilianist insights regarding 
the critical importance of party institutionalization but extend the domain of the literature, 
which in studying congresses that have remained vastly masculine, has depended upon 
male-dominant samples and largely neglected gender (e.g., Ames, 2001; Mainwaring, 
1995, 1997, 1999; Samuels, 2003). 
In introducing women and gender into the analysis of Brazilian electoral and party 
systems, this dissertation enhances our understanding of the role of parties in open-list 
elections. Although parties have indeed proven less important for men possessing 
independent political (or converted) capital, the negation of the party gatekeeping role 
simply does not hold for actual outsider candidates. This finding could only be uncovered 
by bringing gender into the analysis. Moreover, as the literature itself acknowledges, 
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variation exists among Brazilian parties (Mainwaring, 1999; Morgenstern and Vázquez-
D’Elía, 2007; Samuels, 1999), with the Workers’ Party (PT) often the cited exception to 
the country’s pattern of weak party institutionalization. This dissertation capitalizes on 
such interparty variation to illuminate the critical role of parties in mediating the effects 
of electoral rules and enhancing the political empowerment of women. 
Another contribution offered in this dissertation is one of the only individual 
candidate-level quantitative analyses of the conditions under which women can acquire 
political power.
16
 The country-level aggregation prevalent in the dominant cross-national 
approach potentially obscures the relationship between electoral success and the factors 
that drive it,
17
 especially in candidate-centered elections. Moreover, using aggregate-level 
findings to infer effects on individuals is to commit an ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, 
and Verba, 1994). Rather, if we are to understand the effects of voters, electoral rules, 
and parties on women’s electoral prospects, we must test them at the candidate level. 
Although the country context remains constant, I use an explicitly comparative 
lens to assess the variance in the relationships between candidate electoral performance 
and several multilevel characteristics over states, electoral rules, and parties. In an article 
on the state of the art of gender and politics, Childs and Krook (2006) argue that future 
work must proceed from a micro-level approach to elaborate the causal linkages in our 
theories. Childs and Krook push gender and politics scholars to progress beyond 
oversimplifying assumptions regarding female politicians and instead to disaggregate 
women (2006) and acknowledge and analyze the diversity of women (Avelar, 2001). 
Accordingly, this dissertation also allows for heterogeneity among women, analyzing the 
                                                 
16 An important exception is Rainbow Murray’s 2007 piece on candidate performance in France’s 2002 
parliamentary elections. 
17 A recent advance on this front has emerged from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems with its 
groundbreaking cross-national study using multilevel analysis to embed individual voters in their country-
level contexts (Dalton and Anderson, 2011). 
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variation in individual characteristics and campaigns of Brazil’s female contenders. 
Rather than assuming that women represent a homogenous group and pursue a single 
path to power, I examine the (albeit circumscribed) range of profiles of women in 
Brazilian politics and the individual, party, and district level characteristics that comprise 
those profiles, explaining how parties have interacted with voters and electoral rules to 
bound women’s paths to power, and how the structure and process of gender are 
intertwined throughout those interactions. I work to consider how gender manifests at 
various levels, including traditional gender norms regarding women’s aptitude for politics 
and the issue areas women should engage, structural disadvantages, voter and party 
biases, and the perceptions and confidence of female political aspirants themselves. 
In sum, this study aims to fulfill the goals of the literature with a contextually 
embedded individual-level theory of women’s representation outside the standard 
US/Western European setting. I push beyond oversimplified and untested explanations of 
how women attain elected office in Brazil that focus merely on family connections and/or 
ties with civil society and instead specify precisely and provide empirical evidence for 
whether and how several individual, party, and district-level characteristics interact to 
illustrate how women, as individuals, are elected. This work thus illuminates how female 
political aspirants navigate Brazil’s weakly institutionalized party system through an 
analysis of the interaction of the individual, party, and district-level characteristics 
associated with successful electoral strategies of Brazil’s female politicians, thereby 
exploring the conditions under which women can acquire political power. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
This dissertation research is expressly mixed-method, drawing on cross-national 
aggregate-level data, survey data, an original database of several individual, party, and 
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district characteristics of all 21,478 candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate 
(1994-2010), primary source documentary research, and 73 in-depth interviews with 
female politicians, candidates, party officials, bureaucrats, activists, and experts in eleven 
states throughout Brazil’s five regions. I also accompanied a female candidate for local 
office18 on the campaign trail and observed several meetings of the bancada feminina in 
Brasília. 
I overcome a significant limitation of most individual-level research on 
representation by broadening the universe of observations analyzed to include all 
candidates. We cannot speak confidently about what it takes to win by focusing merely 
on the winners, but must also consider the losers. Similarly, if we wish to comprehend the 
effects of candidate gender on electoral prospects, we must consider both women and 
men. The database comprises the full universe of valid candidates to the Brazilian 
Congress in the last five election cycles (1994-2010), negating the need to sample from 
the population. A common approach to individual-level data in the extant literature is to 
analyze a subset of the data, such as elected legislators or candidates from the major 
parties. Instead, I analyze all 21,478 cases of candidacy to the Brazilian Congress from 
1994 to 2010. I also incorporate case studies of the pathways to power pursued by 
Brazil’s few female politicians. 
In sum, this study engages the central research questions – what are the barriers 
preventing women’s substantial societal gains from parlaying into greater political 
presence, and how have Brazil’s few female politicians managed to overcome those 
obstacles – by advancing an array of quantitative and qualitative data. I use those data to 
explore variation in the electoral performance of candidates across districts, electoral 
                                                 
18 Councilwoman Vânia Galvão, Municipal President of the PT in Salvador da Bahia. 
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rules, parties, sex, and women, thus illuminating how state, electoral, and party contexts 
can interact to mediate the effects of gender on electoral outcomes. 
Interview Selection 
Table 1.5. Interviews with Female Politicians 
 
LEFT NON-LEFT 
   
NORTH Sen. Fátima Cleide (PT-RO)* Dep. Bel Mesquita (PMDB-PA) 
  
Dep. Rebecca Garcia (PP-AM) 
  
Dep. Nilmar Ruiz (PFL-TO) 
   
NORTHEAST Dep. Alice Portugal (PCdoB-BA) Dep. Nice Lobão (PFL-MA)* 
 
Sen. Patrícia Saboya Gomes (PDT-
CE)* 
Dep. Jusmari Oliveira (PR-BA) 
 
Dep. Ana Arraes (PSB-PE) Telma Pinheiro (PSDB-MA) 
 
Dep. Lídice da Mata (PSB-BA) Dep. Tonha Magalhães (PR-BA) 
 
Gov. Wilma de Faria (PSB-RN) 
 
 
Kátia Born (PSB-AL) 
 
 
Dep. Fátima Bezerra (PT-RN) 
 
 
Lenilda Lima (PT-AL) 
 
   
CENTER-
WEST 
Sen. Serys Slhessarenko (PT-MT) Sen. Marissa Serrano (PSDB-MS) 
  
Dep. Raquel Teixeira (PSDB-GO) 
  
Dep. Thelma de Oliveira (PSDB-MT) 
   
SOUTHEAST Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ) Judge Denise Frossard (PSDB-RJ) 
 
Dep. Cida Diogo (PT-RJ) Dep. Rita Camata (PMDB-ES) 
 
Dep. Iriny Lopes (PT-ES) Dep. Rose de Freitas (PMDB-ES) 
 
Dep. Janete Rocha Pietá (PT-SP) 
 
 
Dep. Jô Moraes (PCdoB-MG) 
 
 
Dep. Luiza Erundina (PSB-SP)* 
 
 
Dep. Marina Maggessi (PPS-RJ) 
 
   
SOUTH Dep. Emília Fernandes (PT-RS) 
 
 
Dep. Luciana Genro (PSOL-RS) 
 
 
Dep. Manuela d'Ávila (PCdoB-RS) 
 
I selected my interviews with failed and successful female candidates to ensure 
representation from the major parties (PFL, PMDB, PP, PSDB, PT) and the PC do B and 
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in each of the five regions. Table 1.5 displays the interviewees, their party and state as 
well as title at the time of the interview (*or questionnaire), organizing them by region 
and ideology. Names in bold indicate a failed candidacy at the time of the interview. 
I interviewed party officials, most often the Women’s Secretary or Secretary of 
Organization, in those six parties in six states (Bahia, Maranhão, Pará, Rio de Janeiro, 
Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo) and the Federal District. I also interviewed scholars of 
women and politics and activists in the women’s movement in each of the five regions to 
ascertain local historical dynamics regarding women’s participation in informal and 
formal politics. Finally, I interviewed federal, state, and municipal-level bureaucrats in 
the women-specific secretariats in Brasília, Alagoas, Fortaleza (municipal), Pará, 
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro (municipal), Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, 
Salvador (municipal), and São Paulo. The 73 interviews were conducted from September, 
2008 to July, 2009, with follow-up interviews conducted in July, 2010, and April and 
May, 2012. 
SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
Chapter 2 reviews the insights and limitations of the extant explanations of 
women’s representation for understanding the obstacles confronting female political 
aspirants in Brazil. It then maps out the theoretical argument advanced in this 
dissertation, which contends that two important challenges to Latin American 
democracies – the underrepresentation of women and minorities and the weak 
institutionalization of parties and party systems – are related. I explain how Brazil’s 
weakly institutionalized parties undermine women’s representation. First, a lack of 
clearly defined rules of the game makes it difficult for outsiders to ascend the party ranks. 
Such limited transparency also fosters a norm of non-compliance with internal and 
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external laws, such as the quota. Second, absent an effective party recruitment network, 
candidates must self-select with political entrepreneurs being the norm. A resilient 
constructed gender gap in formal political ambition means that women are far less likely 
than men to self-select. Weak party organizations are also unable to offer opportunities 
for capacity-building, whether through internal elections, political training, or 
mobilizational events, which deprives outsider candidates of the chance to develop the 
requisite political skillset. Finally, in weakly institutionalized parties, personalist politics 
dominate and programmatic appeals are rare. Due to wage inequities and traditional 
gender norms, women generally lack the personal political capital – accrued by 
individual status, wealth, and connections – necessary to sustain a candidate-centered 
campaign, and also tend to eschew individualistic enterprises in favor of more collective 
endeavors. 
Together, those manifestations of inchoate parties undermine the electoral 
prospects of women by leaving intact a constructed gender gap in political ambition and 
favoring individuals with accumulated personal political capital. Given the paucity of 
women in Brazilian politics (see Table 1.4), I argue that parties must actively intervene to 
enhance women’s political participation. Their capacity to do so effectively, however, is 
constrained by their level of institutionalization, with weakly institutionalized parties 
being ill-equipped to provide women (and other outsiders) with the requisite 
psychological, organizational, and material support for confronting Brazil’s 
entrepreneurial system. I contend that the capacity of parties to promote women’s 
participation is effectuated by their will to do so, with parties that incorporate women in 
their party leadership being the most likely to mobilize resources on behalf of women. 
Often a sin of omission rather than commission, when party leadership lacks a critical 
mass of female voices it will likely lack consciousness of the need and mechanisms for 
 26 
leveling the playing field for women. An explicitly gendered frame of reference, whereby 
we consider the implications of and for gender in structures and processes (Lovenduski, 
1998) must be introduced,19 and women leaders are far more likely than male leaders to 
show the initiative and know how to do so. 
Figure 1.3. Interparty Variation among Brazilian Parties’ Capacity for and Will to 
Support Female Candidates, National Level (By Ideology) 
Figure 1.3 depicts how party capacity and will interact, and the variation among 
parties within Brazil. It previews the national averages across a party’s state-level 
organizations over the 1998-2010 elections to the Chamber of Deputies on the central 
party characteristics of interest, illustrating the range within Brazil as well as the extent of 
                                                 
19 A similar conclusion has finally been reached in the development community, where gender is now an 
explicit consideration for budgeting and other policy decisions. For more on this, see Quinn (2009) and UN 
Women’s Gender Responsive Budgeting website (www.gender-budgets.org). 









LACK CAPACITY & WILL: LEFT - PCB, PPS, PSB; NON-LEFT - PFL,
PHS/PSN, PP/PPB, PR/PL, PRB, PRN, PSDC, PSL, PT DO B, PTB, PTN  
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the obstacles confronted by female contenders, with half of the parties having neither the 
capacity nor the will to support women, and only three of the 28 parties enjoying both.  
By acknowledging interparty variation in key party characteristics and women’s 
electoral prospects, I can unpack the mechanisms substantiating leftist parties’ apparent 
superiority in electing women. Leftist parties have, through their greater tendency to be 
institutionalized and to incorporate women in party leadership, proven more capable and 
willing to actively promote women’s participation. The finding has important 
implications for the future of women’s empowerment in Brazil, because the 
institutionalization of parties and inclusion of women in their decision-making structures 
are universal goals within the reach of leftist and non-leftist parties alike. 
Finally, I examine aggregate-level data from throughout Latin America on party 
system institutionalization, women in national party leadership, and women in the lower 
house of Congress to explore the generalizability of my theory beyond Brazil. Those data 
lend tentative but inconclusive support for the ability of party institutionalization and 
women in party leadership to enhance democratic representativeness, while also 
justifying the strength of this dissertation’s candidate-level approach, with its ability to 
differentiate among parties within Brazil.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the successes and failures of the Brazilian gender quota, 
asserting that there are limitations to formal institutional fixes in a context of weak 
institutions. Although many observers are quick to attribute its inadequacies to the open-
list electoral context, I reveal that that is only part of the explanation. I explain why the 
open-list system has been expected to disadvantage women and its incompatibility with 
candidate quotas, and explore the experiences with women’s representation in the other 
nations with candidate-based proportional representation (hereafter, “preferential”) 
voting. I then review the literature on quotas as a fast-track for women’s representation. 
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Next, I discuss Brazil’s process of quota implementation and examine recent mobilization 
by various organs of the women’s movement for greater female presence in politics. I 
draw on accounts of the quota negotiations to explain how the finished product was a 
diluted version of the initial proposal, and discuss why the quota – poorly implemented 
and weakly enforced – has been unable to enhance women’s representation, even after 
attempts to reform it. 
Chapter 4 addresses issues related to the data, measurement, and methods 
employed in this dissertation. I introduce my party institutionalization index, and also 
advance several descriptive analyses of the individual, party, and district-level variables 
of interest. The chapter highlights the extensive variation observed across states, electoral 
rules, parties, and sex, which is subsequently explored in the following chapters. 
Chapter 5 employs a multilevel model of the electoral performance of candidates 
to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010) to explore variation across states and parties. I 
review the obstacles confronted by women, present various model specifications, and 
elucidate the conditions hindering/hastening female candidates. The findings demonstrate 
that the traditional explanations of women’s underrepresentation emphasizing district 
modernization and magnitude do not hold at the candidate level in Brazil. While non-
negligible levels of voter bias against women exist, and are predicted by district 
development, such bias has not depressed the vote share of female candidates. Moreover, 
women have not performed better in districts or parties with a greater seat share. 
Instead, party institutionalization and the presence of women in party leadership 
explain variation in women’s electoral performance in Brazil. I find the role of party 
ideology to be indirect; while running with a leftist party is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for women’s electoral success, leftist parties are more likely than are 
non-leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate women into party leadership, 
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which in turn leads such parties to mobilize resources on behalf of women. I then use the 
illustrative case of the Workers’ Party (PT) to examine how ideology, party 
institutionalization, and women in party leadership have interacted to enhance women’s 
electoral prospects, and discuss the challenges that remain for the PT and other parties, 
and the inroads accomplished by the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). The most 
striking and unique contribution of Chapter 5 is the finding that party matters in Brazilian 
elections. 
In Chapter 6, I compare women’s electoral performance across the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate, using the variation in electoral rules within Brazil as a natural 
laboratory to explore the effects of electoral rules on women’s electoral prospects while 
holding constant numerous potentially confounding factors. While the more prestigious 
Senate poses a higher electoral hurdle, low magnitude plurality elections with restricted 
ballot access generate significantly greater incentives for party support than do the 
Chamber’s high-magnitude OLPR elections. I demonstrate that women have consistently 
achieved proportionately greater electoral successes in the Senate since 1994 because its 
electoral rules incentivize unified party support, which when mobilized by women in 
party leadership provides a powerful boost to female candidates. 
The empirical evidence provides support for an indirect rather than direct effect 
for electoral rules. While an analysis of the direct effects of plurality elections, low 
district magnitude, and no candidate quota would expect those conditions to undermine 
women’s electoral prospects, a broader consideration that accounts for how those rules 
are mediated by political parties demonstrates their relative favorability for female 
contenders. The distinct electoral rules across the chambers yields varying incentives for 
party support and intraparty competition, with the implications of those incentives for 
female candidates being contingent upon party institutionalization in the Chamber, and 
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women in party leadership in both houses. When compared to the intense climate of 
intraparty competition incentivized by the electoral rules of the Chamber of Deputies, it is 
no surprise that female candidates running in parties with a critical mass of women 
leaders have performed better in the Senate, where the electoral rules incentivize unified 
party support.20 
Drawing on the findings of Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 explains how Brazil’s few 
female deputies have been able to attain election in the midst of such intraparty 
competition, weakly institutionalized parties, and bias among party elites and the 
electorate. I contend that the demonstrated insignificance for explaining women’s 
electoral prospects of the traditional explanatory factors for women’s representation does 
not mean that obstacles such as voter bias and electoral arrangements do not exist. 
Rather, (some) women have crafted profiles enabling them to thrive in inhospitable 
contexts. Those alternate profiles are necessary because the traditional path pursued by 
most successful male politicians in Brazil – the consummate insider, with status, wealth, 
and connections – is closed to most women because of wage inequities and traditional 
gender norms. 
Chapter 7 uses the cross-national literature and descriptive data from Brazil to 
delineate women-friendly and women-averse parties and districts, and the profiles that 
have enabled women to thrive in the face of those intersecting constraints. Exemplified 
with case studies, the chapter explains how the characteristics of the lutadora, the 
supermadre, and the technocrat have afforded women electoral success despite the 
obstacles. In sum, I explore how the preponderance of inchoate parties and persistence of 
                                                 
20 As I discuss in Chapter 6, while female party leaders in the traditional oligarchic parties (PFL) are more 
likely to mobilize such unified party support in the Senate elections on behalf of women candidates running 
with familial capital (wives and daughters), women elected with the PSDB are more likely to have 
converted technocratic capital, and women elected from the PT most often worked their way through the 
party ranks. These three parties represent 73% of the women elected to the Senate. 
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traditional gender norms have bounded the profiles available to women, and explain how 
the strengthening of parties can open up space to female political aspirants and in turn 
enhance both the accountability and representativeness of Brazilian democracy. I also 
illuminate how women have employed alternate spaces to acquire political capital and the 
role played by those experiences in developing their political aspirations and campaign 
strategies. 
The concluding chapter reviews the core findings, and ties the central themes 
together. I contend that reforms intended to strengthen parties can pose a powerful 
remedy for the representative deficits in Brazilian democracy and beyond. I then consider 
the theoretical implications of this dissertation, revisiting the “crisis of representation” 
confronting many countries of the third wave of democratization.  
I make explicit my point of departure, which is an understanding of democracy 
that entails both descriptive and substantive representation. Rather than appointing a few 
elite men to represent the interests of an electorate that is 52% female, descriptive 
representation requires that representatives loosely mirror their constituents in 
demographic characteristics. In accordance with this vision of democratic governance, a 
legislature that is 91% male cannot adequately represent a majority female electorate. 
The same holds for ethnicity, religion, and income and educational background. In other 
words, representatives should best represent their constituents’ interests because they 
themselves share those interests. That is, however, an incomplete conception of 
democracy, with substantive representation also playing an important role.  
I consider how institutions can shape the quality of a democracy – both its 
representativeness and accountability, and contemplate the viability of institutional 
engineering in the context of weak institutions. I close by placing the substantive 
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implications of this research agenda into perspective, and then review avenues for future 
research. 
Brazil’s “crisis of representation” – in part manifested by weakly institutionalized 
parties and the underrepresentation of marginalized groups – can be mitigated by reforms 
that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women’s political 
participation. Thus the goals of the women’s movement and the broader movement for 
democratic reforms coincide once more. This dissertation endeavors to elucidate the 
conditions that realize the goal of increased representativeness. As outlined in the 1995 
Beijing Conference and reiterated in the Millennium Development Goals, the 
equalization of opportunities for women to reach the highest nodes of decision-making is 
a critical next step in the ongoing processes of democratization and development in Latin 
America and beyond.
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Chapter 2 – Explaining the Underrepresentation of Women in Brazil 
 
If there is a single conclusion to be drawn from our account of the political 
representation of women, it is that their exclusion from politics is 
ubiquitous, operated through layer upon layer of established male 
dominated institutions (not least political parties) that are insulated by 
layer upon layer of formal and informal rules of exclusion (Childs and 
Lovenduski, 2012, 20). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The lingering underrepresentation of women in Brazil despite having the region’s 
strongest women’s movement (Alvarez, 1990; Costa, 2008), substantial socioeconomic 
progress (Secretary of Women’s Affairs, 2010), an increasingly receptive electorate 
(Ibope, 2009), and the 1997 implementation of a gender quota for proportional elections 
poses an important challenge to Brazilian democracy. Not only does women’s political 
presence remain woefully scarce even in the “representative” chamber of congress, but 
institutional remedies have thus far proven insufficient mechanisms for altering the 
largely masculine political landscape. I argue this failure results from the weak 
institutionalization of most Brazilian parties – itself a shortcoming confronting many 
third wave democracies – and contend that the preponderance of inchoate parties has 
fostered a climate in which decisions on leadership and candidate selection lack 
transparency and the expectations of compliance with formal rules such as the gender 
quota are limited. Moreover, weakly institutionalized parties are ill-equipped to level the 
playing field for female political aspirants because they lack clearly defined rules of the 
game for ascension within the party, rely on self-nomination, are unable to provide 
critical capacity-building opportunities, and suffer from a deficit of programmatic 
politics. 
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In this chapter I review the extant explanations for women’s representation, and 
demonstrate their contributions and limitations in the context of elections to the Brazilian 
legislature. I argue that parties are the central arbiters of women’s political empowerment 
in Brazil, with weak party institutionalization constraining their capacity to reach out to 
women and disproportionately male party leadership often limiting their will to do so. I 
contend that reforms that strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of the 
political participation of women can enhance the representativeness and accountability of 
Brazilian democracy. 
THE LITERATURE ON WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION 
Traditional explanations of women’s (under)representation emphasize economic 
development and culture (Inglehart and Norris, 2003),21 electoral systems (Darcy, Welch, 
and Clark, 1994; Duverger, 1955; Matland, 1993; Moser, 2001a; Rule and Zimmerman, 
1994), the strength of leftist parties (Duverger, 1955; Studlar and McAllister, 1991), and 
the presence of women in party leadership (Kittilson, 2006). Below, I survey the central 
arguments of each approach and then apply them to the Brazilian context, demonstrating 
their contributions and limitations. 
Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development 
Hostility among voters and party elite are two of the primary barriers female 
political aspirants confront throughout the world. Gendered associations with politics 
lead many to the conclusion that women’s presence in formal decision making spheres 
remains marginal because voters and/or elites (both male and female) doubt women’s 
capacity for the political realm. As displayed in Table 1.2, World Values Survey data 
                                                 
21 Other renditions of the cultural argument look to structural manifestations of economic changes, such as 
women’s workforce presence (Salmond, 2006) and the welfare state (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 
2006). 
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demonstrate a striking resilience of constructed perceptions of women’s capacity for 
politics rooted in traditional gender norms in countries around the world (WVS, 2005-
2008). Voter bias is conventionally considered the most formidable impediment to 
women’s representation due to the glacial velocity of changes in cultural attitudes (IPU, 
2000). 
National gender ideology – the extent to which the national sociopolitical climate 
is receptive to female politicians – is indeed a key predictor of women’s overall 
legislative presence (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003, 93). Many cross-national studies of 
women’s representation have employed region or religion as a proxy for the women-
friendliness of the sociopolitical climate, with the Scandinavian region usually deemed 
the most open to women and Islamic countries considered the most restrictive for women 
(Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Gendered expectations for the 
appropriate division of labor in public and private spheres often dictate the societal and 
political latitude afforded both women and men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 8). 
Substantial levels of perceived male political superiority can disincentivize female 
candidacies and undermine the electoral prospects of the few women who run for office, 
thus perpetuating male dominance in the political arena. 
Following Paxton and Kunovich (2003), Figure 2.1 plots cross-national responses 
to the World Values Survey (2005-08) question “men make better political leaders than 
women” to illuminate variations in national gender ideology, also incorporating data from 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on women in national parliaments (2011) to 
graphically examine the bivariate relationship between voter hostility to women and 
women’s legislative representation. As predicted in the literature, the scatterplot and 
imposed regression line demonstrate a clear negative relationship between the two, with 
countries with high levels of perceived male political superiority having lower female 
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legislative presence. This finding often yields the assumption that women’s electoral 
prospects will be limited where voter bias against women is prevalent. 
Figure 2.1. Voter Bias and Women’s Representation 
Institutional Rules of the Game 
Another prevalent explanation for women’s (under)representation emphasizes the 
primacy of electoral rules. From discussions of gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 
2009; Tremblay, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008) and the relative benefits of proportional 
representation (PR) or plurality elections (Matland, 1993; Matland and Studlar, 1996; 
Matland and Taylor, 1997; Moser, 2001a; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; SalmonPd, 2006), 
to analyses of how these factors interact (Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; 
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Schwindt-Bayer, 2010), the emphasis on electoral institutions so prevalent in 
contemporary political science (i.e. Cox, 1997; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Peters, 2005; 
Weingast and Shepsle, 1995) is echoed in studies of women’s representation. 
A resolute consensus of the literature on women’s representation and electoral 
systems is that the elections most conducive to women’s representation are those 
conducted under closed-list PR rules with enforced gender quotas that include placement 
mandates (Htun and Jones, 2002; Krook, 2009; Moser, 2001a; Tremblay, 2008, Tripp and 
Kang, 2008). In what follows, I discuss the three factors substantiating the superiority of 
PR electoral systems over majoritarian/plurality systems for enhancing the representation 
of women: (1) party-centered rather than candidate-centered elections, (2) higher district 
magnitude, and (3) compatibility with gender quotas. 
Party-Centered Elections 
In the vast majority of countries with PR elections, closed-list rules dictate that 
voters cast their ballot for a party rather than a candidate (Schmidt, 2008). In such a 
system, party reputation and platforms are more salient in the elector’s vote choice than 
are the relationships personalized by clientelism, pork, and/or “identifier characteristics” 
that permeate candidate-centered elections (Valdini, 2010). 
Closed-list PR’s party-centered elections can also enhance women’s 
representation through the mechanism of candidate selection. Whereas candidate-
centered elections (whether majoritarian, plurality, or OLPR) often result in decentralized 
and inclusive candidate selection processes, in closed-list PR elections the selectorate – 
the actors responsible for selecting candidates – is more likely to be centralized and 
exclusive (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). A centralized selectorate allows national party 
leaders to circumvent predominantly male “local power monopolies,” freeing them to 
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nominate outsiders such as women (Hinojosa, 2009). While this does not guarantee that 
national party leaders will promote women’s candidacies, they are more likely to select 
candidates that will benefit the party’s overall fortunes and image, while local power 
monopolies focus on preserving their own power (Hinojosa, 2009). And as discussed 
below, due to a socialized gender gap in formal political ambition women are 
significantly less likely to self-nominate than are men. When external rather than self-
nomination is the norm, the effects of this gender gap are attenuated (Fox and Lawless, 
2004; Hinojosa, 2009; Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010). 
District and Party Magnitudes 
The most prominent explanation for PR’s demonstrated empirical superiority in 
electing women is based on the higher district magnitudes, or seats available per district, 
in PR elections. While elections in single member districts (SMD) are largely zero-sum 
endeavors, requiring candidates to be the last one standing (in their party) to even have a 
shot at high-level elected office,
22
 PR elections by definition enhance proportionality 
(Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). By reducing the 
threshold required to gain a seat, PR’s higher district magnitudes increase the viability of 
outsider candidacies unlikely to command a plurality of votes (Moser and Scheiner, 
2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Moreover, by virtue of the multiple seats available per 
district, large district magnitudes facilitate “ticket balancing,” whereby parties can reach 
out to particular constituencies (including women), promoting equity while maintaining 
party peace (Matland, 1993; Matland, 2005; Matland and Taylor, 1997; Salmond, 2006). 
Finally, SMD systems foster an incumbency advantage, while higher district magnitude 
elections are associated with a higher rate of turnover (Moser and Scheiner, 2012; 
                                                 
22 For an assessment of how primary elections in the US have disadvantaged female candidates, see 
Lawless and Pearson (2008). 
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Schwindt-Bayer, 2005), itself conducive to women candidates in electoral systems 
currently dominated by male incumbents. 
Extremely high district magnitudes, however, are associated with a proliferation 
of parties, which often splits the seat share across parties, resulting in low effective 
magnitudes for each party. Party magnitude, or “the number of seats a party has (wins) in 
a district” (Matland, 1993, 742), has thus been used as an alternative institutional variable 
explaining the positive correlation found between PR and women’s representation 
(Matland, 2005; Matland and Taylor, 1997; but, see Jones, 2009; Schmidt, 2008). If 
parties win more seats, they are able to delve deeper into their candidate lists when 
allocating seats. In the context of closed-list elections with no placement mandates, this 
will help women since parties (unless mandated otherwise) tend to cluster female 
candidates at the bottom of their lists (Htun and Jones, 2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2012; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).23 
Quotas and Placement Mandates 
By enabling the use of placement mandates, PR’s multimember elections also 
facilitate the mechanics of quotas (Htun and Jones, 2002; Tremblay, 2008). Placement 
mandates, which are unfeasible in SMD elections,24 overcome the party tendency to place 
female contenders in unelectable list positions in closed-list elections (Htun and Jones, 
2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Furthermore, resistance to 
quotas is more likely in the context of SMD rules, where the introduction of outsider 
candidates necessarily displaces traditional power holders. Again, the availability of 
                                                 
23 As I discuss below, the logic changes in open-list PR elections. 
24 Several parties (e.g., Canada’s Liberal Party), however, implement the equivalent of placement mandates 
in SMD elections, mandating that their candidates for a certain percentage of “safe seats” are female. This 
stands in contrast to the common practice of parties, which seeking to merely gesture to gender equality, 
advance women candidates as “party standard bearers” or sacrificial lambs in contests the party has little to 
no chance of winning (Thomas and Bodet, 2011). 
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multiple seats in PR elections is expected to enhance women’s representation; when 
nominations are a scarce resource, the introduction of a quota is more likely to generate 
opposition from other contenders. 
Party Ideology and Women in Party Leadership 
Two other conventional explanations for women’s representation focus on 
political parties, in particular, ideology and the proportion of women in party leadership. 
The left’s historical emphasis on social equality – a stance hypothesized to be conducive 
to gender egalitarianism – generates the expectation that parties that lean left are more 
hospitable to women politicians (e.g., Duverger, 1955). Many cross-national analyses 
uphold the influence of ideology (on overall proportions of women in parliaments), 
operationalizing and measuring the concept as the strength of leftist parties based on the 
proportion of seats in the lower house of congress held by leftist parties (Kenworthy and 
Malami, 1999; Kittilson, 2006; Norris, 1987; Reynolds, 1999; Rule, 1987; Schmidt, 
2008). Some have suggested a potential “contagion from the left” effect whereby the 
promotion of female candidates by leftist parties drives all rational and competitive 
parties to advance female candidacies therefore leading to a declining salience of 
ideology (Matland and Studlar, 1995). 
A few studies of women’s representation have also looked to the role of women in 
national party leadership in promoting women’s political participation (Caul, 1999; 
Kittilson, 2006; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005). Female party leaders are able to “let the 
ladder down” to other women, using their position to convince traditionally male party 
leaders of the electoral utility of recruiting and training female candidates, and can also 
pressure for the adoption of internal gender quotas (Kittilson, 2006; Kunovich and 
Paxton, 2005). 
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This possibility becomes more likely as women approach a critical mass, 
conventionally deemed somewhere between 20 and 30 percent, and thus progress beyond 
the constraints of mere “token” status (Childs and Krook, 2008; Kittilson, 2006; Matland, 
1998). Childs and Krook trace the application of critical mass theory (Schelling, 1978) to 
gendered dynamics to Kanter (1977), which subsequently spawned its use as a lens to 
explain why incremental increases in women’s legislative presence have often not 
ushered in drastic changes in the substantive representation of women (e.g., Dahlerup, 
1988). 
In a study of corporate men and women, Kanter finds that until minority groups 
reach at least “tilted” status – of a ratio around 65:35, the “dominants” (or majority, 
which in her case, are men) “control the group and its culture” while the minorities 
(women) confront “performance pressures…, token isolation, which forces them to 
remain an outsider or become an insider by being a ‘woman-prejudiced-against-
women…, and role entrapment, which obliges them to choose between alternative female 
stereotypes” (Kanter, 1977, 966, cited in Childs and Krook, 2008, 727). As their presence 
approximates titled status, members of the minority group can form alliances to diminish 
pressures and isolation, and are also increasingly free to differentiate themselves. 
Dahlerup applies Kanter’s approach to the study of women in politics, concluding that 
“critical acts” are key, and what is “most significant is the willingness and ability of the 
minority to mobilize the resources of the organization or institutions to improve the 
situation for themselves and the whole minority group” (1988, 296, cited in Studlar and 
McAllister, 2003, 236). 
Whereas evidence that a critical mass of women legislators facilitates women-
friendly policies or the election of more women is mixed (Studlar and McAllister, 2003), 
Kittilson (2006) finds strong support that a critical mass of women in national party 
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leadership structures enhances women’s representation. Leveraging Tarrow and 
McAdam’s insights on political opportunity structures, Kittilson contends that “the 
addition of women to the subset of party elites may introduce a new perspective on the 
utility of women’s votes,” with women leaders introducing “new frames of meaning” of 
women’s groups’ demands for greater representation (2006, 26). Women in party 
leadership can thus provide a new outlook that convinces male leaders of the electoral 
value of promoting women’s participation. While women acting on behalf of women is 
not guaranteed, at a minimum, the inclusion of women in party leadership structures 
helps them to “stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs” (Godinho, 1996, 155), in 
turn bringing the voice of women to the decision-making table rather than ghettoizing 
them in women’s sections as has long been the norm in parties around the world (Roza et 
al., 2010). Moreover, incorporating women in party leadership can itself capacitate 
women for high-level electoral campaigns, with service in party leadership often 
considered a “necessary apprenticeship” (Henig and Henig, 2001, 48, cited in Kunovich 
and Paxton, 2005, 521) for political aspirants. 
In her study of Western European democracies, Kittilson finds that the parties 
most likely to have women in leadership are those that are centralized (providing a clear 
target for women’s movements to lobby, and minimizing veto players), with internal 
party quotas, New Left values of equality, and are fractionalized with strong external ties, 
thus augmenting access points to the party (Kittilson, 2006). 
Next, I consider the contributions and limitations of these traditional explanations 
of the literature on women and politics for understanding women’s underrepresentation in 
Brazil. 
 43 
Lessons from and Limitations of the Literature on Women’s Representation 
Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development 
The observed relationship between overall proportion of women in parliaments 
and voter bias against women (see Figure 2.1) implies that female candidates are less 
likely to succeed among biased electorates. Can voter hostility to women explain their 
extreme underrepresentation in Brazil? This explanation seems plausible in Brazil’s 
patriarchal cultural context, where machismo sentiments persist. As stated in Chapter 1, 
30.8% of Brazilian respondents in the 2006 wave of the World Values Survey and 33.5% 
in the 2008 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey expressed agreement with the 
statement “men make better political leaders than women,” including nearly a quarter of 
female respondents (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 1981-2008).25 But ranking 23
rd
 of 60 nations 
surveyed, perceived male political superiority in Brazil is actually moderate, comparable 
to many other countries in the Americas, where the regional average is 28.6 percent. Can 
this residual hostility to the idea of women in politics explain the drastic 
underrepresentation of women in Brazilian politics? 
Such a cursory glance at the Brazilian situation might lead one to suspect 
machista voter attitudes as the culprit of women’s continued exclusion from high-level 
elected office, particularly given the open-list electoral context, with it ultimately being 
voters (rather than parties) who determine the end ranking of candidates. As I discuss in 
Chapter 3, however, Brazil has the lowest proportion of women legislators of any country 
with preferential (candidate-based) list voting, with even countries that exhibit 
significantly greater voter bias electing more women than Brazil (see Tables 3.1 and 1.2). 
                                                 
25 I would like to thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the 
United Stated Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. 
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And how does such bias affect the electoral prospects of female contenders? In 
spite of conventional wisdom otherwise, the empirical evidence on the relevance of voter 
hostility for individual women’s electoral prospects is actually mixed. Furthermore, 
voters appear to be warming up, however gradually, to the idea of women politicians. 
Indeed, although machista voter bias remains a commonly employed justification for the 
dearth of female candidates and politicians, public opinion polls in Latin America suggest 
that the electorates are actually quite receptive to female candidates for high-level office, 
as exemplified in the recent election of female presidents in Brazil (Rousseff) and 
elsewhere in the region (Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica). Women are often seen by voters 
as novel alternatives to the corrupt status quo (Barrionuevo, 2007). 
According to an exploratory26 Gallup poll (in coordination with the Inter-
American Development Bank [IDB] and the Inter-American Dialogue [IAD]) conducted 
in 2001, 72% of Brazilian respondents said they would vote for a woman for president 
(Fêmea, 2000; Sacchet, 2007). In 2010, 93.5% of Brazilians in a nationally representative 
sample said they would vote for a woman for any majoritarian office, with a majority of 
these respondents believing women could be just as competent as men (CESOP, 2010). 
And on October 3, 2010, a majority of the Brazilian electorate actually did vote for a 
female presidential candidate! Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva won more than 47.6 and 
19.6 million votes, respectively, together earning 66% of just over 100 million total 
votes; in the second round, Rousseff increased her vote share to 56 percent, becoming 
Brazil’s first woman president. 
Moreover, these survey data suggest that “the Brazilian electorate regards women 
in government positively, rating them higher than men not just on honesty and reliability, 
                                                 
26 The sample was limited to 2,000 respondents in five of Latin America’s major cities. 
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but also on competence, responsibility, toughness and capability, normally deemed more 
‘masculine’ attributes, with little resistance to electing women to executive positions” 
(Macaulay, 2006, 45).27 Results from a more recent and nationally representative survey 
found that 7 in 10 respondents thought more women in politics would improve 
competence and honesty in politics as well as commitment to constituents, administrative 
capacity, and authority (Ibope, 2009).28 
In sum, there are reasons to question the explanatory capacity of voter bias for 
women’s electoral prospects in Brazil. First, while hostility to women in politics in Brazil 
persists, it is relatively moderate (See Table 1.2). Second, the extant literature has drawn 
largely on aggregate-level evidence to substantiate the claim, a relationship which may 
not necessarily apply to the individual level. Finally, public opinion polls in Brazil and 
the recent election of Dilma Rousseff demonstrate substantial postulated support for 
female candidates. 
Institutional Rules of the Game 
What can we learn from the literature on electoral systems discussed above? As 
elaborated in Chapter 3, distinctions in list type or “ballot structure” are critical. Yet, 
most studies attesting to the superiority of PR in enhancing women’s representation draw 
on cases with closed-list rules to make the comparison with majoritarian elections. Open-
list variants of PR elections, however, significantly heighten the incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2010) and 
are thus candidate- rather than party-centered. Indeed, the simple dichotomization of 
electoral systems between majoritarian/plurality and PR overlooks important variations in 
                                                 
27 Instituto Vox Populi polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 suggest that these ratings are improving over 
time. 
28 Recall, these surveys were conducted prior to the emergence of Dilma Rousseff’s candidacy for the 
presidency. 
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ballot structure and beyond, leading many to explore how certain characteristics (rather 
than categorizations) of electoral systems affect women’s representation (Jones, 2009; 
Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; Thames and Williams, 2010). 
PR’s association with gender quotas certainly hinges on the common closed-list 
ballot structure (Htun and Jones, 2002; Jones, 2009; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). With open-lists, the proportion and placement 
of women on candidate lists has a less direct effect, with electors rather than party leaders 
determining the final ranking of candidates. Yet, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Poland have all achieved significantly greater results than has Brazil in combining a 
legislated gender quota with open-list electoral rules. 
Can variations in party magnitude – another driving factor behind PR’s 
demonstrated superiority in electing women – shed light on women’s limited access to 
political power in Brazil? While the rationale changes in open-list elections, where 
ordering on a party’s pre-electoral list is presumably irrelevant for a candidate’s chance 
of success, party magnitude may also affect women’s electoral prospects in Brazil due to 
strategic concerns. 
Parties with a history of winning several seats in a given statewide district are less 
likely to suffer a scarcity of organizational and other campaign resources than would be a 
party that is fighting for a single seat. As mentioned above, when only one seat is within 
reach, the contest tends toward a zero-sum game whereby party resources given to one 
candidate are necessarily diverted from another. Thus, a quite rational party strategy 
would be to concentrate resources on its top candidate in each state, which with very few 
women in power, still tends to be male. Limited party magnitude may then intensify the 
already heightened intra-party competition for resources in Brazil’s open-list elections, 
where partisans compete against one another for support within the party, among donors, 
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and in the electorate (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Nicolau, 2006). It follows that higher 
party magnitudes can benefit female contenders. 
Party Ideology and Women in Party Leadership 
Much like voter bias, evidence linking ideology and women in party leadership to 
women’s representation has almost exclusively been tested at the aggregate or party 
rather than candidate level. Most studies of the role of ideology operationalize the 
concept as the strength of Leftist parties in the legislature and/or executive (Caul, 1999; 
Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Krook, 2010; Reynolds, 1999; Tripp and Kang, 2008). 
The relationship appears not to hold in Brazil, where leftist parties hold 34.2% of 
congressional seats, the presidency, and 11 of 27 governorships (40.7%), yet women 
comprise less than 10% of the Congress.29 
Again, the mechanisms connecting a country’s tendency to elect a large share of 
leftists in parliament with the overall proportion of women legislators may not operate at 
the individual level. Countries with an affinity for leftist parties may have greater support 
for welfare state policies, which has been shown to enable women to enter the paid 
workforce – especially the public sector – and thus change working women’s political 
interests sufficiently to induce an ideological gender gap, which in turn incentivizes 
electorally motivated parties to respond by competing for women’s votes by augmenting 
their female parliamentary presence (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 2006). It is not 
immediately clear how such logic would apply to the individual candidate running in a 
leftist party. We do often see a disproportionate representation of leftists among elected 
women (Avelar, 2001). Does this mean that women are electorally advantaged in leftist 
parties? If so, why? Must female contenders then run with a leftist party to have a shot at 
                                                 
29 Numbers tallied by author using data from the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and party (PSB and PT) 
websites (July, 2012). 
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election? Has the salience of ideology’s effect truly declined (Matland and Studlar, 
1995)? The hypotheses must be assessed at the candidate level to discern their effects on 
individual women. 
While the argument has yet to be empirically tested at the candidate level, women 
politicians do believe that the presence of women in party leadership is beneficial (IPU, 
2000). Indeed, cross-national findings (aggregated across parties) suggest that women 
running in candidate-centered campaigns are bolstered by the presence of women in party 
leadership. This is because female party leaders have access to and are able to distribute 
material and institutional support to women candidates (Kunovich and Paxton, 2003, 
538), an argument I develop further below. 
In Brazil, the mean proportion of women on party NECs is 12.99 percent.30 This 
average conceals significant variation across parties, with the PT and PDT31 respectively 
having 37.0% and 4.2% women in their national decision-making structures. While 
Brazil fares moderately on all the obstacles discussed above, ranking 23
rd
 of 60 nations in 
terms of perceived male political superiority (30.8%), having high magnitude (but open-
list) PR elections with a (only recently enforced) gender quota, and leftist parties holding 
34.2% of congressional seats, its poor incorporation of women in party NECs is far more 
proportionate to its exceedingly low level of women in Congress. Although the other 
obstacles certainly persist at non-negligible levels, with 1 in 3 Brazilians expressing 
skepticism of women’s capacity for the political realm, and a quota that constitutes a far 
from ideal fit for open-list electoral rules, Brazil’s middling status on these factors – with 
numerous countries faring much worse on these fronts, including those with significantly 
                                                 
30 Calculated by the author using data from party websites and the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Gender and Political Parties in Latin America Initiative (GEPPAL) (2010). 
31 The Democratic Labor Party PDT) is a center-leftist party founded in 1979. 
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higher levels of women in parliament – simply cannot explain its severe 
underrepresentation of women in Congress. The expectation that incorporating women 
into party decision-making structures will facilitate increases in women’s legislative 
representation, however, appears quite plausible. I consider how each of these obstacles 
affects individual women’s electoral prospects in the analyses ahead.  
An Alternative to the Aggregate Cross-National Approach 
Although the abovementioned explanations of women’s representation have been 
substantiated in an array of cross-national studies, their generalizability and influence on 
women’s electoral prospects remain open to debate (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; 
Matland, 1998; Salmond, 2006; Schmidt, 2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008). While such 
cross-national studies have illuminated interesting aggregate trends, I contend that 
disparate findings in the literature persist because: (1) until recently, the majority of 
studies on women’s representation have had a distinct advanced-industrial focus, (2) the 
predominant mode of cross-national analysis is often executed at excessively aggregated 
levels, and (3) the unspoken but usually present assumption of causal homogeneity is 
tenuous.  
In light of these gaps, this dissertation offers three important contributions: (1) a 
candidate-level analysis of women’s paths to power in an understudied context (2) a rich 
examination of variation in candidate electoral performance across districts, electoral 
rules, and parties that brings into focus the centrality of parties in arbitrating the political 
empowerment of women, and (3) a typology differentiating the accessibility to women of 
electoral districts and parties, i.e. a measure of “women-friendliness,” and the varying 
profiles most likely to thrive in the midst of intersecting district and party constraints. 
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The analysis of obstacles to women’s representation at the candidate level 
elucidates their actual effect on the electoral prospects of women. To infer the effects of 
these barriers on individual women’s electoral performance from aggregate country-level 
analyses is to commit an ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 30; 
Robinson, 1990).32 As discussed above, the mechanisms linking such barriers to the 
overall proportion of women elected may not operate at the individual level. Moreover, 
the majority of studies on women’s representation have been based largely on OECD 
countries, producing expectations that simply may not hold in the Brazilian case. 
Indeed, by conducting an individual-level analysis of women’s electoral prospects 
in the context of Brazil’s open-list elections and preponderance of weakly 
institutionalized parties, this dissertation challenges the explanatory power of aggregate-
level findings derived from more developed and institutionalized contexts. Despite being 
practiced in more than a dozen nations, the open-list context remains an understudied 
environment, with the majority of findings regarding women’s representation hinging 
upon party-centric systems and thus ignoring important distinctions that may alter the 
effects of these obstacles on women’s electoral prospects.33 This dissertation addresses 
this lacuna by theorizing the relationship between female political aspirants, electorates, 
and parties in the candidate-centric open-list context. 
I take advantage of variation across Brazil’s 29 registered political parties to 
assess their role in mediating women’s access to political power. Whereas cross-national 
analyses consider only the averages across a nation’s political parties and thus overlook 
variation within a country, my research design introduces partisan variation to explore 
                                                 
32 An ecological fallacy is committed when “incorrectly using aggregate data to make inferences about 
individuals” (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 30). 
33 For recent exceptions, see Thames and Williams (2010), Jones (2009), and Schmidt (2008). 
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how parties negotiate electorates and electoral rules to affect the representation of 
women. Parties are, after all, widely considered in most contexts to be the primary 
gatekeeper of political power. Analyzing the candidate (rather than national) level 
assesses variation in key party characteristics such as ideology, party institutionalization, 
and women in party leadership, and how these factors influence a party’s tendency to 
promote the political participation of women and support their pursuit of electoral office. 
In the upcoming empirical chapters, I explore why the postulated support for 
female candidates in Brazil has not translated into greater women’s representation. I 
assess the ability of the modernization hypothesis – which associates economic 
development with gender egalitarianism (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) – to explain the 
variation in voter bias and its ability to predict women’s electoral prospects, taking 
advantage of the wide range in development levels across Brazil. I find that while 
residual levels of machista voter bias persist, and are predicted by a respondent’s state 
development level, this bias cannot explain variation in women’s electoral prospects. 
Lesser levels of voter bias in more developed regions have not translated into the election 
of more female deputies. Moreover, several women have achieved considerable electoral 
successes in the context of voter bias. Similarly, while I find party ideology (indirectly),34 
institutionalization, and proportion of women in leadership are significant predictors of 
women’s electoral prospects, some women have attained electoral office even in the 
absence of the party support effectuated by these party-level factors. I explore these 
intriguing findings in Chapter Seven. 
                                                 
34 As I elaborate below, party ideology retains an indirect role in explaining women’s electoral prospects. 
While party institutionalization and women in party leadership actually bear more direct explanatory power 
for the electoral chances of female legislative candidates than does running with a leftist party per se, leftist 
parties have historically been those most likely to incorporate women in party leadership.  
 52 
My typology of women-friendliness, combined with an elaboration of successful 
electoral profiles in Chapter 7 moves beyond the assumption of causal homogeneity 
common to cross-national studies. Rather, I explain how discrete profiles have enabled 
women to navigate both women-friendly and averse contexts. Women are a 
heterogeneous group, and have found innovative ways to thrive electorally in ostensibly 
inhospitable districts and parties.  
The typology and profiles help to explain what at first glance may seem to be 
conflicting findings. Residual machista voter bias among the electorate does exist, but at 
a relatively moderate level cannot explain variation in women’s electoral prospects. 
Moreover, several women have achieved success under the condition of voter bias by 
either working with their party to overcome such bias as lutadoras with a substantial 
party organization and firmly rooted platform, or by conforming to traditional gender 
norms in the absence of such party support. Supermadres can simultaneously overcome 
the constraints posed by bias among voters and party elites by basing their political 
presence and campaign on some extension of their role in the private sphere, and thus 
minimizing their perceived threat to established order. Finally, technocrats take 
advantage of evolution in their societal status in more women-friendly states and apply 
their expertise acquired in the professional world to counteract lacking party support, 
converting their expertise into political capital and using their professional contacts to 
raise campaign funds.  
The fact that party-level factors retain a significant role in predicting women’s 
electoral performance, even while some women have found a way to thrive electorally in 
the absence of the party support these factors enable, reflects the preponderance of 
inchoate and male dominant parties in Brazil. It also puts into stark relief the essential 
role parties have to play in enhancing the political participation of women in Brazil. Even 
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with these innovative profiles affording (some) women electoral success in women-
averse contexts, party-level factors continue to predict a woman’s ability to succeed. This 
finding contrasts with the dominant approach of the Brazilianist literature, which tends to 
de-emphasize ‘party’ as a predictive factor for electoral success. 
I thus employ variation in candidate electoral performance across districts, 
electoral rules, political parties, sex, and individual women to elucidate the barriers 
impeding women’s political participation and the paths to overcoming these obstacles. By 
lowering the level of analysis, I reveal that contrary to conventional wisdom – which 
considers political parties to be less relevant for candidate recruitment and electoral 
success in the candidate-centric open-list context – parties are the central arbiters of 
women’s political empowerment in Brazil, Latin America’s most populous democracy. 
Far from insignificant, the particular characteristics of each party shape its capacity and 
will to promote women’s participation. 
PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
For decades the significance of institutionalization for democratic governance has 
been a stalwart in the political science literature (Diamond, 1988; Jones, 2005; 
Mainwaring, 1998, 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; 
Schedler, 1995; Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997). Under-institutionalized parties have 
been shown to hinder identifiability, accountability, and programmatic appeals, are 
conducive to anti-system politics, and result in a Wild-West style politics where each 
politician is on her own and collective party organizations are elusive.  
Recently, however, a new debate has emerged over the conceptualization of party 
institutionalization, with some suggesting that the general decline of political parties in 
society (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) warrants a narrowing of the concept to focus 
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merely on their electoral presence, with parties participating in at least three national 
elections considered institutionalized (Rose and Mackie, 1988; Braga, 2010; Tarouco, 
2010). Here however, I understand the process of party institutionalization as the 
“process through which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns 
of behavior and of attitudes, or culture” (Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 12). This 
conceptualization builds on Huntington’s initial formation of the concept as “the process 
by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (1968, 12) and 
Panebianco’s related notion of internal “systemness” (1988), or in Huntington’s terms, 
organizational “complexity” and “coherence” (Quoted in Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 
10). It also includes an external/societal dimension elaborated by Janda (1980) and 
Levitsky (1998) centering on the meaning and value of the party label, or “value 
infusion” with an institutionalized party being “reified in the public mind” (Janda, 1980, 
cited in Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 11).  
To be precise, in what follows I work with the outcome of an institutionalized 
party. I conceptualize a party as institutionalized if it possesses value infusion – observed 
by its maintenance of a relatively stable electoral base and membership over time, and an 
identifiable and programmatic platform – and internal systemness, made evident through 
a solid party organization with material and human resources wherein “internal party 
processes are predictable and routinized, and the party as an institution is prescient over 
individual party leaders” (Jones, 2005, 12). This work thus follows the traditional 
scholars of party and party system institutionalization, operationalizing the outcome of 
party institutionalization as an index of the stability in party vote and seat share 
(volatility), party membership (societal roots), and party organization (e.g., Mainwaring, 
1999). 
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I improve the measure of party organization by supplementing the traditional 
proxy of party age with data I collected on party funds and original measures of 
organization that assesses current information on: (1) the number of active municipal 
party directorates each party has across each state and (2) whether there exists an 
alternation in state party leadership. Together, these factors enable the measurement of 
party institutionalization across time (elections) and space (parties, states) while holding 
the institutional context constant, allowing for a more precise examination of the 
relationship between party structures and representation within open-list PR electoral 
rules. This approach allows me to highlight how some parties – in particular, those that 
are well-institutionalized and incorporate women in party leadership – have been more 
effective in counteracting the detrimental implications of open-list PR for the quota and 
women in general. 
And while the general issue of party institutionalization has enjoyed a rather 
salient position within the literature, surprisingly little has been said about its 
implications for the representation of women and minorities (Guadagnini, 1993; Caul, 
1999; Kittilson, 2006; Moser and Scheiner, 2012).35 This dissertation helps to fill this 
void, contending that the prevalence of weakly institutionalized parties in Brazil has 
undermined women’s representation36 in four ways. (1) The absence of a norm of 
compliance has facilitated an environment in which internal and external formal laws are 
flouted, providing no clear means for ascension through the party making it difficult for 
                                                 
35 I discuss Marila Guadagnini (1993) and Miki Caul Kittilson’s (1999; 2006) arguments from their studies 
of the Italian party system and Western European parties, respectively, below. Moser and Scheiner find that 
the condition of weakly institutionalized parties negates the expected negative effects of single member 
district (SMD) systems relative to proportional representation systems due to the absence of SMD’s usual 
mechanical effect of constraining the number of parties (2012). 
36 Although this discussion emphasizes women’s representation, it may also explain the paucity of minority 
representation in Brazil. I will consider this in the conclusion and hope to address the question more 
adequately in future research. Unfortunately, the extremely limited N and difficulties involved with 
classifying race in Brazil have prevented me from undertaking the effort here. 
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outsiders to gain entry, while also crippling the gender quota. (2) By emphasizing self-
nomination it exacerbates the socialized gender gap in formal political ambition. (3) 
Amorphous party organizations are ill-equipped to provide critical capacity-building 
opportunities for women. (4) The rarity of programmatic appeals and dominance of 
personalist politics favor those with personal political and financial capital, which due to 
wage inequities, traditional gender norms, and the still vastly masculine character of 
Brazilian electoral politics (see Table 1.4) tend to be men. Each of these points deserves 
further development below. 
“Lei Que Não Pega”: A Norm of Non-Compliance  
The inchoate character of the Brazilian party system has facilitated an 
environment in which formal rules remain nominal and informal norms and practices 
carry the day. A clear understanding of the rules of the game and expectation that these 
rules will be followed is less likely in weakly institutionalized parties because the few 
leaders that dominate such parties often operate beyond the bounds of formal rules. An 
extensive study by Fernando Guarnieri (2011) reveals a disconcertingly common 
tendency especially among parties characterized by “monocracy” but also “oligarchy” to 
use the mechanism of provisional commissions as a means of manipulating the 
construction of party lists in their favor. Guarnieri (2011) builds on Angelo Panebianco, 
who contrasts a monacracy – “a form of domination characterized by a predominant 
influence of one person over the group’s decisions,” with an oligarchy, under which a 
few groups control the process, and a polyarchy, where the existence of multiple groups 
prevents any one member/group’s hegemonic control (Panebianco, 1988, 172). 
The formal rules of most party statutes (the PT is somewhat different, which as of 
2001, has direct membership elections for its party leadership through the Process of 
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Direct Elections, PED [Hunter, 2010]) dictate hierarchical participation in a clear, 
predictable way, with municipal conventions electing state conventional delegates and 
choosing municipal directorates that in turn choose the municipal executive commission 
(which selects municipal candidates), with the process repeated at state and national 
levels (Guarnieri, 2011). The executive commissions often present an already composed 
candidate list (chapa única) at the conventions, with the expectation that they will be 
summarily approved (Braga, 2008). 
Yet, as revealed by Guarnieri, parties disproportionately wield the mechanism of 
provisional commissions, which is intended for instances of limited party members but 
by his account vastly abused by all parties (2011).37 He characterizes Brazil’s major 
parties as following – weakly organized/monocratic (PP, PTB), of mixed 
organization/oligarchic (PSDB, PDT, PFL), and organized/polyarchic (PT, PMDB), and 
finds that party leaders in oligarchic and especially monocratic parties are less 
accountable to the formal rules of the game than those in polyarchic parties (2011). By 
dissolving a municipal or state party directorate and replacing it with a provisional 
commission, the leaders of monocratic and often oligarchic parties are free to nominate 
who they want rather than working through the constraints of lower level conventions or 
delegations.38 In contrast, polyarchic parties in general abide by clear and universal 
criteria for leadership and candidate selection (Braga, 2008; Guarnieri, 2011). Guarnieri’s 
analysis demonstrates that the absence of strong party organizations substantially 
undermines the ability of outsiders to “anticipate the criteria” for ascending the ranks, as 
well as substantial inter- and intra-party variation. 
                                                 
37 Note, Guarnieri limits his analysis to the major parties: PDT, PFL, PMDB, PP, PSDB, PT, PTB (2011). 
38 Guarnieri uses the proportion of municipal party organizations that are provisional to measure their 
centralization, which he turns uses to predict a party’s strategic decision to not run a candidate in executive 
contests, something unlikely in the context of clear and predictable rules to which party leaders were held 
accountable by lower level conventional delegates (2011). 
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Such a norm of (non-)compliance with internal party statutes may carry over into 
other realms, with party leaders accustomed to being held accountable to internal rules of 
the game more likely to comply with external rules such as the gender quota, in spite of 
its until recently weak enforcement. Indeed, studies from the international organizations 
literature have documented the greater likelihood of rule-bound states to comply with 
rarely enforced international agreements due to a norm of compliance entrenched in such 
states. “Political leaders accustomed to constitutional constraints on their power in a 
domestic context are more likely to accept principled legal limits on their international 
behavior; therefore, governments with strong constitutional traditions, particularly those 
in which intragovernmental relations are rule governed, are more likely to accept rule-
based constraints on their international behavior” (Simmons, 1998:83-84). 
I draw on the norm of (non-)compliance instilled by transparent and universal 
internal rules of the game to explain the significant variation across Brazilian parties in 
their responsiveness to the quota provisions. This yields superior analytical leverage than 
does the emphasis on the quota law’s poor fit for the OLPR system and only recent 
enforcement, which while certainly inhibiting its effectiveness, cannot explain variation 
across parties confronting the same Electoral Law. 
For Brazil’s inchoate parties, the gender quota persists as a “lei que não pega” 
(roughly, “law on paper only”) in spite of the recent mini-reform emboldening 
enforcement efforts. As mentioned above, only a quarter of state parties participating in 
the 2010 elections complied with the reinforced quota law. The vast disregard of the 
quota in spite of the mini-reform strengthening it and credible threats of enforcement is 
reflective of the abundance of weakly institutionalized parties. I argue that such parties 
are unlikely to comply with the quota because they – rather than existing as an 
organization in their own right operating under transparent rules of the game – suffer 
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from a norm of non-compliance, dominated by a few leaders who function with impunity 
in decision-making. The dominant leaders of such parties often use the mechanism of 
provisional commissions to circumvent compliance with other party statutes, which in 
effect “permits the more absolute control over the formation of (party) lists” (Guarnieri, 
2011, 241). Indeed, a simple logistic analysis of state party compliance with the quota 
since its implementation demonstrates that a one unit increase in party institutionalization 
increases a party’s odds of quota compliance by 25.2 percent. 
Moreover, even in the few instances where Brazilian parties have nominally 
complied with the gender quota, the quota’s intended result has not been met. This is 
because party leaders often do not confront their deficit of female contenders until the last 
moment, at which point they fill the slots reserved for women with “candidatas 
laranjas”39 (sacrificial lambs) with no intention of supporting their candidacies. The 2010 
elections—the first after the mini-reform strengthened the quota—saw a striking number 
of apparent candidatas laranjas, with an average of 39.5% of female candidates earning 
less than one percent of the minimum vote acquired by a winning candidate in their state. 
For male candidates, this average was less than half that, at 16.6 percent. With 21 of 27 
states having significantly more candidatas laranjas in 2010 than in 2006, I contend that 
this preponderance of female sacrificial lambs in 2010 constitutes an observable 
implication of the elite resistance to even the reformed quota. 
While the mini-reform enabled greater enforcement of the formal quota law, the 
decade-long disregard for the quota by Brazil’s often inchoate and male-run parties was 
entrenched. Nearly 80% of women surveyed in a recent poll had never even heard of the 
                                                 
39 According to a Brazilian etymologist from the University of São Paulo, using the term laranja (orange) 
to describe a figurehead or pawn is thought to have emerged in the 1970s, with two potential origins: (1) 
the juice of the orange is extracted, leaving only the tasteless remains behind, and (2) people in countries 
prohibiting the public consumption of alcohol injected their booze in an orange to avoid getting caught 
(Perissé, 2010). 
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gender quota more than a decade after its implementation (Ibope, 2009), suggesting that 
for the majority of parties and electors, the law existed only in the books, or “para ingles 
ver,”40 with no real intention of compliance. To be discussed at length in Chapter 3, the 
emphasis of Brazil’s gender quota on the formal rules of candidate selection leaves much 
to be desired. 
Figure 2.2. Deputy Nice Lobão in a Winning Multi-Party Dobradinha (2010) 
     In the Brazilian 
case, such formal 
electoral rules have 
long gone unheeded 
with local bosses 
often calling the 
shots.41 Aspiring 
candidates cozy up 
to mayors and governors to gain entry and access to resources (Samuels, 2003), with the 
coveted dobradinha (an alliance between candidates running concurrently, see Figure 
2.2) serving as visual evidence to this practice. For most parties, the leadership simply 
presents candidate lists at state party conventions; for the few more institutionalized 
                                                 
40 “For the English to see,” meaning a law existing on paper only. The Brazilian idiom references the 
country’s 1831 law declaring free any Africans arriving in Brazilian ports, which was promulgated as a 
symbolic act to appease the British, who had prohibited the slave trade in 1807 (Bethell and Carvalho, 
1985, 696). 
41 Guadagnini paints a similar portrait in her analysis of the Italian party system. “Although the various 
parties have developed formal rules governing the selection of candidates…, in fact candidate selection has 
been a prerogative of top party leaders. Furthermore…mere inclusion on a party’s list of candidates is not 




parties, party delegates propose and vote on individual candidates or slates of candidates 
at local or state meetings (Braga, 2008).  
Finally, recent work on candidate selection in Latin America contends that 
exclusive candidate selection processes facilitate the nomination and election of women, 
while decentralized processes (as is the case throughout Brazil, with the exception of the 
PSOL [Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008]) undermine women’s prospects for inclusion due 
to the influence of “local power monopolies” generally dominated by men (Hinojosa, 
2009). In sum, Brazil’s electoral infrastructure, a widespread lack of transparency and 
associated norm of non-compliance have undermined women’s ability to anticipate the 
criteria for selection and deterred all efforts at leveling candidate selection processes, 
effectively nullifying the country’s gender quota. 
Self-Nomination and the Gender Gap in Political Ambition 
In the weakly institutionalized context where “political parties have limited 
resources, internal processes are unpredictable, and individual party leaders dominate the 
parties, with the party as an institution weak to nonexistent” (Jones, 2005, 12), self-
nomination is the norm. Such an “entrepreneurial” (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2008) 
system has led many to conclude that “parties do not perform even minimum functions of 
gatekeeping” with “routes to power” deemed “open for easy ascent” (Schedler, 1995, 18; 
Samuels, 2008); entrepreneurial systems have, however, proven daunting for women and 
other marginalized groups. Morgenstern and Siavelis’ authoritative volume on candidate 
selection in Latin America characterizes Brazil as conducive to the “entrepreneur” ideal 
type of legislator due to its high-magnitude open-list elections, federal structure, weak 
legislative parties, localized and exclusive candidate selection, reliance on self-selection, 
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inchoate party organizations, and campaigns financed privately, rather than by parties 
(2008, 18). 
The authors assert that these variables converge to make parties “unnecessary for 
entrepreneurs to succeed in getting on the ballot and being elected” (Morgenstern and 
Siavelis, 2008, 23). But while a weakly institutionalized party system may facilitate 
political outsiders’ entry due to the diminished ballot control of party leaders in such 
systems (Mainwaring, 1999), these partisan outsiders gain entry by converting their 
economic and/or social capital into political capital (Bourdieu, 1986). So although the 
notion that the electoral context constitutes “nonregulated markets” open to all (Schedler, 
1995, 18) is formally true, the open or “entrepreneurial” system in fact tends to reproduce 
societal inequities and maintain patterns of marginalization. If party leaders do not 
actively cultivate female political aspirants, women will be reluctant to confront this 
elitist system. As professional career paths become increasingly viable alternatives for 
women, who comprise 46% of the economically active workforce (IBGE, 2010),42 and 
Brazil’s political system remaining executive-dominant, women may understandably be 
hesitant to seek election to a position they perceive as corrupt and ineffective (LAPOP, 
2010).43 
The socialized gender gap in formal ‘political ambition,’ or the expressed desire 
to seek political office, intensifies the marginalization of outsiders (Lawless and Fox, 
2005, 2010; Schlesinger, 1966). Through socially constructed gender roles and norms, 
women have long been dissuaded from entering the public sphere, particularly at the 
                                                 
42 It is not my intention, however, to gloss over the fact that women continue to confront foreboding 
obstacles in the workforce, where they receive less pay for equal work (Ibge, 2010), have to wait longer to 
get promoted (Ipea, 2010b), and remain disproportionately absent from leadership positions, with less than 
14%  of the leadership positions in Brazil’s top 500 businesses being women (Mulheres Brasileiras, 2012).   
43 Women express significantly lower levels of agreement that the federal government is fighting 
government corruption, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with Brazilian democracy than 
do men (LAPOP, 2008, 2010). 
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national level. Three manifestations of traditional gender socialization identified by 
Lawless and Fox, the leading authorities on gender and political ambition, are instructive. 
Traditional gender socialization, along with disenchantment with the corrupt and 
ineffective state of politics, inherent risk and uncertain reward of seeking office, and 
increasing opportunities in the professional realm, comprise part of an interconnected 
web of factors dissuading women from entering the formal political sphere. First, 
traditional family role orientations mean that for women, party activism usually entails a 
“triple shift.”  
As corroborated in my interview findings presented in Chapter 5, women simply 
may not have time to be the entrepreneurial candidate advantaged in the Brazilian system. 
Traditional family role orientations produce expectations that women remain confined to 
the private (or some extension thereof) rather than public sphere. In the 2006 wave of the 
LAPOP surveys, 17.4% of respondents answering a question on whether men deserve the 
right to jobs over women during times of elevated unemployment agreed or strongly 
(LAPOP, 2006). Moreover, although the vast socioeconomic inequalities within Brazil 
have made domestic labor an affordable commodity for even the middle class, even 
relatively well-off women nonetheless endure time constraints on the basis of traditional 
gender norms. Income has no relationship to the number of hours men dedicate to 
domestic chores, and 76.6% of women earning more than eight times the minimum wage 
spend on average 25.2 hours a week on domestic chores (Ipea, 2011, 37). While the 
percent of women that devote this amount of their time – equivalent to a part-time job – 
to household labor jumps to a striking 93% for women who earn the minimum wage or 
less, with income certainly reducing the constraints on women’s time, it is safe to say that 
traditionally gendered domestic responsibilities constitute a second shift for women 
working outside the home across income levels in Brazil (Ipea, 2011). 
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Political party meetings are often held at night, which due to these traditional 
family role orientations, poses a disadvantage to women because they are expected to be 
home with their family. Marianismo (the counter-part to machismo) idealizes women as 
“semi-divine, morally superior and spiritually stronger than men” (Stevens, 1973, 62) and 
in addition to sustaining these traditionally gendered family obligations, can make it less 
acceptable for women to leave the house at night to attend party meetings. As I discuss in 
detail in Chapters 5 and 7, the women I interviewed frequently cited the incompatibility 
of party meeting times and locations with their familial commitments. Moreover, elected 
federal deputies divide their time among their home district and Brasília,44 spending 
Monday to Thursday afternoons in the Congress and the extended weekend at home. Also 
corroborated through my interview data, this schedule poses significant constraints to 
women, who remain largely accountable for most household responsibilities.  
As stated by the National Secretary of Women’s Affairs, Eleonora Menicucci, 
“Women enter politics, but they have a world that goes with them: the house, their 
kids…so they enter politics either when they are single, or when their kids have already 
left the house” (Quoted in Grayley, 2012). The fact that 68 and 78 percent of male 
Chamber candidates and elected deputies, respectively, are married, but only 45 and 56 
percent45 of female Chamber candidates and elected deputies are married lends support to 
Secretary Menicucci’s claim. In sum, party activism and high-level electoral office 
constitute a “triple shift” for the vast majority of Brazilian women, leading them to be 
reluctant to throw their hat in the ring to compete for an office they perceive as corrupt 
and ineffective. 
                                                 
44 Poor road conditions and Brazil’s vast geographic terrain add to the logistical difficulties of the 
commuter schedule – deputies from many states in the Amazon region have to travel five hours by plane(s) 
to reach Brasília. 
45 These differences are statistically significant at the p<0.000 level. 
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Second, the vastly male dominant character of the majority of political institutions 
entrenches a masculinized ethos of politics that privileges masculinity and devalues 
femininity. As discussed in Chapter 1, while Brazil did elect a female president in 2010, 
the proportion of women in all other elected offices has not exceeded 14.8 percent, with 
no more than 22.1% of candidates in any election being female (see Table 1.4). President 
Rousseff’s appointment of 11 women to her cabinet has elevated women’s presence in 
the federal ministries (28.9%),46 but as late as 2009 (under former President Lula), only 
5.4% of federal ministries were held by women with less than 20% in women in other 
appointed bureaucratic posts (Secretary of Women’s Affairs, 2010). The proportion of 
women among federal government personnel is 45% at the lowest three levels, but 
decreases to 38.6, 25.6, and 23.0 percent at the top three levels (Inter-Union Department 
of Socioeconomic Statistics and Studies, 2011). 
The few recent prominent exceptions in President Rousseff and Maria das Graças 
Silva Foster (named President of Petrobras in January, 2012)47 belie the widespread 
pattern of exclusion of women from high-level office demonstrated in Table 1.4. The vast 
male dominance of Brazil’s political institutions not only discourages women from 
getting involved in politics, but also maintains a set of rules and norms that was designed 
by and for men. An extensive literature on institutional change suggests that those in 
power formulate institutions to preserve their own position (North, 1990; Thelen, 1999), 
and Brazil’s largely male politicians are by no means exempt from this tendency.   
                                                 
46 Calculated by author from information on the Planalto website (http://www2.planalto.gov.br) (2012), 
also including in the count Bel Mesquita, who recently resigned as Secretary of Tourism. 
47 Graça Foster gained significant clout while serving as the Secretary of Petroleum and Gas under 
President Rousseff when she was Minister of Mines and Energy. Occupying an office of the same title in 
Petrobras since 2007, Graça Foster was then the first woman to assume a leadership role in any of Brazil’s 
powerful state-owned enterprises (Globo, 2012 January 23). 
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As I illustrate in Chapter 7, some women have managed to overcome such 
constraints by conforming to traditional gender roles, working with their party, or, as is 
the case with President Rousseff, converting their expertise from the professional world 
into political capital. Yet, like most women, President Rousseff was initially encouraged 
to embark upon electoral politics and run for the presidency by a male party leader, 
former President Lula, who had appointed her to serve as Minister of Mines and Energy 
and Chief of Staff. Even Brazilian women with great personal ambition often espouse a 
disdain for electoral politics and are hesitant to enter an arena which they perceive to be 
not only vastly male dominant, but also extremely corrupt. 
Indeed, nearly all of the female politicians I interviewed, questioned, and studied 
have cited external encouragement rather than some internal affinity for electoral politics 
in their decision to run for office. This leads to Lawless and Fox’s final point about 
traditional gender roles – the resilient gendered psyche, “a deeply embedded imprint that 
propels men into politics, but relegates women to the electoral arena’s periphery,” which 
is instilled and sustained by traditional gender role expectations and the masculinized 
ethos of politics (2005, 10-11). 
In spite of economic development and cultural progress, from an early age girls 
continue to be socialized as caregivers rather than leaders. The results of this traditional 
gender socialization are manifest, with pervasive gender gaps in political interest, 
political knowledge, and political efficacy (Moore, 2005). In the 2010 LAPOP surveys, 
Brazilian women reported significantly lesser levels of political interest than did men, 
with 4.9% and 10.5% of women and men, respectively, saying they were very interested 
in politics, and an additional 17.1% and 22.3% indicating mild interest (LAPOP, 2010). 
Experimental and observational evidence demonstrate that self-promoting behavior 
enhances public perception of one’s competence, yet women are penalized for self-
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promotion while men are rewarded for it (Correll et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998). By 
“violat(ing) prescriptive stereotypes” of femininity, self-promoting or assertive women 
“are derogated as interpersonally hostile… (and) personally disliked” (Correll et al. 2007, 
7). 
 
Women, in essence, tend not to be socialized to possess the qualities the modern 
political arena demands of its candidates and elected officials. Whereas men are 
taught to be confident, assertive, and self-promoting, cultural attitudes toward 
women as political leaders, expectations of women’s family roles, and the 
overarching male exclusiveness of most political institutions leave an imprint 
suggesting to women that it is often inappropriate to possess these characteristics 
(Lawless and Fox, 2005, 11). 
Although I unfortunately do not have access to such experimental or extensive 
survey data in Brazil, the empirical evidence cited above, interviews discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 7, the gendered treatment of women in the media (Finamore and 
Carvalho, 2006; Miguel and Biroli, 2009, 2011; Paiva, 2008), and my own observations 
of the double binds confronted by President Rousseff in her 2010 campaign48 give me no 
reason to suspect that such traditional gender roles would be more egalitarian in Brazil 
than they would in the US case discussed in Lawless and Fox (2005; 2010), Correll et al. 
(2007), Moore (2005), and Rudman (1998). 
Figure 2.3 maps the gendered processes and structures conceptually, 
demonstrating the interacting effects of traditional gender socialization on individual 
women’s political ambition, public opinion of women in politics, and the structural 
disadvantages confronted by women in parties and society. The outcome of these 
                                                 
48 I surveyed media coverage of President Rousseff’s campaign for an expert survey solicited for Murray 
and Piscopo’s manuscript on the double bind confronted by women in executive elections. The “double 
binds” are lose-lose scenarios in which women are at once penalized for being too feminine and too 
masculine, are considered either too young or too old, or too connected or too independent, and are often 
criticized for a lack of experience when attempting to emphasize their novelty (Murray, 2010; Murray and 
Piscopo, n.d.).  
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gendered processes and structures is a resilient gender gap in formal political ambition 
that is sustained by women’s disillusionment with the corrupt state of electoral politics 
and increasing availability of professional alternatives. 
Figure 2.3. Voters, Parties, and Women’s Representation 
         
 
The problems of the ambition gender gap are compounding, with women more 
likely than men to doubt their qualifications for office and less likely to be encouraged to 
run (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Hinojosa confirmed these findings in her study of gender 
and candidate selection in Chile and Mexico, concluding that while men were open about 
their political ambition, women would defer to the party, stating that they would do 
“whatever the party asks of me” (2009, 389). In concordance with the literature on the 
US, Hinojosa found that women were less likely than men to espouse political ambition, 
with the constructed gender norms regarding women’s appropriate societal roles 
remaining a powerful psychological constraint on their ambition (2009). Building on 
these findings and the parallels with these cases illustrated above, I expect that similar 
dynamics operate in Brazil and argue that women’s hesitance to self-nominate coupled 
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with the entrepreneurial character of Brazilian elections renders active party recruitment 
essential for their meaningful inclusion in formal politics. 
Amorphous Party Organizations 
Weakly institutionalized parties are also characterized by amorphous party 
organizations that provide few opportunities for less experienced political aspirants to 
ascend the ranks and hone their political capital. Such parties – in addition to eschewing a 
universal set of rules and thus negating the ability of women and other outsiders to 
“anticipate the criteria” for candidate selection and to hold leaders accountable to these 
rules (Kittilson, 2006, 29) as discussed above – are ill-equipped to recruit and develop 
viable female candidacies. Often a one-man show rather than a cohesive organization, 
inchoate parties may have few internal leadership positions, are dominated by a small and 
unchanging cadre of party elite, offer little in the way of programmatic training, and exist 
as a mere electoral vehicle with inadequate mobilizational activities. 
In contrast, an institutionalized party is more likely to facilitate training 
opportunities and other mechanisms for capacity-building. Studies suggest that women 
are in general more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Schubert, 2006) 
and therefore unlikely to throw their hat in the ring without the requisite preparation. An 
observable implication of this tendency is that women candidates are in general much 
more qualified than male candidates (Anzia and Berry, 2011). So opportunities for 
capacity-building not only provide organizational support by enabling women to acquire 
the requisite toolkit, but they also instill a powerful psychological effect, boosting 
women’s political ambition. 
I will elaborate on the capacity-building opportunities offered in institutionalized 
parties – with a strong organization, programmatic platforms, and material and human  
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resources – further in Chapter 5, but a quick preview of the Communist Party of Brazil 
(PC do B) is illustrative. The PC do B regularly offers multiday courses in “political 
formation” or training through its National School of Formation (ENF), where party 
members take several levels of courses on philosophy, class and the state, economics, 
socialism, and the party, and are certified at advanced levels only after they submit a 
monograph or article with themes and bibliography to be approved by senior party 
members (PC do B, 2010). The ENF works with state party organizations to offer “local 
courses that help in the training and realization of candidates” (PC do B, 2010). This 
reality sharply contrasts with the entrepreneurial candidate setting painted in Morgenstern 
and Siavelis (2008) and Samuels (2008), which while capturing the overall patterns of 
Brazilian politics, gloss over significant variation across the parties. By providing women 
and other outsiders with opportunities to acquire the requisite toolkit, a strong party 
organization can level the playing field for these contenders while also enhancing their 
confidence, thus preparing them for the difficult path to elected office. 
Personalist Politics 
As demonstrated by Ames (2001) and others, weakly institutionalized parties are 
particularly susceptible to personalist politics. Such parties are fleeting, have weak 
societal roots, and due to weak party discipline and shifting loyalties within 
constituencies, coalitions, and ideologies, party switching is rampant (Ames, 2001; 
Mainwaring, 1999; Nicolau, 2006). True outsiders will often lack the personal appeal 
necessary to thrive in such a system (Guadagnini, 1993). Institutionalized parties are 
more conducive to “less ‘advantaged’ groups and individuals, like women, who possess 
fewer external resources” (Guadagnini, 1993, 181). In contrast, personalist competition 
advantages those with accumulated personal political capital, “all those resources based 
 71 
on status (social position, professional career etc.) and/or on strong external group 
support and/or on a political career through which an individual can develop an extensive 
electoral base… [as well as] the capacity to channel funds from the business community 
and other powerful interests to the party leadership” (Guadagnini, 1993, 181). 
The personalist politics that dominate weakly institutionalized parties result in 
candidate-centered elections that require a contender to distinguish herself from her co-
partisans, thus necessitating an inflated campaign budget. Tellingly, the correlation 
between both the self- and corporate-financed proportion of candidate campaign 
contributions and party institutionalization is negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that candidates in weakly institutionalized parties are compelled to either seek 
funding from corporate donors, or finance their own campaign. In the 2010 elections to 
the Chamber of Deputies, campaign contributions to winning candidates averaged over 
R$1.1 million (more than US$600,000), with campaign finance being one of the strongest 
predictors of an individual candidate’s chance of success (Samuels, 2001a, 2001b; author 
calculations). 
Given Brazil’s pervasive wage inequities (Ipea, 2009),49 with men earning 30% 
more than women of the same age and education level (Downie and Llana, 2009), such 
expensive campaigns further disadvantage women (and minorities) while favoring 
incumbents and others with established material capital. Personal wealth allows 
candidates to self-finance their costly campaigns and also affords status and access to 
business elites and corporate donations. While winning candidates to the Chamber of 
Deputies (1994-2010) draw on average 47.9% of their campaign budgets from 
                                                 
49 The median monthly salary for women and men, respectively, in 2009 was R$1097.93 and R$1518.31. 
Among those with a college degree working in the commercial/business sector, the disparity was even 
more pronounced, with women and men’s median monthly salaries at R$2066.90 and R$3720.60, 
respectively (Ibge, 2010). 
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corporations, female candidates tend to raise significantly less from corporate donors 
(39.4%) than do male candidates (48.6%). Overall, women candidates received only 
14.6% of their funds from corporations, compared to 24.8% for male candidates. The 
average campaign contributions of female candidates was R$225,575 (R$834,621 for 
elected), while male candidates averaged R$347,400 (R$997,389 for elected). In sum, the 
necessity of personal wealth and/or access to corporate donors in weakly institutionalized 
parties disadvantages most women and other outsiders. 
The emphasis on programmatic politics in institutionalized parties, however, 
allows women to focus the campaign on their policy positions rather than their individual 
characteristics. In addition to being more palatable to female political aspirants, who in 
general eschew the combative climate of personalist campaigns (Ellis, 2002; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 350; Shugart, 1994), emphasizing programmatic 
policy appeals may enhance women’s electoral prospects in two ways. First, it allows for 
a more collective campaign, where party militants rather than material resources driven 
by personal wealth or political capital fire up the base, and parties shoulder more of the 
financial burden. Indeed, the correlation of the proportion of candidate campaign 
contributions from parties and party institutionalization is positive and statistically 
significant. Second, as I discuss in Chapter 3, ideas-based campaigns may diminish the 
elector’s reliance on gender stereotypes to evaluate the candidate (Valdini, 2010).  
Party Institutionalization and Women: The Argument in Brief 
As summarized in Table 2.1, the debilitating effects of weakly institutionalized 
parties for women’s electoral prospects are compounding. Not only are such parties 
lacking transparent rules of the game internally and a norm of compliance and thus 
apathetic in enforcing the letter or spirit of the quota law, but the necessity to self-
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nominate upholds the constructed gender gap in formal political ambition, fabricating a 
robust psychological disincentive to participate. Amorphous party organizations sustain 
this disincentive by inhibiting the development of political skillsets and organizational 
support, essentially leaving women (and others) to survive on their own devices. The 
prevalence of personalist politics and prioritization of personal political and financial 
capital then exacerbates inchoate parties’ inability to develop capacity-building 
opportunities for women. 
Table 2.1. The Argument: The Effects of Party Institutionalization on Women’s Electoral 
Prospects 
In contrast, institutionalized parties provide a more hospitable environment for 
outsiders as they are more likely to actively recruit candidates, be accountable to clear 






(1)   Norm of  
          compliance 
 
No transparent rules for 
candidate selection and 
ascending party ranks, no 
expectation of quota compliance 
with good ole’ boy network 
prominent in leadership and 
candidate selection 
Clear and universal rules for  
leadership and candidate 
selection, women can 
anticipate the criteria for 
ascension and there is an 
expectation of quota 
compliance 
(2)   Nomination 
Self-nomination exacerbates 
gender gap in political ambition 
External nomination, active 
recruitment mitigates gender 
gap in political ambition 
(3)  Organizational  




resources) to offer capacity-
building opportunities 
Training opportunities offer 
chance to acquire requisite 
toolkit, enhances confidence 
and perceived viability 
(4)     Personalist/  
          programmatic 
Personalist politics favors those 
with accumulated personal 
political and financial capital 
Programmatic politics favors 
more collective campaigning, 
minimizes prospect of gender 
stereotyping by electorate 
 Will – Contingent upon women-friendly leadership promoting these opportunities for women 
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internal rules and thus conform to a norm of compliance, offer opportunities for political 
training, emphasize programmatic politics, and have and distribute material party 
resources. These benefits bolster female candidates, both in the eyes of voters, and in 
candidates’ own self-perceptions. Nevertheless, I argue that the prospective 
psychological, organizational, and material support effectuated by party 
institutionalization is conditioned by the presence of party leadership that is willing to 
mobilize this potential in the name of actively promoting women’s participation. Thus, a 
given party’s level of institutionalization influences its capacity to support women, but its 
will to do so is determined primarily by the party leadership’s willingness to champion 
women’s involvement (see Figure 1.3). 
Ideology, Party Leadership, and the “Women-Friendliness” of Parties 
Most explanations of the “women-friendliness” of parties center on ideology, with 
some expecting a declining salience of ideology (Matland and Studlar, 1995). I build on 
the latter expectation, arguing that any remaining observed effects of ideology on 
women’s electoral prospects are indirect. I contend that the mechanisms substantiating 
leftist parties’ apparent superiority in accommodating women’s demands operate through 
their greater propensity to: (1) be institutionalized, which grants them the capacity to 
support women, and (2) to have a strong female presence in their top decision-making 
bodies, which enhances their will to support women.50 
Drawing on prior studies of OECD democracies that have demonstrated that 
“women’s presence among the party leadership is the single most important mechanism 
for initiating women’s gains in parliament” (Kittilson, 2006, 37), I argue that the most 
                                                 
50 Note, I demonstrate these two tendencies empirically in Chapter 5. 
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women-friendly parties are those that are well-institutionalized and that have a “critical 
mass” of women in top party decision-making structures. 
In male-dominant parties, women are usually ghettoized into women’s sections 
often denied any say in important party decisions. Such parties call upon their women’s 
sections to mobilize women in the electorate with the sole intent of rallying support for 
the campaigns of male candidates (Llanos and Sample, 2008; Roza et al., 2010, 9-10). In 
contrast, parties with a substantial female presence in party leadership allow women a 
space at the decision-making table. This is a critical distinction; when women have a real 
voice within party decision-making structures, they are able to “let the ladder down” to 
other women (Godinho, 1998; Kittilson, 2006).  
As mapped conceptually in Figure 2.4, when women occupy a critical mass of 
leadership positions in institutionalized parties, they can hold parties accountable to the 
quota provisions, recruit and train female candidates, and mobilize party resources on 
behalf of female aspirants and their campaigns. Indeed, a simple logistic analysis of party 
compliance with the quota demonstrates that state parties with a critical mass of women 
in their leadership are 76.2% more likely than those without a critical mass of women 
leaders to comply with the quota. As summarized by expert José Eustáquio Diniz Alves, 
“The more women in party directorates, the more support to women to run for office. The 
parties that have women in their party leadership are able to elect more women” (quoted 
in Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011). A critical mass of women leaders in institutionalized 





Figure 2.4. The Effects of Women in Leadership of Institutionalized Parties on Women’s 
Electoral Prospects 
With women in party leadership, the ideals of equality espoused but often 
relegated to the realm of the theoretical in leftist parties are more likely to be realized. 
Leftist parties are more likely than non-leftist parties to incorporate women in party 
leadership, yet being leftist per se guarantees neither a party’s incorporation of women in 
leadership nor the electoral success of its candidates. Note, for example, that the effect of 
being a leftist party was statistically insignificant in a simple logistic model predicting a 
party’s odds of complying with the gender quota. In sum, while there is certainly a 
tendency of leftist parties to be sympathetic to issues of equality, leftist ideology is an 
insufficient condition for the incorporation of women in party leadership and the resultant 
promotion of women’s participation. 
Hold party accountable to fulfilling 
gender quota: party more incentivized 
to promote viable female candidacies, 
triggers a virtuous cycle developing 
women’s political ambition and 
capacity while devoting resources 
 
 Recruit female candidates: minimizes 
implications of gender gap in political 
ambition, psychological boost 
 
Women in party leadership  Mentor female political aspirants; 
lobby for and host capacity-building 
opportunities: enhances women’s 
skillset and confidence, seen by voters 
as more competent 
 
Help women acquire party resources: 
finance disadvantage mitigated, women 
seen by voters as more viable 
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Analyzing the rich variation of Brazilian parties in gender composition of party 
leadership and in party institutionalization, I explore how party ideology, women’s 
presence in party leadership, and party institutionalization interact to explain variation in 
women’s electoral prospects across parties. As expected, I find that the positive effect of 
leftist ideology for women’s electoral performance is actually a proxy for party 
institutionalization and women in party leadership. When we bring women in party 
leadership and party institutionalization into the analysis, the effect of ideology for 
women dissipates. This is because these are the mechanisms through which running with 
a leftist party helps female contenders, with the effect of leftist ideology being indirect. 
Moreover, my analysis shows that the positive effects of women’s presence in 
party leadership and party institutionalization for women’s electoral prospects condition 
each other; when party capacity is lacking, regardless of female presence in parties’ top 
decision-making bodies, and vice-versa, I demonstrate that the psychological, 
organizational, and material support so critical for realizing women’s political ambition 
will also be deficient. In short, parties must have both the capacity (institutionalization) 
to promote women’s political participation and the will (women-friendly leadership) to 
do so. 
GENERALIZABILITY 
This dissertation analyzes the extensive variation across Brazil’s 29 political 
parties, 27 electoral districts, five election cycles, and 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian 
Congress to assess the ability of the central hypotheses advanced in the extant literature 
to explain women’s electoral prospects outside the standard advanced-industrial and 
institutionalized party context. I use the full universe of cases of candidacies to the 
Brazilian Congress from 1994 to 2010 to evaluate the conventional wisdom and advance 
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an original argument that establishes the interrelationship between two fundamental 
challenges to democratic representation in Brazil and beyond. The research design thus 
holds constant the national context while exploiting a diverse internal variation in parties 
(Chapters 4 and 5), electoral rules (Chapter 6), and in how parties interact with those 
rules (Chapters 5-7). While the focus of the dissertation is not therefore cross-national, an 
approach which I have argued cannot explain the conundrum of women’s extreme 
underrepresentation in Brazil, consideration of the generalizability of my theory that 
party institutionalization and women in party leadership are the key predictors of 
women’s electoral prospects is nonetheless worthwhile. 
Latin America provides an excellent opportunity to explore the generalizability of 
my theory because, beyond being Brazil’s broader geographic region, it is home to five of 
the 13 countries that employ candidate-based, or “preferential” proportional 
representation voting. In addition to Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and 
Peru all have some form of preferential list voting (Schmidt, 2008). It is also the world’s 
leading region in the use of legislated gender quotas, with Argentina pioneering the 
mechanism in 1991 and 10 other countries throughout Latin America soon following suit 
(see Table 1.3). Moreover, the crisis of representation by which I have framed this 
dissertation is one confronting the region in general (Jones, 2005). Can reforms that 
strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women’s political 
participation resolve democratic deficiencies in countries throughout Latin America and 
potentially beyond? 
Table 2.2 incorporates aggregate-level data from Jones (2005), the Inter-
American Development Bank’s initiative – Gender and Political Parties in Latin America 
(GEPPAL) (http://www.iadb.org/research/geppal), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 
2012), and the Quotas Project (http://www.quotasproject.org) to demonstrate the 
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variation in party system institutionalization, the average proportion of women in the 
national executive committees (NECs) of the major parties in each country, and the 
overall percentage of women in their national legislatures. Although the limited N and 
aggregated character of the data prevent us from drawing any conclusions about the 
effects of our central variables of interest on the electoral prospects of individual women, 
the data allow for an illustration of the general plausibility of my theory beyond the 
Brazilian context. 
Table 2.2. Party System Institutionalization, Women in National Party Leadership, and 

















URUGUAY 84 73 51 97 76 12 19 
D.R. 75 75 50 98 75 21 14 
NICARAGUA 84 62 34 98 70 40 20 
HONDURAS 94 66 40 74 69 20 38 
MEXICO 88 62 33 85 67 26 23 
PANAMA 77 66 41 83 67 9 13 
EL SALVADOR 90 62 35 78 66 26 25 
CHILE 95 49 40 77 65 14 15 
PARAGUAY 79 82 32 65 65 13 16 
ARGENTINA 74 46 34 94 62 37 17 
COSTA RICA 77 62 40 67 62 39 41 
COLOMBIA 89 49 30 73 60 12 34 
BRAZIL 80 49 40 66 59 9 16 
BOLIVIA 66 60 26 72 56 25 40 
VENEZUELA 60 47 42 73 56 17 21 
PERU 51 54 34 75 54 22 31 
ECUADOR 73 53 23 62 53 32 17 
GUATEMALA 58 45 34 58 49 13 16 
 Note: Countries in bold have an “effective quota” (Jones, 2009). 
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Argentina and Costa Rica, the two nations historically enjoying the highest 
rankings on women’s representation (excluding from consideration Cuba’s non-
democratic elections), do indeed fall at the median of Jones’ party system 
institutionalization index, which captures electoral volatility, party roots in society, 
perceived legitimacy of parties and elections, and party organization (assessing party age 
and survey data of elites from the University of Salamanca’s Parliamentary Elites of 
Latin America project) (Jones, 2005). Bolivia also scores at a moderate level of party 
system institutionalization (PSI), and has 25% women in its lower house. While both 
Costa Rica and Bolivia have an impressive average of 40% women in national party 
leadership structures, the average level of women in leadership across Argentine parties 
is only 17 percent. The PSI index for Chile and Paraguay is moderate, but their 
proportion of women in party leadership is weak, leading to a low proportion of women 
in office. 
While the available data constrain any cross-national inferences, in future 
research, I hope to work collaboratively with country experts to compile a cross-national 
candidate-level database. Doing so would facilitate a more thorough assessment of the 
generalizability of my argument, and thus illuminate the capacity of reforms to strengthen 
parties and incentivize their promotion of women’s political participation to resolve the 
crisis of representation confronting Latin America and beyond. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the ensuing chapters, I empirically test the relative explanatory capacity of the 
rival hypotheses of the extant literature discussed above – voter bias and development, 
electoral institutions such as district and party magnitude, and party ideology – and of my 
central argument on the predictive power of party institutionalization and leadership for 
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women’s electoral prospects in Brazil and beyond. I test these alternative explanations at 
the lowest available level, revealing their influence on the election of individual women 
(rather than on the overall proportion of women elected). Bringing the analysis to the 
candidate level and thus seizing Brazil’s extensive interparty variation, this dissertation 
demonstrates the limitations of the traditional explanations for understanding women’s 
extreme underrepresentation in Brazil, while illuminating the unanticipated role of parties 
in mediating women’s political empowerment. My unique approach yields a thorough 
candidate-level analysis in which I amass a rich array of individual, party, and state-level 
data to examine how electoral rules, parties, and voters interact to affect women’s 
representation. 
While I do not contest the persistence of residual machismo and traditional gender 
roles in Brazil, I contend that neither machista voter attitudes nor state development 
levels bear explanatory power for women’s electoral performance in Brazil. To be 
elaborated in Chapter 7, I argue that these traditional explanations of women’s 
underrepresentation do not hold at the candidate level in Brazil because (some) women 
have crafted profiles enabling their electoral success even in the context of non-negligible 
voter hostility. Two ways in which female candidates can win in less developed states is 
by conforming to the traditional gender norms still present among machista electorates 
(supermadre), or by confronting such bias, bulwarked by the psychological, 
organizational, and material support of one’s party (lutadora). In sum, I argue that 
although voter bias against women in politics will certainly deter women’s political 
ambition (see Figure 2.3), once they become candidates, the development of their state 
does not determine their electoral prospects. 
I explore variations in party support across states, parties, and sex in elections to 
the Chamber of Deputies in Chapters Five. Although the institutional context remains 
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constant, district development levels, district and party magnitudes, and party ideology, 
institutionalization, and leadership are varied, and I use this variation to explore how 
parties interact with electoral rules across distinct district and party contexts to mediate 
the effect of gender on electoral outcome. This approach allows me to bring parties to the 
fore of the analysis, which in turn highlights the unanticipated centrality of parties in 
arbitrating women’s political empowerment in Brazil’s candidate-centered elections. 
In Chapter 6, I analyze variation in women’s electoral prospects across the above 
mentioned electoral rules and the incentives for party support or party competition these 
rules generate to assess their explanatory capacity in elections to the Brazilian Chamber 
of Deputies and Senate. I contend that women have achieved unexpected success in the 
more prestigious Senate with seemingly unfavorable electoral rules because these rules 
incentivize parties to rally behind their candidate(s) in Senate elections. The analysis 
demonstrates that when electoral rules incentivize party support, the positive effect of 
women in party leadership is amplified, with female candidates of such parties being 
particularly well-equipped to win. The cross-chamber comparison highlights how the 
effects of electoral rules are not always direct, are often mediated by parties, and can 
interact to affect the electoral prospects of female political aspirants in Brazil. 
Indeed, as illustrated in the chapter ahead, an exclusive emphasis on formal 
electoral rules rarely yields an adequate explanation of political outcomes, particularly in 
the context of weak institutions. Next, I discuss the limitations of Brazil’s poorly 
designed and only recently enforced gender quota, and the resistance by inchoate and 
male-led parties to the implementation and subsequent reforms of the quota. I contend 
that the poor compatibility of open-list electoral rules with gender quotas cannot fully 
account for the severe underrepresentation of women in Brazil, nor can it explain the 
variation across its political parties. I conclude in Chapter 3, as in the chapters that 
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follow, that electoral and party systems intersect, and that comprehensive explanations 
for our most fundamental questions – such as the conditions enhancing representation and 
accountability – necessitate an integrative approach. 
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Chapter 3 – Brazil’s Lei de Cotas: The Challenges of Incentivizing the 
Representation of Women in the Context of Preferential Voting and 
Inchoate Parties 
Countries around the world have achieved considerable gains in women’s 
representation through the implementation of gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Tripp and 
Kang, 2008). Whether through reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, or voluntary 
party quotas, such mechanisms have contributed to leveling the playing field between 
male and female contenders in the heretofore pervasively masculine political realm. The 
results, however, have not been uniformly positive. In several cases there have been 
instances of elite resistance and backlash, leading to a circumvention of the intended 
results of the quota (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, 2009).1 Moreover, as will be 
explored below, not all electoral and party systems have proven conducive to the use of 
quotas. 
This chapter contends that Brazil’s Lei de Cotas has been substantially 
undermined not only by the country’s open-list electoral context, but also by its 
abundance of inchoate parties. I start with a brief explanation of Brazil’s electoral and 
party systems that establish for the reader a baseline understanding of Brazilian elections. 
I then discuss the hypothesized effects of the electoral system on women’s representation, 
drawing on cross-national experiences under the condition of preferential (candidate-
based list) voting to explain how open-list and other preferential electoral systems2 may 
disadvantage female contenders. This is followed by a brief discussion of women’s roles 
in contemporary Brazilian politics. Next, I review the literature on gender quotas and the 
                                                 
11 In Bolivia for example, (predominately male) party elites actually tweaked the names of candidates to 
feign compliance with their electoral quota (Costa Benavides, 2003)! 
2 Examples of preferential voting systems are open-list PR, flexible formats, single transferable vote, and 
the single non-transferable vote (Schmidt, 2009). 
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global campaign to fast-track women’s representation through quotas, and discuss the 
process of quota design, implementation, and reform in Brazil. Building on these 
discussions, I explain how Brazil’s electoral context – shaped by both the electoral and 
party systems – has posed challenges to the quota law. I conclude that because electoral 
rules do not exist in a vacuum, formal institutional fixes to the electoral system must be 
paired with reforms that target the informal practices of party elites. 
Driven by select success stories widely trumpeted by international organizations 
and pressures to appear ‘modern’ and inclusive, the use of quotas to enhance women’s 
representation has diffused around the world (Dahlerup, 2006), reaching countries from 
Rwanda (ranked 1st worldwide, with 56.3% women in the lower house) to Afghanistan 
(ranked 35
th
 with 27.7% women in the lower house) (IPU, 2012). Since closed-list 
proportional representation elections greatly facilitate the mechanics of candidate quotas 
(Htun and Jones, 2002), many analyses quickly dismiss quotas in open-list elections such 
as those in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and move on.3 As a result, knowledge of 
the effects of quotas on women’s representation in preferential voting systems remains 
limited. Discussions of the effects of party systems on the functioning of quotas are even 
more elusive.4 
If quotas are to be promoted as mechanisms to achieve equality in legislative 
representation, we must broaden our understanding of their interactions with the electoral 
and party systems in which they are embedded. This chapter contributes to this mission, 
responding to Mona Lena Krook’s call – “Ideally, future work will focus on analyzing 
single cases and situating them in relation to other quota campaigns” (2009, 226) – and 
                                                 
3 Brazilian political scientist Clara Araújo (1999, 2001, 2005, 2007) has been a pioneer in research on the 
Brazilian quota, but much work remains. 
4 A noteworthy exception is Mona Lena Krook’s recent study, which examines how systemic (electoral and 
party systems), practical, and normative institutions are gendered, can hinder women’s representation, and 
can be ameliorated by reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas, respectively (2009). 
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thus enhancing our comprehension of how quotas may be successfully employed to 
empower marginalized groups. It also reveals that while the Brazilian quota law is 
certainly limited in scope by the open-list format of its proportional elections, this feature 
cannot fully account for its striking failure to induce real change in the tendencies by 
many parties to marginalize women, nor can it explain the variation among parties. 
Rather, a key component of the explanation for why the quota has failed rests in the 
inchoate character of most Brazilian parties, for which the quota law remains a “lei que 
não pega” (law on paper only) and where, in the absence of effective party organizations, 
candidate recruitment and support are driven by the whims of domineering personalist 
party leaders. This conclusion has fundamental implications for reform efforts, which 
must work to strengthen parties if they are to achieve significant advances in the 
representation of women and other marginalized groups. 
BRAZIL’S ELECTORAL CONTEXT 
The Brazilian legislature is bicameral, with an upper house (Senate) and lower 
house (Chamber of Deputies) comprised of 81 and 513 members, respectively. Elections 
to the Chamber of Deputies are held every four years, concurrently with presidential, 
gubernatorial, senatorial, and state legislative assembly elections. Each of Brazil’s 27 
districts elects multiple statewide representatives to the Chamber of Deputies, with a 
minimum of 8 and maximum of 70. These floor and ceiling limits on the number of 
representatives per district, or “district magnitude,” induce a high degree of 
malapportionment, with the most populous state, São Paulo, having more than ten times 
more inhabitants per deputy than the least populous state, Roraíma (Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics, 2010).  
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Voters cast a single vote for federal deputy, and while they can vote either for a 
party (voto de legenda) or a candidate, over 90% of valid votes5 cast in the 2010 
Chamber of Deputies elections were for a candidate (25% of legenda votes were for the 
governing Workers’ Party [PT] alone).6  Coalitions across Brazil’s 29 registered political 
parties are common, and often afford political influence to smaller parties in spite of an 
electoral threshold. Seats to the Chamber of Deputies are allocated using the highest 
averages method (known as the d’Hondt formula) to calculate the electoral quotient 
threshold – the minimum votes parties/coalitions must earn to gain a seat.  
Seats are then divvied up among each party/coalition according to each 
candidate’s preference votes. For example, if a candidate attains the third highest quantity 
of votes in her coalition, but the coalition only wins enough total votes (equal to the sum 
of its candidates’ preference votes and the member parties’ legenda votes) for two seats, 
this candidate is not elected but remains the highest ranked substitute (suplente). 
Substitutes are called upon when elected members leave office before their term is up. It 
is quite common for federal deputies to contest the mayoral post, with municipal 
elections staggered by two years with presidential, gubernatorial, and federal and state 
legislative elections. In 2008, 277 senators and federal and state deputies ran for mayor or 
vice-mayor (Folha, 2008). Five senators and 87 federal deputies in the 54
th
 Congress 
(2011-2014) ran for mayor in the October 2012 elections; 25 of those deputies were 
ultimately successful (Brazil Focus, 29 October 2012; Congresso em Foco, 2012). This 
practice means that substitutes often reach office, with the 53
rd
 Congress (2007-2010) 
including 123 substitutes serving as federal deputies.7 
                                                 
5 The “valid votes” total used in electoral calculations excludes blank and null ballots (as of 1998). 
6 Calculated by the author using data from the TSE website (http://www.tse.gov.br). 
7 Calculated by author using data from the Chamber of Deputies website (http://www2.camara.gov.br). 
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Brazilian elections – even for the legislative bodies – are largely candidate-
centered affairs. This is a by-product of the open-list proportional representation (OLPR) 
system used in elections for federal and state deputy and municipal councilor, with 
electors casting their votes for candidates rather than for parties (as is the case in closed-
list PR elections).
8
 The open-list format incentivizes fellow partisans to compete amongst 
themselves (Ames, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Nicolau, 2006), leading to extremely 
expensive candidate-centered campaigns as candidates spend to lend visibility to their 
individual campaign (Samuels, 2001). The name and number of candidates rather than 
the party label often figures most prominently. In the (usually electronic) voting booth, 
electors are not presented with a list of candidates but instead must recall and key in the 
four-digit number of their candidate for federal deputy.
9
 The first two digits are the party 
number (the PT is 13), with the second two indicating the candidate. 
Figure 3.1. Electoral Flyer, Rio Grande do Sul (2010) 
     Figure 3.1 depicts a flyer 
from the 2010 elections, 
intended as a guide for electors 
to bring into the voting booth. 
Candidates scramble for the 
most desirable (easy to 
remember) number, with 
incumbents entitled to their 
                                                 
8 As mentioned above, the voto de legenda option is infrequently exercised. 
9 Candidates for president and governor run under the two-digit party number, senatorial candidates have a 
three-digit number, and state legislative assembly candidates have a five-digit number. Electors must recall 
all of these numbers, or as is common, bring in a cheat sheet of sorts (see Figure 3.1). 
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number from prior campaigns and newcomers left to pick among the remaining available 
numbers. Throughout the 45-day campaign season, candidates contract drivers to 
circulate their districts in cars with external speakers blasting jingles that pound home 
their number for constituents. 
Campaigns are privately-financed by donations from individuals and 
corporations, with an increasing share of revenues coming from parties. In the 2010 
Chamber of Deputies elections, on average 16.1% and 43.5% of reported candidate funds 
came from corporations and party organizations, respectively. These campaigns are 
extremely expensive, with the average contributions for winning candidates in 2010 
reaching R$1.1 million (over half a million dollars). Candidates spend a significant 
portion of their budgets traveling the large distances usually required to run a statewide 
campaign. For example, Amazonas (Brazil’s largest state), is more than double the size of 
Texas at 1.5 million square kilometers, without the benefit of a well-maintained highway 
system. The production of campaign publicity materials (flyers, banners, stickers, etc.) 
often consumes the bulk of candidate budgets.  
While candidates are also responsible for paying to produce their media 
advertisements, which can be quite expensive, the federal government actually allocates 
free television and radio air time to each party, with purchased air time being strictly 
forbidden and even “earned” media being highly regulated during the campaign season.10 
Negative campaigning – including parodies or other sketches by media outlets ridiculing 
particular politicians – is also illegal. For the Chamber of Deputies elections, a 25-minute 
segment is broadcast twice a day, three days a week, on all open (non-cable) television 
channels and radio stations for the 45-day campaign season in the form of Horário 
                                                 
10 If the TSE deems a media outlet to have non-equitable coverage of candidates, fines are assessed. 
However, this practice, “isonomy,” has thus far primarily been applied in executive elections (Knight 
Center for Journalism in the Americas, 2010). 
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Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral (HGPE, Free Hour of Electoral Propaganda), and also 
in off-years for party building in the form of Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Partidária 
(Free Hour of Party Propaganda). The federal government allocates this time in part (1/3) 
equally among parties and coalitions11 and in part (2/3) in proportion to the size of their 
congressional presence (Lei Eleitoral 9.504/1997, Article 47). How parties subsequently 
divvy up the HGPE time among candidates has historically been at their discretion, 
although mandates for equitable distribution of HGPE time are the subject of proposed 
political reforms. 
As predicted by Duverger’s Law, the mechanical and psychological effects of 
Brazil’s proportional representation electoral system have resulted in a plethora of 
parties, with 29 currently registered and an effective number of parties at the legislative 
level (ENPP) of 10.36 in 2010 (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008, 2011). It is important to 
note, however, that nearly 42% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies are currently held 
by the top three parties (PT, PMDB, PSDB), with these parties winning five of the six 
presidential elections held since the country’s return to democracy.  
The PMDB, or Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, is a catch-all party that 
emerged from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the only sanctioned 
opposition party for most of the 1964-1985 military regime. Although the PMDB has not 
run its own viable presidential candidate since it won the 1985 election, it remains a 
highly sought after coalition party that has alternately supported the rival parties, the 
PSDB and the PT.  
The Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) was originally a center-left off-
shoot of the PMDB, but since its 1988 founding has drifted rightward and become known 
                                                 
11 To qualify parties/coalitions must currently have representation in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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for its support of neoliberal economic policies and technocratic directives, in addition to 
administrative decentralization and anti-corruption efforts. The PSDB’s most prominent 
politician is the widely respected social scientist and popular former president, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2001), who is credited with stabilizing Brazil’s fiscal and 
political systems after rampant hyperinflation and the impeachment process of former 
president Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-92).  
Finally, the Workers’ Party (PT) is “Latin America’s largest, most organized and 
arguably most innovative left party” (Hunter, 2010, 2). Founded in 1980 by São Paulo 
union leaders, liberation theologists, and leftist intellectuals and artists, the PT was 
pivotal in mobilizing the citizenry on a grassroots rather than corporatist basis and 
bringing democracy back to Brazil. The PT was seemingly in perpetual opposition until 
Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) finally won his (fourth!) bid for the presidency in 2002. 
Since then, the PT has grown tremendously and has remained in control of the 
presidency, with Lula’s former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, gaining election in 2010. 
One of the most defining characteristics of Brazil’s party system stems from its 
open-list variant of proportional representation legislative elections. The OLPR system 
formally diminishes the ballot control of party leaders, with candidates’ rank order on 
lists and thus prospects for a seat determined not by the party leader but by candidate vote 
share. Until 2002, the candidato nato, or “birthright candidate,” provision actually 
guaranteed incumbents a place on the party list, even if they had switched parties since 
first gaining election. This can result in weakened party discipline and undermine the 
significance of party labels for constituents. While a voluminous debate exists over the 
end product of the Brazilian party system, with Figueiredo and Limongi being the most 
prolific advocates of the view that presidential power and intra-legislative mechanisms 
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induce party discipline and cohesion in spite of OLPR (1995, 2000), “there is much less 
debate over the (anti-party) incentives of the electoral rules” (Desposato, 2006, 7-8). 
The diminished ballot control by party leaders, the prevalence of candidate rather 
than party voting by electors, and the intraparty competition these factors induce led 
Carey and Shugart to characterize Brazilian elections as having a high degree of 
personalization (1995). Moreover, under the condition of intraparty competition, 
evidence suggests that the incentive to cultivate a personal vote increases with district 
magnitude (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005).12  This is 
because candidates must differentiate themselves from the mass of candidates running in 
their party and others. 
As demonstrated in the U.S. and comparative literatures, the personal vote – “that 
portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, 
qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987, 9) – reifies the 
“electoral connection” (Mayhew, 1974), incumbency, and personal wealth (Ames, 1995; 
Carey and Shugart, 1995). In such a system, candidates may also successfully use 
“identifier characteristics” indicating their societal grouping to distinguish themselves 
(Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005). While voters often use party label as a heuristic, 
or information shortcut, in their decision-making calculus, voters may also employ such 
candidate traits, with “the gender of a candidate [being] one of the ‘cheapest’ bits of 
information to gather” (Valdini, 2010, 13). This is particularly likely in Brazil’s open-list 
elections, where a single party is allotted at minimum 1.5 times the number of seats up 
for grabs, with the elector casting a single vote. For example, in 2006, the Partido Verde 
(Green Party – PV) in São Paulo ran 90 candidates (five were elected). 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, the authors found district magnitude to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of a 
personal vote for systems without intraparty competition (Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005; Valdini, 
2010). 
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WOMEN AND THE PERSONAL VOTE  
Recent studies find that the presence of the personal vote often has a negative 
effect on women’s electoral prospects (Thames and Williams, 2010; Valdini, 2010). 
Although earlier scholarship had anticipated a positive effect of preferential voting on 
women’s representation, presuming party elites to harbor more bias against women than 
would the electorate, these studies were based primarily in Western European countries 
(Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Rule, 1994). Are Brazil’s political parties also more 
biased against women than the electorate? Valdini explains the discrepancy in recent and 
earlier findings by the moderating effect of even moderate levels of voter bias on the 
relationship between the personal vote and women’s representation (2010). In other 
words, the negative effect she finds of the personal vote on women’s representation is 
conditional upon voter bias against women. In countries where voter bias is nearly 
absent, however, the personal vote does not have a significant effect on the overall 
proportion of women elected, a finding she expected would also apply to individual 
women’s electoral prospects.13 
To be precise, Valdini finds that when the percent of World Values Survey 
(WVS) respondents in a country strongly agreeing with the statement “men make better 
politicians than women” is very low (one standard deviation below the mean of 10%), the 
marginal effect of the personal vote on women in the legislature is not statistically 
different from zero. As more and more respondents strongly agree with this statement, 
the effect becomes increasingly negative (Valdini, 2010). With 11.4% of Brazilian 
respondents in the 2008 wave of the LAPOP survey strongly agreeing with this 
statement, but only 5.9% of Brazilian respondents for the 2005 World Values Survey 
strongly agreeing with the statement, it is not quite clear, but is plausible that the personal 
                                                 
13 Personal communication with Valdini, April 30, 2011. 
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vote14 may exercise a negative effect on women’s representation in Brazil (LAPOP, 
2008; WVS, 2005-2008).15 
Table 3.1. OLPR, Voter Bias, and Women’s Representation 
  % Women in Lower 
House 
Bias Against Women 
(% Strongly Agreeing) 
Legislated and Party Quotas 
  
                    Brazil 8.8 5.9 
                    Brazil* 8.8 11.4 
                    Dominican Republic* 20.8 20.2 
                    Ecuador* 32.3 5.0 
   Legislated Quotas 
  
                    Peru 21.5 2.3 
                    Peru* 21.5 3.9 
                    Poland 23.7 10.5 
   Party Quotas 
  
                    Chile 14.2 17.6 
                    Cyprus 10.7 10.2 
                    Luxembourg 25.0 - 
                    Switzerland 28.5 3.5 
   No Quotas 
  
                    Finland 42.5 3.9 
                    Latvia 23.0 - 
                    Liechtenstein 24.0 - 
                    San Marino 18.3 - 
Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012); Schmidt (2008); World Values Survey (2005-2008) 
* WVS unavailable so substituted 2008 AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2008). Given the observed   
   differences between the AmericasBarometer and WVS, I included both scores when possible. 
If the electoral disadvantage for women posed by the incentive to cultivate a 
personal vote is conditioned by voter bias, the severity of women’s underrepresentation 
in Brazil is excessively heightened given relatively moderate levels of intense bias 
                                                 
14 Valdini codes this dichotomously, and includes non-list variants such as SMD/plurality systems. 
15 This discrepancy is smaller for the total percentage of respondents agreeing (somewhat and strongly), 
with 30.8% of the 2005 WVS respondents agreeing, and 33.5% of the 2008 AmericasBarometer 
respondents agreeing (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 2005-2008). 
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(“strongly agree”) against women. In a 2010 nationwide survey, 81.0-83.8% of 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with similar statements regarding perceived 
male political superiority, with only 4.1-4.7% strongly agreeing (and an additional 12.1-
14.3% agreeing) (CESOP, 2010). Nevertheless, as displayed in Table 3.1, despite 
relatively moderate levels of voter bias, Brazil suffers the lowest rate of women’s 
representation of all countries with preferential voting. Even countries with comparable 
(and higher!) levels of bias among voters outperform Brazil in terms of women’s 
legislative presence (IPU, 2012; LAPOP, 2008; WVS 1981-2008). 
Moreover, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Poland have all had 
significantly more success combining legislated gender quotas with preferential voting 
(see Table 3.1). In short, Brazil’s OLPR electoral system cannot fully account for the 
near exclusion of women from political decision-making. It is also an insufficient 
explanation for interstate and interparty variation within Brazil. Accordingly, in the 
ensuing chapters, I consider how various parties interact with electoral rules such as 
OLPR and the quota to affect the electoral prospects of women in Brazil.  
WOMEN AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this extreme underrepresentation of women persists in 
spite of the strength and breadth of the women’s movement, their vast participation in 
other avenues of informal politics and among the party rank-and-file, and significant 
societal progress. Since gaining the right to vote by Getúlio Vargas’ presidential decree in 
1932 – itself the result of a prolonged battle for women’s suffrage – women’s political 
progress in Brazil has been gradual (see Table 3.2). Vargas’ authoritarian Estado Novo 
phase (1937-1945) and the 1964-1985 military regime posed setbacks to this crawling 
progress. While a handful of women did serve during the period of military rule, it was 
 96 
mostly as surrogates for their husbands or male relatives who had been imprisoned, 
exiled, or otherwise declared ineligible through the infamous Institutional Act Number 1, 
in what was a largely ceremonial congress (Avelar, 2001). Throughout this period, 
women remained economically and politically marginalized. As late as 1988, 78% of 
working women were employed in the lowest sectors, earning only 60% of that earned by 
men (Ipea, 1988, cited in Avelar, 2001). 
Table 3.2. Women’s Representation in the Chamber of Deputies (1932-2010) 
Nevertheless, women mobilized in great numbers in the Amnesty and Diretas Já 
(Direct Elections Now) movements of the 1970s and 1980s, helping to re-democratize 
Brazil (Alvarez, 1990). Their activism propelled women’s engagement in formal politics 
and in 1986, 26 women were elected to the Constitutional Assembly. This so-called 
“lobby do batom” (lipstick lobby) of the Constitutional Assembly achieved impressive 
results and revitalized women’s insertion into the formal political realm. In the second 
election to occur since the implementation of the gender quota, the 2002 elections saw 
Year Candidates Elected 
 
Year Candidates Elected 
       1932 1 1 
 
1978 - 4 
1935 - 2 
 
1982 58 8 
1946 18 0 
 
1986 166 26 
1950 9 1 
 
1990 229 29 
1954 13 3 
 
1994 185 32 
1958 8 2 
 
1998 348 29 
1962 9 2 
 
2002 480 42 
1965 13 6 
 
2006 627 45 
1970 4 1 
 
2010 929 45 
1974 4 1 
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another increase in women’s political presence. It has since, however, plateaued across 
elected offices (see Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2. Women’s Political Progress Stalled 
To clarify the pervasively masculine character of Brazilian politics, a few points 
regarding the incumbency advantage and the revolving door are in order. Although the 
abovementioned “candidato nato” (birthright candidate) provision no longer exists, and 
rates of renewal are higher in the Brazilian Congress (an average of 46.2% from 1994-
2010) than that of many countries allowing reelection, incumbency remains the key 
predictor of electoral success. Even after controlling for several candidate (sex, 
education, occupation, marital status, campaign finance), party (ideology, party 
































incumbents were 5 to 10 times more likely to win election than non-incumbents in the 
five recent elections to the Chamber of Deputies (1994-2010).  
Moreover, this renewal, or “oxygenation” as it has been called in Brazil, has itself 
historically occurred among the politically savvy, with it “difficult (for an aspirant) to 
reach the parliament without having had some type of political experience” (Santos, 
1999, 105). While Samuels’ (2003) work on political ambition in the context of Brazilian 
federalism demonstrates that most politicians in Brazil do not seek a legislative career 
(using it instead as a springboard to subnational offices), it is also true that there is 
essentially a revolving door linking elected and appointed positions, with many 
politicians returning to the Congress after serving as mayor, governor, or even president. 
Of the federal deputies serving from 1987-1999, 19.8 and 72.3 percent (respectively) had 
already won executive and legislative elections in prior years, with 39.1% having been 
previously appointed to the bureaucracy (30.5% in the primary post) (Santos, 1999, 102-
4). 








Governor 7.4 Federal Minister 5.4 
Senator 14.8 State Secretary 16.5 
Federal Deputy 8.8 Municipal Secretary (capitals) 19.9 
State Deputy 12.9 Municipal Secretary 8.0 
Mayor 9.1 
  
Municipal Councilor 12.5 
 
 
Yet, such a “political trajectory” has proven the least accessible to women 
(Álvares, 2004). In short, the widespread claim of permeability of Brazil’s Chamber of 
Deputies rings hollow for those without some kind of prior political experience. As 
shown in Table 3.3, women comprise a meager 7.4 to 19.9 percent of all bureaucratic and 
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elected posts (other than the presidency) (Secretary of Women’s Affairs, 2010), 
constituting a “vicious cycle” of exclusion that is difficult to break (Pinheiro, 2007, 83). 
The incapacity and/or unwillingness of most Brazilian parties to promote women’s 
participation have essentially closed the traditional party-based trajectory to women. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 7, most of Brazil’s few female politicians have managed to 
break the cycle of exclusion by toting traditional gender norms, inheriting familial 
political capital, or converting capital acquired through their experiences outside of 
formal politics into the requisite political capital. 
An explanation of the limitations of Brazil’s quota requires a brief survey of the 
international discourse and tremendous moment for the use of quotas to remedy gender 
inequities, followed by a discussion of the processes of quota design, implementation, 
and reform. 
FAST-TRACKING WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION 
Confronting the generally glacial pace of cultural changes, many nations have 
looked to quotas and other institutional reforms as promising mechanisms for fast-
tracking the political participation of such marginalized groups. Indeed, the more than 
100 countries that have implemented gender quotas have achieved marked results in 
enhancing the representation of women, with recent studies finding quotas to be the 
single greatest explanatory factor of women’s representation (Tripp and Kang, 2008).16 
As I illustrate in this dissertation, however, due to extensive variation in the dynamics 
and enforcement of quotas and the nuances of the electoral and party systems in which 
                                                 
16 With a sample of 153 countries (77 with a quota), Tripp and Kang found the effect of gender quotas to 
be positive and statistically significant. Constructing a baseline model (setting other common explanatory 
factors to their mean), they find that the addition of a quota raises the percentage of women elected from 
9.3 to 16.1, a jump of more than 70% (2008, 351). 
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they are embedded, such institutional remedies have in many countries proven 
insufficient agents for enhancing women’s representation.17 
The Platform for Action agreed upon at the Fourth UN World Conference on 
Women in Beijing in 1995 shifted the discourse on women and politics toward targeting 
mechanisms of exclusion and affirmed the goal of women’s equitable decision-making 
power, recommending the use of positive affirmative action to achieve equality 
(Dahlerup, 2006, 4). Women’s movements leveraged this discourse to confer legitimacy 
to still controversial quota measures, with international organizations such as the UN, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), and 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) playing an active role in promoting quotas 
(Dahlerup, 2006; International IDEA, 2011; IPU, 2011).  
In 1992, the IPU issued a strong resolution emboldening the drive for equitable 
representation, “The concept of democracy will only assume true and dynamic 
significance when political policies and national legislation are decided upon jointly by 
men and women with equitable regard for the interests and aptitudes of both halves of the 
population” (IPU, 1994). The Beijing Platform subsequently asserted that “without the 
active participation of women and incorporation of women’s perspective(s) at all levels 
of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved” 
(Fourth UN World Conference on Women, 1995, Article 181). In sum, by the mid-1990s, 
the goal of women’s empowerment had gained tremendous visibility, with quotas 
becoming the go-to solution to remedy their persistent exclusion from political power in 
many parts of the world (Dahlerup, 2006). 
                                                 
17 Furthermore, recent studies have shown the insufficiency of quota laws in achieving meaningful 
substantive representation (“politics of ideas” (Phillips, 1995)), due not only to the unintended consequence 
of such laws limiting their benefactors’ credibility and policymaking latitude (Franceschet and Piscopo, 
2008), but also to the heterogeneity of these groups and their interests (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, 
2009). This study, however, is limited to explaining the conditions under which women get elected. 
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With 11 of 18 Latin American democracies adopting legislated gender quotas, it 
is considered the leading region in the drive to fast-track women’s representation through 
quotas.18 Eager to differentiate themselves from military regimes and accrue both 
domestic and external legitimacy, post-dictatorial governments have espoused a rhetoric 
of “good governance,” a discourse often associated with equality and rights for 
marginalized groups (Araújo and Garcia, 2006). The story of Argentina’s impressive 
success was widely trumpeted – just four years after introducing the quota in 1991, the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies saw a fivefold increase in women’s legislative presence. 
Referred to as the “Argentina ‘contagion effect,’” countries across the region (and 
beyond) implemented party and legislative quotas in the late 1990s (Araújo and Garcia, 
2006; Marx, Borner, and Camionotti, 2007). 
BRAZIL’S LEI DE COTAS 
The use of gender quotas in Brazil was initiated by the PT, which in 1991 
instituted a requirement that party directorates must at minimum be comprised of 30% 
women. In 1993, the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT), the country’s largest union, 
followed suit. Although discussions of the successes of these measures as well as the 
Argentine quota appeared in reports from meetings of the women’s movement in 
preparation for the 1995 Beijing Conference, along with recommendations for positive 
actions to achieve gender equality in decision-making spheres, much of the women’s 
movement appears to have tiptoed around any explicit reference to legislated gender 
quotas (Araújo, 1999).  
Instead, it was PT Deputies Marta Suplicy and Paulo Bernardo who first 
introduced the proposal to amend the electoral law to require parties to advance female 
                                                 
18 Venezuela’s 1997 gender quota was declared unconstitutional in 2000, reducing the number to 10. Most 
of the remaining countries have voluntary party quotas. 
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candidacies. In preparation for the pivotal 1995 Beijing Conference, Marta Suplicy (then 
federal deputy, currently senator) had attended two conferences, one in Brussels of the 
European Union, and one soon thereafter in São Paulo of Latin American and Caribbean 
women legislators where the groundbreaking experiences with quotas in Scandinavian 
countries and Argentina, respectively, were discussed. A few weeks after the São Paulo 
conference, building on Argentina’s success and the international attention surrounding 
women’s empowerment resulting from the upcoming Beijing Conference, she and 
Deputy Bernardo proposed the gender quota (Suplicy, 1996). 
With a surprising lack of publicized debate throughout the process (Araújo, 1999, 
117), several qualifications of the proposed quota law emerged.19 One entailed an 
increase in the number of vacancies on candidate lists from 100% of the seats contested 
to 120% for each party (Suplicy, 1996).20 Former Deputy, Senator, and Minister Emília 
Fernandes said the bancada feminina knew then that the quota law was “completely 
insufficient,” but it was all they could get through (Interview with author, April, 2009). In 
practice, this compromise ensured that the number of vacancies available for men was not 
reduced, therefore sustaining general support for the measure (Fêmea, 2007). For 
example, before the increase in vacancies, each party in a state with a district magnitude 
of eight could advance eight candidates. Instead of the quota requiring that of these eight, 
no more than five were men, the increase allows each party to advance twelve candidates 
(and thus still allowing each party to advance eight male candidates). 
                                                 
19 Among the provisions excluded from the approved version were proposals to require each candidate’s 
sex be listed on ballots/electronic voting machines, greater female presence in HGPE, and a publicity 
campaign divulging the existence of the quota. The TSE did, however, require candidates to list their sex 
upon registering their candidacy (Araújo, 1999, 116). 
20 The quota approved also entailed a reduction of the target to 20 percent. Soon thereafter, the target was 
raised to 30%, with the permitted vacancies on candidate lists increased to 150% per party, or 200% per 
coalition. For the eight states with a district magnitude greater than 20, the number of vacancies is 200% 
per party (or 250% per coalition) (Araújo, 1999; Macaulay, 2006). 
 103 
The result, however, is a diluted quota (Suplicy, 1996). With so many vacancies, 
parties need not fill their lists to be competitive and are therefore not incentivized to fill 
the quota (Interview with Former Deputy Judge Denise Frossard, June, 2009). In the end, 
the candidacies most lacking are female candidacies, with parties rarely coming close to 
meeting the quota. For example, in the 2010 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the 
electoral rules allowed 11,414 candidacies (for 513 seats!), but there were “only” 4,857 
candidates (42.6% percent of the available spots), 19.1% of these women.21  Moreover, 
such a large number of candidates drives up campaign budgets by requiring that 
candidates spend more to differentiate themselves from their co-partisans. Given gender 
gaps in campaign finance (discussed above and in Chapters 4 and 5), this factor further 
disadvantages most women contenders. 
Moreover, the effects of the Brazilian quota are inherently limited given open-list 
PR elections, where a party could advance 30% women candidates and still elect an 
exclusively male delegation. Closed-list PR elections with placement mandates almost 
guarantee that candidate quotas will deliver results. Placement mandates, which require 
parties to present a pre-ordered list of candidates that alternates candidates by sex in 
accordance with the quota target, stipulate that party leaders put women in electable 
positions. For example, for a quota of 30%, every third candidate must be female. This 
inhibits the disturbing tendency of party leaders to cluster female candidacies at the 
bottom of their lists. But in the Brazilian case, where candidate ordering on the pre-
electoral list is presumably irrelevant for electoral outcome, placement mandates are 
inapplicable. 
                                                 
21 Calculated by the author using data from the TSE, following Samuels (2008). 
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The top-down implementation of the Lei de Cotas driven by the Argentine 
experience and the hype surrounding the Beijing Conference resulted in a process that 
was not only a poor fit for the Brazilian system, but also not organic, lacking broad 
participation from the women’s movement (Araújo, 1999). Many feminists viewed 
quotas with reservation due to their emphasis on difference, quantification, and the 
potential to set a ceiling, and no consensus emerged. In the final reports and statements of 
the women’s movement leading up to the Beijing Conference, quotas were not 
mentioned; rather, the women’s movement emphasized pushing parties directly to 
incentivize women’s participation in party life and as candidates and in particular, to 
promote political capacity-building opportunities for women (Araújo, 1999). As recently 
as 2009, more than a decade after its implementation, less than a quarter of respondents 
in a national survey had even heard of the quota law (Ibope, 2009). It is therefore no 
surprise that the generic quota, a product of diffusion from the Argentine success, has not 
materialized results in Brazil’s quite different open-list PR elections. 
While the above narrative provides part of the explanation for the failure of the 
quota, it is not the entire story. Brazil ranks the 6
th
 lowest in terms of women legislators 
of the more than 60 countries with legislated quotas, and other countries have attained 
considerably greater success combining OLPR and quotas (IPU, 2012; Quota Project, 
2012). Moreover, some parties have achieved significantly more results than others. In 
sum, the mechanics of OLPR elections are part of the problem, but we must also consider 
the context in which these rules are embedded. The following discussions on the limited 
results of the quota and its recent mini-reform demonstrate the insufficiency of an 
exclusive focus on changing the formal rules; rules do not exist in a vacuum, and 
adequate consideration must be given to the interactions between electoral rules, parties, 
and voters. 
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PARTIES AND THE (REFORMED) LEI DE COTAS 
As North argued, formal institutional change that “ignores the deep-seated 
cultural inheritance that underlies many informal constraints” will often fall short of 
producing a new equilibrium; even in the instance of a “wholesale change in the formal 
rules…there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity” (1990, 
91). Consistent with accounts of layered institutional change (Thelen, 1999), male 
politicians voting to implement the quota sought rationally to accommodate demands for 
change and greater inclusion while maintaining their own power, which would have 
necessarily been diluted by an effective gender quota (Fêmea, 2007).22 As will be 
substantiated in the ensuing chapters, electoral rules are endogenous to power structures 
themselves, and despite the focus of the electoral systems literature, such rules rarely 
exercise a direct and unmediated effect on outcomes. 
Araújo explains that debate against the quota was so limited because there was a 
complicit understanding that “quotas would not alter the political engineering of the 
process of political composition of candidacies and of competition” (1999, 129). A clear 
instance of layered institutional change (Thelen, 1999), the quota was summarily diluted 
and pushed through with no expectation that it would actually change the power 
structures in place. Indeed, Deputy Jandira Feghali stated that while it was politically 
incorrect for a politician to position himself against the gender quota, “they also knew 
deep down that it (the quota) did not have the power to alter this structure, such that 
nothing passed that signified concrete support” (quoted in Araújo, 1999, 125). Given that 
mere inclusion on the electoral list was secondary to “the weight of subsequent 
                                                 
22 “The political parties – institutions notoriously masculine in terms of their leadership, functioning, and 
priorities – were able to make it such that the minimum of 20% was not defined as obligatory in the 
legislation, and that the number of spaces on the electoral list was increased…so that the number of spaces 
available for male candidates did not diminish” (Fêmea, 2007, IX.150, 10). 
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arrangements that are necessary to turn a candidacy potentially electable,” the potential of 
the quota to fundamentally alter power structures through the incorporation of new voices 
into the political decision-making process was inherently limited (Araújo, 1999, 129). As 
stated by Deputy Luiza Erundina, the quota law “has had almost no efficacy, it was 
merely a formal achievement” (quoted in Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2011a). 
In short, an excessive emphasis on formal structures is inappropriate. “Many 
studies have focused on the formal recruitment process as set out in legal regulations, 
constitutional conventions and formal party rules. These studies often assume that the 
formal processes determine the outcome. The obvious weakness of this approach is that 
formal rules may have little bearing on informal practices” (Norris, 1997, 9). As I make 
clear in the following discussion of the inability of even the emboldened quota to compel 
party leaders to comply, comprehensive reform efforts must target both formal and 
informal constraints in order to induce adaptation. 
In the wake of international women’s day in 2009 with heightened pressure from 
the women’s caucus (bancada feminina) and women’s movement stalwarts such as the 
Feminist Center for Studies and Advisory Services (Cfemea), President Lula’s Secretariat 
of Women’s Affairs (SPM) formed a Tripartite Commission (with representatives from 
the executive and legislative branches as well as from civil society) to deliberate and 
propose changes to the Electoral Law that would enhance women’s participation in 
formal politics. According to then Minister Nilcéa Freire of the SPM, the Commission’s 
approach was to ratchet up support for proposals that had already made their way to 
Congress, thereby facilitating their quick adoption. 
One such measure is Deputy Luiza Erundina’s 2002 proposal (6216/2002) 
requiring parties to devote: (1) 30% of their federally-allocated funds for party 
organization to the promotion of women’s participation and (2) 30% of their publically-
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funded television and radio propaganda time to women. Although a government that 
espouses rhetoric of equality23 should in theory not object to directing federally-funded 
party resources to effectuate such equality, debates with Chamber leadership ensued in 
the Commission deliberations24 and the approved version entailed only a fraction of these 
requirements. Other proposals of the women’s movement considered by the Commission 
included public financing of electoral campaigns and the adoption of closed-lists with 
placement mandates,25 which would respectively level the playing field for outsider 
candidates (which women often are), and strengthen Brazil’s notoriously inchoate parties 
while allowing for a strict implementation of the gender quota. 
Despite this broad toolkit of possibilities advocated by the bancada feminina and 
women’s organizations in the Tripartite Commission, the accomplishments of the 
subsequent mini-reform (12.034/2009) were more limited. The approved measures 
directly affecting women include: (1) changes in the language of the quota law from 
“reserve” to “fill” a minimum of 30% and maximum of 70% of candidacies per party list 
with candidates of each sex (Article 10), (2) a minimum of five percent of federally-
allocated party organization funds devoted to the promotion of women’s participation 
(Article 44), and (3) a dedicated 10% of each party’s publically-funded television and 
radio time (in both election and non-election years) to women (Article 45). Importantly, 
these changes come with enforceable sanctions, perhaps the most noteworthy 
achievement of the mini-reform.  
                                                 
23 On March 5, 2008, President Lula approved by executive decree the Second National Plan of Policies for 
Women, a comprehensive plan of objectives and specific proposals for advancing women’s rights 
(Secretary of Women’s Affairs). 
24 Personal communication with civil society and bancada feminina representatives to the Commission. 
25 Comissão Tripartite irá rever a Lei Eleitora [Tripartite Commission to reform the Electoral Law]. March 
30, 2009; Alerta Feminista dos Movimentos de Mulheres que Assinam a Plataforma dos Movimentos 
Sociais pela Reforma do Sistema Político [Feminist Alert of Women’s Movements that Signed the Social 
Movements’ Platform for Reforms of the Political System], October 31, 2008. 
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In spite of this impressive convergence of attention to women’s 
underrepresentation and the ensuing concrete policy proposals and actual changes to the 
institutions perceived to be undermining women’s participation, the immediate results 
were minimal. Although significantly more women threw their hat in the ring in the 2010 
elections, the end result was stagnation, with a Chamber of Deputies with exactly the 
same number of women that it had in the prior legislature, for a meager total of 8.8 
percent. This failure to induce change corroborates my claim above that formal 
institutional mechanisms are poorly situated for alleviating inequality in the context of 
weak institutions. 
The often mere formality of the written rules of the game among Brazil’s weakly 
institutionalized parties becomes evident when considering the enforcement of the 2009 
mini-reform to the gender quota (12.034/2009). In a 6-1 vote on August 12, 2010 by the 
Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the ministers ruled that “30% women is law” and lists 
that did not comply with the recently revised electoral law would have to increase the 
number of female candidates, decrease the number of male candidates, or have the list 
rejected, with “exceptional” justifications being granted only by the electoral court 
(Abreu, 2010; Coelho and Costa, 2010). 
The decision was widely praised by scholars, activists, and politicians 
sympathetic to women’s representation, with Sônia Malheiros Miguel, Undersecretary of 
Institutional Articulation for the Minister of Women’s Affairs, proclaiming “The decision 
of the TSE is historic, because it signifies recognition by the highest electoral court in 
Brazil of the necessity for this country to overcome this embarrassing democratic deficit, 
ensuring a more equitable participation of Brazilian women in the political process.” 
After all, as stated by demographer and Professor for the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE) Dr. José Eustáquio Diniz Alvez, “The decision of the TSE to 
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require compliance with Law 12.034, of the 29th of September of 2009, must be doubly 
celebrated, because the Law is meant to be complied with and the country cannot 
condone this culture of ‘Lei que não pega’ (‘Law on paper only’)” (quoted in Agência 
Patrícia Galvão, 2010).  
But under pressure from political parties, regional electoral officials varied widely 
in their enforcement of the quota in the 2010 legislative elections (e.g., Agência de 
Notícias da Justiça Eleitoral, 2010a), and in the end less than 18% of the party/coalition 
lists met the 30% quota (Diário do Grande ABC, 2010). Of the 606 parties contesting the 
Chamber of Deputies elections, more than 44% did not run a single female candidate.26 In 
spite of the reformed quota and credible threats of enforcement, the “lei que não pega” 
culture among party elites of Brazil’s inchoate and male dominant parties persists 
unscathed. 
MIXED RESULTS 
The 2010 elections delivered mixed results. In addition to the election of Brazil’s 
first female president (with Dilma Rousseff winning 56% of the vote in the second round) 
a female candidate was the top vote earner in seven of the 27 statewide districts in the 
Chamber of Deputies elections. Nevertheless, the percent of female deputies remained 
the same, and there was a drastic increase in the proportion of extremely unviable 
candidacies among women, reeking of a widespread offering of sacrificial lambs by 
parties seeking to make a minimal but empty gesture at the reformed gender quota law 
(Wylie, 2011). Secretary of Women’s Affairs, Eleonora Menicucci, quipped “The 
political parties are not interested in complying with the (quota) legislation. The law is as 
follows for every party: it must have at least 30% (candidates) of each sex. So if it has 
                                                 
26 Calculations by the author using data from the TSE. 
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70% men, it has to have 30% women, but the parties do not respect it. At all. Party 
resources for women are few and far between.” (Quoted in Grayley, 2012). Looking just 
to party funds (which, along with campaign materials, production assistance for the 
HGPE spots, and support from the party’s gubernatorial campaign, constitute valuable 
party resources for a campaign), we see that in 2010, among the top 14 parties, national 
directorates devoted only 8% of their party funds to the campaigns of women, who 
represented 19.7% of the total candidates. The PSDB, which advanced 20.4% female 
candidates, dedicated less than 2% of its funds to women candidacies (Mendonça and 
Navarro, 2012). 
In the next chapters, I descriptively explore the variation in the central 
explanatory factors and women’s electoral performance (Chapter 4), subsequently 
delving into variation across and within candidate sex, states, and parties in the Chamber 
of Deputies elections and how this variation can explain women’s electoral prospects in 
Chapter Five. I find that female candidates are indeed electorally disadvantaged, but that 
party-level factors can ameliorate this disadvantage. Next, in Chapter 6, I compare 
electoral prospects in concurrent elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. By 
providing institutional variation while maintaining most other factors under consideration 
constant, the controlled comparison analysis sheds light on the difficulties faced by 
women in Brazil’s OLPR elections, where incentives for intraparty competition often 
leave female candidates un-prioritized and lacking the necessary structure to wage a 
successful campaign, and how party support can overcome these obstacles. When 
electoral rules incentivize party support, as in the Senate, its effect is amplified, with 
women running in parties that are institutionalized and incorporate women in party 
leadership being particularly well-equipped for electoral success.
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Chapter 4 – Data, Methods, and Descriptive Analyses 
The current chapter highlights the significant variation in women’s electoral 
performance across Brazilian political parties and states, around which I design the 
comparative analyses that follow. I advance an array of quantitative and qualitative data 
to reveal the central explanatory factors substantiating gendered variation in electoral 
success as well as variation in women’s electoral prospects across states, parties, and 
electoral rules. The research design thus blends most-similar and most-different 
strategies, comparing women vs. men who succeed in elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies, women who succeed vs. fail in the Chamber elections, women vs. men who 
succeed in elections to the Senate, and women who succeed in the Chamber elections vs. 
women who win election to the Senate.  
This strategy illuminates the two central research questions – (1) what are the 
obstacles confronting female political aspirants in Brazil, and (2) how have Brazil’s few 
female politicians managed to defy the odds and gain election – by allowing me to 
control for several individual, party, district, and institutional characteristics potentially 
explaining women’s extreme underrepresentation in Brazil. In answering these questions, 
I focus on the candidate level, leveraging extensive variation across Brazil’s 29 registered 
political parties which in turn reveals parties’ unanticipated centrality in arbitrating 
women’s political empowerment in Brazil. 
First, in this chapter I discuss issues related to data, methods, and measurement, 
while presenting several descriptive analyses and introducing my party 
institutionalization index. This step exhibits the extensive variation within Brazil across 
states, electoral rules, parties, sex, and women that I endeavor to explain in the ensuing 
chapters. Before proceeding, however, I want to emphasize that I meticulously collected 
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data from numerous sources to bring to bear on this research agenda. My database of 
several individual, party, and district-level characteristics of all 21,478 candidacies to the 
Brazilian Congress – carefully crafted in the last three years – is a unique contribution, 
and it is my hope that it will be employed to illustrate numerous other research inquiries 
concerning electoral success in Brazil. Unfortunately, data limitations mean that 
exceedingly few studies outside the US literature (which is itself inherently limited in 
variation given the two-party system) analyze the effect of gender on electoral 
performance at the candidate level.77 In spite of the intense data collection required, I was 
compelled by my initial observations of intriguing variation in women’s political 
presence across Brazil’s 27 states and 29 parties to eschew the more straightforward, but 
given my research questions, excessively aggregated78 cross-national approach and delve 
into measuring and explaining the variance in women’s electoral prospects in Brazil. In 
this chapter, I preview this variation. First, I discuss the data and methods employed. 
MISSING DATA 
The full universe approach has the advantage of ample variation on electoral 
success and party-level factors. Yet, the inclusion of effectively non-viable candidates 
introduces missing data on a few variables, particularly campaign finance. Of the 21,478 
candidacies, 36.0% did not report their campaign contributions. While 164 of the 7924 
candidacies with missing data for campaign finance were successful, the vast majority 
were non-viable, with an average vote share of 0.19 percent. There are also missing data 
                                                 
77 The two exceptions that I know of are Murray’s 2007 study of electoral performance in France, and 
Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp’s 2010 analysis of electoral success in single transferable vote 
systems. 
78 The aggregate approach is especially suspect in a case like Brazil, where vast variation across its many 
parties is averaged out thus leaving unanswered fundamental questions regarding how different parties 
interact within similar constraints. It is also not conducive to understanding electoral success in candidate-
centered contests. 
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on some of the other individual characteristics and the proportion of women in party 
leadership for a few parties. 
James Honaker, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell’s Amelia II program uses a 
bootstrapping-based algorithm to impute data missing from time-series-cross-sectional 
data (Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2010). In short, this program uses a bootstrapping-
based algorithm to impute m values for the missing data, based on the case’s scores on 
the nonmissing variables and the scores of other cases in the cross-section or time-series 
with nonmissing data on campaign finance. It runs a series of imputations to produce m 
datasets that the user can append to a single dataset.79 
While it is mathematically sound (Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2010), it can 
generate nonsensical values and leaves you with m new datasets, which can be merged 
and accounted for in Stata, but at the cost of additional computing time. It also presumes 
that the data are missing completely at random (MCAR), which may very well be untrue 
in the case of campaign finance. In the multilevel analyses of electoral performance in the 
Chamber of Deputies (Chapter 5) and Senate (Chapter 6), I alternately estimated the 
models including the original data with observations missing data listwise deleted (with 
most of these cases being non-viable), and using the multiply imputed data. 
I exclude from consideration candidacies that were deemed invalid by the 
electoral court, as such candidacies introduce unwarranted error into the prediction of 
electoral prospects. For example, a seemingly viable candidacy of a longtime politician 
recently exposed in a corruption scandal and therefore deemed ineligible, would have 
likely been predicted to succeed by the model had their invalid status been ignored. With 
their name removed from the final ballot due to ineligibility, their vote total would be 
                                                 
79 Statistical software allows the user to specify the merged dataset (of m datasets + the original) as 
multiply imputed thus taking into consideration the uncertainty regarding the imputed data. 
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zero despite prediction for success thus enhancing the residuals (difference between 
observed outcome and predicted outcome based on values of independent variables) and 
decreasing the fit of the model to the data. Instead, I include only valid candidacies in the 
analyses included in this dissertation. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Candidate Level 
Using the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral’s (TSE) online electoral returns, I gathered 
data on the quantity of votes, electoral outcome, party name/number, sex,80 educational 
attainment, and reported occupation of the 21,478 valid candidates to the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate from 1994 to 2010. I gathered data on members of congress from the 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate websites as well as Senate biographies to determine the 
mandates (to be) served (“titular” and substitute) from 1991-2015, and used this 
information to determine incumbency. Distinct use of accents and spellings and orderings 
of names or nicknames on these websites and in the electoral rolls required that I 
manually input the information it into my database. 
I also collected state-level rolls of individual campaign contributions to candidates 
by election and created subtotals of contributions to each candidate disaggregated by 
source (corporate, party, individual, self-financed). I merged these data into the database 
meticulously to navigate issues related to the extensive missing data on campaign finance 
for non-viable candidacies. I created a unique identifying number for each candidate, 
reconciling disparities in the spelling, ordering, and use of accents in names, parties, and 
even dates of birth across the five election cycles. Finally, I calculated subtotals of each 
                                                 
80 Women are coded 1, men 0. I scrolled the candidacies looking for instances of (apparently) random error 
based on the baby name guidelines (Valdini, 2010), conducting internet searches when possible. Based on 
these findings I manually adjusted the sex coding when necessary. 
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state-level vote in each election, and used this and each candidate’s quantity of votes 
attained to measure their share of the valid candidate votes. This measure excludes from 
consideration blank and null votes, as well as party label votes.81 
Party Level 
Figure 4.1. Power and Zucco’s Scaled Estimates of Ideology – Variation over Time 
For party ideology, I attained Tim Power and Cesar Zucco’s scaled estimates of 
the ideology of 11 of Brazil’s 28 legislative parties based on several waves of their 
Brazilian Legislative Surveys (see Power and Zucco, 2009).
82
 The ten-point scale ranges 
from left (1) to right (10), with a range of 1.36 (PC do B in 2001) to 7.37 (PPB in 2001) 
                                                 
81 For more information on the prevalence of blank and null voting in Brazil, see Power and Roberts (1995) 
and Power and Garand (2007). 






















Source: Brazilian Legislative Surveys (Power and Zucco, 2011). 
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and mean of 4.18. The authors use survey responses from legislators of other parties, 
rescaling the data “to account for idiosyncrasies in responses as well as variation in use of 
the survey scale across time” (Power and Zucco, 2009, 218). An advantage of the data is 
the variation of time, which accounts for the moderation of many parties over time (See 
Figure 4.1). Although using this superior measure of ideology necessitates dropping 
smaller party candidates from the analysis, the 11 parties included (PC do B, PDT, 
PFL/Democratas, PMDB, PPR/PPB/PP, PPS, PL/PR, PSB, PSDB, PT, PTB) do represent 
94.7% of the candidates elected to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010).83 
To maintain the full universe of candidacies, I supplement Power and Zucco’s 
ideology variable with a dichotomous coding of ideology (a left-non-left indicator) using 
data from Mainwaring (1999) and platforms on party websites. This tremendously 
facilitates the inclusion of the barrage of “partidos nanicos” (tiny parties) that often lack 
precise ideological platforms; most are clearly non-leftist, locating somewhere between 
center and right (if on the traditional scale at all). 
I employ the proportion of women in both national and state-level party 
leadership in this dissertation. I gathered data on women’s presence in party national 
executive commissions (NECs) from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Gender 
and Political Parties in Latin America (GEPPAL) website, and cross-checked these 
against party websites. For state party leadership, I examined party leadership rolls 
submitted to the TSE for each party across the 27 districts. If a roll was missing, I 
searched the party website, looking either for a list of the leadership or signed documents, 
which often include the party leaders at the end. For both levels, I researched any names 
                                                 
83 This excludes candidates from the following parties with congressional representation: PAN, PHS, 
PMN, PRB, PRN, PRONA, PRP, PRTB, PSC, PSD, PSDC, PSL, PSOL, PST, PT do B, PTC, PV (148 
elected of 6800 candidates = 2.18% success rate); and candidates from the following parties with no 
congressional representation: PCB, PCO, PGT, PSN, PSTU, PTN, PTRB (0 elected of 825 candidates = 
0.00% success rate). 
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with an ambiguous gender, and counted as party leadership only those members with an 
office. At minimum, this includes the party president, vice-president, secretary general, 
and treasurer. 
In creating my party institutionalization index (discussed further below), I first 
calculated measures of party seat shares (=party magnitude/district magnitude) and vote 
share, merging into my database a separate tally from the TSE of each party’s total 
candidate and party label votes in each state, by election. I then collected data on party 
age from party founding dates listed on TSE website, cross-checked against party 
websites, used this information to calculate party age, by party in each election, and 
merged it into my database. In cases where the party simply changed names but 
maintained the same party number,84 I used the original founding date to calculate the 
age. 
I compiled data on state party membership from counts of affiliates by state party 
over time reported to the TSE. I calculated each state party’s share of party affiliates by 
state in 2002, 2006, and 2010 (using 2002 data for 1998). For party funds, I analyzed 
each party’s 2010 report to the TSE of monies and intraparty (national to district) 
transfers, including both “fundos partidários” (publically-funded party funds) provided by 
the government in proportion to its vote share in prior Chamber of Deputies elections,85 
and “fundos próprios” (a party’s own funds), and merged this into my database. 
For additional data on party organization, I explore party presence in a state and 
party leadership. My data on party presence throughout each state come from the 
municipal party organizations reported to the TSE. For each state party, I totaled up the 
                                                 
84 PFL/DEM, PL/PR, PPR/PPB/PP, PRN/PTC, PSN/PHS, PTRB/PSL. 
85 Five percent of the funds are distributed equally among parties, 95% in accordance to their vote share. 
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municipal party organizations that are currently active,86 and then calculated each state 
party’s share of the total number of active municipal party organization across parties in 
their state. For party leadership, I analyzed multiple years of each state party’s leadership 
rolls on the TSE website to determine whether there exists alternation in party leadership. 
To ascertain party magnitude, I merged into my database the TSE data (reported 
separately) on the number of seats won by each state party, by election. I then cross-
checked these data with my own measure of the total number of candidates in each state 
party reported as “elected” in my database. This additional step was necessary because 
the separate TSE report does not include a zero for the parties that did not win seats, so 
this allowed me to manually code 0 for candidates running in state parties that did not 
win a single seat. Party magnitude varies from 0 to 20. 
District Level 
District magnitude is constant in each state for the elections under consideration, 
and readily available from the Chamber of Deputies website. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
district magnitude varies from 8 to 70 in the Chamber of Deputies. For the Senate, 
elections in 1994, 2002, and 2010, were for two-thirds (54) of the seats, while elections in 
1998 and 2006 were for one-third (27), so the district magnitude varies from one to two. 
To control for the competitiveness of a district, I calculate the effective number of 
candidates in each election by state, which is equal to 1 divided by the sum of the squared 
vote share of all candidates in district j in election k:  ∑            
 ⁄  (Moser and 
Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). 
 
                                                 
86 Current as of June, 2012. Data retrieved from http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-politicos/certidao-
de-composicao-partidaria. 
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Figure 4.2. From South Africa to Estonia: A Map of Brazilian States’ Country 
Equivalents on the Human Development Index (2005) 
For district development, I use district-level measurements of the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which is an index of the adult literacy rate and gross 
enrollment ratio, the log of GDP per capita, and longevity (UNDP).
87
 I gathered these 
                                                 
87 The following link further illuminates how the HDI is calculated: 
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data from Brazil’s Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea, 2010a). As depicted in 
Figure 4.2, the HDI scores across Brazil vary significantly, with 2005 assessments from 
the UN showing the most developed state (the Federal District) on par with Estonia 
(ranked 38/175), and the least developed state (Alagoas) ranking just under South Africa 
at 120
th
 of 175 (Ipea, 2010a; UN Human Development Report, 2009).88 
These data comprise a multilevel database of the electoral performance of 
candidates to Brazil’s two legislative chambers. I use this database to ascertain the factors 
most conducive to women’s electoral success in elections to the Brazilian legislature. 
HIERARCHICAL MODELING 
Many quantitatively-inclined scholars of gender and politics have advocated the 
adoption of multilevel modeling techniques (e.g., Hughes, 2008; McConnaughy, 2007; 
Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes, 2007). Through multilevel modeling, we are able to 
model the influence of context (i.e., time, state) and thereby avoid the assumptions of 
interchangeability and independence of individuals often made in standard regression 
analyses. Moreover, whereas inferring individual-level characteristics from the aggregate 
level is susceptible to the ecological fallacy, the inference of group-level phenomena 
from aggregated individual-level data may suffer from the atomistic/individual fallacy. In 
order to avoid these inference-based problems, we should take advantage of the 
availability of multilevel modeling techniques to consider these varying levels in their 
rightful contexts. This approach provides leverage on the role of district-level phenomena 
in differentiating the impact of individual-level factors such as gender and education on 
the electoral performance of candidates. Such an approach renders greater appreciation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/technote_1.pdf. While gender related indices are also available nationally, 
they are unfortunately not yet available subnationally in Brazil. 
88 With recent changes to the calculation of the HDI, I used 2005 data to be sure both the cross-national 
data and the UNDP’s calculations for the Brazilian states were measuring the same thing. 
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the variation across states in the significance of a candidate’s gender for their electoral 
prospects. 
In addition to these theoretical justifications, empirical evidence further attests to 
the relevance of multilevel modeling for this research. First, state-by-state regression 
analyses demonstrate that the effects of a candidate’s sex on candidate vote share are not 
constant across Brazil, but vary significantly by state (see Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3. Running as a Woman in Chamber of Deputies Elections – Differences across 
Brazil (1994-2010) 
We can use the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the 
amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by each level and is derived from 
the individual- and group-level variance components of the unconditional multilevel 
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model, to quantify this variation (Luke, 2004). Another way of looking at the ICC is the 
expected correlation between two candidacies chosen randomly from a given level (Hox, 
2002). Given the district-level ICC of 0.139,89 we see the non-negligible extent of 
clustering at the state level. The expected correlation between any two randomly chosen 
candidates in a state is 0.139. This means that if we merely pooled the data and used OLS 
to estimate the model, we would violate the classical assumption of uncorrelated error 
terms. A rule of thumb for evaluating the size of the ICC is whether the design effect (1 + 
[average cluster size -1] * ICC) exceeds two; if so, multilevel modeling is warranted 
(Muthén and Satorra, 1995). The design effect (105.69)90 here well exceeds the 
convention, thus providing further evidence of the increased leverage proffered by the 
multilevel design. 
In sum, the use of hierarchical modeling allows us to account for the non-
independence of observations, in particular the correlations among candidates running in 
the same state. It nests candidates within their state-level contexts, modeling cross-level 
interactions such as the potentially mediating roles of district development, magnitude, 
and competitiveness on the effect of candidate sex on electoral outcome. By estimating 
the naïve model (empty, with only the hierarchical structure modeled) of candidate vote 
share in the Chamber of Deputies, we found a district level ICC of 0.139, demonstrating 
that 13.9% of the variance in vote share is attributable to the district level. It is therefore 
essential that the correlation among candidates running in the same district is accounted 
for, and hierarchical modeling is the most sophisticated accessible technique for handling 
such clustering at the district-level. 
                                                 






r), or proportion of variance explained by level 2. 
90 Design effect = 1 + (Average cluster size 754.2 – 1) * 0.139 = 105.69 
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Given the theoretical, statistical, and empirical justifications outlined above, in the 
analyses of Chapters 5 and 6 I estimate hierarchical models of an individual candidate’s 
prospect of election. Rather than assuming an interchangeable blob of individuals (as in 
the standard regression analysis), I use the hierarchical approach to embed the individual 
candidates in their electoral contexts while controlling for several proxies of candidate 
quality. This technique also sheds light on how these multilevel characteristics interact, 
i.e. how district magnitude or party ideology may intermediate the effect of candidate sex 
on electoral outcome. I estimate both continuous (Models (1-3)) and dichotomous 
measures of electoral performance (Model (4-6)), where Yij denotes the predicted vote 
share of individual i in district j, with uij assumed to be normally distributed (0, σ²), and 
πij denotes the probability of individual i in district j getting elected:91  
(1)                    
(2)                   
(3)                   
(4)                              
(5)               
(6)               
 
Models (2-3) and (5-6) display how hierarchical modeling uses level-2 variables 
to model the intercepts and effects (slopes) of level-1 variables on the outcome of 
interest. The cross-level interaction allows me to explore whether district magnitude, 
competitiveness, development, or some unobserved district influence predict the effect of 
candidate gender on electoral outcome (instead of assuming that the effect of candidate 
                                                 
91 Note Model (1) includes a level-1 variance term, rij, or the variation between individuals within a district 
j, which is not used in the logit model (Models (4-6)) where the mean determines the variance (Luke, 
2004). 
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gender is the same throughout Brazil). Moreover, by including cross-level interactions 
and district-specific error terms (u0j, u1j), this structure allows for non-independence – or 
observed and unobserved correlations – among candidates running in the same district. 
Given the particularities of state campaigns in Brazil’s decentralized federalist context, 
the hierarchical approach is much preferred to the common but untenable assumption of 
independence of observations, with at best clustered error terms by district (as would be 
done in more standard regression analysis with the clustered robust standard errors 
option) that do not explicitly model the district-level effects. 
Note that in addition to the random intercepts by district, I also include random 
slopes for female. By maintaining only random intercepts for the remaining variables, I 
model unobserved correlations between any two candidacies from the same district, but 
model fixed effects for these other independent variables, thus assuming that their effects 
on the outcome are the same across districts. The addition of random terms to the slopes 
for female allows for the possibility that the effect of this predictor varies across states, 
with the values of these coefficients calculated for each district rather than across the 
entire sample.92 The understanding that women’s electoral prospects vary across Brazil 
is, after all, one of the central premises of this dissertation. 
To account for the possibility that an individual’s prior candidacy could influence 
their latter candidacies, I incorporated a third-level, essentially estimating a latent growth 
curve model that models an individual’s change over time. In this three-level model, level 
1 is the election year i and time-varying covariants, level 2 is the individual j and time-
invariant covariants, and level 3 is the district k and district-level variables. With rampant 
                                                 
92 Because the introduction of random predictors consumes a great deal of statistical power, I use them 
sparingly when justified by theoretical expectations (Hox, 2002; Hughes, 2008). I also tried including 
random slopes for left and female*left but they approximated zero, did not improve the model, and 
immensely extended the computational power required to estimate the models, so they are dropped from 
the presented models. 
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party switching, the only time-invariant variable was candidate sex. Several candidates 
changed electoral districts, with a few even reporting different birthdays over time!93 
A naïve (unspecified, with only the hierarchical structure and level-specific error 
terms, but no predictors) three-level model of electoral outcome allows me to calculate 
the ICC. Recall, the ICC is the percent of variance in electoral outcome attributed to each 
level (Luke, 2004), or the expected correlation between two candidacies chosen randomly 
from a given level (Hox, 2002). The ICCs measuring expected correlations among an 
individual’s candidacies over election cycles approximated zero, with an individual’s 
candidacies over time no more likely to be correlated than any other randomly selected 
candidacies. Given the substantive and statistical insignificance of this potential for 
correlation, and the extreme computational intensity of three-level models with random 
intercepts and coefficients,94 I estimate two-level models below with controls for the 
election year to capture any election-specific effects. 
For a candidate’s vote share in the Senate, the district-level ICC increases from 
0.04 to 2.48 percent when the third level is dropped in the naïve model. Given such a low 
expected correlation (0.0248) among any two randomly chosen candidates from the same 
district, and the relatively small number of level 1 units (24 to 77 candidates, average 
41.3) in each level 2 unit (27 districts), the hierarchical model may not be warranted in 
the case of the Senate-only analysis (Hox, 2002). I therefore estimate both hierarchical 
linear models and standard regression models using OLS to explore candidate vote share 
in the Senate. One of the OLS estimations adjusts standard errors to correct for 
                                                 
93 A few times I saw different days of the month or years for what was ostensibly the same individual in 
different election cycles. It seems a bit much to fib about your age to the electoral court, so I’ll attribute this 
to the non-universality of birth certificates (see Hunter, n.d.) and thus uncertainty about one’s actual 
birthdate. 
94 My first go at a near fully-specified three-level model of these data finally converged (over iterations of 
starting values and optimizations) after almost 48 hours straight, even specifying fewer integration points! 
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unobserved correlations among candidates in the same district and one corrects for such 
clustering of errors among the same candidate running in several elections over time.  
MEASUREMENT AND A FIRST GLANCE AT THE DATA 
Sex 
I measure candidate sex dichotomously, with those reporting female coded as 1, 
and those reporting male coded 0. Note, I refer to candidate “sex” rather than “gender” in 
the quantitative analyses throughout this dissertation because the latter is a socially 
constructed concept not amenable to quick quantification. As shown in Table 4.1, women 
remain a minority in the Brazilian legislature. Table 4.1 also highlights the success of 
women candidates in the Senate relative to the Chamber – in three election cycles (1994, 
2002, and 2010), women actually comprised a greater share among elected Senators than 
among candidates. Indeed, in these elections, the success rate ratio of female to male 
candidates was above 1, indicating that women were, overall, more successful than were 
male candidates to the Senate in these elections. I investigate such unexpected relative 
success for women in Brazil’s more prestigious legislative chamber in Chapter Six. 
Table 4.1. The Brazilian Congress – Percent Women among Candidates and Elected 
Election 
Year 
Federal Senate Federal Chamber of Deputies* 
Candidates Elected Candidates Elected 
     1994 7.3 7.4 6.2 6.2 
1998 14.0 7.4 10.4 5.7 
2002 12.4 14.8 11.4 8.2 
2006 15.8 14.8 12.7 8.8 
2010 12.9 14.8 19.1 8.8 
Note: Values reflect the percentage of women among candidates and elected.  
*Beginning in 1996, the candidate quota applies.  
Sources: TSE, Cfemea. 
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Educational Attainment 
Table 4.2. Educational Attainment of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010) 
In the analyses that follow, I include a series of proxies for candidate quality. 
First, education is coded as an ordinal variable, with 1 = read and write, 2 = primary 
school, 3 = secondary school, and 4 = college. Most candidates to the Brazilian 
legislature have attended college, with 74.14% of candidates to the Senate having 
completed college, and 66.78% of Chamber of Deputies candidates indicating at least 
some college education (See Table 4.2). Relatively speaking, three times more candidates 
in the Chamber reported primary schooling as their educational attainment than did 
candidates for the Senate. Nearly a quarter of Chamber candidates had only a high school 
education, compared to just 14% of Senate candidates. This is reflective of the Senate’s 
 
 Chamber of Deputies Senate 
Education Men Women Total Men Women Total 
      
Read and write 102 16 118 5 0 5 
 0.57% 0.62% 0.58% 0.52% 0.00% 0.45% 
       
Primary 1702 181 1883 36 2 38 
 9.57% 7.05% 9.25% 3.71% 1.47% 3.44% 
       
Secondary 4093 667 4760 135 20 155 
 23.02% 25.99% 23.39% 13.92% 14.71% 14.01% 
       
College 11887 1702 13589 794 114 908 
 66.84% 66.33% 66.78% 81.86% 83.82% 82.10% 
       
Total 17784 2566 20350 970 136 1106 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 
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greater prestige relative to the Chamber of Deputies (discussed in Chapter 6). Only a 
handful of candidates – about half a percent of the total – indicating the ability to read 
and write as their educational attainment have run for Congress. No such women have 
sought a Senate seat, although five men have (all unsuccessful). Overall measures of 
educational attainment show no statistically significant gender differences. 
Occupation 
There are literally hundreds of occupations95 reported to the TSE in the candidate 
registrations, which change over time, rendering less useful the traditional battery of 
dummy variables for common feeder occupations. Instead, I use the reported occupations 
to create a single dummy variable for feeder occupation, with candidates reporting their 
profession as lawyer, doctor, politician, public servant/bureaucrat, educator, or 
businessman coded 1, and all others coded 0. I run the analyses alternately with the 2473 
Chamber and 83 Senate candidates reporting the amorphous category “other” excluded, 
and coded as 0, but find no significant differences in results. I used my research for the 
incumbency variable (discussed next) to manually adjust the coding of feeder occupation 
for prior politicians who reported either “other” or their hobby/old day job as their 
primary profession.96 
As demonstrated in Table 4.3, while the most common profession overall in both 
chambers is lawyer, for women candidates it is educator. More than 20% of female 
candidates to the Senate are educators. The bureaucratic route is also common for 
                                                 
95 Nine political scientists won a measly 33,312 votes! 
96 Abelardo Lupion, for example, may in fact breed cattle, but declaring “pecuarista” as his primary 
occupation in 2006 when he was a four term incumbent, president of the PFL in Paraná, grandson of the 
former governor, and declared millions of dollars in assets (www.excelencias.org.br) is a bit of a stretch. I 
changed his coding to “1” for feeder occupation. 
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women, with 14.7% of female candidates (and only 6.3% of male candidates) reporting 
their occupation as civil servant. 
Table 4.3. Occupations of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010) 
Cross-chamber comparisons suggest that while the business world has a greater 
entrée into the Chamber than the Senate, journalists and engineers are more represented 
 
  Chamber of Deputies Senate 
Top Occupations Men Women Total Men Women Total 
        
Lawyer 1991 186 2177 167 8 175 
  11.55% 7.48% 11.04% 17.43% 5.88% 16.00% 
        
Elected Office 1490 156 1590 151 18 169 
  8.64% 6.28% 8.06% 15.76% 13.24% 15.45% 
        
Educator 900 359 1251 79 28 107 
  5.22% 14.44% 6.34% 8.25% 20.59% 9.78% 
       
Bureaucrat 1323 233 1556 60 20 80 
  7.68% 9.37% 7.89% 6.26% 14.71% 7.31% 
       
Doctor 887 62 949 49 8 57 
  5.15% 2.49% 4.81% 5.11% 5.88% 5.21% 
        
Engineer 587 12 599 51 2 53 
  3.41% 0.48% 3.04% 5.32% 1.47% 4.84% 
        
Business 1147 119 1266 45 2 47 
  6.65% 4.79% 6.42% 4.70% 1.47% 4.30% 
        
Journalist 234 25 259 37 4 41 
  1.36% 1.01% 1.31% 3.86% 2.94% 3.75% 
        
Subtotal 8559 1152 9711 639 90 729 
     Total reported 17237 2486 19723 958 136 1094 
     Percent of total 49.65% 46.34% 49.24% 66.70% 66.18% 66.64% 
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 
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in the Senate elections. As would be expected by the prestige of the Senate, the 
proportion of candidates reporting elected office as their primary occupation is nearly 
twice as high in the Senate than in the Chamber. Lemos and Ranincheski report that more 
than 40 and 70 percent of the senators from 1991-1999 had held elective executive and 
legislative office, respectively (2008, 103-7). Santos found that more than 70% of elected 
deputies also had legislative experience (more clustered in the Chamber itself), but far 
fewer had held executive elective posts (19.8% from 1987-1999) (2000, 102-4). 
Incumbency 
Although the incumbency advantage is not as high in Brazilian elections as in 
many other nations, with a “renewal rate” of nearly 50 percent (Samuels, 2003; TSE), it 
remains an advantage nonetheless and is important to consider. I used the data discussed 
above on incumbency to generate a binary variable, with candidates serving in the current 
term and running for reelection coded 1, and all others coded 0. For the Chamber of 
Deputies, I included substitutes running for reelection as incumbents, since they had 
earned the substitute role by virtue of their votes. For the Senate, however, I did not 
include substitutes as incumbents, since they had not actually been voted on in the prior 
election but were essentially appointed by the “titular.” In any case, there were relatively 
few senators who were currently serving as substitutes while running for election 
(compared to the greater frequency in the Chamber). In elections to both the Chamber 
and the Senate, 5.8% of female candidates ran as incumbents. Men were significantly 
more likely to run as incumbents in both chambers, but particularly in the Chamber, with 
11.6% of male candidates to the Chamber running as incumbents (8.5% in the Senate). 
 131 
Campaign Finance 
I amass extensive data on campaign contributions.97 Following other analyses of 
campaign finance (e.g., Samuels, 2001a, 2001b), I calculate the square of campaign 
finance to account for diminishing returns. The wide variations in finance over time and 
space lead me to advance an array of variations on the concept, including a candidate’s 
share of all contributions in the state, and a candidate’s contributions standardized by the 
average contributions in the state. None of these various manifestations of campaign 
finance significantly change the results, but make for interesting descriptives.98 In each 
rendition of campaign finance, women candidates are overall outspent by male 
candidates. 
Table 4.4 displays the gendered discrepancies across both legislative chambers for 
several measures of campaign finance. While the average campaign contributions of male 
candidates is much higher than that of female candidates, substantial variation renders the 
observed differences just outside standard bounds of statistical significance. It is 
interesting to note that the average in campaign contributions for winning female 
candidates to the Senate is lower than the average of all male Senate candidates. This 
suggests that those few women who have done so are in general winning office with 
fewer resources than are men. The average female candidate to the Senate and Chamber 
earned just 12.7% and 0.8% of all candidate contributions in her district elections, 
compared to 17.0% and 1.1% for male candidates, with all observed differences being 
statistically significant (across gender groups and chambers). 
 
                                                 
97 I would like to thank David Samuels for sharing his data from 1994 to 2002. For 2006 and 2010, I 
scoured lists of donations for each candidate to generate a sum of campaign contributions for all candidates 
with reported data. 
98 In Chapter 5, I delve deeper into variations within the Chamber, including differences in campaign 
finance across parties and states. 
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Table 4.4. Campaign Finance of Candidates to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010) 
^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
                   Senate      Chamber of Deputies 
  Men Women Women Men 
All Candidates 
    
Overall R$ 2,255,488 R$ 906,078 R$ 225,575** R$ 347,400^ 
  (685237) (275375) (46786) (29878) 
Share of State Total 17.0%   12.7%^ 0.8%*** 1.1%** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative to State Average 1.03   0.75* 0.63 1.05*** 
  (0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) 
Cost per Vote R$ 6.47 R$ 1.18 R$ 31.42 R$ 27.49 
  (2.43) (0.28) (8.28) (6.96) 
Share from Corporations 36.7%   26.2%*     14.6%***      24.8%*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share from Party 18.0%   23.8%^   34.2%*      19.1%*** 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share from Individuals 22.6%   28.6%^ 33.8% 32.7% 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share Self-Financed 21.0% 17.3% 16.2%      22.5%*** 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
N 559 74 1510 11340 
Elected 
    
Overall R$ 6,129,084 R$ 2,067,136 R$ 834,621* R$ 997,389 
  (2417233) (688855) (198967) (113849) 
Share of State Total 38.0% 29.8%      4.3%*** 3.3% 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) 
Relative to State Average 2.14 1.89   2.96^ 3.25 
  (0.12) (0.31) (0.22) (0.08) 
Cost per Vote R$ 10.33 R$ 1.97 R$ 29.17 R$ 18.14 
  (5.50) (0.70) (15.26) (3.20) 
Share from Corporations 57.0% 47.3% 39.4%      48.6%*** 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share from Party 19.3% 20.5% 14.4%      9.2%*** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00) 
Share from Individuals 12.5% 15.8%     31.9%**      25.0%*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share Self-Financed 8.1% 12.0% 13.1%   16.1%^ 
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
N 153 21 184 2283 
Notes: One-tailed tests of statistical significance of observed differences between: men and women in the Senate, 
between women across the Senate and Chamber, and between men and women in the Chamber. 
 133 
The measure “relative to state average” divides a candidate’s contributions by the 
average in contributions in her statewide district, with numbers higher than one indicating 
the candidate raised more funds than the average. In both chambers, the average female 
candidate raised less than the state mean, while the average male candidate’s campaign 
finance was just above the mean. For winning candidates, the observed gender 
differences in relative campaign finance are not statistically significant. Together these 
measures indicate gendered discrepancies in campaign finance, a clear manifestation of 
the gender inequalities maintaining an un-level playing field. 
An interesting finding is that women candidates to the Senate appear to do 
substantially more with less. Although women winning Senate seats earned on average 
much less in campaign contributions, their success rates were higher than those of men in 
1994, 2002, and 2010 (See Table 6.5). The “cost per vote” measure divides a candidate’s 
campaign contributions by her quantity of votes, and demonstrates that the average 
female candidate to the Senate spent a couple of reais99 per vote, while for male 
candidates the average was R$6.47 (R$10/vote for winning male candidates). Note the 
greater cost of election to the Chamber, where the average cost per vote is nearly R$28. 
This is reflective of the vast quantities of candidates in elections to the Chamber, where 
individuals must spend to differentiate themselves from candidates running on their list 
and others. 
Women get more of their campaign funds from individuals, and finance less of it 
themselves (the statistical significance of these observed differences varies). The 
proportion of campaign funds financed by the candidates themselves is greater in 
                                                 
99 In the past several years the exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and US Dollar has fluctuated 
between 1 and 2. From 1994-2010, the range was just under 1 in 1994 (months after the Plano Real), to 3.7 
in 2002. I have left the contributions in their original form, since I am comparing candidates with one 
another (who are facing the same inflationary constraints). 
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Chamber elections, with an average of 21.7% for all candidates, and 15.9% for successful 
candidates (corporation contributions comprise a large share of successful candidates’ 
funds). Successful candidates to the Senate contributed on average 8.6% of their own 
budgets, with party organizations and corporations contributing the vast majority (67-
77%) of their campaign finance. Measures of campaign finance help to control for such 
discrepancies when exploring the effects of gender and electoral rules on electoral 
success. In the multivariate analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, I used these variations on 
campaign finance to explore its role in undermining women’s electoral prospects. 
Party Ideology 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the hypothesis on ideology’s influence on women’s 
representation stems from the understanding that leftist parties most often embrace an 
egalitarian platform that is more consistent with the premise of equality and active 
measures to attain it. Given that the question is not the extent of (non)left-ness but rather 
a simple statement of whether a party can be considered leftist, I alternately employ 
Powers and Zucco’s scaled ideology estimates discussed above and the dichotomous 
coding prevalent in the women and politics literature to estimate the effect of ideology on 
candidate performance. Following Mainwaring (1999) and platforms on party websites, I 
coded the following parties as leftist: PCB, PCO, PC do B, PDT, PMN, PPS, PSB, PSOL, 
PSTU, PT, and PV. I coded all other parties as non-leftist. 
Women candidates are more likely than are male candidates to be running in 
leftist parties, with 41% and a striking 63.3% of female candidates to the Chamber and 
Senate coming from a leftist party. In contrast, 35.9% and 43.5% of male candidates to 
the Chamber and Senate ran with a leftist party. The average ideology score for male 
legislative candidates is 4.2, which is closest to the scaled estimate for the PMDB. 
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Women are slightly left of that, with the average for female candidates to the Chamber at 
4.0 (around the PSDB) and Senate at 3.5 (PDT). 
Figure 4.4. Ideological Distribution of Elected Female Legislators, 1994-2010 
As shown in Figure 4.4, many of the women elected to the Brazilian Congress are 
from leftist parties – especially in the Senate (with the exception of 2006) – with 45.1% 
and 57.5% of elected female deputies and senators, respectively, winning election with 
leftist parties. Yet, non-leftist women also have a presence, with right wing parties 
electing 23.8% and 30.8% of elected female deputies and senators, respectively. Still, the 
fact that most women are elected with leftist parties in the Senate – where nearly three-
quarters of those elected are from non-leftist parties – is striking. Women’s 
disproportionate presence among leftist delegations also manifests in the Chamber, which 





















deputies. In the ensuing chapters, I draw on party institutionalization and women in party 
leadership to explain this apparent women-friendliness of leftist parties. 
Women-Friendly Parties 
Party Institutionalization 
The most commonly utilized proxy for party institutionalization is electoral 
volatility (e.g., Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Tarouco, 2010), or the swing in the party 
vote and seat share from election to election (Pedersen, 1979). While it is certainly the 
most amenable to quick quantification, it is an incomplete concept for our purposes here. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, I conceptualize institutionalized parties as those with 
established value infusion (Huntington, 1968; Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 1998) and internal 
“systemness” (Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Rather than footnote the 
exceptionalism of the PT and then continue to work from the unfounded assumption that 
Brazilian parties act as mere electoral vehicles and are therefore secondary to explaining 
electoral outcomes, my conceptualization and index of party institutionalization 
incorporate parties not only in the electorate but also as an organization. 
I measure electoral volatility with each state party’s difference (absolute value) in 
vote share and in seat share in elections at time t and t-1 (Jones, 2005; Pedersen, 1979). I 
take the average of each state party’s volatility across votes and seats, and include the 
inverse of this average volatility (votes and seats) in my party institutionalization index 
(Jones, 2005). To remedy nonsensical values, I round up volatility for state parties with a 
difference in vote/seat share less than one to one. Thus, if a state party earns within one 
percentage point of its prior vote/seat share, it gets the full point for volatility in the 
index. 
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Along with electoral volatility, I incorporate party membership and party age to 
get at the societal perception or “value infusion” of a party. I measure each state party’s 
share of their state’s party members, and each party’s age relative to the country’s longest 
registered parties – the PDT, PMDB, and PTB (29 years). A party with no real platform 
or established significance in the public imagination will be unlikely to attract a 
consistently sizeable membership or vote/seat share over time, but rather be contingent 
upon a particular politician/state/time. It will then, as discussed in Chapter 2, be 
susceptible to personalist politics and less conducive to women’s participation. Moreover, 
similar to the lagged party magnitude argument, a party unable to predict its electoral 
fortunes across Brazil (due to volatility, newness,100 and/or a lack of on-the-ground 
information from members) will be less able to recruit and support candidates. 
I measure the internal systemness of each state party by the funds it has at its 
disposal, its presence throughout the state, and an original measure of whether there 
exists an alternation in state party leadership. Parties with limited funds (measured 
relatively, as a state party’s share of all party funds in the state) are poorly situated to 
recruit candidates or provide training opportunities and campaign assistance, and thus 
lack the capacity to promote women’s participation. Candidates running in such parties 
will be dependent upon their own capital, which due to an un-level playing field is likely 
to disadvantage women contenders. 
I expect that parties with a weak municipal presence – based on the proportion of 
municipalities in which a party has an active municipal party directorate (not provisional 
commission) – will be ill-equipped to actively recruit candidates, which will disadvantage 
                                                 
100 This raises the question of newness vs. institutionalization, which are distinct. Nevertheless, a truly new 
party (i.e. did not merely change its name) will likely pose similar barriers to outsider candidates, because 
they often lack a consolidated party organization to recruit and support candidacies. It is important to note, 
however, that new parties may very well have a programmatic platform and potentially inclusive structure. 
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women. Parties with a more extensive presence throughout the state will have more 
contact with municipal leaders and a better network for recruiting potential candidates. 
Because of the constructed gender gap in political ambition discussed above, parties with 
no statewide network – which will have to rely largely on self-nomination – are less 
favorable for women. Parties with a limited municipal presence will also be less able to 
support candidate campaign efforts, which will deter female contenders by undermining 
the prospect of a collective campaign. 
For the final indicator in my index of party institutionalization, I use the state 
party leadership rolls discussed above to measure whether there exists alternation in state 
party leadership. State parties with a 0 have no alternation across elections (specifically, 
more than one election cycle), and state parties coded 1 consistently introduce new blood 
into their leadership. A party that remains dominated by the same president and/or 
secretary general and vice-president over time is likely to be subordinate to the leader(s), 
and unlikely to develop as an institution in its own right. Such weakly institutionalized 
parties will be more dependent upon their leader(s)’ image and charisma than on 
programmatic policy positions and will be highly susceptible to personalist politics, 
which will disadvantage (most) women contenders. Moreover, because the electoral 
appeal of such a party is likely contingent upon the particular leader, it is not sustainable. 
Finally, the leader will fight to maintain his power rather than work to recruit and support 
independent female candidacies.  
There is a possibility, however, that women can be elected when running in 
parties dominated by such monopolistic leaders due to the pooling of votes in the 
allocation of seats. In 2006, for example, Aline Corrêa101 was elected with the right-wing 
                                                 
101 Aline Corrêa is the daughter of Pedro Corrêa, a 7-term deputy sacked in the wake of the Mensalão 
scandal (Diap, 2007). 
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Partido Progressista (PP) in São Paulo despite winning only 11,132 of the nearly 18.8 
million statewide candidate votes cast.102 This is because the domineering state party 
leaders Paulo Maluf and Celso Russomanno103 (Braga, 2008, 461) led the PP-SP ticket 
with a combined vote total greater than 1.3 million votes. Maluf and Russomanno’s votes 
in excess of the electoral quotient (296,987) accrued to other members on the PP’s list. 
While this component of my party institutionalization index would not code the PP in São 
Paulo as institutionalized, but rather susceptible to personalist politics, it is clear that 
Corrêa’s electoral chances were substantially improved by running with the PP.104 I 
therefore estimate the model alternatively using an index of the abovementioned factors, 
and with each factor modeled separately. 
Table 4.5 displays the means and standard deviations across states on these six 
dimensions of party institutionalization for each party. The parties are arranged by 
ideology (left/center/right) and then electoral size, with the parties no longer active 
displayed at the bottom of the list.105 The values represent the average over time and 






                                                 
102 Notably, Corrêa increased her vote share to 78,317 in the 2010 elections. 
103 In 2011, with an eye on the São Paulo mayoral contest, Russomanno left the PP for the PRB (Serapião, 
2011). 
104 Corrêa received nearly R$10,000 in campaign contributions from Maluf’s campaign and the PP-SP, as 
well as R$82,000 from the national party directorate (Diap, 2007). The ability to fund candidates would be 
picked up in the party funds component of the index. 
105 Because the party funds are 2010 data, parties no longer active are missing data on this measure. 
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        LEFT 
       PC do B 1.4 (2.1) 1.2 (3.0) 14 2.0 (2.1) 0.4 (0.8) 0.2 (0.2) 0.5 (0.5) 
PCB 0.1 (0.4) 0.0 (0.0) 10 0.2 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.5) 
PCO 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 7 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.4) 
PDT 3.2 (3.6) 4.0 (6.3) 21 7.4 (4.4) 3.1 (9.2) 0.3 (0.2) 0.3 (0.5) 
PMN 1.2 (2.3) 1.3 (3.5) 13 1.8 (1.1) 0.9 (1.5) 0.0 (0.1) 0.7 (0.5) 
PPS 2.9 (3.5) 3.1 (4.6) 11 3.6 (2.3) 1.4 (1.8) 0.3 (0.2) 0.3 (0.5) 
PSB 3.5 (4.1) 4.7 (5.9) 15 3.6 (2.1) 4.2 (4.1) 0.2 (0.2) 0.4 (0.5) 
PSOL 0.6 (0.9) 0.2 (0.8) 3 0.2 (0.4) 0.4 (0.5) 0.1 (0.1) 0.7 (0.5) 
PSTU 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 10 0.2 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.5) 
PT 3.9 (3.3) 4.8 (6.5) 20 7.8 (2.8) 16.2 (16.7) 0.9 (0.1) 0.8 (0.4) 
PV 1.2 (1.5) 0.8 (2.5) 11 1.5 (1.0) 1.0 (1.9) 0.1 (0.2) 0.5 (0.5) 
        CENTER 
       PMDB 6.8 (6.0) 9.0 (8.3) 21 16.9 (5.6) 21.4 (11.5) 0.6 (0.3) 0.2 (0.4) 
PSDB 6.0 (4.8) 7.9 (7.3) 13 9.6 (2.6) 27.9 (20.3) 0.4 (0.2) 0.7 (0.5) 
        RIGHT 
       PAN 0.3 (0.4) 0.1 (0.8) 6 0.5 (0.5) 0.0 (0.0) - - 
PFL/DEM 8.1 (8.0) 9.5 (9.2) 16 10.4 (4.6) 11.1 (9.7) 0.2 (0.3) 0.3 (0.5) 
PGT 0.3 (0.6) 0.0 (0.0) 7 0.3 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) - - 
PHS 0.4 (0.5) 0.0 (0.3) 8 0.7 (0.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.5 (0.5) 
PL/PR 3.9 (3.9) 4.6 (6.3) 12 5.1 (1.6) 3.4 (4.5) 0.0 (0.1) 0.4 (0.5) 
PPR/PPB/PP 5.7 (6.1) 6.7 (7.9) 9 11.0 (3.9) 6.8 (3.8) 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.4) 
PRB 1.6 (2.0) 1.2 (3.2) 4 1.6 (1.7) 0.3 (0.9) 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.5) 
PRONA 0.9 (1.7) 0.3 (1.4) 12 0.6 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) - - 
PRP 0.4 (0.5) 0.2 (1.5) 13 1.6 (1.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.5) 
PRTB 0.4 (1.2) 0.2 (1.5) 10 0.9 (1.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.5) 
PSC 1.5 (2.5) 1.0 (3.0) 13 2.1 (1.2) 0.4 (1.6) 0.0 (0.2) 0.7 (0.5) 
PSD 1.4 (2.2) 1.9 (3.7) 12 2.8 (2.1) 0.0 (0.0) - - 
PSDC 0.3 (0.9) 0.1 (0.4) 8 0.9 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.5) 
PSL 0.7 (1.1) 0.2 (0.8) 8 1.3 (0.9) 0.2 (0.7) 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.5) 
PST 0.8 (2.0) 0.7 (2.5) 5 1.0 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) - - 
PTB 3.5 (5.0) 4.6 (6.7) 22 6.9 (2.2) 4.7 (4.7) 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.5) 
PTC 0.4 (0.9) 0.3 (1.6) 14 1.1 (0.7) 0.4 (1.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.6 (0.5) 
PTdoB 0.5 (1.1) 0.3 (1.6) 11 1.1 (0.8) 0.3 (0.8) 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.4) 
PTN 0.3 (0.6) 0.0 (0.0) 8 0.6 (0.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.5 (0.5) 
AVERAGE 2.5 (4.2) 2.9 (5.8) 13 4.3 (5.0) 5.0 (10.6) 0.2 (0.3) 0.4 (0.5) 
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In particular, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 display what I argue throughout the dissertation – 
that there exists significant variation across parties, thus rendering inadequate the 
traditional cross-national aggregate approach. Brazil with its numerous parties is simply 
not the US, UK, or Mexico. Rather, it implores a lower level analysis that uses the rich 
interparty variation to illuminate on the relationship between parties, voters, and 
representation. Also evident in the data (See Table 4.7) is extensive variation across the 
states, even within many parties. Such variation renders Brazil an excellent selection for 
the analysis of individual women’s representation. I employ this variation to analyze how 
the central explanatory factors of the literature on women’s representation interact to 
affect individual women’s prospects outside the traditional developed and 
institutionalized contexts. 
We also see that, while the smaller parties endure significantly less volatility in 
their electoral fortunes than do the major parties, their overall share of votes, seats, party 
members, and funds are limited. This demonstrates that electoral volatility cannot itself 
capture the concept of party institutionalization or even societal roots, but rather must be 
considered in tandem with the other components. The party with the highest average 
levels of volatility is the PFL/Democratas party, which has seen its longtime near 
oligopolistic dominance of the northeastern states eclipsed in recent years by the PT. 
It is important to note from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 the variation across parties of the 
same ideological orientation. While many of the larger leftist parties are more 
institutionalized, the fit is not perfect.106 The index provides a real and plausible 
alternative to ideology. 
                                                 
106 In fact, the correlation with “left” is actually negative for some of the index’s component parts. 
 142 
The resource advantage of the larger parties is striking, with all but the major 
parties having on average less than one percent of the total state party funding (including 
private and public party funds). So while smaller parties may suffer from less volatility, 
their limitations in human and financial resources are apparent. I transform the scores on 
these six dimensions (taking the inverse of the average of vote and seat volatility) into a 
factor-based index of party institutionalization, with lower values indicating a weakly-
institutionalized party. I expect that parties with a higher score on the index of party 
institutionalization will have a greater capacity to support female candidacies and will be 
more conducive to women’s active political participation. 




Figure 4.5 plots the bivariate relationship between the party institutionalization 
index and the number of women elected by a state party in a given election. In the 
multivariate analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, I expect to find that the interaction of the party 
institutionalization index and women in party leadership is positively correlated with the 
electoral performance of female candidates in Brazil. 
Women in Party Leadership 
I use the above mentioned state party leadership rolls to calculate the proportion 
of women, and then code state parties as having a critical mass if at least 25% of their 
their leadership is female. I also reference women in each party’s national executive 
commissions (NECs) when developing the argument. As portrayed in Table 4.6, there is 
significant variation across parties in their incorporation of women in top party 
leadership. Leftist parties (including the old left Communist Party of Brazil, PC do B) are 
the Brazilian parties with the greatest female presence in NECs, and it is also these 
parties that tend to see through more of their female candidacies. 
In the 2010 elections, over 25% of the PC do B’s candidates were women, with 
40% of its elected representatives and 26% of its top leadership body being female. In 
sharp contrast, the PSDB (a non-leftist party) advanced over 20% female candidates but 
had less than six percent women among its elected deputies and 11% women in party 
leadership. This suggests that the electorally smaller PC do B’s female candidates are 
actually more viable, enjoying significantly greater support from the party and electorate 




Table 4.6. Female Presence in National Party Leadership 
Figure 4.6. Average Proportion of Women in State Party Leadership, by Party 
Party 
National Executive Committee 
       Members         Women (%) 
Women Candidates 
in 2010 (%) 
Women Elected 
in 2010 (%) 
PCdoB 27 7 (25.9%) 30 (25.4%) 6 (40.0%) 
PDT 24 1 (4.2%) 44 (16.9%) 2 (7.7%) 
PFL 52 5 (9.6%) 21 (11.0%) 2 (4.7%) 
PMDB 25 2 (8.0%) 57 (16.9%) 7 (9.0%) 
PP 87 6 (6.9%) 35 (18.0%) 4 (9.1%) 
PR 25 2 (8.0%) 34 (20.7%) 2 (5.0%) 
PSB 31 6 (19.3%) 63 (21.6%) 4 (11.8%) 
PSDB 46 5 (10.9%) 55 (20.2%) 3 (5.7%) 
PT 27 10 (37.0%) 71 (21.2%) 9 (10.2%) 
PMN 16 2 (12.5%) 51 (24.9%) 1 (25.0%) 
PSC 20 2 (10.0%) 33 (16.9%) 2 (11.8%) 
PT do B 
  
21 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 
PTB 26 2 (7.7%) 66 (23.2%) 1 (4.5%) 
PV 32 7 (21.9%) 73 (19.9%) 1 (7.1%) 
Notes: Data compiled by author from TSE and party websites; left parties are italicized. 
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Because congressional campaigns in Brazil are state-centered rather than national 
affairs, state-level measures of women in party leadership are far more appropriate for 
assessing the influence of party leadership on women’s electoral prospects. Figure 4.6 
displays the variation across parties and within ideological positions. As shown by Figure 
4.6, the parties that have an average proportion of women in their state leadership nearing 
the critical mass (25%) are not all leftist (PRP, PRTB). Also evident in Figure 4.6 and 
Table 4.6 is the existence of leftist parties with minimal women’s representation in state 
party leadership (PCB, PDT, PPS), as well as disparities in some parties’ national and 
state-level leadership structures.  
For example, while the PT has 37% women in its national leadership, its average 
proportion of women in state party leadership is less than 25 percent. This is reflective of 
the decentralized character of Brazilian politics, with even one of the country’s most 
centralized parties having such discrepancies between its national and state-level 
leadership structures – only 56% of the PT state executive commissions have a critical 
mass of women leaders. The PC do B, on the other hand, more consistently incorporates 
women in its party leadership, with 26% women in its national leadership, and 75% of its 
state executive committees having a critical mass of women leaders.  
In Figure 4.7, I plot the women in state party leadership against my index of party 
institutionalization. I expect parties most conducive to female political aspirants to be 
those approximating the upper-right quadrant, where the proportion of women in party 
leadership reaches a critical mass of 25 percent, and the party institutionalization index is 




Figure 4.7. Party Institutionalization Index and Proportion of Women in State Party 
Leadership, by State Party 
We can see from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that there is extensive variation in the central 
variables of interest across Brazilian parties and states. Although the success rate of all 
female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies is 7.51%, this number conceals a low of 
0% in various parties and a high for the PC do B, which has managed to elect more than a 
quarter of its female candidates. Also evident is that such electoral success is not simply a 
question of ideology, with more than 20% of the PFL/Democratas female candidates 
winning election. Yet the measure of candidate success rate by party also obscures 
relevant information; the parties with more female candidates running will inevitably 
have a higher denominator in the calculation of success rate, regardless of their actual 
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electoral outcomes. This means that parties running fewer female candidates might enjoy 
higher success rates. For example, the PFL’s 20% success rate belies that fact that a mere 
8% of its 1150 candidates to the Chamber were women, which pales in comparison to the 
PC do B, which advanced 23% women among its 322 candidates. 
Variation across party averages on the party institutionalization index 
demonstrates that it is not merely a question of electoral strength, with several small 
parties such as the PMN (Party of National Mobilization), PSC (Social Christian Party), 
and PTC (Christian Workers’ Party) scoring relatively well. The PP (Progressive Party) 
and PR (Party of the Republic) are two parties that are fairly strong electorally, each with 
8% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but are extremely low on the party 
institutionalization index, hovering just above one (on a scale of six). 
Table 4.7 also allows shows the proportion of a party’s state executive 
commissions across Brazil that have a critical mass of women leaders. Just over half of 
the PT state party organizations have a critical mass of women leaders. This is reflective 
of both the nature of their internal quota, which can be satisfied with posts that do not 
actually have a voting position on the executive commission, and the relatively large size 
of their state party leaderships. The two parties with the highest proportion of state 
organizations with a critical mass of women are leftist (PSTU and PC do B). As 
mentioned above, the PRTB also performs quite well on this front, with 58% of its state 
party organizations having at least 25% women, an average proportion of 27%, and 10% 






Table 4.7. Party Institutionalization Index, Women in Party Leadership, and the Success 
of Female Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, by Party 












     
PAN 0.02% 0.00% - - 
PC DO B 1.65% 25.33% 2.07 0.75 
PCB 0.07% 0.00% 1.68 0.19 
PCO 0.01% 0.00% 1.42 0.43 
PDT 0.40% 4.52% 2.08 0.25 
PFL 1.45% 20.62% 1.70 0.15 
PGT 0.05% 0.00% - - 
PHS/PSN 0.10% 0.00% 1.77 0.13 
PMDB 1.43% 18.46% 2.29 0.07 
PMN 0.15% 1.06% 2.07 0.64 
PP (1994) 2.62% 14.29% - - 
PP/PPB 0.74% 11.58% 1.38 0.19 
PPS 0.25% 1.98% 1.74 0.19 
PR/PL 0.23% 3.13% 1.44 0.19 
PRB 0.03% 0.00% 1.36 0.48 
PRN 0.02% 0.00% - - 
PRONA 0.08% 1.82% - - 
PRP 0.04% 0.00% 1.88 0.43 
PRTB 0.07% 0.00% 1.68 0.58 
PSB 0.62% 9.27% 1.81 0.38 
PSC 0.17% 2.97% 2.09 0.09 
PSD 0.36% 5.88% - - 
PSDB 0.83% 13.56% 2.36 0.04 
PSDC 0.04% 0.00% 1.60 0.47 
PSL 0.11% 0.00% 1.62 0.32 
PSOL 0.15% 1.22% 1.82 0.46 
PST 0.78% 7.14% - - 
PSTU 0.06% 0.00% 1.70 0.80 
PT 0.86% 16.87% 3.17 0.56 
PT DO B 0.24% 2.08% 1.65 0.38 
PTB 0.26% 2.26% 1.89 0.32 
PTC 0.10% 1.47% 2.09 0.18 
PTN 0.02% 0.00% 1.76 0.20 
PV 0.07% 0.55% 1.81 0.47 
     Total 0.53% 7.51% 1.90 0.34 
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Table 4.8. Party Institutionalization Index, Women in Party Leadership, and the Success 
of Female Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, by State 
The variation across states in the variables of interest is evident from Table 4.8. 
The northeast has both the fourth highest success rate – Rio Grande do Norte at 18.9%, 
and many of the lowest success rates, with only 3-5% of female candidates in three 












     
Acre – N  2.41% 17.95% 2.02 0.29 
Alagoas – NE 1.07% 9.76% 1.69 0.28 
Amazonas – N 1.73% 15.00% 2.01 0.33 
Amapá – N 2.31% 22.45% 1.98 0.45 
Bahia – NE 0.33% 12.70% 1.59 0.31 
Ceará – NE 0.14% 3.08% 1.94 0.26 
Distrito Federal – CO 0.79% 7.69% 1.98 0.41 
Espírito Santo – SE 1.47% 21.05% 1.91 0.47 
Goiás – CO 1.49% 20.75% 2.09 0.25 
Maranhão – NE 0.66% 9.52% 1.85 0.41 
Minas Gerais – SE 0.11% 4.83% 1.86 0.24 
M.Grosso do Sul – CO 0.66% 4.48% 2.02 0.30 
Mato Grosso – CO 1.19% 10.71% 2.03 0.23 
Pará – N 0.81% 10.81% 1.81 0.33 
Paraíba – NE 0.45% 6.06% 1.99 0.35 
Pernambuco – NE 0.30% 4.29% 1.82 0.46 
Piauí – NE 0.60% 4.26% 2.06 0.39 
Paraná – S 0.14% 2.78% 1.77 0.08 
Rio de Janeiro – SE 0.12% 5.81% 1.67 0.37 
R.G. do Norte – NE 1.89% 18.92% 1.73 0.37 
Rondônia – N 1.51% 9.43% 1.89 0.44 
Roraima – N 1.18% 10.20% 1.56 0.55 
Rio Grande do Sul – S 0.37% 8.33% 2.25 0.20 
Santa Catarina – S 0.38% 4.82% 2.42 0.16 
Sergipe – NE 0.30% 0.00% 2.02 0.48 
São Paulo – SE 0.07% 4.47% 1.81 0.36 
Tocantins – N 1.62% 7.84% 1.80 0.30 
     
Total 0.53% 7.51% 1.90 0.34 
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northeastern states winning election and not a single woman winning in Sergipe. The 
highs for female candidate success rate (Amapá) and average vote share (Acre) are both 
in the northern Amazonian region. The low average vote share for female candidates in 
São Paulo reflects the large number of candidates; in 2010, 1017 candidates sought one 
of its 70 seats up for grabs. 
Variation averaged across state parties on the party institutionalization index is 
less informative, since the measure includes each state party’s share of statewide 
affiliates and funds. But Table 4.8 does reveal significant variation in the presence of 
women in party leadership. The fact that women have struggled to gain election among 
the more developed southern states is less puzzling once we appreciate women’s limited 
presence in its state party organizations – only 8 to 20 percent have a critical mass of 
women! In contrast, all but two of the eight states in which at least 40% of the party 
organizations include at least 25% women in their leadership are in the lesser developed 
northern and northeastern states. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary contribution of this chapter has been to demonstrate the immense 
variation in our central variables of interest across Brazil’s 29 registered political parties 
and 27 statewide electoral districts. I first discuss the intensive data collection process, 
and then provide theoretical, empirical, and statistical justifications for the 
appropriateness of hierarchical modeling for my central research questions on the barriers 
confronting and paths to power of female political aspirants in Brazil’s still vastly 
masculine legislature. I explicitly outline my operationalization and measurement of the 
central variables, and advance an original state-level index of party institutionalization 
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and comprehensive multilevel database of all candidacies to the Brazilian Congress from 
1994-2010 
I provide an initial reading of the individual and party variables comprising the 
database, and discuss variation in women’s presence among candidates and elected across 
states, parties, and electoral rules. I also examine the range of and gendered discrepancies 
(or lack thereof) in educational attainment, occupations, incumbency status, and 
campaign finance, finding that while women candidates tend to be as educated as male 
candidates, they are in general less likely to run as incumbents and have less access to 
campaign finance. Finally, I explore the variance in party ideology, party 
institutionalization, and women in party leadership, and exhibit the disproportionate level 
of women among leftist parties’ candidates and elected legislators relative to their overall 
legislative presence. After observing the disproportionate concentration of leftists among 
women elected to the rather conservative Brazilian Congress, I advance party 
institutionalization and women in party leadership to substantiate leftist parties’ apparent 
women-friendliness.  
In the ensuing chapters, I use my original database introduced in this chapter to 
model and explain the gendered variation in electoral performance across states, parties, 
and electoral rules, thus elucidating the obstacles hindering women’s representation and 
the paths to overcoming these barriers. In a departure from the aggregate cross-national 
approach so prevalent in the women’s representation and electoral systems literatures, 
which most often considers only averages across a nation’s political parties, I seize the 
interparty variation revealed above to illuminate the role of particular party 
characteristics – party institutionalization and women in party leadership – in explaining 
women’s extreme underrepresentation in the Brazilian legislature. 
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Chapter 5 – Machista Voters, the Rules of the Game, or the Good Ole’ 
Boys’ Club? Assessing the Obstacles to Female Politicians in Brazil’s 
Chamber of Deputies 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter demonstrates that the extensive interstate and interparty variation in 
women’s electoral prospects in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies outlined in Chapter 4 are 
best explained not by machista voters in less developed states or electoral rules producing 
varying district or party magnitudes, but rather by variation across state parties in 
institutionalization and the presence of women in their decision-making structures. 
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the design and enforcement of the gender quota has 
been inadequate and prompted little more than unsubstantiated rhetoric from the vastly 
male leaders of Brazil’s often inchoate parties. Yet, some parties have managed to 
overcome these deficits and effectively promote women’s participation. 
Here, I use interstate and interparty variation in women’s electoral prospects 
within the Chamber of Deputies to empirically assess the explanatory power of the rival 
explanations for women’s underrepresentation – voter bias and development, electoral 
rules (district and party magnitude), and ideology – along with my argument that (a lack 
of) party institutionalization and women-friendly leadership are the key predictors of 
women’s electoral prospects in Brazil.  
Although conventional wisdom rooted in the formal rules of the game dismisses 
the gatekeeping role for parties in an entrepreneurial context like Brazil’s, this chapter 
demonstrates that parties, or more precisely, weak party institutionalization and 
unsupportive party leadership—manifested as an absence of critical psychological, 
organizational, and material support—remain the central barrier to women’s 
representation in Brazil. The successful incorporation of women in Brazilian politics is 
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contingent not on the development levels or electoral size of districts, but rather on the 
effective commitment of parties to the promotion of women’s political participation. 
Thus, the amorphous character of many Brazilian parties does not preclude their 
theoretical and empirical relevance for explaining electoral outcomes. This research 
brings parties to the center of the analysis, exploiting significant interparty variation and 
finding the key to enhancing women’s political empowerment in Brazil to be the 
inclusion and championing of women by party leadership in institutionalized parties.  
The parties that have proven women-friendly have tended to be leftist due to their 
often more comprehensive infrastructure (Toole, 2003) and historical emphasis on 
egalitarianism (Duverger, 1955). Yet rather than leftist ideology per se, the most salient 
factors for predicting women’s electoral prospects are the party structure and critical acts 
performed by women in party leadership. This is especially true given the postulated 
support for female candidates in the electorate, and the recently emboldened gender 
quota, with all parties standing to gain from the effective promotion of strong female 
candidacies. As such, leftist and non-leftist parties alike can mitigate the severe gender 
gap in women’s legislative presence by institutionalizing their party and including 
women in their party leadership, conditions under which, as my analysis demonstrates, 
women’s electoral prospects are heightened. 
To make my argument, I subject the central explanations for the 
underrepresentation of women to empirical testing at the candidate level, in a context that 
is recently (re)democratized, has open-list elections, and a still inadequately 
institutionalized party system replete with a range of institutionalization among parties, 
ranging from inchoate to fully-institutionalized. I leverage extensive quantitative and 
qualitative data to assess the explanatory capacity of the principal explanations in 
contexts that extend beyond the traditional approach. While the conventional wisdom of 
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the extant literature considers voter hostility and district magnitude to be significant 
barriers undermining women’s representation, this research finds that they have had only 
negligible effects on women’s electoral performance in Brazil. Moreover, lesser levels of 
voter bias against women have not correlated with increases in female candidates or 
deputies. Instead, I find that parties play a crucial gatekeeping role through their 
(in)capacitation of female candidacies and are therefore the essential actors in the 
political empowerment of women. The chapter concludes with a discussion of findings, 
how the electoral rules of the Chamber amplify the importance of party 
institutionalization for women (demonstrated in Chapter 6), and the lingering variation to 
be explained (the subject of Chapter 7). 
THE OBSTACLES TO POWER 
To set up my argument and hypotheses, I first review each of the rival arguments 
from the women and politics literature, focusing on their hypotheses of the principal 
obstacles to women’s representation, and considering their applicability for explaining 
women’s electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.  
Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development 
In Chapter 2, I discussed Paxton and Kunovich’s measure of voter bias against 
women – national gender ideology – and their aggregate cross-national evidence that 
found it to be a key predictor of women’s overall representation (Paxton and Kunovich, 
2003, 93). Here, I use the wide range in development levels across Brazil mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (See Figure 4.2) to explore the covariates of voter bias and assess the ability of 
this rival explanation to predict female candidates’ electoral prospects in Brazil. I use 
data on public opinion, state development levels, and candidate electoral performance to 
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investigate whether voters across Brazil are equally likely to support women in politics 
both hypothetically and at the polls. 
Nationwide data from the 2008 LAPOP surveys reveal considerable interstate 
variance among respondents’ perceptions of the political aptitude of women. The 
variation in public opinion may have important implications for women’s electoral 
prospects, with women in states with more favorable perceptions of female candidates 
faring better electorally than women in states with negative perceptions of female 
candidates. Can the modernization hypothesis – which asserts that as societies develop 
economically, the rates of educational attainment, literacy, and workforce presence of 
women increase, leading invariably to a shift from traditional societal values to modern 
values, and thus significant attitudinal change toward more progressive conceptions of 
gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) – explain such interstate variability? If so, 
the least developed states would harbor more negative perceptions of female candidates 
than would the more developed states, leading female candidates to enjoy their greatest 
electoral prospects in the latter. 
Figure 5.1 maps these 20081 LAPOP data on negative perceptions of women in 
politics and the Brazilian Central Bank’s 2009-2010 estimates for state-level values of the 
HDI (Banco Central, 2009; LAPOP, 2008). It suggests a plausible bivariate relationship 
between voter bias and district development, with many of the larger circles (indicating 
that the majority of respondents in the state expressed bias against women in politics) 
clustered in the lesser developed Northeast, and the southern and southeastern states 
having mostly small circles. Indeed, the correlation between a respondent’s answer to the 
question “in general, men make better politicians than women” (where 1 indicates 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately LAPOP did not ask the question about perception of women in politics in the 2010 wave of 
their survey. 
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“strongly agree” and 4 indicates “strongly disagree”) and her state’s HDI is positive 
(0.195) and statistically significant (LAPOP, 2008). A simple logistic regression with 
only two binary predictors – one for respondent sex, and one for whether the respondent 
lives in a state with an HDI above the national mean – suggests that the odds of a 
respondent in a more developed state (compared to one in a less developed state) 
agreeing that men are superior politicians are 0.46 to 1. In sum, the LAPOP data suggest 
that HDI and the prospect of strongly disagreeing with the statement increase together 
(LAPOP, 2008). 
Yet, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, there are some noteworthy outliers. In the 
southeastern and southern states of Rio de Janeiro and Santa Catarina for example, a 
striking 41 and 45% of respondents, respectively, either agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement. Respondents in Ceará (31.0%), Pará (28.6%), and Rio Grande do Norte 
(33.3%) – three states which at the time of the survey had leftist female executives 
(capital city Mayor Luizianne Lins and Governors Ana Júlia Carepa and Wilma de Faria) 
– exhibited levels of machista voter bias below the national mean (33.5%). In any case, 
limitations in the reach of the LAPOP survey, which was not designed to be 









Figure 5.1. Do State Development Levels (HDI) Predict Voter Bias Against Women? 
The recent wave of the Brazilian Electoral Study (CESOP, 2010), however, was 
designed to be representative at the regional level. As shown in Table 5.1, the data do not 
support the notion that the more developed southern and southeastern regions are more 
conducive to women’s representation than the poorer regions. While respondents in 
southern states did express significantly lower levels of voter bias in 2010, this has not 
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translated into more women politicians. Descriptive evidence thus suggests that machista 
voter attitudes may not predict women’s electoral prospects in Brazil. Although residual 
voter bias against women does persist across Brazil, several female candidates have 
nonetheless found way to succeed electorally in inhospitable contexts, with some doing 
so even without the support of an institutionalized and women-friendly party (illustrated 
in Chapter 7). 
Table 5.1. Women’s Electoral Prospects (1994-2010) and Voter Bias, by Region 
Interestingly, empirical work has actually revealed female candidates to be most 
successful in their bids for local elected office in Brazil’s more traditional municipalities 






Female         
Success Rate 
Female-Male   
Success Rate Ratio 
North 355 (15.3%) 46 (14.2%) 13.0% 0.91 
Northeast 452 (10.2%) 34 (4.5%) 7.5% 0.42 
Center-West 241 (14.9%) 25 (12.2%) 10.4% 0.79 
Southeast 1186 (12.9%) 69 (7.7%) 5.8% 0.57 
South 335 (12.1%) 19 (4.9%) 5.7% 0.38 
BRAZIL 2569 (12.6%) 193 (7.5%) 7.5% 0.56 





(2010)   
North 36.8% 23.7%   
Northeast 46.7% 18.7%   
Center-West 38.6% 18.7%   
Southeast 25.6% 20.8%   
South 28.0% 12.6%   
BRAZIL 33.5% 19.0%   
Notes: Voter bias in 2008 and 2010 represent the percent of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed 
with the statements “men make better politicians than women” (2008) and “in general, men are more 
appropriate for a political career than are women” (2010). 
Sources: TSE, LAPOP (2008), CESOP (ESEB, 2010). 
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fact come from the lesser developed north and northeastern regions (e.g., Marina Silva of 
Acre, Heloísa Helena of Alagoas, Roseana Sarney of Maranhão), and these regions have 
consistently had the greatest proportions of female mayors and municipal councilors 
(Miguel and Queiroz, 2006; TSE, 2008). Moreover, February 2009 public opinion polls 
suggest that the northeast region has the country’s highest postulated support for women 
in politics, a hypothetical translated into action when electors in the Northeast voted in 
droves for Dilma Rousseff in the 2010 presidential election. Together, these observations 
weaken the traction of the modernization hypothesis on the question of women’s 
representation in Brazil. 
Some analyses of aggregate level data, however, suggest that female candidates 
for national office should be most likely to thrive in the more developed regions of 
Brazil, with others finding no effect (Araújo and Eustáquio, 2007). Table 5.2 depicts the 
variation in female candidacies and success rates across Brazil’s five regions over the last 
five election cycles. While women have in fact struggled to gain national-level power in 
the impoverished northeast, they also confront challenges in the more developed South 
and Southeast. As shown in Table 5.2, women’s political presence in these more 
developed regions has actually rated lower – on several dimensions – than that of the 








Table 5.2. Female Candidacies and Success Rates in the Chamber of Deputies, by Region 
(1994-2010) 
 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Women Candidates      
     North 43 (11.6%) 49 (12.1%) 76 (13.8%) 84 (15.3%) 103 (23.0%) 
     Northeast 30 (4.3%) 62 (9.2%) 99 (10.3%) 110 (10.2%) 151 (14.7%) 
     Center-West 18 (7.4%) 38 (14.0%) 58 (15.1%) 57 (15.1%) 70 (20.5%) 
     Southeast 71 (5.5%) 158 (10.4%) 199 (11.2%) 303 (13.3%) 455 (19.3%) 
     South 23 (5.6%) 41 (8.3%) 48 (9.2%) 73 (10.9%) 150 (22.1%) 
      
Women Elected      
     North 10 (15.4%) 5 (7.7%) 8 (12.3%) 12 (20.0%) 10 (15.4%) 
     Northeast 3 (2.0%) 3 (2.0%) 8 (5.3%) 9 (6.0%) 11 (7.3%) 
     Center-West 6 (14.6%) 7 (17.1%) 5 (12.2%) 3 (7.3%) 4 (9.8%) 
     Southeast 11 (6.1%) 12 (6.7%) 15 (8.4%) 16 (8.9%) 15 (8.4%) 
     South 2 (2.6%) 2 (2.6%) 6 (7.8%) 4 (5.2%) 5 (6.5%) 
      
Female Candidate 
Success Rate 
     
     North 23.3% 10.2% 10.5% 15.5% 9.7% 
     Northeast 10.0% 4.8% 8.1% 8.2% 7.3% 
     Center-West 33.3% 18.4% 8.6% 5.3% 5.7% 
     Southeast 15.5% 7.6% 7.5% 5.3% 3.3% 
     South 8.7% 4.9% 12.5% 5.5% 3.3% 
      
Female-Male 
Success Rate Ratio 
     
     North 1.39 0.61 0.87 1.38 0.61 
     Northeast 0.45 0.20 0.49 0.56 0.46 
     Center-West 2.14 1.27 0.78 0.44 0.42 
     Southeast 1.12 0.62 0.73 0.64 0.38 
     South 0.45 0.29 0.84 0.45 0.24 
Notes: Values in parentheses represent the percent of women among the region’s total candidates and 
elected. Source: Compiled by author with data from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. 
Given such mixed findings, this research seeks to clarify the relationship between 
state development level, public opinion, and women’s representation by subjecting the 
hypothesis to empirical testing at the individual level.2 I first use public opinion data to 
                                                 
2 Although I intended to avert the confusion often rendered by such hyper-aggregated concepts as 
modernization by breaking it down into its component parts—urbanization, educational attainment, 
workforce participation of women, and income—multicollinearity concerns prevented me from including 
all of these variables in a model. 
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explore the covariates of voter hostility to women, expecting machista bias to remain 
more pronounced in lesser developed states and especially in rural areas. While the 
literature would therefore predict a positive influence of state development level upon the 
electoral performance of women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Schmidt, 2008; Thames and 
Williams, 2010), with other studies restricting this relationship to women on the left (e.g., 
Avelar, 2001), I expect that state HDI will nonetheless be an insignificant predictor of 
vote share for all candidates, including leftist women. As is discussed at length in Chapter 
7, women have crafted means to thrive even in the context of machista electorates. I test 
the following hypotheses with survey data3 from three nationally representative surveys 
conducted in 2001,4 2009,5 and 2010,6 as well as the LAPOP survey, and my multilevel 
database of the individual, party, and district-level variables discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
Modernization Hypothesis: Development level will predict the bias against women, with 
respondents from rural areas and lesser developed states harboring heightened levels of 
machista bias relative to those from urban areas and more developed states. 
   
Voter Attitudes Hypothesis: A candidate’s state development level will nonetheless be 
uncorrelated to her electoral performance, irrespective of sex or ideology. 
 
Rival Machista Voters Hypotheses 1-2: (1) For female candidates, district development 
level will be positively correlated to her electoral performance. (2) For leftist female 
candidates, district development level will be positively correlated to her electoral 
performance. 
                                                 
-3 I would like to thank Rachel Meneguello of UNICAMP’s CESOP for making these data available. 
4 Survey, “The Brazilian Woman in the Public and Private Spheres,” conducted by researchers from the 
PT’s Fundação Perseu Abramo in October, 2001, with 2,502 respondents from 187 municipalities 
throughout Brazil. 
5 Survey, “Women in Politics,” conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics 
(Ibope) in February, 2009, with 2002 respondents from 142 municipalities throughout Brazil. 
6 Survey, “Brazilian Electoral Study,” conducted by Vox Populi in November, 2010 with 2000 respondents 
in 149 municipalities throughout Brazil, and representative at the regional level. 
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Institutional Rules of the Game: District and Party Magnitude 
A second rival explanation for women’s representation focuses on the institutional 
rules of the game. The feature of electoral systems most commonly considered in cross-
national analyses of women’s representation has been the allocation of seats per district 
(district magnitude).7 As discussed in Chapter 2, a greater district magnitude is widely 
considered favorable for women’s representation. When there are multiple vacancies on a 
party list, the resource of a candidacy is less scarce. Parties are therefore able to diversify 
their lists, including candidates from various societal sectors, constituencies, or groups. 
Party magnitude brings this measure to the party level, accounting for the 
fragmentation of votes that results from the multiplicity of parties associated with high 
district magnitude elections (Duverger, 1954). The predictive power of party magnitude 
for women’s representation stems from the tendency of party leaders to place female 
candidates in unelectable positions at the bottom of their closed party lists (Matland, 
1998). As the party magnitude increases, candidates in less desirable list positions enjoy a 
greater chance of election. This explanation loses ground in open-list PR elections, where 
voters rather than party leaders determine the rank order of candidates. 
Indeed, Jones finds that party magnitude is an insignificant predictor of the 
proportion of women elected on party lists in recent open-list elections in Latin America 
(2009). But party magnitude may retain relevance for strategic reasons. In a party that 
anticipates winning only one seat, the candidacies of women will in most instances be 
subordinated to candidacies of those with a proven track record of attaining votes and/or 
raising funds. In the Brazilian electoral system, prioritized candidates on the so-called 
“unofficial list” and particularly the “puxadoras da legenda” – candidates who enhance 
                                                 
7 Given the widespread diffusion of quotas in the last two decades (Krook, 2009), most cross-national 
analyses now also incorporate a measure of quota systems among their institutional variables. 
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the electoral prospects of fellow partisans by virtue of their anticipated quantity of votes 
in excess of the electoral quotient – enjoy greater access to the state-funded propaganda 
time (HGPE) allocated by the party, more support in producing their advertisements for 
HGPE and other propaganda materials, and a greater chance of garnering organizational 
support and endorsement from their party’s gubernatorial campaign (Matos, 2008; 
Samuels, 2003). A party that is fighting for a single seat will likely be hesitant to 
encourage and support additional candidacies, recruiting instead candidatas laranjas 
(sacrificial lambs) intended solely to garner votes for the top (usually male) candidate. 
Conversely, a party that anticipates winning more seats in a state will be more 
willing to share party material resources such as campaign literature, time on and 
production assistance for HGPE, the highly-desired dobradinha in concurrent elections, 
and funds among its candidates. Such support generally parlays into a perception of 
viability in the media and electorate. Given these strategic considerations, I expect party 
magnitude – lagged to account for the anticipatory quality of the effect – to exert a 
positive influence on women’s electoral performance in Brazil. I expect that parties that, 
based on prior performance in a district, anticipate winning less than two seats will not 
support outsider candidacies and will therefore disadvantage most female contenders. 
Of the 2,390 state parties that ran in four election cycles (1998-2010)8 across 
Brazil’s 27 statewide multimember districts, with more than 20 parties in each election, 
838 won at least one seat. Only 147 (17.5%) of these successful state parties had women 
in their delegations, with 691 – more than 82% – failing to elect a single woman.9 A 
pairwise correlation demonstrates a slight positive relationship between a party’s seat 
                                                 
8 Because I am using the lag of party magnitude, the 1994 elections are excluded due to limited data 
availability from 1990 elections. 
9 This number jumps to 2,243 – nearly 94% – when including those parties that competed but won no seats. 
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share and their election of women, and the parties with women in their congressional 
delegation tend to be those with a party magnitude of two or more (17.3% of the total) 
rather than one. Yet, the fact that some of the numerous all-male delegations hail from 
parties enjoying higher party magnitudes suggests that other factors such as the biases 
confronted in the electorate (machista voter attitudes) and among party elites (the “good 
ole boys’ club”) must also be considered. 
I use the wide range in district and party magnitudes in Brazil’s Chamber of 
Deputies (ranging from 8 to 70, and 0 to 20, respectively), to empirically test their effects 
on female candidates’ electoral prospects. Although most prior studies of women’s 
representation and district and party magnitude contend that both measures of magnitude 
are positively correlated to women’s electoral success, I argue that it is a logical leap to 
expect that more female candidates presumed to result from greater district magnitude 
will automatically lead to the election of women. 












1994 185 (1% ⇧) 3008 6.2 32 6.2 
1998 348 (69% ⇧) 3357 10.4 29 5.7 
2002 480 (10% ⇧) 4198 11.4 42 8.2 
2006 627 (11% ⇧) 4946 12.7 45 8.8 
2010 929 (51% ⇧) 4854 19.1 45 8.8 
*The percentage in parentheses indicates the increase in proportion of female candidacies from the prior 
election. 
On the contrary, the only two elections in contemporary Brazilian politics in 
which the percentage of women deputies decreased or stayed the same were 1998 and 
2010, the two elections where the increase in female candidacies was the greatest (see 
 165 
Table 5.3).10 Increases in the number of female candidates have not automatically 
translated into more female deputies.  
I therefore expect district magnitude to have a negative influence on candidate 
electoral performance, irrespective of gender, due to the greater number of candidates and 
thus more competitive electoral contexts in states with higher district magnitudes. I also 
include the effective number of candidates running in each state, (1 divided by the sum of 
the squared vote share of all candidates running per state), which accounts for the 
fragmentation of the vote resulting from the mass of candidates in Chamber of Deputies 
elections (Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). I hypothesize that 
once competitiveness and seat availability are taken into account through effective 
number of candidates and party magnitude, we will see a positive relationship for party 
magnitude, with candidates emerging from parties with greater seat shares enjoying 
superior electoral performance. 
 I estimate the model with party magnitude from both the current and prior 
election (as a lag, or party magnitudet-1). Again, given the open lists, I expect party 
magnitude to exercise an effect that is anticipatory in quality; parties that based on their 
performance in past elections do not expect to win many seats will therefore have a 
scarcity of resources and be less likely to support outsider candidacies. I expect the effect 
of lagged party magnitude to be positive for all candidates, but especially salient and thus 
elevated for female candidates because they are less likely than are male candidates to 
run as the consummate insider of the “unofficial list,” and therefore stand to gain more 
from the potential of shared party resources. 
                                                 
10 This is in part due to the widespread occurrence of sacrificial lamb candidacies among women 
contenders in the wake of the gender quota and subsequent reform (see Wylie, 2011). 
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Although this expectation runs contrary to Jones’ (2009) finding that party 
magnitude does not predict a coalition’s proportion of women elected in open-list 
elections, I contend that we must subject these hypotheses to testing at the individual 
level in order to elucidate the conditions under which individual women can thrive.11 
 
Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis: District magnitude will be 
negatively correlated to candidate electoral performance, irrespective of candidate sex. 
 
Rules of the Game – Party Magnitude Hypothesis: Party magnitudet-1 will be positively 
correlated to candidates’ electoral performance, with an elevated effect for female 
candidates. 
 
Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 1 (conventional wisdom): District magnitude will be 
positively correlated to female candidates’ electoral performance. 
 
Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 2 (Jones): Party magnitudet, t-1 will be uncorrelated 
to female candidates’ electoral performance. 
The Good Ole Boys’ Club: Party Institutionalization and Leadership 
The literature on Brazilian electoral politics emphasizes the weakness of most 
Brazilian parties and thus tends to discount their role in explaining electoral outcomes 
(e.g., Ames, 2001; Mainwaring, 1995, 1999; Samuels, 2003, 2008). Yet, most 
comparative studies of women’s representation point to political parties as the key 
gatekeepers (Caul, 1999, 2001; Kittilson, 2006; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). Parties’ 
(albeit varied) roles in candidate recruitment, capacity-building, and resource allocation 
are understood as critical to the development of viable female candidacies in both party- 
and candidate-centered contexts (Lawless and Fox, 2005). 
I bridge these seemingly disparate literatures to explain precisely how the above 
mentioned weakness of many Brazilian parties has undermined their capacity to recruit, 
                                                 
11 While Jones’ party/coalition list-level analysis represents a significant advance from the bulk of studies 
that aggregate at the country level, it cannot tell us how these factors affect individual women. Moreover, it 
is unclear how he codes “left” for Brazil’s rarely ideologically coherent coalitions. 
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develop, and support viable female candidacies. I use interparty variation to explain 
which of Brazil’s parties have proven most conducive to women’s electoral prospects, 
finding that rather than ideology per se, party institutionalization and inclusion or 
exclusion of women into the “good ole boys’ club” (party leadership) best predict the 
electoral performance of female candidates. 
Ideology 
Ideology’s role as a conventional predictor of women’s electoral fortunes derives 
from the left’s historical emphasis on social equality and a platform of active policies 
intended to realize equality (e.g., Duverger, 1955). Due in part to this professed 
ideological commitment to equality by parties on the left, non-leftist parties are more 
likely than are leftist parties to be dominated by men. These men will fight to maintain 
their status and therefore be unsupportive of female candidacies (Duverger, 1955). 
The causal process through which leftist ideology should exercise a positive effect 
on the electoral prospects of women is not entirely clear in extant work. Most 
explanations point to the left’s historical emphasis on egalitarianism, but discussion of 
the precise mechanisms substantiating the relationship at the individual level is elusive. 
Kenworthy and Malami argue that the strength of leftist parties can predict overall 
women’s representation because leftist parties’ ideological commitment to reducing 
inequality should lead them to nominate more women candidates, with the assumption 
being that more female candidates will translate into more women elected (1999, 238). 
Have Brazil’s leftist parties run and elected more female candidates? 
In the elections under consideration here, 14.3% of leftist candidates were female, 
compared to 11.9 and 11.4 percent for centrist and rightist parties, respectively. When 
looking at only elected deputies, we see that 11.1% of deputies elected by leftist parties 
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are female, with only 5.9% of those elected in non-leftist parties being women. These 
observed differences between left and non-leftist parties’ advancement and election of 
female candidates are statistically significant at the p<0.000 level. But the question 
remains – what is it about running with a leftist party that seems to benefit female 
contenders? Is the apparent electoral advantage in fact a product of egalitarian ideology, 
and therefore universal to leftist parties? 
The potential for a “contagion from the left” effect, whereby the initial promotion 
of female candidates by leftist parties drives other competitive parties to do the same, 
gives us reason to expect ideology will lose predictive power over time (Matland and 
Studlar, 1995). Given the gender quota, especially in the wake of reforms that enable its 
enforcement, as well as great diversity among women, I do not expect the circumstance 
of running with a leftist party per se (after controlling for other key party characteristics) 
to advantage female candidates. I contend that it is the institutionalized structure and 
incorporation of women in leadership common – but not universal – to leftist parties that 
enables and motivates their effective promotion of women’s participation. 
Among the 2180 state parties competing in the 1998-2010 elections, left is indeed 
positively correlated at the highest level of statistical significance with party 
institutionalization (ρ=0.15), proportion of women leaders (ρ=0.21), and critical mass 
(ρ=0.26). A logistic model of critical mass – whether or not a state party has at least 25% 
women in its leadership – demonstrates that leftist parties are much more likely than non-
leftist parties to have a critical mass of women leaders, with an odds ratio of 3 to 1. Yet 
recall from Chapter 4 that there are non-leftist parties outperforming some leftist parties 
on these fronts, with the country’s largest leftist party (the PT) having a critical mass of 
women in just over half of its state leadership committees (See Figure 4.6, Table 4.7). 
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Given these observations, and the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2, I 
argue that while the mass and participatory character and ideological commitment to 
equality of most leftist parties have given them a head start on effectively promoting 
women’s participation, leftist ideology per se is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for women’s electoral success. I contend that party institutionalization and the 
incorporation of women in party leadership yield superior analytical leverage for 
explaining variation in women’s electoral prospects. The effect on female candidates of 
leftist ideology is indirect, with parties with a mass and participatory orientation more 
conducive to institutionalization, and those supporting egalitarianism more likely to 
incorporate women in top decision-making structures. Next, I recall the discussion from 
Chapter 2 outlining precisely why I expect well-institutionalized parties with women 
leaders to improve the electoral prospects of female contenders. 
Transparency and the Norm of Compliance 
Well-institutionalized parties are more likely to cultivate an environment in which 
the rules of the game are transparent, and where there is a reasonable expectation that 
such rules will be respected by all. The implications for women’s electoral prospects are 
many, with two being particularly salient. First, institutionalized parties will be more 
likely to abide by a norm of compliance with internal and external formal rules, and thus 
more compelled to comply with the gender quota than will parties in which formal rules 
are regularly flouted.12 When decisions are made within an exclusive realm of state party 
elites rather than according to clearly defined rules of the game, transparency and 
accountability suffer. The propensity of party leaders in inchoate parties to dominate 
                                                 
12 As discussed in Chapter 2, this logic derives from findings in the international organizations literature 
that constitutional constraints on states instill a norm of compliance that carries over to the international 
realm, inducing compliance with rarely enforced international laws (Dixon, 1993; Simmons, 1998). 
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internal decision-making and act with total impunity spills over into the realm of external 
rules. This is particularly true in the case of the Brazilian quota, which until the 2009 
mini-reform provided ample loopholes for circumventing the law.  
In contrast, when parties have a propensity to abide by their own transparent 
internal rules, the norm of compliance extends to external rules. As a result, 
institutionalized parties are more likely than are inchoate parties to make a good-faith 
effort to comply with the gender quota. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the odds that a 
well-institutionalized party (party institutionalization=3) will comply with the quota, 
relative to a weakly institutionalized party (party institutionalization=1), are 
approximately 2 to 1.25, with a one-unit increase in party institutionalization yielding a 
25% increase in the odds that a party will meet the quota target.  
The absence of any real expectation that formal laws will be complied with in 
inchoate parties is well-illustrated by the frequent manipulation of the provisional 
commissions mechanism by domineering party leaders eager to defuse any challenges to 
their authority (Guarnieri, 2011). This leads to the second implication of such an 
environment for women; absent a universally understood set of rules and a norm of 
compliance, those new to or low in the party ranks cannot anticipate the path of ascension 
within the party. This means that women and other outsiders will have a difficult time 
attaining intermediary leadership positions as well as candidacy. 
If top party leaders regularly circumvent elected delegations for the purpose of 
candidate nomination, political aspirants must cozy up to these party leaders in order to 
attain the nomination and subsequent campaign support, rather than cultivate a broad 
base of support within the party (Braga, 2008; Guarnieri, 2011). The fact that the upper 
echelons of party decision-making in most parties remain largely male means that most 
women are insufficiently connected to such good ole’ boy networks, and therefore less 
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likely to have success ascending the ranks of inchoate parties. On the contrary, where 
parties make a concerted effort to comply with the quota and exhibit clear processes for 
ascending to candidacy, women are able to work their way up through the party, with 
party leaders seeking to meet the quota target eager to capitalize on their potential. 
The Psychology of Self-vs.-External Nomination 
In Brazil’s entrepreneurial electoral context, where party organizations are often a 
few-man-show rather than a collective and well-structured organization, self rather than 
external nomination is the norm (Samuels, 2008). It is up to candidates to get themselves 
on the party list, which will most often simply be presented—as is—at a ceremonial 
convention (Braga, 2008; Mainwaring, 1999). This is problematic for women’s 
representation in part because of the constructed gender gap in political ambition, with 
women socialized to perceive their appropriate societal role as in the home. Despite the 
fact that women are transcending such constructed barriers, are the head of household in 
35% of Brazilian homes – often times the manager of family funds (with 94% of the 
Bolsa Família transfers benefitting millions of Brazilian families going to women 
(Leonardi, 2011)), and comprise the majority contingency of many if not most social 
movements, many women maintain a distance from formal politics.  
This is a result of a complex interconnected web of factors, including traditional 
gender socialization, disillusionment with pervasive political corruption, and the inherent 
risks of the campaign. As illustrated in Chapter 2, traditional gender socialization has left 
women largely responsible for domestic duties, with the vast majority of women who 
work outside the home having to take on a “triple shift” in order be active in party life. 
This has a fundamental influence on the kind of women seeking and winning election. 
Women deputies are less likely than their male counterparts to be married and have 
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young children while serving, and if they do have a family at home, must have the 
conditions to contract household help in their stead. With societal gender norms still 
privileging women as mothers, a family supportive of female political ambition – which 
if successful, will result in her spending a sizeable portion of her time away from home – 
is not a given. 
Moreover, women are often reluctant to make such a sacrifice to enter an arena 
they perceive as corrupt and ineffective. Public opinion data demonstrate statistically 
significant gender gaps in trust in and satisfaction with the country’s political institutions. 
More than a third of female respondents indicated that they had absolutely no trust in 
parties, 20.6% reported no trust whatsoever in elections, and 41.2% said they were 
unsatisfied with the functioning of Brazilian democracy (LAPOP, 2008). An oft repeated 
expression characterizes politics as dirty and a man’s world, a bastion of corruption and 
masculinity that women are frequently hesitant to confront. Add to these already 
powerful deterrents the expense and combative character of campaigns alongside 
gendered wage inequities, and the disincentives for women to self-nominate are evident. 
Without the strong encouragement and assurance of support from her party, most women 
will be hesitant to embark on such an endeavor that is fraught with abundant risk and 
questionable rewards. 
Women in general also have a greater affinity for parties that recruit loyalists 
rather than entrepreneurs, with women being “more likely to try to obtain their party’s 
nomination when a loyalist is the type of deputy the party commonly wants” (Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 347). The probability of combative intraparty 
competition will drive away most women, with experimental evidence suggesting that 
women prefer being a part of collective team-based strategies “rather than intraparty 
 173 
competition that directly pits co-partisans against each other” (Ellis, 2002; Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008, 350; Shugart, 1994, 38). 
Women running in weakly institutionalized parties are likely to be those that 
either possess family or converted political capital independent of their party (to be 
discussed in Chapter 7), or those that have been tapped at the last moment as candidatas 
laranjas (sacrificial lambs) intended to garner votes for the priority (usually male) 
candidate(s) while allowing the party to feign an attempt at compliance with the gender 
quota. The latter candidate will be poorly equipped for the campaign and have no party 
support, with any success achieved by the former candidate done so in spite of her party. 
In well-institutionalized parties, on the other hand, municipal party organizations 
collect suggestions for candidates, with leaders from the women’s and organizational 
sectors often approaching women leaders in the community about considering a run well 
in advance of the election (rather than at the last minute solely to gesture at the gender 
quota). Nominations are evaluated by municipal and state party leadership, and then a 
unified party ticket is presented at an inclusive state party convention, where popularly 
elected delegates are allowed to propose and debate changes to the party slate, after 
which the final candidate list is voted upon (Braga, 2008). These conditions are 
propitious for women because they externalize the decision to run, with being selected 
itself serving to boost women’s self-confidence and thus viability. Greater vetting by an 
active party organization is also likely to result in a more qualified candidate pool, 




Well-institutionalized parties also provide opportunities for newcomers to cut 
their political teeth. Whereas inchoate parties often have only a couple of offices that 
remain in the hands of a few leaders, more institutionalized parties have various sectors 
that are represented by internally elected leaders, with regular alternation. This range of 
electable internal party positions affords aspirants a lower risk opportunity to gauge their 
support within the party and explore their broader electability, with those elected having 
the chance to learn the ropes and eventually demonstrate their political prowess to co-
partisans. Frequent meetings and mobilizational events are other means through which 
active party organizations facilitate the acquisition of political skillsets by their members. 
As illustrated in the discussion of the PC do B in Chapter 2, well-institutionalized parties 
also often offer courses designed with candidate capacity-building in mind. Such 
opportunities demonstrate both the how and what of politics. 
As discussed above, women are in general predisposed to collective strategies 
based on constructive ideas rather than combative and individualistic campaigns 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). Particularly given the intraparty 
competition prevalent in Chamber of Deputies elections, the ability to campaign on party 
(or faction) ideals and proposals, rather than clientelistic strategies that favor incumbents, 
is advantageous for female contenders. An institutionalized party has clearly identifiable 
policy positions, with participation in party events providing on-the-ground training 
allowing women to adopt and articulate these positions. By offering candidates the 
chance to develop political wherewithal, institutionalized parties enhance their 
candidates’ electoral viability. In contrast, a weakly institutionalized party is problematic 
for women because it lacks coherent platforms, and offers little or no opportunities for 
outsiders to acquire the necessary skillset. With a party organization that is fleeting at 
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best, candidates are left to fend for themselves. One result of this extremely 
entrepreneurial setting is that many of the few successful female candidates have 
developed their political capital in alternate spheres rather than coming up through the 
party ranks (see Chapter 7). 
Organizational support from one’s party can also have a psychological effect, 
with women unlikely to contest an election for which they feel unqualified. Fox and 
Lawless’ surveys of men and women from the “candidate eligibility pool” in the US (law, 
business, education, political activism) reveal that women are significantly more likely 
than men to doubt their qualifications and capacity for both electoral politics and the 
campaign itself (Fox and Lawless, 2004, 2011; Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010). I expect 
the same dynamic of “gendered evaluative standards” to hold in Brazil, where socialized 
gender norms are equally (if not more) resilient despite recent progress. The availability 
of additional training opportunities, whether through courses or on-the-ground training, 
thus improves women’s political prospects by not only teaching the how and what of 
politics, but also by providing a powerful psychological boost to their political ambition. 
Together, such organizational and psychological support projects to the electorate an 
image of viability. 
Personalist-vs.-Programmatic Politics and Material Support 
The prospect of programmatic campaigns rather than personalist politics is far 
greater in institutionalized parties than in inchoate parties (Ames, 2001; Guadagnini, 
1993). Programmatic politics facilitate collective, ideas-based strategies, with candidates 
running in such parties able to emphasize party policy positions rather than their own 
personal appeal. This may in turn lead the elector to evaluate a candidate on the basis of 
her articulated policy positions rather than personal traits such as gender (Valdini, 2010). 
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An ideas-based evaluation can mitigate the potential for voter bias against women, which 
is elevated in electoral systems such as Brazil’s (Valdini, 2010), where open-list electoral 
rules and large district magnitude foment intraparty competition (Shugart, Valdini, 
Suominen, 2005). 
In such a context, weakly institutionalized parties exacerbate the potential for 
personalist politics, favoring those with accumulated personal political capital – which as 
a result of constructed gender roles are primarily men (or women relatives of male 
politicians). While candidates in weakly institutionalized parties will have to themselves 
hire most of their campaign help and thus independently garner extensive campaign 
funding, well-institutionalized parties with strong party organizations can provide female 
candidates with funding and militant (wo)man power to overcome their probable finance 
deficit. Indeed, among the candidacies studied here, as party institutionalization 
increases, the proportion of campaign contributions financed by one’s party grows. But as 
party institutionalization decreases, the proportion of campaign funds coming from the 
candidate herself and from corporations increases. Absent the support of a well- 
institutionalized party, candidates must fend for themselves. 
In spite of women’s substantial advances in education and workforce 
participation, they continue to receive less remuneration for equal work and perform the 
vast majority of unpaid labor in the home (Ipea, 2009).13 This means that most women 
will simply not possess the material capital to bank a campaign, and thus be dependent 
upon the availability of party or external (corporate, individual) funding. A well-
institutionalized party will have both party funds and militants at its disposal, which can 
provide women with much needed material support for the campaign. 
                                                 
13 In 2007, the average reported weekly hours on domestic duties for women 16 and older was 27.2 hours, 
compared to only 10.6 weekly hours for men 16 and older. Only 50.7% of men (compared to 89.9% of 
women) affirmed that they took care of any household labor (Ipea, 2009). 
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A materially well-off campaign (whether through money or [wo]manpower) is 
essential due to the vast numbers of candidacies and often extensive territory within a 
district. Parties can assist with the acquisition of necessary resources and otherwise help 
to orient newcomers to the nuances of this daunting electoral arena that privileges 
incumbents (Araújo and Alves, 2007) and others possessing political and/or economic 
capital (Avelar, 2001; Pinheiro, 2007). Party (and external) funds help to produce 
electoral propaganda and stage and attend political rallies, parades, and other events over 
the course of the campaign. Candidates without such campaign materials and/or events 
will be lost in a sea of competitors and thus have little to no chance of election. While 
there are several deputies who have won election with limited funds, campaign finance 
remains one of the strongest predictors of an individual candidate’s chance of success 
(Samuels, 2001a, 2001b; author calculations). 
In sum, institutionalized parties are well-equipped to provide female contenders 
with the psychological, organizational, and material backing critical in Brazil’s 
entrepreneurial electoral context. Recruitment by party leaders, the availability of party 
training and support, and prospect of an ideas-based campaign convinces women to 
throw their hat in the ring, and enhances their self- and externally-perceived viability. 
Women in Party Leadership 
The capacity to recruit and promote female candidacies, however, is only 
effectuated with the endorsement and active support of party leadership. When women 
attain a “critical mass” among party leadership, they are able to lobby for the active 
promotion of women’s participation (Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011; Kittilson, 2006).14 
                                                 
14In an event history analysis of the adoption of candidate gender quotas in sixty parties in ten Western 
European democracies, Kittilson found that even after controlling for several party and electoral system 
variables, “for each percentage point gain in the proportion of women among the party’s leadership, or 
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Once reaching a critical mass, and therefore less hindered by the constraints of token 
minority status, women in party leadership can use their awareness of the barriers 
confronted by female contenders to introduce a gendered frame of reference and carry out 
a number of “critical acts” (Dahlerup, 1988). As illustrated in Figure 2.4, women leaders 
can pressure parties to adopt women-friendly policies, hold parties accountable to the 
quota, serve as mentors for women aspiring to ascend within the party, recruit and 
recommend women for inclusion on candidate lists, lobby for and host capacity-building 
events, and mobilize party resources to support female candidacies. Such critical acts, 
which help women overcome an array of obstacles, are less likely to be promoted by 
male party leaders, who are often incognizant of the significance of such acts for women 
and/or unwilling to support efforts that may ultimately dilute their own influence. 
While female presence in party leadership can be a potent mechanism for 
enhancing women’s legislative representation, acquiring power within these largely male 
decision-making circles is difficult. According to a recent study of several Western 
European parties by Kittilson, the parties most likely to have women in their high-level 
party leadership structures are those that have internal party quotas, are centralized, have 
New Left values, and are fractionalized with strong external ties (2006). As depicted in 
Table 4.8, women’s presence on the national executive committees (NECs) of most 
Brazilian parties remains minimal, with women at least approximating 20% in only five 
leftist parties (PC do B, PPS, PSB, PT, PV). While there are several outliers at the 
national and state levels, with even those five parties having some state organizations 
with few women and other leftist parties having only minimal representation of women in 
their national and state leadership, it is noteworthy that leftist parties are 3 times more 
                                                                                                                                                 
national executive committee, the likelihood that the party will adopt quotas increases by almost 8% in the 
first model (1975-1995) and by 13% in the second model (1985-1995)” (2006, 60). 
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likely to have a critical mass of women leaders in state leadership than non-leftist parties 
(author analysis). 
Ideology thus retains an indirect influence, with leftist parties being more likely to 
provide the initial conditions propitious for women. Under historical conditions of 
inclusion, women in leftist parties are more likely to have developed critical organizing 
experience allowing them to ascend the party ranks. In short, there is a certain degree of 
path dependency, with leftist parties traditionally more conducive to women’s 
participation than non-leftist parties. While this can illuminate why leftist parties have 
been overall more likely than non-leftist parties to incorporate women in their leadership 
structures, it is less convincing for explanations of women’s electoral prospects. I contend 
that the fact of not being leftist does not itself lead a party to defy the quota law while 
diminishing its own electoral conquests by squandering candidate slots. Rather, male 
party leaders evade efforts they perceive will dilute their influence and/or lack awareness 
of how they can effectively recruit and develop viable female candidacies. 
A critical mass of women in state party leadership facilitates a greater 
commitment of resources toward women. For instance, two critical acts that women in 
party leadership can perform are to hold party leaders accountable to the quota and recruit 
female candidates. Looking to Table 5.4, which displays the results of a logistic model of 
a state party’s odds of complying with the gender quota, we see that state parties with a 
critical mass of women are 75% more likely to comply with the gender quota than are 
parties lacking a critical mass of women in their leadership.15 As mentioned above, a one 
unit increase in party institutionalization is associated with a 25% increase in the odds 
that a party will comply with the quota. Notably, the introduction of critical mass 
                                                 
15 The robust standard errors adjust for clustering among a state party over time. 
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diminishes the effect of left. This suggests that it is the inclusion of women in party 
leadership rather than leftist ideology per se that is more important for quota compliance.  
Table 5.4. Which Parties Comply with the Gender Quota? 
So while leftist parties are in general considered to be more women-friendly, with 
parties being constrained in their ability to respond to new demands by their historical 
ideological orientation (Kitschelt, 1994), I argue that any observed correlation is 
spurious, with leftist ideology being an insufficient condition for a party to be deemed 
open to women. I contend that it is not leftist ideology per se that enables female political 
aspirants, but rather the party institutionalization and incorporation of women in party 
leadership more common to parties on the left that has proven women-friendly in recent 
elections. These are, however, two distinct mechanisms enabling women’s electoral 
success – a party’s capacity to provide conditions propitious to women, and their will to 
mobilize this capacity on behalf of women. 
 
Boys’ Club Hypothesis: Leftist party ideology will have a negative effect on the vote 
share of male candidates, and a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. 
The effect of ideology, however, will be subsumed by party institutionalization, which 
will have a positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. Moreover, the positive 
effect of ideology or institutionalization for women will be conditioned by the proportion 
of women in the party leadership, with the interaction effect between left or 
institutionalization and women in the party leadership rendering insignificant the main 
effect of ideology or institutionalization. 
Odds Ratio Robust SE Odds Ratio Robust SE
Left 1.417 (0.185) ** 1.262 (0.164)
Critical mass 1.750 (0.226) ***
Party institutionalization 1.252 (0.125) * 1.254 (0.127) *
N 2192 2180
Pseudo R² 0.008 0.019
Model 1 Model 2




Rival Ideology Hypothesis: Leftist party ideology will have a positive effect on the vote 
share of female candidates, independent of party institutionalization and irrespective of 
the proportion of women in the party leadership. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Hierarchical Modeling16 
As elaborated in Chapter 4, the use of hierarchical modeling allows us to account 
for the non-independence of observations, in particular the correlations among candidates 
running in the same state. It nests candidates within their state-level contexts, modeling 
cross-level interactions such as the potentially mediating roles of district development 
and magnitude on the effect of candidate sex on electoral outcome. A naïve (empty, with 
only the hierarchical structure modeled) estimation of candidate vote share demonstrates 
that 13.86% of the variance in vote share is attributable to the district level. It is therefore 
essential that the correlation among candidates running in the same district is accounted 
for, and hierarchical modeling is the most sophisticated technique for handling such 
clustering at the district-level. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a candidate’s electoral outcome in elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies. I use both vote share – a candidate’s share of the valid candidate 
vote17 (range 0.00% to 28.36%, mean 0.66%) – and whether a candidate attains election, 
and report any significant and interesting differences. 
                                                 
16 For more information on the appropriateness of hierarchical modeling for this research question, see 
Chapter 4. 
17 Party label votes and blank and spoiled votes are excluded from the calculation. 
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Independent Variables 
To test the alternative explanations and my argument, I interact with female the 
above-mentioned variables for machista voter attitudes (machista bias and state HDI), 
rules of the game (district magnitude, party magnitude, and effective number of 
candidates), and the good ole’ boys’ club (ideology, left, party institutionalization, and 
critical mass), along with the battery of individual controls for candidate quality 
introduced in Chapter 4 – education, feeder occupation, incumbency, and campaign 
finance;18 – I expect these controls to exercise a positive effect on candidate vote share. 
Before introducing the model, I examine the variables descriptively (see Table 
5.5). With the exception of education (and campaign finance, due to great variation 
among women), the gender discrepancies in all of the variables are statistically 
significant. Most but not all of these disparities remain significant among successful 
candidates. Women candidates are on average just as educated as male candidates, but 
are less likely to win election and have a lower vote share. They are also less likely to be 
married, come from a feeder occupation, or be running as an incumbent. The campaign 
finance of women candidates is lower than that of male candidates, although wide 
variation renders the difference insignificant. As mentioned above, women candidates 
receive on average a greater share of their campaign contributions from parties and a 
lesser share from corporations. 
Women are on average running in districts that have (minimally) lower levels of 
voter bias against women and higher scores on the HDI, as predicted by the Rival 
Machista Voters Hypothesis. With the average female candidate coming from district and 
                                                 
18 Following previous analyses of campaign finance (e.g., Samuels, 2001a, 2001b), I also include the 
square of campaign finance – campaign finance² – to account for diminishing returns, and expect its effect 
to be negative, while the main effect of campaign finance should be positive. Although more campaign 
finance will certainly enhance a candidate’s competitiveness, after a certain point the positive effects taper 
off, which is captured by the quadratic term. 
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parties with lower magnitudes, but a lower average effective number of candidates, the 
relationship between electoral rules and women’s prospects is unclear. Whereas 71% of 
male deputies won with non-leftist parties, only 55% of women did so. Women are also 
running and winning in parties that are on average more institutionalized than the parties 
of male candidates. The average proportion of women in state party leadership is two 
percentage points higher for female candidates than for male candidates, a discrepancy 
heightened to 4.7 percentage points among successful candidates. 
Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
All candidates Successful candidates 
  Women Men Women Men 
     Election 0.075     0.133*** 
  
Vote share 0.525     0.683*** 4.446      3.193*** 
Education 3.580  3.562± 3.819 3.834 
Married 0.444     0.680*** 0.557      0.785*** 
Feeder occupation 0.480  0.506* 0.802 0.825 
Incumbent 0.058     0.116*** 0.451    0.554** 
Campaign finance R$225,575 R$347,400 R$834,621 R$997,389 
Prop CF – Party 0.340      0.190*** 0.144     0.092** 
Prop CF – Corps 0.145      0.247*** 0.394     0.486** 
District voter bias 25.558 25.930* 25.678 26.139 
District HDI 0.796      0.783*** 0.780   0.768* 
District magnitude     34.749  5.898* 27.358     32.772*** 
Party magnitude 2.152      2.527*** 4.306   5.141* 
Effective n of cands  55.389    58.875*** 46.324   53.998** 
Left 0.446      0.387*** 0.451       0.294*** 
Ideology 3.998      4.214*** 3.837       4.566*** 
Pty institutionalization 2.033      1.976*** 2.198    2.094± 
Women in party leadership 16.700     14.870*** 16.573       11.893*** 
Two-tailed tests of the gender differences are significant at the following levels:  
± p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Women are on average running in districts that have (minimally) lower levels of 
voter bias against women and higher scores on the HDI, as predicted by the machista 
voter bias hypothesis. With the average female candidate coming from district and parties 
with lower magnitudes, but a lower average effective number of candidates, the 
relationship between electoral rules and women’s prospects is unclear. Whereas 64% of 
male candidates ran with non-leftist parties, 41% of women did so with leftist parties. 
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Model 
I use those variables to assess the relative explanatory power of machista voter 
attitudes, the rules of the game, and the good ole’ boys’ club for women’s electoral 
prospects in Brazil, estimating the following hierarchical model: 
 
                 
   Individual-level model: β0j + β1j femaleij + β2j leftij + β3j female*leftij + β4j partymagij +  
     β5j partymag(t-1)ij + β6j female*partymagij + 
     β7j female*partymag(t-1)ij + β8j PIIij + β9j female*PIIij  +   
     β10j c.massij + β11j female*c.massij + β12j PII*c.massij +  
     β13j female*PII*c.massij + β14j educationij + β15j occupationij + 
     β16j incumbentij + β17j campfinanceij + β18j campfinance²ij + rij 
 
District-level model: 
  β0j = γ00 + γ01 HDI groupj + γ02 dmag groupj + γ03 eff n candsj + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 HDI groupj + γ12 dmag groupj + γ13 eff n candsj + u1j 
  β2j = γ20 + γ21 HDI groupj 
  β3j = γ30 + γ31 HDI groupj 
  β4j = γ40  
  β5j = γ50  




β8j = γ80 
β9j = γ90 
β10j = γ100 
β11j = γ110 
β12j = γ120 
β13j = γ130 
β14j = γ140 
β15j = γ150 
β16j = γ160 
β17j = γ170 
β18j = γ180 
I also estimate the above model with each of the dimensions of the party 
institutionalization index analyzed in turn and as an index and factor score. To improve 
our confidence in the use of HDI as a proxy for machista voter attitudes, I estimate a 
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supplemental multilevel model of machista biasij (of respondent i in state j) that explores 
the covariates of sexist attitudes toward women in politics. 
Qualitative Evidence 
I complement the findings from these multilevel analyses of candidate electoral 
performance with extensive qualitative data from documentary, ethnographic, and 
participatory research conducted across Brazil. I draw upon party and campaign 
materials, 18 years of the quarterly journal of CFEMEA – Brazil’s foremost feminist 
organization, 73 interviews, field notes and observations of women’s caucus meetings 
and the successful campaign of a female candidate for the municipal council and 
President of the PT in Salvador, Bahia, as well as primary data compiled by others to 
illuminate, contextualize, and reinforce the quantitative findings on the challenges to 
women’s representation in Brazil. 
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
My supplemental analysis finds that machista voter attitudes persist, and are 
indeed predicted by a respondent’s district development level, with heightened bias 
existing in less developed areas. An even stronger predictor of that bias is the variable 
differentiating locales on the basis of size,19 with male and female respondents in rural 
areas having a predicted probability of expressing machista bias of 0.53 and 0.36, 
compared to 0.39 and 0.24 in capital cities, even after controlling for respondent 
education, age, and income. Those findings provide confidence that the HDI variable will 
indeed capture the dynamic of machista voter attitudes, and lend support to the 
Modernization Hypothesis. Of 2,454 women surveyed in a nationally representative 
sample, less than one percent said machismo did not exist in Brazil, with 37% agreeing 
                                                 
19 Ranging from 1 (capital/metropolitan area) to 5 (rural area). 
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that machismo was extensive (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2001). Support for the 
Modernization Hypothesis paves the way for us to assess the Rival Machista Voters 
Hypothesis by exploring whether such machista attitudes impede female candidates using 
HDI in the multivariate analyses below. 
Table 5.6 displays the results of the above-specified multilevel model of candidate 
electoral performance, estimated in steps. Model 1 includes the traditional predictors of 
women’s representation and their interactions with female – HDI (as a proxy for machista 
voter attitudes), party magnitude and district magnitude, and ideology. Model 2 
incorporates controls for candidate quality, as well as electoral competitiveness (effective 
number of candidates). Finally, in Model 3, I test my argument – introducing the main 
effects for female candidates of the party institutionalization index, women in party 
leadership, and their interaction. 
Machista Voters 
Although the supplemental analysis discussed above demonstrates that machista 
voter bias is negatively correlated to development level in Brazil – thus supporting the 
Modernization Hypothesis – we see from the insignificance of γ11 and γ31 which assess 
the female*HDI and female*left*HDI cross-level interactions (see Table 5.6), that women 
in less developed districts nonetheless do not face an electoral disadvantage nor do 
women in more developed districts enjoy an advantage. I therefore find no support for the 
first Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis that the district development level of female 
candidates would be positively correlated to their electoral performance. Interestingly, 
after the introduction of controls for electoral competitiveness and party 
institutionalization in Models 2 and 3, district development level actually exercises a 
negative effect (γ01) on candidate vote share, irrespective of gender. 
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Table 5.6. Multilevel Analyses of Candidate Electoral Performance (1994-2010) 
  Model 1 - Rivals Model 2 - Controls Model 3 - Wylie 
          Fixed Effects Coef. SE sig Coef. SE sig Coef. SE sig 
          Level 2 District Variables 
         For Intercept (β0j) 
            Intercept (γ00) 0.018 (0.001) *** 0.019 (0.002) *** 0.021 (0.002) *** 
   HDI (γ01) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
-0.002 (0.001) ** -0.002 (0.001) ** 
   District magnitude (γ02) -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.000) *** 
   Effective n cands (γ03) 




           Cross-Level Interactions 
         For Female slope (β1j) 
            Intercept (γ10) -0.005 (0.001) ** -0.004 (0.002) * -0.007 (0.003) ** 










    Effective n cands (γ13) 




 For Left slope (β2j) 
            Intercept (γ20) -0.005 (0.000) *** -0.005 (0.001) *** -0.006 (0.001) *** 
   HDI (γ21) 0.002 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.000) *** 
For Fem*Left slope (β3j) 
            Intercept (γ30) 0.003 (0.001) ** 0.003 (0.001) * 0.001 (0.002) 






          Level 1 Party Variables 
            Party magnitude (β4j, γ40) 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 





    PII (β8j, γ80) 
      
-0.001 (0.000) *** 
   Fem*PII (β9j, γ90) 
      
0.001 (0.001) 
    C.Mass (β10j, γ100) 
      
-0.002 (0.001) * 
   Fem*C.Mass (β11j, γ110) 
      
-0.005 (0.003) * 
   Fem*PII*C.Mass (β13j, γ130) 
      
0.002 (0.001) * 
          Level 1 Candidate Controls 
            Education level (β14j, γ140) 
   
0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 
   Feeder occupation (β15j, γ150) 
  
0.000 (0.000) ± 0.001 (0.000) ± 
   Incumbent (β16j, γ160) 
   
0.012 (0.000) *** 0.012 (0.000) *** 
   Campaign finance (β17j, γ170)     0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 
Random Effects Var SE sig Var SE sig Var SE sig 
Intercept (u0j) 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 
Female slope (u1j) 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 





















 ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ±p<.10 (one-tailed tests) 
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I anticipated in my Voter Attitudes Hypothesis that a candidate’s district 
development level would, in spite of the greater machista voter bias in less developed 
states uncovered in the supplemental analysis, be uncorrelated to candidate vote share 
irrespective of sex or ideology. The findings of Models 1-3 do not support this 
hypothesis. The main effect of HDI (γ01) and its two-way interaction with left (γ21) 
actually are both statistically significant, although their three-way interaction with female 
(γ31) is insignificant. This means that the relationship between district development level 
and electoral outcome does exist, and is differentiated by ideology. Yet because the 
interactions of HDI (γ11) and HDI*left with female (γ31) – which are measuring the 
difference in slopes across candidate sex  – are not statistically different from zero, we 
can conclude that the effects of district development on candidate vote share are not 
gendered. 
As suggested by HDI’s negative main effect (γ01) – which assesses the effect of 
HDI for non-left men (when both left and female equal zero) – and affirmed in the 
disaggregation of marginal effects displayed in Figure 5.2, for non-leftist men the effect 
of HDI is negative, with these candidates being worse off electorally in more developed 
states (even after controlling for district competitiveness). For leftist male candidates, the 
effect is reversed, with γ21 being positive and statistically significant. That finding, as 
well as the breakdown of marginal effects discussed next, would seem to lend partial 
support to the second Rival Machista Voters Hypothesis, which expected leftist women’s 
electoral prospects to be better in more developed districts. Yet, the beneficial effect of 
district development for candidates in leftist parties is no greater for female candidates 
than it is for men. Again, neither of the effects of district development level on male 
candidate vote share – negative for non-leftists and positive for leftists – is differentiated 
by gender.  
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As depicted in Figure 5.2,20 which breaks down the HDI into three groups and 
treats them as factors rather than presuming a continuous scale, the positive effect of HDI 
for female leftist candidates is exercised when moving from the mean HDI level (1) to 
the high HDI level (2). Moreover, Figure 5.2 shows that female candidates have the 
highest predicted vote share in states at the low levels of development (0.80%), and the 
lowest predicted vote share in states at the mean levels of development (0.39%). Thus, 
although I cannot quite reject the second Rival Machista Hypothesis, I can say that even 
leftist women running in more developed states fare no better electorally than those 
running in less developed states. 
Figure 5.2. Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, by Ideology and 
District Development Level (1998-2010) 
                                                 
20 It is important to keep in mind when viewing Figure 5.2 that the interaction of female with left*HDI is 
insignificant, as can be inferred by the overlapping confidence intervals of male and female candidates. 
 
 190 
In sum, while the supplemental analysis demonstrates that residual machista voter 
attitudes do persist, especially in less developed states, they have not depressed the 
electoral performance of female candidates. Rather, non-leftist candidates have 
performed best in less developed districts, with development not exercising a gendered 
effect on candidate vote regardless of party ideology. In Chapter 7, I explain how women 
have cultivated profiles enabling them to navigate the constraints of voter bias, either by 
conforming to traditional gender norms, or by working with supportive and programmatic 
parties to overcome such bias. 
Rules of the Game 
Models 1-3 lead me to reject the Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis 1 
(conventional wisdom), which predicted that district magnitude would be positively 
correlated to female candidates’ electoral performance. Rather, I find support for my 
Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis, which contends that district 
magnitude is negatively correlated to candidate electoral performance, irrespective of 
candidate sex. As we see in Table 5.6, while the main effect of district magnitude (γ02) is 
negative, its interaction with female (γ12) is insignificant. This means that the 
disadvantage posed by the more competitive electoral climate in high district magnitude 
elections – a finding that holds even after the introduction of a control for the effective 
number of candidates – is not gendered. Even when breaking down the marginal effects, 
the effect of district magnitude on candidate vote share does not vary significantly by 
gender, and is negative. Thus, I reject the first Rival Rules of the Game Hypothesis, and 
find support for my Rules of the Game – District Magnitude Hypothesis. 
Beyond the sheer number of candidates, which I control for, the dynamics of 
electoral competition in high district magnitude elections are distinct. Campaigning as 
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one of 39 candidates (Acre-2010) is qualitatively different than being one of 1029 
candidates (São Paulo-2010), and is substantially more costly. The average in campaign 
contributions among candidates running in states with a district magnitude of 8 to 25 
(approximately R$190,000) is less than half the average for candidates running in larger 
districts (R$428,577). Even after controlling for funding discrepancies through campaign 
finance, as well as the effective number of candidates, high district magnitude elections 
prove challenging for both male and female contenders. 
The findings of Models 1-3 displayed in Table 5.6 do not support my expectation 
in the Rules of the Game – Party Magnitude Hypothesis that party magnitudet-1 would be 
positively correlated to female candidates’ electoral performance. Rather, the main effect 
of party magnitude (β4j, γ40) is positive, and the lagged effect (party magnitudet-1: β5j, γ50) 
is actually negative,21 with neither interaction with female (β6j, γ60; β7j, γ70) being 
statistically significant. Those findings and a disaggregation of the marginal effects of 
lagged party magnitude lead me to reject my Party Magnitude Hypothesis that women 
would be advantaged in parties that, based on their prior share of seats, anticipate 
winning more than one seat. The vote share of both male and female candidates actually 
depresses with higher prior seat shares for their party. Thus, my prediction that parties 
with a record of electoral success in a district would be more open to women did not 
hold. As I argue throughout the dissertation, a party having the resources and capacity to 
support female candidacies is not sufficient to bring about women’s effective 
participation; it must also have the will. 
Although Jones’ argument outlined in the second Rival Rules of the Game 
Hypothesis expects that party magnitude will not predict female candidates’ electoral 
                                                 
21 Due to constraints of space, those results for party magnitudet-1 (β5j, γ50) and female*party magnitude (β6j, 
γ60) are not displayed in Table 5.6. 
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performance in the open-list context, the main effect of party magnitude (β4j, γ40 – the 
total predicted effect for men and part of the effect for women) is actually positive and 
statistically significant. Yet, once again, the interaction with female (β6j, γ60) is not 
statistically different from zero, meaning that for women the effect party magnitude on 
vote share is simply β4j rather than β4j + β6j; in other words, the positive effect of party 
magnitude is not differentiated by gender. 
Figure 5.3. Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, by Party Magnitude 
(1998-2010) 
An analysis of the marginal effects disaggregated by party magnitude and 
candidate sex reveals that the vote share of both men and women increases with party 
magnitude, with considerable variation among women at the upper bounds of party 
magnitude. As shown in Figure 5.3, the predicted vote shares of male and female 
candidates at a party magnitude of one – 0.69 and 0.72 percent respectively – increases to 
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0.76 and 0.77 percent for a party magnitude of two, and continue to increase with party 
magnitude. The overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 5.3, however, suggest that a 
candidate’s sex does not mediate the effect of party magnitude. 
To recap, neither state development level nor district/party magnitude has 
exercised a statistically distinct effect on the vote share of male and female candidates, 
with all of their interactions with female being insignificant. Moreover, two of those 
overall effects operate in the opposite direction expected by the cross-national literature 
on women’s representation. Candidate vote share – both female and male – declines as 
the development (for non-leftists) and electoral size of one’s district increases. Vote share 
does increase with the electoral fortunes of a candidate’s party (captured in party 
magnitude), but the effect is not significantly amplified for female contenders. Therefore, 
the conventional explanations for women’s overall representation – district development 
and district/party magnitude – are not mediated by gender at the candidate level. Female 
candidates fare no better electorally in more developed and larger districts than in 
districts with lower development levels and magnitudes. Next, I discuss several party-
level factors that do operate in gendered ways to predict female candidates’ electoral 
prospects. 
The Good Ole’ Boys’ Club 
Models 1 and 2 corroborate the Boys’ Club Hypothesis, which expected leftist 
party ideology to have a negative effect on the vote share of male candidates, and a 
positive effect on the vote share of female candidates. The negative main effect of left 
(γ20) and its positive interaction with female (γ30) demonstrate that while running with a 
leftist party disadvantages candidates electorally, that negative effect is mitigated for 
women. Looking to the marginal effects for Model 2 reveals that for non-leftist 
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candidates, men have a higher predicted vote share; but among leftist candidates, this is 
reversed, with women enjoying the greater predicted vote share. Leftist parties’ historical 
commitment to general ideals of equality – and active measures to attain it – has provided 
an environment more fertile for women’s participation. Can that ideological affinity for 
egalitarianism itself explain variation in the electoral success of female candidates, or are 
there also organizational considerations at work? 
My analysis demonstrates that the mechanisms through which running with a 
leftist party hastens the electoral success of female candidates are the greater tendency of 
leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate women in party leadership. Indeed, 
the positive interaction of female*left (γ30) dissipates with the introduction of my index of 
party institutionalization (PII) and critical mass (which measures whether at least 25% of 
a party’s state leadership is female) in Model Three.22 The effect of left (γ20) remains 
negative, but its interaction with female (γ30) loses statistical significance. This means that 
the gendered effects of left seen in Models 1 and 2 are in Model 3 captured through 
interactions with PII and critical mass, and provides support for my argument that leftist 
ideology per se is insufficient to induce electoral gains for female candidates. A 
breakdown of the marginal effects demonstrates that female candidates running in leftist 
parties with a critical mass of women leaders enjoy a greater predicted vote share 
(0.99%) than women and men in non-leftist parties (0.84 and 0.93 percent, respectively) 
and men in leftist parties (0.69%). Absent the critical mass of women leaders, however, 
leftist women’s predicted vote share falls to 0.55 percent. 
 
                                                 
22 I also added these variables stepwise, and again find that once I include either PII or critical mass and 
their interaction with female*left, the significance of female*left is not statistically different zero.  
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Figure 5.4. Willing and Able: The Predicted Vote Share of Male and Female Candidates, 
by Party Institutionalization and Critical Mass 
As shown in Figure 5.4, I also find as expected that the electoral benefit of party 
institutionalization for women is conditioned by the proportion of women in state party 
leadership. Moreover, the predicted vote share for female candidates in parties at low or 
middling levels of institutionalization is not differentiated by critical mass, as seen by 
their overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 5.4. But once parties gain the capacity to 
support women (at above average levels of PII), the trajectories diverge with the 
predicted vote share of women in parties with a critical mass of women leaders 
significantly higher than that of women in male-led (more than 75% men in state 
leadership) parties. Once PII exceeds the average, we see a divergence of women’s 
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electoral prospects both with those of men, and according to the presence of women in 
party leadership. Indeed, the positive effect of PII on the vote share of female candidates 
does not gain significance until the introduction of critical mass. This means that party 
capacity is insufficient on its own, with its positive effect on women’s vote share 
contingent upon its joint occurrence with party will. Thus, as I theorized, female 
candidates are electorally advantaged when running in parties that have both the capacity 
and will to support the political participation of women. 
The findings lead me to reject the Rival Ideology Hypothesis; the positive effect 
of leftist party ideology is diminished by the introduction of PII and/or critical mass, thus 
refuting the rival expectation that leftist women are advantaged regardless of other 
important party-level factors. Leftist ideology per se has not yielded superior electoral 
gains for female candidates. Instead, it is the combination of a structure favorable to 
outsiders and the presence of actors willing to mobilize resources on their behalf. In sum, 
the quantitative findings support my argument that it is the institutionalization and 
incorporation of women in leadership common to leftist parties that has proven beneficial 
for female candidates. I substantiate these findings qualitatively in the following section. 
QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Machista Voter Bias 
Corroborating the quantitative findings, most of the female candidates 
interviewed believed that voter bias no longer posed a significant hurdle. Yet as 
demonstrated in the survey data cited above, few would contest the persistence of 
residual machismo in Brazil (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2001). Why does such bias not 
appear to have depressed the vote share of female candidates? The fact that many of the 
women discounting machista voter attitudes in my interviews conformed to traditional 
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gender roles suggests that while the voter bias did not prevent their election, it has 
certainly affected the dynamics of women’s campaigns and political profiles (to be 
discussed in Chapter 7). 
Deputy Rebecca Garcia of the conservative PP in the northern state of Amazonas 
thought being a woman actually helped her in the eyes of the elector, because she 
represented a fresh alternative to the corrupt, largely male status quo (Interview, 
December, 2008). Garcia also thought that given her pro-business stance, her gender 
enhanced her portrait of viability in the perspective of corporate funders, who were 
looking to back pro-business candidates but eager to endorse a novel candidate such as 
herself (young and female). Deputy Iriny Lopes of the PT in Espírito Santo (Southeast) 
also said that she had never suffered gender discrimination from electors, but drew a 
sharp contrast to her experience with corporate donors, the media, and interactions in the 
legislature, where she reported being “a victim of prejudice” (Interview, December, 
2008). Lopes’ sentiment that the legislature was considerably more machista than the 
electorate was echoed in several interviews, and suggests a troubling disconnect between 
elected and electors. 
Others reported that they had confronted voter bias (Interviews with Tonha 
Magalhães, November, 2008; Ana Arraes, March, 2009; Fátima Bezerra, March, 2009; 
Olívia Santana, April, 2009), with even many women constituents being hesitant to vote 
for female candidates (Interview with Maninha, April, 2009). For Municipal Councilor 
Olívia Santana (PC do B-BA) and Deputy Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ), Afro-descendent23 
women from impoverished backgrounds, prejudice in the electorate was intensified by 
multiple and intersecting layers of marginality (Interviews, April, 2009; June, 2009). 
                                                 
23 This designation is a translation of the Portuguese language term used to depict Brazilians descended 
from Africans: afrodesendentes. 
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Santana felt that these factors damaged her ability to acquire corporate funding, which 
undermined her campaign and ability to reach her constituents (Interview, April, 2009). 
Another stereotype faced by female contenders, especially heightened for physically 
attractive women candidates, is the challenge of being objectified and discredited 
(Interview with Rita Camata, December, 2008; Murray, 2010). 
In sum, the qualitative evidence on voter bias is mixed. The interviews suggest 
that while many women have been affected in some way by voter bias, most do not think 
it has diminished their chances of election. This perception is reinforced by the 
quantitative finding demonstrated in Figure 5.3 that female candidates and male non-
leftist candidates perform best in lesser developed districts. In Chapter 7, I advance an 
explanation for the apparent inconsistency of residual machista attitudes in less 
developed states existing alongside the perceived and observed insignificance of 
development level for women’s electoral prospects. By conforming to traditional gender 
norms, or campaigning collectively in a programmatic and supportive party, (some) 
women have managed to navigate the constraints of machismo. 
Rules of the Game 
District and party magnitude were not explicitly mentioned in any of my 
interviews with politicians. To be discussed further in Chapter 6, women who had 
contested majoritarian/plurality positions often contrasted the varying electoral rules and 
the implications for party support. Several of the interviewees also mentioned electoral 
rules in passing when asked about the political reforms under debate, with the proposal 
for public financing being more commonly mentioned but a handful expressing support 
for or opposition to adopting closed party lists. It is suggestive that although I asked 
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interviewees about electoral rules in several instances, few respondents actively engaged 
the question. 
Good Ole’ Boys’ Club 
On the contrary, structural inequities and party support were repeatedly 
emphasized across my interviews with candidates, bureaucrats, activists, and scholars. 
Every single female candidate I interviewed underscored the importance of party support. 
This focus stands in contrast to the image of a minimal or non-existent gatekeeping role 
so often painted for Brazilian parties. Rather, as outlined in Chapter 2 and the current 
chapter, supported in the quantitative findings presented above, and illustrated in what 
follows, parties with the capacity and will to provide female aspirants with critical 
psychological, organizational, and material support hold the key to enhancing women’s 
political empowerment in Brazil. 
The Norm of (Non-)Compliance 
Formal institutional change is often insufficient to induce genuine change (North, 
1990). Rather than a wholesale shift in the rules of the game, such formal change often 
maintains intact “tenacious” informal norms (North, 1990), and can occur in a gradual 
process that allows actors to nominally accommodate demands for change while 
maintaining their power (Thelen, 1999). Such limitations to formal institutional change 
are especially heightened in a context where formal laws are regularly flouted and 
informal norms carry the day. The abuse of the provisional commissions mechanism by 
party leaders in inchoate parties seeking to defuse threats to their interests (Guarnieri, 
2011) is illustrative of the frequent malleability of formal laws in Brazil’s weak parties. 
Absent a norm of compliance, parties are unlikely to comply with either internal or 
external rules. 
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Indeed, domineering male leaders of Brazil’s inchoate parties have acted with 
impunity in their resistance to the legislated gender quota. Even in the wake of the 2009 
electoral reform strengthening the measure, only a quarter of state parties met the 30% 
target for female candidates. A striking 268 of the 607 (44%) state parties participating in 
the 2010 elections did not advance a single female candidate. The PP – the most frequent 
manipulator of the provisional commissions mechanism (Guarnieri, 2011), with the 
second lowest mean on the party institutionalization index (1.38) and a critical mass of 
women leaders in less than one-fifth of its state organizations – has only complied with 
the quota in 5.6% of the elections it has contested since 1998! In contrast, the more 
institutionalized PC do B (2.07), with a critical mass of women leaders in three-quarters 
of its state organizations, complied with the quota in 39% of the elections it contested. 
As I demonstrate statistically above, and corroborate with interviews, the 
likelihood of compliance with the quota varies across Brazilian parties, and is predictable. 
The state parties most likely to meet the quota target are those that are institutionalized 
and have a critical mass of women in party leadership, with the latter factor being 
particularly salient. Regina Perondi, Vice-President of the women’s organ of the 
strongly-institutionalized PMDB,24 confirmed the importance of women in party 
leadership for meeting the quota. Under her leadership, PMDB Women has set out to 
meet the quota target by the 2012 elections through “occupying spaces throughout the 
party,” pushing for an internal quota, and establishing a national PMDB female working 
group (Interview, July, 2009). Perondi has traveled throughout the country seeking to 
embolden state-level PMDB female working groups, with an eye on consolidating the 
national PMDB female working group to enhance their bargaining power in top party 
                                                 
24 The overall mean for the PMDB across the states over time is 2.29, with 63.9% of state parties scoring at 
least two on the party institutionalization index. 
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decision-making circles (Interview, July, 2009). Her efforts were ultimately successful, 
with the national working group since being reinforced and advancing a national strategic 
plan for furthering women’s participation that includes capacity-building courses 
designed to incentivize female candidacies. In June, 2012, PMDB Women compelled a 
guarantee from the national executive commission that it would comply with the mini-
reform’s requirements to devote HGPE time and publically-provided party funds to 
advancing women’s participation (PMDB Mulher, 2012). 
Although the PMDB has long counted on active women’s sectors (Perondi, 2007), 
women have not been included in the upper echelons of the party’s leadership,25 and the 
promotion of women’s political participation has therefore not been prioritized. As 
Perondi stated, “the biggest obstacle is precisely the men in the party, they don’t want to 
listen to us. They think that we want to take control of the party, they don’t perceive it as 
a way to democratize the party” (Interview, July, 2009). As a result of the failure to 
incorporate women in top party leadership and thus absence of an effective commitment 
to furthering women’s candidacies, less than 13% of state parties complied with the quota 
in the last four elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In our 2008 interview, Deputy Rita 
Camata expressed frustration with what she perceived as disregard for the quota among 
PMDB leadership; the men “não vão abrir a mão,”26 or will not give up their power and 
privileges, and, she continued, do not seek out female candidates until the last hour in a 
meaningless gesture toward the quota with no intent of supporting their candidacies 
(Interview, December, 2008).  
                                                 
25 The median proportion of women in state party leadership is only 12.5 percent, with an average of 8.8% 
and less than 8% of its state parties incorporating a critical mass of women leaders in 2010. 
26 Literally, “will not open (or extend) their hand,” a Brazilian expression that illustrates stinginess. 
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In 2010, the PMDB’s rate of quota compliance doubled to 25.9%, but much work 
remains. To be developed in Chapter 6, since 1994, the PMDB has not elected a single 
female senator despite winning nearly a quarter of the senate seats, and has elected only 
36 women deputies of a total 433 (8%). My analysis suggests that the limited presence of 
women in party leadership is responsible for their poor record electing women. Although 
the PMDB is sufficiently institutionalized in most states, with the largest share of 
affiliated voters of any party, and active party directorates in most municipalities in 19 of 
27 states (average 61.1%) with very few provisional commissions, and is thus both rule-
bound and capable of fulfilling the quota, it has simply not been a priority for male 
leaders who refuse to “abrir a mão” to women. However, I predict this pattern to change 
with the bold initiatives recently introduced by Regina Perondi, former President of 
PMDB Women and Deputy Maria Elvira, and Deputies Fátima Pelaes, Rose de Freitas, 
and Marinha Raupp to hold the party publically accountable to the women-friendly 
provisions of the 2009 mini-reform (PMDB Mulher, 2012). Indeed, among the 608 
variations on the PMDB’s multiparty coalitions for October 2012 elections to municipal 
councils across Brazil, the average proportion of female candidates is 31.3%, a striking 
44% increase from 21.7% women among their 2008 municipal councilor candidates 
(TSE, 2012). 
In sum, as stated by Deputy Luiza Erundina, many parties have not complied with 
the quota due to a “lack of commitment to questions of gender” (Questionnaire, April, 
2009). Responding to a question about the quota law, Deputy Roberto Santos (PSDB-
BA) of the Special Commission of Electoral and Party Legislation stated, “It is only the 
leaderships in favor of women that end up (improving the political process for women)” 
(quoted in Araújo, 1999, 125). Once women leaders reach a critical mass, they are able to 
explicitly incorporate gender into party decision-making, and hold the party accountable 
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to the pro-women provisions of the electoral law. If the party then has sufficient 
resources to recruit and develop women’s candidacies, quota compliance is within reach. 
However, if the party is insufficiently institutionalized and regularly skirts formal 
laws, as seen in the frequent manipulation of the provisional commissions mechanism by 
leaders of inchoate parties (Guarnieri, 2011), even women leaders may have a hard time 
holding the party accountable to quota measures. Indeed, the party with the worst record 
of quota compliance (met the quota in only 5.6% of Chamber of Deputies elections 
contested) and proportion of women contenders (6.4%)27 is the PP, a notoriously inchoate 
party with domineering male leadership. A clear portrait of the PP’s disregard for formal 
laws is its maintenance of provisional commissions in an average of 70.7% of the 
municipalities across its state organizations despite having the second greatest average 
share of affiliated voters.28 In 21 of its 27 state party organizations, leadership has 
remained in the hands of one or two individuals over at least two election cycles. In sum, 
the weakly institutionalized PP succumbs to the whims of its few dominant leaders and is 
therefore not a party held accountable to the formal rules of the game. The parties most 
likely to make concerted efforts to comply with the quota are those that are both well-
institutionalized and incorporate the voice of women in party decision-making structures. 
The second implication of the norm of (non-)compliance – whereby inchoate 
parties do not operate regularly in accordance with clearly defined rules of the game, but 
rather in pursuit of the more particularistic interests of the few dominant party leaders – is 
that women and other outsiders cannot anticipate the criteria for promotion within the 
party and candidate selection. The story of Deputy Jô Moraes of the PC do B in Minas 
                                                 
27 The PPR/PPB/PP is second only to the old PP (1994), which advanced on average on 5.5% women 
candidates. 
28 The legitimate use of the provisional commissions clause is for parties in the process of building their 
membership, with a certain number of affiliated voters required before a municipal directorate can be 
established (Guarnieri, 2011). 
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Gerais illustrates how universal criteria for party ascension can illuminate the path to 
power for outsiders. Moraes climbed her way up the PC do B ranks by “working through 
party structures,” regularly attending meetings and mobilizational events, and 
participating in leadership roles in panels whenever possible (Interview, March, 2009). A 
member of the then underground PC do B since 1972, Moraes served as a staff member 
for party members in municipal government, and was eventually elected Municipal 
Councilor in 1996 and 2000, State Deputy in 2002, and Federal Deputy in 2006 and 
2010. She is state president of the PC do B for Minas Gerais, a member of the National 
Directorate, and has served as Vice-Leader of the governing coalition and Leader of the 
PC do B in the Chamber of Deputies (Chamber of Deputies, 2012a). 
Moraes knew that her party militancy and demonstrated base in the community 
would garner party support, and in 2006, she earned the privilege of being the party’s 
priority candidate. Priority status secured human and material resources for the campaign, 
including the coveted “6565” campaign number (Interview, March, 2009). The party 
chose Moraes to run for mayor of the capital city, Belo Horizonte, in 2008, although the 
campaign ultimately proved unsuccessful. In 2010, 45.4% of her rather sizeable 
campaign budget (R$861,148, more than twice the state mean) came from the party. 
Moraes stated that the strong party militancy and deliberate treatment of gender in the PC 
do B – which she argued had created “a virtuous cycle” furthering women’s 
empowerment – were critical for her electoral successes (Interview, March, 2009). She 
has demonstrated her militancy and electoral viability at each level, inching her way to 
the top and developing a solid base. 
Such an orderly progression through the party ranks is unlikely in inchoate 
parties, where candidacies are not cultivated according to clear guidelines. The candidacy 
of Deputy Rebecca Garcia of the PP, for example, emerged when her father decided not 
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to run for reelection29 to the Chamber of Deputies and suggested she leave her position in 
the family-owned media outlet to contest the election (Interview, December, 2008). This 
is hardly a replicable path for the vast majority of party newcomers, and can prove 
daunting for actual outsiders who lack the economic and/or familial capital to convert 
into political capital. 
External vs. Self-Nomination and Psychological Support 
Several women I interviewed spoke of the difficulties in reconciling family life 
and a political career, and the second/triple shift it entailed (e.g., Interviews with Emília 
Fernandes, April, 2009; Jô Moraes, March, 2009; Maninha, April, 2009; Raquel Teixeira, 
April, 2009; Rita Camata, December, 2008; Serys Slhessarenko, December, 2008). Tonha 
Magalhães (PFL/PR-BA), who is from a modest background and acquired her political 
capital heading up a neighborhood association and then in municipal politics, lamented 
that her children were practically raised by a maid (Interview, November, 2008).30 
District Deputy Eliana Pedrosa (PFL-DF) actually lost her marriage over the time and 
energy she committed to politics rather than spending at home – only two years into her 
mandate her husband (also in politics) delivered an ultimatum – either politics or their 
marriage. She chose politics (Interview, July, 2009). Deputy Iriny Lopes (PT-ES) 
confirmed the importance of a supportive network for her electoral successes, with fellow 
party militants even helping to care for her children when necessary. Lopes stated, “The 
militancy and level of solidarity in the PT has no substitute” (Interview, December, 
2008). 
                                                 
29  Francisco Garcia ran instead as 1
st
 Substitute on the unsuccessful reelection campaign of Senator 
Gilberto Mestrinho. 
30 Magalhães has no relation to Bahia’s longtime dominant Magalhães family. She has belonged to a 
number of parties, moving from the PMDB⟶PMB⟶PFL⟶PDT⟶PP⟶PFL⟶PR.  
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Given such constraints, the vast majority of the women I interviewed said they 
never intended to get involved in politics. All but two (Judge Denise Frossard31 and 
Emília Fernandes32) said that the decision to be a candidate was not “their decision,” but 
was externally made, providing strong support for the importance of external rather than 
self-nomination. Women in institutionalized parties most often said it was their party that 
pushed them to candidacy, with those running in weaker parties saying it was their group 
(association/movement) and one telling me “o povo” (the people) that decided she should 
be a candidate. Deputy Emília Fernandes (PT-RS) corroborated the importance of 
external nomination for women, saying that female candidacies “have to be stimulated” 
by parties, who play a fundamental role in building the self-esteem and audacity of 
potential female aspirants (Interview, June, 2009). In contrast, a young male deputy and 
son of the longtime president of the PMDB in Rio de Janeiro highlighted the typical male 
experience when he proclaimed cavalierly that he had always liked politics and wanted to 
be a politician, so decided to run for office (Interview, December, 2008). 
Although party support for the decision to be a candidate is critical, parties “do 
not offer conditions for women to be candidates…many times…lacking a structure that 
facilitates their participation.” Even with the quotas, the majority of parties “do not seek 
to incentivize enhanced participation by women” (Governor Ana Júlia Carepa, PT-PA, 
quoted in Paiva, 2008, 34-35). Senator Patrícia Saboya Gomes (PDT-CE) proclaimed, 
“among the principal (obstacles) is the lack of party investment in women…It is 
fundamental to stimulate the entrance of women…which necessitates a greater party 
                                                 
31 Judge Denise Frossard is an exceptionally ambitious individual. Her experience in the magistrate – 
which she contended was significantly more egalitarian than electoral politics, and national fame after her 
involvement (and death threats thereafter) in bringing down 14 figures in organized crime – augmented her 
self-confidence and self-perception of viability. She ran for governor in 2006, but lost in the second round.  
32 Emília Fernandes said the firing of her colleagues (teacher) after their participation in a strike provoked 
her and led to her first candidacy for city councilor in 1982 with the PTB (she is now with the PT). 
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investment in women’s sectors and a change in the mentality regarding the importance of 
women’s participation” (Questionnaire, April, 2009). Deputy Thelma Oliveira echoed 
this sentiment, placing the onus directly on party structures, “You do not have this 
reasonable number of women launching their campaigns because of the lack of party 
support…the party has to first make their presence possible…the party has to invest in 
women” (Interview, December, 2008).  
Without influential women in the party pressuring party leaders to make this 
investment and develop and recruit female candidates, those (men) in power will seek to 
maintain the status quo. “The parties need to perceive that it is time to invest in women” 
(Peron paraphrasing José Eustáquio Alves, 2012). Armed with favorable public opinion 
data, a (recently) enforced quota law, and the impressive electoral showing of women 
throughout the country at various levels (seven were the top vote earners in their state in 
2010 Chamber elections), women in party decision-making structures can convince male 
leaders of the electoral utility of cultivating viable female candidacies. The female 
leaders of PMDB Women are perhaps the foremost example of the importance of such 
pressure. Fighting to change the status quo of male dominance in their party by 
infiltrating party leadership and recruiting and training more women members, their goal 
of quota compliance is within reach (Interview with Regina Perondi, July, 2009). 
The PC do B is exemplary of the ability of women in institutionalized parties to 
further the electoral prospects of women through active recruitment. It is well-
institutionalized and has 25.9% women in its NEC, an average of 27.1% women in state 
party leadership, and five state committees presided by women.33 Accordingly, it has run 
an average of 25.5% female candidates across the elections it contested (more than twice 
                                                 
33 São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina and Sergipe. 
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the national mean of 12.8%), complied with the quota in 39% of these elections, and 
enjoys an overall success rate of 29.2% among its female candidates. 
As discussed above, the PC do B operates a thorough recruitment and training 
process for candidates. Female leaders such as Nereide Saviani, Director of the PC do B’s 
National Training School (ENF), have mobilized this infrastructure with a particular 
emphasis on women, offering courses that prioritize women’s participation, gender 
equality issues, and even provide day care for children during the course, alleviating in 
each instance prominent impediments to women’s participation analyzed here (PC do B, 
2009a; PC do B, 2011). Such efforts are at the heart of the PC do B’s impressive success 
promoting women, and should continue to bear fruit through the 2012 elections. After the 
PC do B’s Second National Conference on the Emancipation of Women, Liège Rocha, 
the party’s National Secretary of Women commented, “I think that women and the Party 
itself are more alert for this necessity of the promotion of women and the guarantee of 
female candidates for the Party” (PC do B, 2012). 
Without active measures to recruit and promote female candidacies, the socialized 
gender gap in political ambition is likely to remain intact and women’s disproportionately 
limited participation in formal politics will persist. Well-institutionalized parties have 
proven more conducive to women’s political participation because their recruitment 
process externalizes the decision to seek office and mitigates the constructed gender gap 
in political ambition. When female leaders mobilize supportive party networks to recruit, 
train, and campaign for women, they provide significant psychological incentives for 
women’s participation. Parties lacking such resources favor entrepreneurial candidates 
who must fend for themselves in the absence of any real party recruitment effort or 
organization in general. This results in an individualistic campaigning effort that will 
deter most female aspirants (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). 
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Even with these resources at their disposal, however, without a gendered frame of 
reference introduced by female leaders, male leaders may be unwilling to mobilize 
resources for women or unaware of how best to do so. Former Deputy, Mayor, Senator, 
and Governor Mário Covas’ (PMDB/PSDB-SP) characterization of the PMDB is typical, 
“Women have political space in the party. But for me, a woman is a politician not a 
woman politician, it is not a question of being a woman or not…Politics is all equal and 
the space is open to anyone. It would be highly improbable that the PMDB, in any way, 
made the (political) life of women difficult” (Quoted in PMDB, 1986, 234). Contrary to 
Covas’ statement – the sentiment of which was echoed in my interviews with male party 
leaders across the ideological spectrum, male and female contenders do not compete on a 
level playing field. The interrelated implications of traditional gender socialization – the 
wage gap, women’s disproportionate burden of domestic responsibilities, aversion to risk, 
and distaste for the corrupt formal political sphere – create powerful disincentives for 
women to participate. Yet, Covas’ statement is indicative of the failure of many male 
leaders to comprehend the necessity for parties to actively intervene on behalf of women; 
“parties have to make (women’s) presence possible” (Interview with Deputy Thelma 
Oliveira, December, 2008). Women in party leadership can introduce a gendered frame 
of reference that conveys to male leaders the obstacles confronted by women and the 
means to overcoming them. 
Organizational Support 
A strong party organization can provide training opportunities that incentivize 
women’s participation. For example, some parties offer “political capacitation” courses 
early in the year of elections. They explain what is in the purview of each office, what to 
expect in the campaign, give lessons in rhetoric, and review key party policy positions (if 
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applicable). Since the 2009 mini-reform, which in part requires parties to spend 5% of 
their publically-provided funds on promoting women’s participation, several parties have 
adopted such courses and incorporated gender into the program. In the PC do B’s courses 
at the ENF, participants are required to read over 100 pages of Marx and Engels as well 
as the resolutions of recent party congresses and excerpts from assessments of socialism 
and capitalism in the 21
st
 century, with units on philosophy, class, political economy, 
socialism, gender, and race and ethnicity (PC do B, 2009b). 
Political training and capacity-building courses such as those discussed above 
educate women on their collective party platform. This acquisition of knowledge and 
sense of community prepares female political aspirants both organizationally and 
psychologically, instilling self-confidence and a potentially powerful boost to their 
political ambition. Sílvia Rita Souza, a veteran congressional staffer and former 
Executive Secretary of PSDB Women, emphasized the importance of familiarity with the 
“how and what” of party politics for success, and the power of such knowledge to 
enhance women’s self-confidence and electoral viability (Interview, December, 2008). 
Souza conveyed the difficulties women often confront, and the importance of party 
support for overcoming them, “The parties in general have not invested in building the 
capacity of female candidates. After having the courage to run, women often become lost 
with the instruments of the campaign, principally the media” (Quoted in Jornal Cidade, 
2008). Responding to the limited accessibility of such information, Souza self-financed 
the publication of a brief and easy-to-understand non-partisan book on the process titled, 
The Woman Candidate – A Guide to Dispute Elections (2008), and has served as a 
consultant in capacity-building courses for women. 
In sum, the solid party organizations of well-institutionalized parties are 
conducive to the participation and electoral success of outsiders because they provide 
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lower stakes opportunities for newcomers to acquire the political skillset, and can offer 
capacity-building courses that further awareness of party platforms and aspirants’ sense 
of preparedness. But as I discuss next, the prospect for learning party platforms depends, 
of course, on their presence. If a party exists as a mere electoral vehicle and lacks 
coherent, shared positions, there is little for women (or any candidate) to latch onto 
(Interview with Deputy Rita Camata, PMDB-ES, December, 2008). Thus inchoate parties 
are detrimental to any candidate unable to marshal a suite of individual or familial 
resources. 
Programmatic vs. Personalist Politics and Material Support 
In contexts where party platforms remain elusive, a candidate’s campaign will be 
based more on accumulated personal political capital than collective party ideas. Previous 
studies have shown that female candidates may be advantaged by the prospect of a 
collective campaign because they are more disposed to collective rather than 
individualistic endeavors, it is less costly to the individual candidate, and it diminishes 
the elector’s prospect of voting on individual candidate traits and related stereotypes such 
as gender, with candidates running with more institutionalized parties able to count on a 
loyal base engaged with the party platform. Senator Fátima Cleide (PT-RO) stated, “I 
know no name in the PT that you could point to as elected by his or her own force and 
individual expression with no help from the party” (Questionnaire, May, 2009). 
Candidates’ campaigns in the PT and other institutionalized parties are more 
collectively-run endeavors, with the party often establishing a common platform to which 
it holds its candidates accountable, and providing campaign materials and assistance with 
the production of candidates’ segments on the HGPE (publically-funded electoral 
propaganda hour) that reiterate the collective campaign message. Former Deputy 
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Maninha reported that PT financing of electoral flyers and her HGPE spot34 was 
fundamental for her 2002 victory. She contrasted this campaign to her under-funded and 
unsuccessful 2006 campaign with the then nascent PSOL, which still lacked the 
infrastructure to support her candidacy. 
Nearly all of the women I interviewed spoke of the difficulty posed by campaign 
finance. Deputy Luiza Erundina, the women’s caucus’ most vocal and informed advocate 
within Congress for political reforms to enhance women’s representation, emphasized 
“Without a doubt the financing of campaigns is the most difficult problem,” with the 
related lack of party support being the second most pressing challenge (Questionnaire, 
April, 2009). In weakly institutionalized parties, the problem is compounding – the 
campaigns are often more expensive as candidates spend to distinguish themselves as 
individuals rather than as part of a collective campaign, and weak parties often suffer 
from a resource disadvantage and therefore cannot fund their candidates’ campaigns. 
Pairwise correlations lend support to this argument, with party institutionalization being 
positively correlated to the proportion of campaign contributions from parties, and 
negatively correlated to the proportion financed by corporations or the candidate herself. 
The magnitude of these correlations grows when looking at female candidates only. With 
a gendered discrepancy both in professional wages at large and in candidates’ proportion 
of campaign contributions from corporate donors, the need to depend on self and 
corporate financing in inchoate parties bodes poorly for women. 
Former Deputy Rita Camata also considered campaign resources one of the most 
significant obstacles to women’s representation, saying women “do not have the culture 
                                                 
34 Maninha said the PT spent R$700,000 on the HGPE spot (it was unclear whether this was just her ad, or 
for all 10 candidates in the district). Because this expenditure is indirect (by the party, not the candidate) it 
does not appear in reported campaign contributions. This is one reason, along with “caixa dois” – under the 
table campaign finance – why the quantification of party funding is challenging (Interview, April, 2009).  
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of power,” with men having an easier time asking for money (Interview, December, 
2008). Municipal Councilor Olívia Santana (PC do B) reported difficulties in raising 
money for her campaign for federal deputy, saying businessmen preferred to fund male 
candidacies (Interview, April, 2009). According to Deputy Iriny Lopes, businesses 
commonly discriminate in their donations, giving male candidates much higher 
contributions than they do female candidates (Interview, December, 2008). Parties with 
limited funds cannot compensate, and even where party resources are available, those 
without women-friendly leadership may not avail the resources for women. 
While the relationship between women party leaders and financing for female 
candidates’ campaigns is not determinative, with all rational leaders hesitant to divest 
resources from their own or close allies’ campaigns on behalf of untested newcomers, the 
overall pattern suggests that the presence of a critical mass of women in leadership does 
increase the likelihood that female candidacies will receive funding. In 2010, the average 
share of state funding among female candidates in well-institutionalized parties was 
significantly greater among parties with a critical mass of women leaders than those 
without. If women have an effective voice in party leadership, they can pressure party 
leaders to distribute funds more equitably. The PSDB’s National President Sérgio Guerra 
recently echoed this sentiment when responding to the publicized finding that the PSDB 
ran 20.4% women candidates in 2010, but dedicated only 1.7% of their dispersed funds to 
these women – “This pattern will only change with more mobilization and pressure by 
women” (Quoted in Mendonça and Navarro, 2012). Notably, the women-inclusive PC do 
B actually gave proportionately more money to the campaigns of female candidates than 
to men (Mendonça and Navarro, 2012). 
As the ultimate “fortress of machismo” (phrase stated in several interviews), even 
many institutionalized parties have remained closed to women, with the vast majority of 
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state parties still led by men. The average percentage of women in state party leadership 
is 17.33, with four of the five major parties falling well below this (PFL – 10.6%, PMDB 
– 8.8%, PSDB – 11.6%, PP – 10.7%). The fact that the leading PSDB has only one state 
party leadership with a critical mass of women (Roraima) is appalling. Unfortunately, 
several of the parties that have incorporated women into their leadership such as the PRB 
and the PRTB have yet to institutionalize adequately and are thus unable to provide the 
conditions ripe for women to thrive in Brazil’s candidate-centered electoral system. 
The lack of party support diminishes women’s viability while also discouraging 
female aspirants from waging future campaigns. As Almira Rodrigues of CFEMEA 
stated, “The electoral campaigns of women tend to receive less support and sustenance 
from parties and to have less visibility than the campaigns of men, and consequently, to 
received less support and votes from electors” (Fêmea 2007, IX.151, 11). Often, parties 
will recruit female candidates as laranjas (sacrificial lambs), only to satisfy the quota 
requirements for their party. Many ambitious and respected female party activists I 
interviewed indicated their own reluctance to run, knowing well from their front-row seat 
to the paucity of party support that their party’s initial encouragement would ring empty 
during the campaign and in the end, they would confront an uphill battle on their own, 
committing their personal time and money for an endeavor fraught with risks. For a 
campaign to be viable, a candidate needs material and human resources that endure. 
In sum, “women need to have concrete investment from the parties” (Laisy 
Moriére, National Secretary of Women of the Workers’ Party, quoted in Paraguassu 
2008, 31). CFEMEA summarizes the conundrum, “the parties have not undertaken the 
challenge to stimulate and contribute substantively to the increased political participation 
of women. In this sense, very few have adopted gender quotas for the composition of 
party leadership and, in general, they (parties) do not have policies to devote resources 
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and media time to the promotion of women’s political participation. They are masculine 
institutions whose functioning and structure make female participation difficult. It is 
necessary to democratize the party life and structures” (Fêmea, 2004, XII.135, 5). 
When parties include a critical mass of women in decision-making structures, the 
promotion of women’s participation is more likely to become a party priority. Although 
women do not always work on behalf of women, once they reach a critical mass this 
possibility is far more probable. And at minimum, women’s presence among the 
leadership forces party structures to “stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs” 
(Godinho, 1996, 155). Next, a brief discussion of the PT illustrates how incorporating 
women in party leadership facilitates the recruitment and support of female candidates.  
A Glimpse at the Workers’ Party through the Lens of Women 
Brazil’s largest leftist party has since its founding reached out to women 
(Macaulay, 2003). Leading petistas such as Bete Mendes, Benedita da Silva, and Sandra 
Starling have figured prominently in the party since its founding, establishing the 
importance of women’s participation for the PT and serving as role models for aspiring 
female politicians. The PT’s embrace of women stands in sharp contrast to the right-wing 
Democratas party (PFL), where women have had a minimal role since its inception 
(which has its roots in the military regime) with very few female politicians who are not 
the wife or daughter of a prominent male politician. 
In spite of the historical involvement of women in the PT – sustained in part by 
the party’s affinity with social movements, where women’s participation is far less 
constrained – and their strength among the party rank and file, in 1990, women 
comprised less than 10% of party leadership compared to around 40% of total party 
affiliates. In response to this disparity, the proposal of a quota for party leadership was 
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introduced at the PT’s Second National Women’s Congress in 1988, and debated and 
finally approved at the party’s Third National Women’s Congress in 1991 (Godinho, 
1996, 1998). After a rigorous fight for a voice in the party’s top decision-making circles, 
the PT implemented its pioneering 30% gender quota for all instances of party leadership 
at the National Party Congress later than year (1991) (Godinho, 1996). Female presence 
in the PT’s national directorate catapulted from 6.1% in 1990 to 29.8% in 1993 
(Godinho, 1996; Macaulay, 2003, 7). 
According to Tatau Godinho, then Secretary of Organization of the PT’s National 
Executive Committee, the results were profound. The demand for more women in elected 
office “became more frequent” and gained traction and visibility, persuading both the 
men in leadership and female political aspirants themselves of the importance and 
viability of women as political subjects in general and candidates in particular (Godinho, 
1996, 153; 1998, 29). In the 1994 elections, the proportion of women in the PT’s 
congressional delegation doubled, up from 8.3% in the 1990 to 16.7 percent (TSE). 
Again citing Godinho, of all the mechanisms considered for enhancing women’s 
participation, “none have altered the access and role of women in the party as 
significantly” as the PT’s quota for leadership positions (1996, 156; 1998, 31). 
At the PT’s 4th National Congress in 2011, the party approved a pioneering parity 
statute for all instances of party leadership, to be implemented in the 2013 internal party 
elections (Agência Patrícia Galvão, 2011). The effort to approve the parity quota was the 
result of a coordinated campaign by female petista leaders and women’s sectors, which 
strategically targeted individual “puxadores de legenda” (vote champions) for the party in 
advance of the National Congress and secured their support (Aggege, 2011). The PT’s 
National Women’s Secretary Laisy Morière anticipates a “radical transformation” as a 
result of the parity measure, facilitating “a new party vision” in which “parity is possible 
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and is something that we can attain” (PT, 2012b). Former Deputy and current Minister of 
Human Rights Maria do Rosário was similarly enthusiastic, saying “parity in the PT will 
have a great influence in the parliament” (PT, 2011). 
The equal presence of women will facilitate a more equitable distribution of party 
funds to female candidacies, and will embolden efforts to hold the party accountable to 
its rhetoric of women’s empowerment. One example of these efforts is the PT’s thorough 
audit of the legislated 5% of publically-provided party funds that must be devoted to 
promoting women’s participation, per the 2009 mini-reform (PT, 2012a). While many 
parties have neglected this requirement, choosing instead to incur a fine (deduction in 
publically-provided party funds in the next allocation), with other parties using the funds 
for dubious purposes, women PT leaders have demanded accountability in the spending 
of these funds. The PT has, once again, advanced as a pioneer for the cause of women’s 
empowerment. 
Still, there remains extensive work ahead for the PT to achieve parity in all 
instances of power in the party and in government. While women leaders in the PT have 
used their voice effectively, 12 of its 27 (44%) state party leadership structures do not 
have a critical mass of women. It does have the largest share of elected female deputies 
of all parties (21.8%), but only 13.8 and 11.3 percent of its candidates and elected 
deputies, respectively, are female. So although the PT has made significant advances in 
mitigating the structural disparities confronted by women, the incentives toward 
intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies loom large for all parties, including 
the parties heretofore most successful in recruiting and electing women, the PT and PC 
do B. To further the analysis, in the following chapter, I contrast the experiences of the 
PT and other major parties across the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, bringing into 
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focus how electoral rules incentivizing either intraparty competition or party support 
affect parties, and in turn, the electoral prospects of women. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While parties that have historically incorporated women such as the PT and the 
PC do B enjoy a head start in women’s participation, the findings presented here suggest 
that parties without such women-friendly legacies can overcome their historical deficits 
in women’s presence. By developing a clear and universal set of rules for party ascension 
(including candidate selection) that furthers a norm of compliance, a recruitment 
network, and training and capacity-building programs, while also cultivating a 
programmatic party platform, parties can provide women with critical psychological, 
organizational, and material support that will facilitate their successful participation. 
These tools for enhancing women’s empowerment are not monopolized by leftist parties 
in general, or the PC do B and PT in particular, but are available to any party seeking to 
at once comply with the electoral law while enhancing its electoral fortunes, 
representativeness, and accountability to the electorate. Parties that are well-
institutionalized and incorporate a critical mass of women in their decision-making 
structures provide the conditions most propitious for the mobilization of such resources 
on behalf of women.  
Although the obstacles to women’s representation are formidable, parties can help 
women overcome them. In spite of the incentives for intra-party competition induced by 
the open-list electoral system and related weakness of the gender quota law discussed in 
Chapter 3, when parties are well-institutionalized and have a critical mass of women in 
their leadership, they can level the playing field for female contenders. Psychological, 
organizational, and material support mitigates the constructed gender gap in political 
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ambition, enabling women to acquire the necessary political skillset and participate in a 
collective, ideas-based campaign.    
Voter bias does persist, especially in Brazil’s lesser developed areas, but has not 
precluded women’s electoral success. As I demonstrate in Chapter 7, this is because 
women have crafted profiles enabling them to thrive in spite of such bias, either by 
working through parties to convert their own experiences in informal politics into 
political capital driven by programmatic linkages, or in the absence of party support, by 
conforming to the traditional gender norms persistent in less developed districts. The 
conventional explanations for women’s representation centered on electoral rules such as 
district and party magnitude do not consistently hold for women. This is because many of 
Brazil’s most electorally successful parties (e.g., PSDB) remain dominated by men at the 
upper echelons of party decision-making and are thus difficult for women to infiltrate. 
While leftist parties have certainly reached out to women more than non-leftist 
parties, ultimately, running as a leftist woman in Brazil – where the median voter is right 
of center and traditional gender norms persist – is hardly a generalizable winning 
strategy. What has helped many leftist women is not their ideology per se but rather the 
mobilization of party resources to recruit them and support their candidacies from within 
well-institutionalized parties with programmatic platforms and women-friendly 
leadership. 
As I illustrate further in Chapter 6, rather than negating the role of parties, the 
intraparty competition incentivized by the Chamber of Deputies’ open-list electoral rules 
introduces great variation in women’s electoral prospects across parties, with the few 
well-institutionalized parties with women in leadership being able and willing to work 
toward closing the gender gaps in political ambition and legislative presence. I contrast 
women’s electoral performance in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies to reveal how the 
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presence or paucity of party support can modify the effect of candidate gender on 
electoral outcome, with the Senate’s ostensibly greater electoral hurdle overcome by 
party support. The result is that women senatorial candidates have enjoyed greater 
success than women seeking a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, where a combative 
climate of intraparty competition undermines women and other outsiders by intensifying 
personalist politics, with inchoate and male-led parties being ill-equipped and/or 
unwilling to recruit and support female contenders in their efforts to confront such an 
entrepreneurial system. 
That party does matter in the Brazilian context is the key contribution of this 
chapter. Bridging the Brazilianist literature – which downplays or even negates the 
gatekeeping role of parties – with the women’s representation literature’s emphasis on 
parties as the key gatekeeper, I have demonstrated that Brazil’s extreme 
underrepresentation of women can be explained by the prevalence of weak parties and 
disproportionately male party leadership. But this overall pattern obscures variation in 
party institutionalization and incorporation of women in top leadership structures, which 
when uncovered, helps to explain how Brazil’s few female politicians have managed to 
defy the odds and attain office. 
I thus recast the assumption that Brazil’s often amorphous parties exert little or no 
explanatory capacity in its candidate-centered electoral context, a finding which was 
generated from disproportionately male samples unrepresentative of the experiences of 
women. Honing the analysis to the candidate (rather than legislator, party, or aggregate) 
level and explicitly incorporating women demonstrates how parties do in fact have an 
essential gatekeeping role to play in Brazilian electoral politics. This finding has 
fundamental implications for reform efforts, which must target political parties rather 
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than just electoral rules, if they are to enhance the representativeness and accountability 
of Brazilian democracy. 
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Chapter 6 – Electoral Rules, Party Support, and Women’s Unexpected 
Successes in Elections to the Brazilian Senate 
 
Electoral institutions should be seen as part of a self-reinforcing 
equilibrium that also includes voters and party organizations. Although 
they are widely treated as key explanatory variables, electoral institutions 




In this chapter, I analyze variation in electoral rules across Brazil’s bicameral 
legislature to illuminate the (dis)incentives they yield for party support, and the 
implications thereof for women’s electoral prospects. While candidates to Brazil’s more 
powerful and prestigious legislative chamber – the Senado Federal – confront an 
evidently greater electoral hurdle than do candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, the 
Senate’s low district magnitude plurality elections generate incentives for parties to rally 
behind their candidate. This stands in contrast to the high-district magnitude open-list PR 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which motivate intraparty competition. If, as 
argued throughout this dissertation and substantiated in Chapter 5, party support is in fact 
critical for the development of viable female candidacies, these varying incentives for 
party support should lead women contenders for the Senate to confront a more level 
playing field than their counterparts in the Chamber of Deputies. Indeed, in all five 
election cycles since 1994, a greater proportion of women have attained seats in the 
Senate than in the Chamber. 
After discussing the contributions and limitations of the extant literature on 
electoral institutions and women’s representation, I elucidate why the Brazilian Congress 
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offers a particularly compelling environment for testing how rules and parties interact to 
affect women’s representation. I then discuss the electoral rules in Senate elections, 
differentiating them from those of the Chamber of Deputies described in Chapter 3, and 
compare the incentives for party support generated by each. Next, I marshal descriptive 
evidence to examine the observed differences across the two legislative chambers, and 
finally scrutinize these differences with multilevel analyses of candidate electoral 
performance in five concurrent elections to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. 
The cross-chamber comparison in turn assesses the relative explanatory capacity 
of the rival approaches and my central argument – that psychological, organizational, and 
material support mobilized by women in the leadership of institutionalized parties 
enables female candidates to overcome the barriers posed by the entrepreneurial electoral 
context of the Chamber of Deputies. If the standard explanations of women’s 
underrepresentation such as voter bias and party ideology indeed rang true in Brazil, 
women’s electoral prospects in the Chamber of Deputies should exceed those in the 
Senate, given its greater prestige and the higher electoral hurdle of its low magnitude 
plurality elections. 
But contrary to conventional wisdom, there is a record of consistently greater 
proportions of women elected to the Brazilian Senate than to the Chamber of Deputies. 
Moreover, while gender exercises a negative and statistically significant effect on 
women’s electoral prospects in the Chamber, it loses its predictive power in the Senate 
elections. Following the argument developed in Chapter 2 and substantiated in Chapter 5, 
I attribute women’s greater levels of electoral successes in Brazil’s upper rather than 
lower house to the more forthcoming party support typically enjoyed by candidates to the 
Brazilian Senate. Senate seats are valuable partisan assets, and parties are generally 
generous in their investments of time and money. From the moment of nomination 
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through election day, party elites, organizations, and activists rally behind their 
candidate(s), mobilizing substantial party support to further their campaigns. 
My multilevel analysis reveals two key elements: the Senate’s favorable electoral 
structure, and its amplification of the positive effects of women-friendly party leadership, 
which together enhance women’s electoral prospects. The presence of a critical mass of 
female leaders affords women a say in candidate selection and the distribution of party 
resources, enabling them to mobilize unified party support on behalf of other women. But 
when parties lack a viable female presence in party decision-making circles, I expect they 
will be less likely to develop, advance, and support women candidates in the lower 
magnitude Senate elections, where candidacy itself is a scarce and prized resource. 
In sum, electoral rules and parties interact to generate varying incentives for party 
support and thus, women’s electoral success. Whereas tendencies toward intraparty 
competition in the Chamber of Deputies OLPR elections substantially undermine 
women’s electoral prospects in all but well-institutionalized and women-friendly parties, 
the abundance of party support in Senate elections provides a more propitious context for 
female contenders. Parties with women in party leadership are well-positioned to 
capitalize on the favorable electoral environment with viable female candidacies. 
Contributions and Limitations of the Literature on Electoral Systems and Women’s 
Representation 
As stated in Chapter 3, the literature on women’s representation is no exception to 
the general primacy of electoral institutions for explaining political outcomes in 
contemporary political science. Electoral rules figure prominently in explanations of 
women’s (under)representation, with the implication being that the rules of the game can 
be modified to augment the political participation of women and other marginalized 
groups (Larserud and Taphorn, 2007; Matland, 2005). Amassing considerable evidence, 
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several cross-national studies have affirmed that countries with closed-list proportional 
representation and gender quotas with placement mandates tend to elect more women 
(Htun and Jones, 2002; Krook, 2009; Moser, 2001; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tremblay, 
2008; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Accordingly, international organizations and NGOs 
seeking to advance female political participation advocate for the adoption of such 
measures, with a growing number of countries following suit (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 
2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008). 
Yet, results of such efforts to fast-track women’s representation have been neither 
uniformly positive nor as “fast” as anticipated (Htun and Jones, 2002; Franceschet, 
Krook, and Piscopo, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Such mixed evidence on the 
effectiveness of quotas stems from wide variation in quota design and implementation as 
well as the compatibility of quotas with particular electoral and party systems. Indeed, the 
case of Brazil’s Lei Eleitoral de Cotas discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrates how 
negotiated compromises, open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral rules, 
and intransigent party elites conspired to reduce the Brazilian quota to a mere symbolic 
measure. It is critical, therefore, that analyses of electoral rules account for the specifics 
of the party system in which they operate. 
Most studies of the institutional factors underpinning women’s 
(under)representation suffer from two key limitations: (1) they analyze electoral rules in a 
vacuum, with at best tenuous controls for the sociocultural and historical contexts in 
which such rules are embedded, and (2) they infer the effects of electoral rules on 
individual women’s electoral prospects from aggregate level analyses of women’s 
representation in legislatures, i.e. they commit an ecological fallacy. 
Following Moser and Scheiner (2012), the current chapter avoids these two 
shortcomings with an individual-level, controlled comparison analysis of women’s 
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electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Similar to analyses 
of the effects of electoral rules in mixed electoral systems, the comparison of Brazil’s two 
legislative chambers allows me to hold constant innumerous site-specific (and often 
unquantifiable) confounding explanations while providing rich variation on the 
traditional institutional predictors of women’s representation – ballot structure, district 
magnitude, and quotas – and the incentives these electoral rules generate for parties. The 
intra-national, bicameral analysis thereby affords great variation across both parties and 
electoral rules, focusing on their interaction. Comparing the effects of electoral rules on 
legislative party cohesion and discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate, Desposato demonstrated how such a setting yields “a powerful opportunity for 
testing and inference” (2006, 1018). 
Moreover, this analysis of women’s electoral prospects in the Brazilian Chamber 
of Deputies and Senate advances an interesting puzzle. The electoral rules for ascension 
to the Senate – i.e. plurality elections with a low district magnitude and no gender quota – 
are widely considered disadvantageous for women’s representation (Duverger, 1955; 
Kittilson, 2006; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Further, upper 
chambers in the Americas are the more prestigious legislative arena (Desposato, 2006; 
Lemos, 2008), with an issue domain traditionally gendered masculine (Kahn, 1996). 
Indeed in most bicameral legislatures, women’s presence is greater in the lower house 
than in the upper house (IPU, 2012). Yet, the current (54th) Brazilian Congress includes 
14.8% women in the Senate and only 8.8% women in the Chamber of Deputies. As 
shown in Table 1.3, the proportion of women elected to Brazil’s Senate has over the last 
five elections consistently exceeded the proportion elected to its Chamber of Deputies. 
I explain this apparent puzzle by honing the analysis to the candidate level, and 
thus leveraging interparty variation in women’s electoral performance across Brazil’s 
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bicameral legislature. This approach illuminates how parties mediate the effects of 
electoral institutions, in particular, how the differing electoral rules in the Senate and 
Chamber generate distinct incentives for party support, and the implications thereof for 
women’s chances of election. I thus respond to several recent studies on electoral systems 
and women’s representation that call for consideration of not only electoral rules per se 
but also the party system in which they are embedded (Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Moser, 
2001; Moser, 2003; Moser and Scheiner, 2004, 2012). 
With few exceptions,141 most quantitative studies of the effects of electoral 
systems on women’s representation are conducted at the aggregate level, employing the 
percentage of women in the legislature as the dependent variable to be explained. In 
response, Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp recently asserted that the dominance of the 
aggregate-level approach explaining women’s overall descriptive representation “has 
nearly precluded research on other equally essential and related questions” (2010, 693).  
How do electoral systems and other hypothesized obstacles to women’s overall 
representation affect the electoral prospects of female candidates? To infer such effects 
on women’s electoral performance from aggregate country-level analyses is to commit an 
ecological fallacy (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Robinson, 1990). Recall from the 
discussion in Chapter 2, the mechanisms linking voter bias and ideology, for example, to 
the proportion of women in the legislature are distinct from those substantiating the 
effects of these barriers on individual women’s electoral success.142 Only with a 
                                                 
141 Moser and Scheiner (2012) conduct a legislator-level study, analyzing the chance that a given legislator 
is female, and Jones (2009) conducts an analysis of the percent of women elected on a party/coalition-list. 
142 For instance, the strength of leftist parties in parliament is a common predictor variable in studies of the 
overall proportion of women legislators. The mechanisms linking a country’s affinity for leftist parties to 
women’s representation are their support for welfare state policies, which can incorporate women in the 
paid workforce and in turn change their interests and induce an ideological gender gap, leading parties to 
compete for women’s votes by advancing more female candidates (Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies, 2006). 
This logic does not readily extend to explaining individual women’s electoral prospects, but must be re-
theorized to apply to candidates, and then tested at the appropriate level. 
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candidate level analysis can we elucidate their actual effects on the electoral performance 
of female contenders. Lost within aggregates are the individuals that run for, and 
sometimes win elected office, as is any variation across parties. 
Still, most of the cross-national studies on women’s representation analyze the 
data as static rather than longitudinal – adjusting for temporal effects rather than 
modeling them – and thus cannot illuminate change over time (see Hughes and Paxton, 
2008; Kittilson, 2006; McConnaughy, 2007).143 The introduction of gender quotas in 
many countries will, once sufficient time has passed to allow several pre- and post-
treatment observations, provide a sort of natural experiment, where researchers can 
isolate the actual effects of changes in electoral systems on women’s representation. In 
the meantime, scholars of mixed electoral systems have conducted innovative analyses 
that exploit the laboratory-like setting, contrasting women’s representation in distinct 
tiers within countries to infer their effects (Fortin and Eder, 2011; Moser, 2001a; Moser, 
2003; Moser and Scheiner, 2004, 2012). 
Controlled Comparison Analysis 
The within-country, controlled comparison approach allows for variation across 
electoral rules while holding constant a range of potentially cofounding explanations such 
as political culture and historical background, many of which are simply unquantifiable. 
Several scholars have employed such quasi-natural experiments to enrich our 
understanding of electoral rules and their implications for legislative party discipline and 
cohesion (Desposato, 2006; Ferrara, 2004; Haspel, Remington, and Smith, 1998), for 
representation in the context of inchoate parties (Moser, 2001b), and how the mixed 
electoral system can, under the condition of a weakly institutionalized party system, 
                                                 
143 Paxton, Hughes, and Painter’s (2011) latent growth curve model of changes in women’s representation 
over time represents an important advance on this front. 
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create a mandate divide (Thames, 2005). This chapter extends this line of research by 
analyzing the electoral performance of female candidates to each house of the bicameral 
Brazilian Congress, attentive to the distinctions in electoral rules. I investigate why 
women have enjoyed relatively more electoral success in the Senate than in the Chamber, 
first revealing observed differences across candidacies to the two chambers, and then 
discussing the effects of differences in candidate qualities, ideology, electoral rules, and 
party support on the electoral prospects of women. 
LESSONS FROM THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATURE 
Female candidates to both houses of the Brazilian Congress confront a 
preferential electoral system that, in contrast to closed-list PR elections, is candidate- 
rather than party-centered. Such candidate-centered campaigns undermine women, who 
studies show are generally predisposed to collective, rather than individualistic, 
endeavors (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008), and because voters in such 
elections generally rely on heuristics such as gender and thus potentially negative 
stereotypes in choosing candidates (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005; Valdini, 
2010). Therefore, neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies provides an ideal 
environment for women contenders.144 Yet, I marshal evidence to argue that willing 
parties can go a considerable way toward overcoming those obstacles. Compared with the 
lower house, the potential positive effect of party support for women is heightened in the 
Senate’s low magnitude plurality elections, where all parties play a greater and more 
unified role in the electoral process. In what follows, I compare the electoral rules of the 
Senate and Chamber, their varying incentives for party support, and their anticipated 
effects on women’s electoral prospects. 
                                                 
144 Recall from preceding chapters, OLPR rules also undermine the gender quota. 
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By most considerations, gaining election to the Senate should be more difficult – 
especially for women – than acquiring a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Enjoying 
exclusive jurisdiction over impeachment, international financing, and setting debt limits 
for federal, state, and municipal spending, as well as eight-year mandates, Brazil’s upper 
house is the country’s more prestigious legislative chamber (Desposato, 2006; Lemos, 
2008). Comparisons of the recent legislative agenda in the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate (when not in joint session) suggest more appointments and treatment of fiscal and 
trade policy in the Senate. Such issues are traditionally gendered masculine (Kahn, 1996), 
which along with the greater prestige of the office, poses a disadvantage to female 
candidates (Bohn, 2007). Indeed, only 40 women have ever served in the Senate.145 With 
most of the politicians occupying Senate seats being “veterans,” both in terms of their 
record of elective or executive office and their age146 (Lemos and Rainicheksi, 2008, 
100), such a cycle of exclusion is difficult to break.  
The Senate’s Heightened Electoral Threshold 
Given the discussions of electoral systems in Chapters 2 and 3, the electoral rules 
of the Senate should also disadvantage women contenders. Whereas multiple available 
seats and vote pooling across parties/coalitions mean that candidates often win a seat to 
the Chamber of Deputies with less than one percent of the statewide vote, Senate 
candidates must themselves win a plurality of votes, with no vote pooling. In 2010, the 
average winning vote share of Chamber of Deputies candidates was 3.4%, compared to 
                                                 
145 This count excludes the first female senator to serve, the Imperial Princess Isabel from the late 19th 
century. With a long era of exclusively male senators during the Old Republic, the Vargas Era, the Second 
Republic, and the military regime (one woman, Eunice Michiles, was elected as a substitute for the 
ARENA, and served from 1979-1987), women’s participation in the Senate has grown significantly in the 
New Republic (1985-present), with the first two women (Júnia Marise and Marluce Pinto) elected in 1990 
(Senado Federal, 2004). 
146 While the electoral law requires Chamber of Deputies candidates to be 21 years of age, Senate 
candidates must be at least 35 (Lemos and Rainicheksi, 2008, 101). 
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31.9% in the Senate elections. The higher candidate vote threshold and expense this 
requirement entails (Lemos, 2008) will surely prove prohibitive for most outsiders. 
Figure 6.1. Statewide Constituencies in the Senado Federal 
While both chambers have statewide districts, candidates to the Chamber of 
Deputies can win a seat with votes in only a few municipalities. Senate candidates, on the 
other hand, undertake the prohibitive expense of having to garner votes throughout the 
state. Given the often extensive geographies and precarious highway infrastructure, 
statewide campaigns are costly. Moreover, candidates to the Senate must seek to 
represent a diversity of constituents rather than electoral niches, as is common in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Figure 6.1 maps a characteristic municipality-breakdown of 
winning candidates’ electoral performance in the Chamber of Deputies (Alice Portugal) 
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and Senate (Lídice da Mata) in the northeastern state of Bahia, demonstrating the 
necessarily broader appeal of Senate candidates.  
Varying Incentives for Party Support 
These characteristics of the Senate create an environment disadvantageous to 
women and other outsiders. Yet, the low magnitude plurality rules generate greater 
incentives for party support than do the Chamber of Deputies’ high magnitude OLPR 
elections. With the forthcoming analysis, I argue that this more salient and unified role of 
parties in Senate elections provides a context more propitious for female candidates, 
allowing women in party leadership to capitalize on their potential. In contrast, the 
combative climate of intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies means that only 
well-institutionalized and women-friendly parties will have the capacity and/or will to 
mobilize resources to recruit women candidates and provide them with the psychological, 
organizational, and material party support necessary to thrive in the entrepreneurial 
electoral context. Next, I compare the electoral rules of the two houses – focusing on 
district magnitude, ballot access, and votes – and the incentives they generate either for 
party support or intraparty competition (Carey and Shugart, 1995).  
The Senate has significantly lower district and party magnitudes than the 
Chamber of Deputies. As discussed in Chapter 3, district and party magnitude in the 
Chamber of Deputies varies from 8 to 70, and 0 to 20 (in 1994-2010 elections), 
respectively. Each district elects three senators, who serve staggered eight-year terms. 
Every four years (concurrent with elections for president, governor, federal and state 
deputy), each district elects one or two senators. Elections in 1994, 2002, and 2010, sat 
two-thirds (54) of the Senate; elections in 1998 and 2006 selected one-third (27). In other 
words, district magnitude in the Senate varies from one to two. Looking back on the 
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literature discussed in Chapter 2, this lower magnitude – especially in the elections with a 
district magnitude of one – should diminish women’s representation because it makes 
candidacy itself a scarce resource. 
Conversely, higher district magnitudes entail a dizzying number of candidates. 
This is especially true in elections to the Chamber of Deputies, where parties are 
permitted to run 12 candidates in the smallest districts (8*1.5) and 140 candidates in the 
largest district (70*2). Under the condition of intraparty competition (i.e., OLPR), the 
vast quantity of candidacies in high district magnitude elections intensifies the incentive 
to cultivate a “personal vote” as candidates work to differentiate themselves from the 
masses of candidates on their list and others (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, 
and Suominen, 2005).147 Such tendencies dilute party support across candidacies, with 
most parties strategically devoting disproportionate party resources to the favored 
“puxadoras de legenda” or vote champions, who, by virtue of their votes in excess of the 
electoral quotient, often elect other candidates on the party list. 
In elections to the Senate, however, parties tend to concentrate their efforts on a 
single seat. This means that the party elite, organization, and militants campaign 
collectively for their candidate, and a spot on the party’s gubernatorial ticket presented at 
rallies and on campaign materials is assured (recall the dobradinha). In those elections 
with a district magnitude of two, voters have two votes (which they cannot give to the 
same candidate), so even if parties do advance two candidates in such elections, there 
remain substantially fewer incentives for intraparty competition in Senate elections 
(Desposato, 2006). 
                                                 
147 This contrasts with closed-list PR, where higher district magnitudes decrease the incentives to cultivate 
a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Validini, and Suominen, 2005). 
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Ballot access for Senate elections is controlled by the state party leaders. A few 
parties are considering the introduction of primaries to extend the selectorate (Fonseca, 
2012), but the majority of candidate selections for plurality/majoritarian elections have 
heretofore been conducted in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms (Braga, 2008).148 While I 
dispute the portrayal of Chamber of Deputies elections as “open for easy ascent” 
(Schedler, 1995, 18; Samuels, 2008) and maintain that parties do exercise a gatekeeping 
role, party leaders certainly exercise less formal control over access to Chamber 
candidacies, with 1-2 Senate candidacies being far more scarce and contested. Parties do 
not present a fixed ballot in elections to either legislative chamber, with the rules 
allowing voters to “disturb” the party list. In the Chamber’s OLPR elections, this means 
that in contrast to closed-list PR elections, the end ranking of candidates on the party list 
is determined by voters. For the Senate, it means that when two-thirds of the seats are up 
for grabs, voters can divide their two votes among parties. 
Because voters can “disturb” the party list for both houses, personalist politics and 
thus intraparty competition is implied in each system. Yet for the Senate, this only applies 
in the elections for two-thirds of the seats, where parties can advance two candidates. 
And again, even in the elections allowing more than one candidate per party, there are no 
real incentives for intraparty competition because voters command two votes that cannot 
be cast for the same candidate. In elections to the Chamber, however, voters cast a single 
ballot, and each party’s numerous candidates seek to differentiate themselves from and 
outperform their co-partisans. This breeds an every-man-for-himself mentality and 
diminishes party support for all but the most favored candidacies. Many candidates to the 
                                                 
148 While the Workers’ Party (PT) has formal guidelines requiring a broader approval and are thus more 
inclusive than most parties, state PT leaders retain considerable influence (Álvares, 2008; Braga, 2008). Of 
the major parties, the conservative PFL/Democratas and Progressive Party (PP) have the most exclusive 
candidate selection procedures (Braga, 2008). 
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Chamber receive absolutely nothing from the party organization beyond the party label 
itself (Author analysis of database, corroborated in interviews). 
The lesser scarcity and control of ballot access in the Chamber elections also 
raises the premium on personal reputation relative to party reputation, leading once more 
to intraparty competition. With so many candidate slots available, there may be 
candidacies advanced that the party organization has absolutely no intention of 
supporting. In contrast, in the Senate, party support is always unified behind their 1-2 
candidates with any intraparty competition having been hashed out prior to nomination. 
In sum, the lower district magnitude, fewer candidacies, multiple votes, and 
restricted ballot access in elections to the Senate generate considerably more incentives 
for unified party support than elections to the Chamber of Deputies, where the rules tend 
toward intraparty competition. If women can acquire access to this restricted and scarce 
resource of candidacy in the Senate, they stand to benefit from forthcoming party 
support. I expect that their likelihood to do so is significantly greater among parties with 
a critical mass of women in their leadership. Conversely, the greater scarcity of 
candidacies and more restrictive ballot access for the Senate will, I expect, disadvantage 
female political aspirants if women lack a voice among party leadership.  
Given the heightened incentives for intraparty competition in the Chamber 
relative to the Senate, I anticipate that female candidates bulwarked by a party 
organization with a critical mass of women leaders will enjoy the most success in 
elections to the Senate. In parties where women lack a voice in decision-making, 
however, successful female Senate candidacies are unlikely. And as demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, female candidates to the Chamber enjoy the most success when running in 
parties that have women in party leadership, and are sufficiently institutionalized to 
overcome the vast incentives toward intraparty competition that deter most female 
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political aspirants. In elections to the Brazilian Congress, women’s electoral prospects are 
shaped by the interaction of incentives for party support or intraparty competition and the 
will of party leadership to mobilize this party support on behalf of women, which in the 
Chamber, mitigates the difficulties of intraparty competition. Table 6.1 outlines these 
expectations. 
Table 6.1. Varying Incentives for Party Support in Elections to the Brazilian Congress 
 
Senate: 
Unified Party Support 
Chamber of Deputies: 





#1 Most women-friendly: 
Women leaders mobilize 
forthcoming party support 
and level the playing field 
 
#2 Intraparty competition 
difficult, but women leading 
institutionalized parties mobilize 




#4 Least women-friendly:  
Scarce resource unlikely to 
be mobilized for women 
#3 Parties unwilling (and often ill-
equipped) to mitigate intraparty 
competition 
 
So although the Senate is more prestigious than the Chamber of Deputies, 
candidacy is a scarcer resource, the electoral threshold is higher, campaigns are more 
expensive, and ballot access is tightly regulated, with no gender quota,149 I argue that 
unified party support mobilized by women in party leadership helps female aspirants 
overcome all of these obstacles. Because intraparty competition disincentivizes party 
support for most individual candidates in the Chamber, women running in all but the 
most institutionalized and women-friendly parties essentially undertake the campaign 
alone. The Senate, however, poses a different incentive structure whereby party support 
                                                 
149 As elaborated in preceding chapters, the quota law for proportional elections remains a “lei que não 
pega” – merely nominal, and flouted by the vast majority of political parties. Therefore, the absence of a 
gender quota in Senate elections does not pose a stark disadvantage for female candidates. 
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is more forthcoming. It is this distinction in party support that explains women’s 
unexpected electoral successes in Brazil’s upper chamber. Next, I discuss the observed 
differences across chambers in the presence, qualities, and success rates of female 
candidates. 
THE PRESENCE, QUALITIES, AND COMPETITIVENESS OF FEMALE CANDIDATES 
As displayed in Table 6.2, women’s congressional presence remains limited. Of 
the 2781 representatives elected to the national congress from 1994 to 2010, only 219 
(7.87%) were women. Although the absolute number of women senators is paltry, their 
presence is proportionally greater than that of the Chamber. Of all the senators and 
deputies elected over the last five election cycles, 12 and 7.5 percent, respectively, were 
women. This is especially striking because in most bicameral legislatures women’s 
presence is greater in the lower house than in the upper house (IPU, 2012). Next I 
consider whether women in both legislative chambers tend to cluster in the same parties 
and regions. 
Table 6.2. Women’s Congressional Presence (1994-2010) 
Election 
Year 
Federal Senator Federal Deputy 
 Candidates   Elected  Candidates   Elected 
  
        1994 17 7.3% 4 7.4% 185 6.2% 32 6.2% 
1998 23 14.0% 2 7.4% 348 10.4% 29 5.7% 
2002 38 12.4% 8 14.8% 480 11.4% 42 8.2% 
2006 32 16.8% 4 14.8% 627 12.7% 45 8.8% 
2010 27 12.7% 8 14.8% 929 19.1% 45 8.8% 
         Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; Cfemea. 
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Parties Electing Women 
As shown in Table 6.3, in both legislative chambers, most women are elected with 
leftist parties, and a greater proportion of leftist delegations are women. This tendency is 
exaggerated in the Senate, where nearly 58% of female senators elected from 1994 to 
2010 are from the left. A striking 42.3% and 21.2% of women elected to the Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies, respectively, hail from the PT. The PT has advanced 23 female 
candidates to the Senate, 22.3% of its total, electing eleven. Such an impressive petista 
female presence in the Senate – particularly when contrasted with the Chamber of 
Deputies – suggests that, as anticipated, when the rules of the game incentivize party 
support (as in the Senate), parties with women in leadership are able to capitalize 
electorally while enhancing women’s representation. With the internal quota for women 
in all instances of party leadership (30% since 1991, extended to 50% in 2011), and a 
significant contingent of women among party founders (Macaulay, 2003), the PT is one 
of Brazil’s more women-friendly parties. This relative openness to women has translated 
into significant – although still insufficient – female legislative representation, especially 
in the Senate where the electoral rules incentivize unified party support. 
The women-friendly and organizationally strong but electorally smaller PC do B 
has only elected two senators, one of whom is a woman (Vanessa Grazziotin-AM), with 7 
of its 28 candidates being female (25%). These proportions are slightly higher than those 
for the Chamber, where 23 and 33 percent of its candidates and elected deputies, 
respectively, are female. The PC do B women’s greater success rates in the Chamber 
(25%) relative to the Senate (14%) are a product of the party’s electoral strength, with the 
plurality electoral system concentrating seats in the hands of the larger parties. Of the 214 
Senators elected from 1994-2010, 75% were from the five major parties (PFL, PMDB, 
PP, PSDB, PT). 
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Table 6.3. Women in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, by Party, Ideology, and 
Region (1994-2010) 
This does not mean to imply that all major parties have elected women to the 
Senate. While female deputies have fared relatively well in the PMDB, with 18.7% of the 
PARTY / REGION 
WOMEN SENATORS  
Candidates      Elected 
WOMEN DEPUTIES 
Candidates          Elected 
LEFT 87 (16.9%) 15 (25.4%) 1147 (14.3%) 87 (11.1%) 
  PT 23 (22.3%) 11 (36.7%) 249 (13.8%) 41 (11.1%) 
  PC do B 7 (25.0%) 1 (50.0%) 75 (23.3%) 19 (33.3%) 
  PDT 6 (9.2%) 0 (0.0%) 155 (10.2%) 7 (5.3%) 
  PMN 0 (0.0%) 0 (-) 94 (15.8%) 1 (7.1%) 
  PPS 5 (12.2%) 1 (25.0%) 101 (12.3%) 2 (3.7%) 
  PSB 7 (14.3%) 1 (11.1%) 151 (12.6%) 15 (12.8%) 
  PSOL 12 (27.3%) 1 (50.0%) 82 (18.3%) 1 (16.7%) 
  PV 2 (5.3%) 0 (-) 181 (17.4%) 1 (2.9%) 
     
CENTER 10 (5.3%) 3 (3.6%) 372 (11.9%) 60 (7.6%) 
  PMDB 3 (2.7%) 0 (0.0%) 195 (11.3%) 36 (8.3%) 
  PSDB 7 (9.1%) 3 (9.7%) 177 (12.6%) 24 (6.8%) 
     
RIGHT 40 (9.7%) 8 (11.1%) 1050 (11.4%) 46 (4.6%) 
  PFL/DEM 5 (6.0%) 5 (13.2%) 97 (8.4%) 20 (5.2%) 
  PPR/PPB/PP 4 (8.3%) 1 (11.1%) 95 (8.6%) 11 (4.6%) 
  PP (1994) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (4.2%) 1 (2.9%) 
  PL/PR 2 (7.7%) 0 (0.0%) 96 (10.9%) 3 (2.6%) 
  PRB 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 29 (19.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
  PSC 4 (21.1%) 0 (0.0%) 101 (13.1%) 3 (9.4%) 
  PTB 4 (12.1%) 2 (22.2%) 133 (12.0%) 3 (2.3%) 
  PTC 2 (25.0%) 0 (-) 68 (17.9%) 1 (25.0%) 
  PTdoB 1 (9.1%) 0 (-) 48 (11.8%) 1 (25.0%) 
     
NORTH 33 (14.3%) 9 (16.4%) 355 (15.3%) 46 (14.2%) 
NORTHEAST 37 (10.4%) 7 (9.9%) 452 (10.2%) 34 (4.5%) 
CENTER-WEST  14 (9.5%) 4 (12.5%) 241 (14.9%) 25 (12.2%) 
SOUTHEAST 29 (12.5%) 2 (6.3%) 1186 (12.9%) 69 (7.7%) 
SOUTH 24 (16.0%) 4 (16.7%) 335 (12.1%) 19 (4.9%) 
TOTAL 137 (12.3%) 26 (12.0%) 2569 (12.6%) 193 (7.5%) 
Note: The values in parentheses represent the proportion of the party/region’s candidates and elected that 
are women. 
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women elected to the Chamber of Deputies being from this big tent party, they have not 
elected a single female senator despite winning over 24% of all Senate seats from 1994 to 
2010.150 As predicted above, when a party leadership remains dominated by men as has 
the PMDB, the scarcity of Senate candidacies and more restrictive ballot access makes 
women unlikely to gain access to these resources. Indeed, only 3 of the PMDB’s 111 
Senate candidates (2.7%) are female. 
As shown in Table 6.3, the conservative and often male-dominant 
PFL/Democratas party has an impressive 100% success rate among its five female 
candidacies to the Senate. This feat is suggestive of the power of unified party support to 
level the playing field for women. It also exhibits the role of women leaders in mobilizing 
this support. Less than 20% of the PFL’s state parties contesting Senate elections since 
1998 have had a critical mass of women, with an average of 10% women in party 
leadership. Yet, among the five state parties running the PFL’s successful female 
candidates, the average proportion of women leaders was 27.5%, with all but one 
(Roseana Sarney, the daughter of a former President) emerging from a state party with a 
critical mass of women leaders. This provides tentative support for my prediction that the 
Senate will prove more favorable than the Chamber if there is a critical mass of women in 
party leadership. 
It is worth noting that ideology will certainly affect the kind of woman a party 
will promote and elect, with independent feminists being less likely to gain access to a 
highly coveted Senate seat in non-leftist parties. Indeed, all but one of the PFL’s female 
                                                 
150 The PMDB did have one woman, Iris de Araújo Rezende Machado – wife of the party leader and 
former governor of Goias – serve as a Senate substitute three times from 2003 to 2007, for a total of 13 
months. 
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Senators emerged from powerful political families151 in the northeast (Rosado, Sarney, 
Alves). Whereas the non-left parties exhibit a tendency to elect wives and daughters of 
male politicians (8 of 11, or 73%),152 the PT has elected strong independent women such 
as Ana Júlia Carepa, Benedita da Silva, Heloísia Helena, and Marina Silva. Of the 11 
women petistas and four other leftist women elected to the Senate, only four are 
associated with political families, with two of these (Marta Suplicy and Gleisi Hoffmann) 
having political capital of their own (from the student movement) in addition to that of 
their (ex-)husbands, Senator Eduardo Suplicy and former Deputy and Minister of 
Planning, Budgeting, and Management, and current Minister of Communication, Paulo 
Bernardo. Nevertheless, the experience of the PFL suggests that women in the leadership 
of even non-leftist parties can improve the electoral prospects of female candidates, and 
will be assessed empirically in the analyses below. 
As shown in Table 6.3, while many of the leftist parties have advanced and 
elected proportionally more women to the Senate relative to the Chamber, the opposite is 
true for most non-leftist parties (with the exception of women elected to the Senate on the 
right, driven by the PFL women discussed above). This finding is once again suggestive 
of the influential role of party support in Senate elections. Recall from the preceding 
chapters, due in part to leftist parties’ historical emphasis on equality, they are 
significantly more likely than non-leftist parties to have a critical mass of women in their 
leadership. In the multivariate analyses below, I explore the interacting effects of 
electoral rules incentivizing party support or intraparty competition and the presence of 
                                                 
151 Such parentesco, or familial connection, is not unique to women. Over 30% of male senators in the 
current (54
th
) legislature are the son, grandson, or nephew of male politicians, with several more having 
other family members in politics (Congresso em Foco, 2011). 
152 Of these 8 wives and daughters elected to non-leftist parties in the Senate, only Ana Amélia Lemos 
developed independent capital. Married to Octávio Omar Cardoso, politician for the military regime’s 
ARENA and PDS parties, Ana Amélia was also a reporter for several well-known media outlets. Her 2010 
affiliation with the PP and successful Senate election bid was her first time to contest electoral office.  
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women in party leadership to mobilize party support. But first, I examine the differences 
in candidate quality across the chambers. 
Differences in Candidate Quality 
In general, are female candidates to the Senate qualitatively different than male 
candidates? Is there a difference between female candidates to the Senate and Chamber 
of Deputies? Table 6.4 suggests that women competing for a seat in the Senate are just as 
qualified as the male candidates. Although female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies 
have won a significantly lower vote share than male candidates and are also less likely to 
be an incumbent and to gain election, for Senate candidates such gender gaps are not 
statistically different from zero. As is true among candidates to the Chamber as well as 
society at large, the average educational attainment of women candidates to the Senate is 
slightly higher than that of the male candidates, but the minimal difference is not 
statistically significant. 
One significant gender difference persisting in both chambers is a much greater 
tendency of female candidates to hail from leftist parties. A striking 63.3% of female 
candidates to the Senate come from leftist parties, compared to only 43.5% of male 
candidates. This concentration of leftist women is more pronounced in the Senate than in 
the Chamber, where just over 41% of female candidates come from leftist parties, 
providing yet more evidence suggesting that incentives for party support in the Senate 
can, when paired with women in party leadership, create a favorable environment for 
female contenders. 
Looking across the two legislative chambers, we see that when compared to 
female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, women aspiring to gain a seat in the 
Senate have had greater electoral success, are significantly more educated and likely to 
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come from a feeder occupation and a leftist party, and are less likely to come from a 
developed state.153 In the multivariate analyses below, I take into account these 
differences in education, occupation, and party ideology, thus allowing me to control for 
varying candidate quality and execute a structured evaluation of the greater successes of 
women candidates to the Senate. This gives us confidence that any disparities in women’s 
electoral performance across the bicameral legislature found in the multivariate analyses 
are not due to such differences in candidate quality. 
Table 6.4. Differences in Candidate Quality? A Comparison Within and Across 
Legislative Chambers (1994-2010) 
                                                 
153 This is likely due to the greater district magnitude in the Chamber of Deputies in many of the more 
developed states. Note, differences across women candidates to the Senate and the Chamber in vote share 
and district magnitude are not comparable and were thus not tested for statistical significance. 
 
 
Senate Chamber of Deputies 
  Men    Women    Women Men 
 
   
 
Election 0.192 0.190       0.075***       0.133*** 
Vote share 12.109 11.731 0.525       0.683*** 
Education 3.769 3.819       3.580*** 3.562 
Married 0.736       0.438*** 0.444       0.680*** 
Incumbent 0.085 0.058 0.058       0.116*** 
Feeder Occupation 0.629 0.672       0.469*** 0.473 
Left 0.435       0.633***       0.410***       0.359*** 
Ideology 4.225       3.482***     3.998**       4.214*** 
District magnitude 1.682 1.604  34.749     35.898* 
Developed district 0.474 0.496       0.686***   0.666* 
N 997 139 2569 17794 
Notes: Two-tailed tests of statistical significance of observed differences between: men and women in the 
Senate, between women across the Senate and Chamber, and between men and women in the Chamber. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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District Magnitude and the Election of Women to the Senate 
It is unclear from Tables 6.2 and 6.4 if the Senate elections with a district 
magnitude of two have indeed been the most favorable for female candidates. Although 
there have been more women elected in these elections in absolute terms, the percentage 
has remained at 14.8% since 2002. The average district magnitude of Senate elections 
contested by female candidates is 1.6, which is not statistically different than that of male 
candidates. For winning candidates only, the average is slightly higher but the gender 
difference remains insignificant. Of the Senate elections with a district magnitude of two 
(1994, 2002, 2010), nearly a quarter of female candidates were successful. This success 
rate falls to 11% in years when each state elected only one senator (1998, 2006). 
Interestingly, as Table 6.5 below demonstrates, the 1998 and 2006 elections actually saw 
the greatest proportion of female candidates. So while women’s success rates have indeed 
been more favorable in the elections electing two-thirds of the Senate, with less female 
candidates and more seats up for grabs, this is in part a mathematical truth. In the 
following analyses, I explore the statistical relevance of district magnitude for a woman’s 
electoral prospects. 
Women’s Success Rates in the Brazilian Congress 
Looking at women’s success rates across the two chambers, we see that female 
candidates to the Senate have enjoyed more electoral success than have women running 
for the Chamber of Deputies. Even when taking into consideration women’s relative 
competitiveness through the Female-Male Success Rate Ratio, the Senate has proven 
more conducive to women’s success than has the Chamber in recent elections. This 
discrepancy remains despite the Chamber’s gender quota. That women candidates 
perform their best in the legislative chamber lacking a quota suggests that the quota’s 
effects have been neither forthcoming nor direct. 
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Table 6.5. Women’s Success Rates in the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010) 
Overall, women’s impressive success rates in Senate elections (18.7%) refute the 
enduring argument that the electorate is reluctant to elect women politicians. Even in the 
less developed North and Northeast, women candidates have performed quite well, with 
27.3% and 18.9% of women contesting Senate seats in these regions gaining election. In 
both chambers, women running for office in the richer southern and southeastern regions 
have actually had the lowest success rates. 
Having discussed the expectations of the literature and explored the nuances of 
observable electoral trends, we may now scrutinize Brazilian women’s unexpected 
success in the Senate. In the multivariate analyses that follow, I control for the observed 
differences in candidate quality and explore the effect of gender on electoral outcomes in 
the Brazilian Congress. Drawing on the statistical findings and interviews with female 
candidates to both chambers, I explain how, even in Brazil’s candidate-centered electoral 
context, party support makes the difference for women contesting electoral office. 
 



















         
1994 7.3% 7.4% 23.5% 1.01 6.2% 6.2% 17.3% 1.02 
1998 14.0% 7.4% 8.7% 0.49 10.4% 5.7% 8.3% 0.52 
2002 12.4% 14.8% 21.1% 1.23 11.4% 8.2% 8.8% 0.69 
2006 16.8% 14.8% 12.5% 0.92 12.7% 8.8% 7.2% 0.66 
2010 12.7% 14.8% 29.6% 1.2 19.1% 8.8% 4.8% 0.41 
Notes: Success rate (“S Rate”) = number of (women) elected / number of (women) candidates. A Female-
Male Success Rate Ratio (“FMSR Ratio”) greater than 1 indicates that women candidates have a higher 
success rate than male candidates. In 1994, 2002, and 2010, each state elected two senators.  
Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; CFEMEA. Calculations by author. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Analyzing both chambers simultaneously, I employ institutional variation that 
reveals how distinct electoral rules affect women’s electoral prospects in Brazil while 
controlling for a barrage of potentially confounding variables. I assess variation within 
and across chambers, using hierarchical modeling to explore how gender (or more 
precisely, sex) interacts with electoral rules and particular individual, party, and district-
level factors to predict candidate electoral success. 
Independent Variables – Candidate Characteristics 
I expect that, because the extensive intraparty competition incentivized by the 
electoral rules in the Chamber of Deputies concocts a disadvantageous environment for 
women and other outsiders, female will have a negative effect on the electoral prospects 
of candidates in the Chamber of Deputies. Yet because party support is more forthcoming 
in elections to the Senate, with competition fiercer between parties rather than within, I 
expect female to have an insignificant effect on candidate electoral outcomes in the 
Senate. Public discontent with the corruption scandals of recent years and societal 
perceptions of women as novel candidates who are more honest and less corrupt may 
even render the effect of female positive, particularly under the condition of party 
support, which helps to project an image of viability. Recent public opinion data suggest 
the Brazilian electorate is increasingly receptive to female candidates (e.g., Ibope, 2009), 
in spite of residual levels of machista voter attitudes. Thus, I expect the effect of female 
to be insignificant but positive in the Senate, and negative for candidates to the Chamber. 
As in Chapter 5, I anticipate the controls for candidate quality will exercise a 
positive effect on candidate electoral outcome. I expect education to have a positive 
effect of candidate electoral outcome, regardless of electoral rules or candidate sex. In 
both chambers, coming from a feeder occupation (including but not limited to elected 
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office) should substantially increase one’s chances of victory, so I expect feeder 
occupation to have a positive effect on electoral outcome, regardless of electoral rules or 
candidate sex. Given the lower threshold in Chamber elections, and thereby the greater 
prospect of winning a seat with the support of a small societal sector (e.g., a particular 
union, soccer club, etc.), I expect the magnitude of feeder occupation to be greater for 
Senate elections. 
Although I expect incumbency to have a positive effect on the electoral prospects 
of all candidates, with eight-year terms and only three senators per state, I anticipate the 
magnitude of incumbency to be lesser for candidates to the Senate. I also include 
campaign finance and campaign finance² and expect the former to be positive and the 
latter negative to account for the diminishing returns of increasing campaign funding. I 
expect the effects of incumbency or campaign finance to be positive and statistically 
significant for all candidates, regardless of gender. 
Independent Variables – Party Characteristics 
As the median Brazilian voter is right of center (LAPOP, 2008; WVS, 2005-
2008), I expect the effect of leftist party affiliation to be negative overall, with ideology 
being positive (0 to 10 is left to right) and left being negative regardless of electoral rules. 
But given the historical commitment of leftist parties to equality, and their greater 
incorporation of women, I anticipate the interactions of female*ideology to be negative, 
and female*left to be positive across legislative chambers. As in Chapter 5, however, I 
expect that the positive effect of female*left will dissipate with the introduction of the 
interaction of female with party institutionalization (PII) and critical mass, which I 
contend are the key mechanisms substantiating the electoral success of women in leftist 
parties. 
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Because the electoral rules in the Chamber incentivize intraparty competition, I 
expect female*PII*critical mass to be heightened in the Chamber, with institutionalized 
parties able to mitigate the tendencies toward combative, personalist politics and women 
mobilizing this capacity on behalf of female candidates. The positive effects for female 
candidates of women in party leadership are enhanced in institutionalized parties because 
they facilitate the provision of psychological, organization, and material support critical 
for women to thrive in the entrepreneurial context. In the Senate, I anticipate that PII will 
be less salient, as the electoral rules generate broad incentives for unified party support of 
candidates across parties. I argue that such party support is especially likely to be 
galvanized in the name of recruiting, developing, and supporting female candidacies 
when women have a voice in party leadership, and therefore expect that female*critical 
mass will be positive in the Senate. When bulwarked by a women-friendly party, female 
candidates thrive in the context of unified party support.  
Independent Variables – Institutional Characteristics 
District Magnitude 
District magnitude is measured at the district-level of the model, and is scored one 
for candidates to the Senate in 1998 and 2006, and two for Senate candidates in 1994, 
2002, and 2010. District magnitude for Chamber of Deputies varies over state (but not 
time) from 8 to 70. While I use party seat share, or party magnitude, in the models of 
candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies in Chapter 5, the variation in party magnitude in 
the Senate elections is small, and proffers little explanatory power with such lengthy time 
between mandates. Moreover, if a party currently holds one or two seats they may 
actually be less likely to win the third seat, with voters more apt to give another party a 
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chance. In any case, as discussed above, the key variation in the Senate is between the 
elections with a district magnitude of one and two. 
As in Chapter 5, I expect the effect of district magnitude to be negative for all 
candidates because it introduces additional competition. Recall from the discussion 
above, the vast quantity of candidates in the Chamber’s high district magnitude OLPR 
elections only increases the tendencies toward intraparty competition. And given that the 
unification of party support is the principal reason I expect Senate elections to be most 
favorable for female candidates (in parties with women leaders), I anticipate that women 
will enjoy more success in the Senate’s single district magnitude elections. Women-
friendly parties will not hesitate to advance a female candidate in single seat elections, 
and women-averse parties will be unlikely to devote even a second candidacy to women. 
To enable simultaneous cross- and within-chamber assessments of the effect of district 
magnitude, I also estimate the models with dmag group coded categorically (1: 1; 2: 2; 3: 
8-12; 4: 16-31; 5: 39-70). 
Effective Number of Candidates 
An important difference between the Senate and Chamber in terms of women’s 
electoral prospects is the anticipated fragmentation of the vote and thus party support. 
Despite the presence of various seats, with a profusion of candidates in Chamber 
elections, party resources are necessarily fragmented. In the Senate elections, with all 
eyes focused on the prize of a prestigious Senate seat, and where parties run at most two 
candidates (only 17.2% of district parties from 1994-2010) but more often a single 
candidate (mean of 1.15 number of candidates per party), this fragmentation is minimized 
availing dedicated party resources to the candidate(s) with their hat in the ring. To 
explore this effect on women’s electoral performance, I include effective number of 
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candidates (Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). The mean of 
effective number of candidates in Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections, 
respectively, was 58.44 and 4.15. I expect a higher effective number of candidates to 
depress availability of party support and thus have a negative effect on all candidates’ 
electoral performance, with an elevated significance for women running in elections to 
the Chamber, for whom the detrimental effect of fragmented party support poses a 
particular challenge. 
Gender Quotas 
With the Lei Eleitoral de Cotas implemented in the 1998 elections to the 
Chamber, I include a binary variable, quotas, coded 0 in all Senate elections and in the 
1994 Chamber elections, and 1 in the 1998-2010 Chamber elections. But with the 
concept and implementation of quotas being far from dichotomous, and in line with the 
differentiation of quota regimes in cross-national analyses (Jones, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 
2010), I alternately include a trichotomous variable, quotas2, which is the same as quotas 
but codes the 2010 elections occurring after the 2009 mini-reform that strengthened the 
quota and enforcement as two. Given the potential for limited effectiveness of quotas in 
OLPR elections, and the preponderance of inchoate parties that regularly defy formal 
laws governing elections and parties, I expect the effects of both measures of quotas to be 
weakly positive, at best. 
Senate 
In addition to these particular measures of differences across the chambers, I 
include a binary variable, senate, which is 0 in Chamber candidacies and 1 for 
candidacies to the Senate, to capture any remaining variation. The greater power and 
prestige of the Senate lead me to expect senate to be negative overall. Yet as discussed 
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above, I expect the interaction female*senate to exercise a positive effect on electoral 
outcome, with the disadvantages posed by being a woman mitigated in the Senate, where 
party support is more forthcoming. I also interact senate with several of the variables 
discussed above to evaluate the hypothesized differences across chambers. 
Independent Variables – District Development Levels 
I supplement these data on candidates, parties, and electoral rules with district-
level measurements of development (HDI) (Ipea, 2010a). As discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 5, voter bias against women may depress their electoral prospects. Drawing from a 
modernization-based approach, Inglehart and Norris contend that “the most egalitarian 
attitudes toward the division of sex roles should be found in the most affluent societies,” 
wherein economic development ushers in changes in the workforce and educational 
opportunities for women believed to transform gender norms (2003, 32). If so, women’s 
electoral prospects would be greater in Brazil’s more developed states, leading HDI 
(modeled at the district level) to have a positive effect on the electoral outcome of female 
candidates. Scholars of women and politics in Brazil have argued this to be especially 
true for women from leftist parties, who as feminists have difficulties gaining electoral 
support in states/regions where traditional gender norms dominate (Araújo, 2005; Avelar, 
2001).  
But as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there are several reasons to question the 
applicability of the modernization hypothesis for explaining women’s electoral prospects 
in Brazil. Indeed, the foregoing analysis found that as the development level of a 
congressional candidate’s district increased, his/her chance of election decreased, with 
leftist men the lone exception. If HDI is insignificant for predicting women’s chance of 
election to the Brazilian legislature, we will have further support for rejecting the claim. I 
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include a cross-level interaction between HDI and the interaction of sex and left to assess 
this hypothesis in the analyses that follow. 
Models 
I estimate the model in steps, with Models 1-3 assessing various hypotheses (H1-
H3 below), and Model 4 assessing them jointly (H4): 
 
H1: Women face numerous challenges in their efforts to attain political 
representation in Brazil, with the effect of female on chance of election to the 
Brazilian Congress being negative. In the Senate, however, the greater prospect of 
party support mitigates these negative effects, with the female*senate interaction 
being positive. 
 
H2: Although being from a leftist party usually disadvantages a candidate in 
Brazil, leftist parties are more likely to be supportive of women candidacies, with 
female*left exercising a positive effect on electoral success, whereby the 
constitutive terms in this interaction mitigate each other’s negative “main 
effects.”154 In other words, being a leftist helps women’s electoral prospects, and 
being a woman helps leftists.  
 
H3: According to an extensive literature on electoral systems and women’s 
representation, greater district magnitude and quotas should enhance female 
candidate’s electoral prospects. Yet, given the heightened incentives for intraparty 
competition with increased district magnitudes, and the limitations of Brazil’s 
quota, I expect district magnitude to be negative and quotas2 to be weakly 
positive at best. I test these rival hypotheses while holding all else constant.  
 
H4: Even after controlling for the differences in electoral rules between the 
chambers, the effects of ideology (with more leftist women in the Senate), and the 
superior candidate quality of Senate candidates, I expect that when interacted with 
critical mass, female*senate will remain positive because if mobilized by women 
in party leadership, the greater party support in the Senate levels the playing field 
for female contenders and enables them to thrive. For candidates to the Chamber, 
the heightened incentives for intraparty competition render these positive effects 
of female*critical mass contingent upon party institutionalization.  
                                                 
154 Although this is common parlance, with two interacted dummy variables we are not quite referring to a 
main effect in the traditional sense but rather the effect when the variable is coded zero. Here, I am 
comparing the effect on probability of election of being a woman from a leftist party to the effect of left on 
men, and the effect of female on non-leftist candidates. Figure 6.2 below illustrates this point. 
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Dependent Variable 
The central dependent variable of interest is candidate electoral success. As 
shown in Table 6.4, there is a sizeable discrepancy in the electoral threshold across the 
Senate and Chamber, rendering incomparable the traditional vote share variable. Instead, 
I code electoral outcome dichotomously, with those elected coded one, and all others 
coded zero. Given the binary outcome variable, I estimate the below hierarchical logit 
model, where πij denotes the probability of individual i in district j getting elected, and uij 
is assumed to be normally distributed (0, σ²): 
                  
 
   Individual-level model: β0j + β1j femaleij + β2j leftij + β3j female*leftij + β4j quotas2ij +  
     β5j female*quotas2ij + β6j senateij + β7j female*senateij + 
     β8j left*senateij + β9j female*left*senateij  + β10j c.massij + 
     β11j female*c.massij + β12j c.mass*senateij + 
     β13j female*c.mass*senateij + β14j PIIij + β15j female*PIIij  + 
     β16j educationij + β17j occupationij + β18j incumbentij +  
     β19j campfinanceij + β20j campfinance²ij 
 
    District-level model: 
  β0j = γ00 + γ01 HDI groupj + γ02 dmag groupj + γ03 eff n candsj + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 HDI groupj + γ12 dmag groupj + γ13 eff n candsj + u1j 
  β2j = γ20 + γ21 HDI groupj 
  β3j = γ30 + γ31 HDI groupj 
  β4j = γ40  
  β5j = γ50  




β8j = γ80 
β9j = γ90 
β10j = γ100 
β11j = γ110 
β12j = γ120 
β13j = γ130 
β14j = γ140 
β15j = γ150 
β16j = γ160 
β17j = γ170 
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β18j = γ180 
β19j = γ190 
β20j = γ200 
I also estimated a separate model for candidates to the Senate, using a candidate’s 
valid vote share as the dependent variable. This continuous measurement of the concept 
of electoral success allows for greater differentiation in outcome. The additional model is 
worthwhile because the difference between third place candidates and party standard 
bearer candidates attaining only a small fraction of votes is substantively and statistically 
important. Vote share is displayed here as a percent, equivalent to the number of votes for 
the candidate divided by the number of “valid votes” cast for candidates in the 
candidate’s state. This denominator excludes from consideration blank and null votes as 
well as party-label votes. In the Senate, vote share ranges from 0.01% to 88.76%,155 with 
a mean of 12.06 percent.156 
Interview Sample 
I supplement the quantitative analyses with interviews with seven female 
politicians (and questionnaires with an additional three) who have run for both the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with varying degrees of competitiveness. I selected 
these women to ensure representation from several parties and each of the five regions, 
resulting in a sample that includes eight parties and nine states (See Table 6.6). Although 
the sample is comprised mostly of leftist women politicians, this is also true of the 
Senate’s women’s contingency itself, and as such is a reasonably representative sampling 
of women’s presence in the upper chamber. 
 
                                                 
155 This astounding vote share was won by Tião Viana (PT-Acre) in 2006, when the candidacy of the other 
major contender (Aírton Rocha-PDT) was declared invalid at the last moment (Terra, 2006). 
156 In the end, these results do not provide new information, and so I cut their presentation and discussion. 
Results are available upon request. 
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Table 6.6. Interviews with Female Candidates to the Senate. 
I also draw on secondary sources, including an extensive Brazilian(ist) literature – 
based largely on male politicians – on political ambition and the Brazilian party and 
electoral systems (Ames, 2001; Lemos, 2008; Mainwaring, 1999; Nicolau, 2006; 
Rodrigues, 2002; Samuels, 2003; Samuels, 2008; Santos, 2000) as a base of comparison 
Name Party (Ideo) State (Region) Office, Year, Success 
Benedita da Silva PT (L) Rio de Janeiro (SE) Senate, 1994, Elected 
Chamber, 2010, Elected 
Judge Denise Frossard PPS (L) 
PSDB(C) 
Rio de Janeiro (SE) Senate, 1998, Not elected 
Chamber, 2002, Elected 
Emília Fernandes PTB(R) 
PT(L) 
Rio Grande do Sul (S) Senate, 1994, Elected 
Senate, 2002, Not elected 
Chamber, 2006, Substitute 
Chamber, 2010, Not elected 
Fátima Cleide* PT(L) Rondônia (N) Senate, 2002, Elected 
Senate, 2010, Not elected 
Jô Moraes PC do B (L) Minas Gerais (SE) Senate, 1994, Not elected 
Chamber, 2006, Elected 
Chamber, 2010, Elected 
Lídice da Mata PSB (L) Bahia (NE) Chamber, 2006, Elected 
Senate, 2010, Elected 
Luiza Erundina* PT (L) 
PSB (L) 
São Paulo (SE) Senate, 1994, Not elected 
Chamber, 1998, Elected 
Chamber, 2002, Elected 
Chamber, 2006, Elected 
Chamber, 2010, Elected 
Marisa Serrano PMDB (C) 
PSDB (C) 
Mato Grosso do Sul 
(CO) 
Chamber, 1994, Elected 
Chamber, 1998, Elected 
Senate, 2006, Elected 
Patrícia Saboya 
Gomes* 
PPS (L) Ceará (NE) Senate, 2002, Elected 
Serys Slhessarenko PT (L) Mato Grosso (CO) Senate, 2002, Elected 
Chamber, 2010, Not elected 
Wilma de Faria PSB (L) Rio Grande do Norte 
(NE) 
Chamber, 1986, Elected 
Senate, 2010, Not elected 
*Unfortunately, these three women were unavailable for interviews, but submitted their responses via 
questionnaire. 
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for my interviews with female politicians. Together, these data inform the analyses that 
follow. 
FINDINGS 
Table 6.7 displays the results of Models 1-4 of the probability of election of 
candidates to the Brazilian Congress, converted to odds ratios. I rely on analyses of 
marginal effects to discuss the findings of the cross-chambers models, relate the findings 
to Hypotheses 1-4, and speculate on the variation that remains to be explored. 
Discussion of Results 
Gender 
Model 1 displayed in Table 6.7 includes only the binary variables, female (γ10) 
and senate (β6j, γ60), and their interaction (β7j, γ70), and models the correlations among 
candidates running in the same state. This is a purposively underspecified model to 
simply model (before introducing the interaction terms and series of controls) the 
relationship between candidate sex and electoral outcome across the chambers 
demonstrated in the descriptive statistics above. As demonstrated by Model 1 in Table 
6.7, the simple effect of female (γ10) decreases a candidate’s chance of election; yet the 
female*senate interaction (β7j, γ70) is statistically significant and greater than one, 
meaning that as predicted in H1, the adverse effect of being a woman is mediated in the 
Senate. A disaggregation of the marginal effects reveals that the difference in predicted 
probabilities of male and female candidates gaining election is statistically significant in 





Table 6.7. Multilevel Analyses of the Chance of Election of Congressional Candidates 
 
Fixed Effects Coef. SE sig Coef. SE sig Coef. SE sig Coef. SE sig
Level 2 District Variables
For Intercept (β 0j )
   HDI (γ 01) 0.763 (0.043) *** 0.630 (0.052) ***
   District magnitude (γ 02) 1.159 (0.079) * 0.760 (0.082) **
   Effective n cands (γ 03) 0.998 (0.002) 1.008 (0.003) **
Cross-Level Interactions
For Female slope (β 1j )
   Intercept (γ 10) 0.539 (0.073) *** 0.453 (0.069) *** 1.510 (0.793) 0.510 (0.337)
   HDI (γ 11) 0.911 (0.164) 1.111 (0.226)
   District magnitude (γ 12) 0.928 (0.202) 1.048 (0.282)
   Effective n cands (γ 13) 0.994 (0.006) 0.996 (0.008)
For Left slope (β 2j )
   Intercept (γ 20) 0.609 (0.029) *** 0.479 (0.036) *** 0.642 (0.082) ***
   HDI (γ 21) 1.279 (0.069) *** 1.243 (0.099) **
For Fem*Left slope (β 3j )
   Intercept (γ 30) 1.644 (0.264) *** 1.179 (0.304) 0.672 (0.285)
   HDI (γ 31) 1.368 (0.251) * 1.301 (0.334)
Level 1 Variables
   Quotas2 (β 4j , γ 40) 0.736 (0.044) *** 0.940 (0.054)
   Fem*Quotas2 (β 5j , γ 50) 0.560 (0.130) ** 0.775 (0.149)
   Senate (β 6j , γ 60) 1.433 (0.122) *** 1.819 (0.186) *** 1.700 (0.273) *** 1.625 (0.327) *
   Fem*Senate (β 7j , γ 70) 1.788 (0.450) * 1.753 (0.665) ± 0.642 (0.364) 0.107 (0.246)
   Left*Senate (β 8j , γ 80) 0.515 (0.100) *** 0.546 (0.106) ** 2.646 (1.516) *
   Fem*Left*Senate (β 9j , γ 90) 1.362 (0.706) 1.398 (0.724) 13.348 (21.628) ±
   C.Mass (β 10j , γ 100) 0.649 (0.152) *
   Fem*C.Mass (β 11j , γ 110) 1.419 (1.002)
   Fem*C.Mass*Senate (β 13j , γ 130) 152.4 (500.4)
   PII (β 14j , γ 140) 1.159 (0.079) * 0.954 (0.047)
   Fem*PII (β 15j , γ 150) 1.133 (0.186)
Level 1 Candidate Controls
   Education level (β 16j , γ 160) 1.362 (0.086) ***
   Feeder occupation (β 17j , γ 170) 1.352 (0.111) ***
   Incumbent (β 18j , γ 180) 8.265 (0.612) ***
   Campaign finance (β 19j , γ 190) 1.000 (0.000) ***
Random Effects Var SE sig Var SE sig Var SE sig Var SE sig
Intercept (u 0j ) 0.058 (0.019) *** 0.061 (0.020) *** 0.029 (0.012) *** 0.047 (0.024) ***





***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ±p<.10 (one-tailed tests)
16128 16047 7100
16329 16216 16047 7386
21478 21478 21478 11174
-8130 -8053 -8000 -3511
Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
16274
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Although the Senate is more prestigious than the Chamber, senate (β6j, γ60) 
exercises a positive influence on chance of election. Male and female candidates to the 
Senate, respectively, are 1.43 and 1.79 times more likely to win election than male 
candidates to the Chamber, who in turn are almost twice as likely to get elected than 
female candidates to the Chamber. The predicted probability of election for female 
candidates to the Senate is 0.19, but only 0.08 for female candidates to the Chamber. It is 
possible that the smaller ratio of candidates to elected in the Senate (216 elected of 1115 
candidates, compared to 2565 elected of 20,363 candidates in the Chamber), not 
controlled for in this underspecified model, affects the findings here. Does the positive 
effect of senate persist for women candidates after the introduction of controls? 
Ideology 
The results of models estimating ideology and left did not differ, so I present the 
models using left, which maintains the full universe of candidacies. Model 2 in Table 6.7 
introduces left (γ20) and its interactions with the predictors of Model 1, female*left (γ30), 
left*senate (β8j, γ80), and female*left*senate (β9j, γ90), to assess H2. As predicted, the 
“main effects,” or more precisely, the effects of left for male candidates (γ20), and female 
for non-leftists (γ10) are statistically significant and less than one, thus negatively 
affecting probability of election. This means that being a leftist disadvantages men, and 
being a women disadvantages non-leftists. 
Yet, the interaction effect of female*left (γ30) is greater than one and statistically 
significant, with female leftist candidates 1.64 times more likely to win election than 
male non-leftists, thus supporting H2. In sum, the simple effect of ideology on electoral 
prospects is different for men and women. Being a leftist mitigates the negative effect of 
gender, and being a woman diminishes the disadvantage posed by running with a leftist 
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party in an electorate that is right of center. The other interactions with female of senate 
(β7j, γ70) and senate*left (β9j, γ90) are both positive but not quite statistically significant. 
Figure 6.2. The Simple Effect of Being a Woman on the Electoral Prospects of 
Candidates to the Brazilian Congress, by Party Ideology (1994-2010) 
 
As Figure 6.2157 illustrates, running with a leftist party diminishes the negative 
influence of being a woman on electoral outcome. The negative slope modeling the 
simple effect of candidate gender is less steep for leftist candidates in the Chamber than it 
is for non-leftists. For leftist candidates to the Senate, the simple effect of candidate sex 
                                                 
157 Note that Figure 6.2 depicts the simple effect of the independent variable on the outcome, with no other 
predictors. Moreover, the regression line is imposed on binary data, and intended solely as an illustration. 
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on probability of election actually becomes positive. This suggests that women can in fact 
thrive electorally in the Senate. It should be noted, however, that the probability of 
election to the Senate of both male and female non-leftists is still higher than that of 
leftists. Moreover, this is before introducing electoral rules or candidate quality – do the 
positive effects for women of being from a leftist party persist once these differentiating 
factors are introduced in Models 3 and 4? 
As depicted in Table 6.7, while the “main effect” or effect on male candidates of 
left (γ20) remains negative and statistically significant after the inclusion of controls for 
electoral context and candidate quality in Models 3 and 4, the gendered mitigating effect 
of running with a leftist party for women, measured in female*left (γ30) loses statistical 
significance. Table 6.7 shows that the introduction of PII (β14j, γ140) and critical mass 
(β10j, γ100; β11j, γ110; β13j, γ130) subsumes the positive effect of female*left (γ30). Are these 
factors equally important for women’s success in both chambers? 
Although not displayed here, comparing the separate analyses of Senate and 
Chamber candidate vote share demonstrates that, as predicted, the positive effect of 
female*critical mass*PII on women’s electoral prospects manifests only in the Chamber 
elections where institutionalized parties help to overcome the tendencies toward 
combative intraparty competition. While the positive effect of critical mass for women is 
contingent on party institutionalization in the Chamber, this is not the case for the Senate. 
An analysis of the marginal effects of female*critical mass*senate (β13j, γ130) 
demonstrates the greater magnitude of its positive effect in the Senate – women’s 
predicted probability of election in parties without a critical mass (0.17) is half that of 
female candidates running in parties with a critical mass of women leaders (0.35). As 
predicted, the combination of electoral rules generating incentives for party support and 
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parties with women in their decision-making structures amplifies their positive effects for 
female candidates’ chance of election. 
Institutional Variables 
By testing for the effects of institutional variables – district magnitude, dmag 
group, effective number of candidates, and quotas – across Brazil, I was able to assess 
their impact on electoral outcome while holding constant a barrage of potentially 
confounding factors. It also allows me to examine their effects on the electoral prospects 
of individual women rather than representation as a whole, in a domain beyond the 
advanced-industrial context still prevalent in the extant literature. The evidence supports 
the findings of Matland (1998) and Moser and Scheiner (2004, 2012) that institutional 
variables function differently in recently (re)democratized contexts. It also affirms that 
we must look beyond the simple implementation of quotas to understand their 
(in)effectiveness, and consider their interaction with the party and electoral systems in 
which they are embedded (e.g.,  Krook, 2009; Schmidt, 2008). 
A breakdown of the marginal effects suggests that the simple effect of dmag 
group on the probability of election of candidates to the Chamber of Deputies is negative, 
with this adverse effect being more pronounced for female candidates. Yet in the Senate, 
the bivariate relationship is precisely the opposite, with female candidates seeing a 
positive effect of dmag group on electoral prospects that is stronger than its positive 
effect for male candidates. But as shown in Table 6.7, once the other variables are 
introduced, in particular, the effective number of candidates (which is itself insignificant, 
γ03, γ13), district magnitude does gain a positive effect on the chance of election for male 
candidates, with one unit increase in dmag group increasing their electoral prospects by 
16 percent (captured in γ02). But the effect of dmag group is not statistically differentiated 
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by gender, as shown by the insignificance of γ12. An analysis of the marginal effects of 
Model 4 demonstrates that the gender differences in predicted probability of election are 
only significant when district magnitude is greater than two; i.e., in the Chamber 
elections. 
Although the literature expects women running in elections with two Senate seats 
up for grabs to see an electoral advantage, the multivariate analyses suggest otherwise. A 
model incorporating a factor-based differentiation of all possible combinations of dmag 
group and female suggests that women in the Senate elections with a district magnitude 
of two are 2.07 times more likely to win election than male candidates running in an 
election with a district magnitude of one; yet, the large confidence interval (0.70 to 6.11) 
includes 1, meaning the effect in fact is not statistically significant. Put more simply, 
there has been too much variation in women’s experiences in two-seat elections to 
declare the relationship to be universally positive or negative. 
As would be expected from the discussion in Chapter 3, which explains the 
shortcomings of the Lei Eleitoral de Cotas, quotas2 (β5j, γ50) does not exercise a positive 
effect on women’s electoral prospects. Rather, the effect on candidate chance of election 
has been negative (β4j, γ40), with this negative effect being heightened for female 
candidates (β5j, γ50). The pressure to advance candidates alongside resistance from party 
leaders has led many parties to advance sacrificial lambs, with no intent of supporting 
their candidacies (Wylie, 2010). The plethora of non-viable candidacies undermines 
efforts to assess the quota’s potential, although the 2009 mini-reform and recent 
emboldening of enforcement efforts in 2012 should facilitate assessment in future 
elections. 
Despite the Senate’s electoral rules which at first glance seem more arduous, 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies are in fact more bitterly competitive because of the 
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extensive intra-party competition, as well as the fact that such internal competition for 
(the chance to seek) Senate seats is hashed out long before the campaign begins. During 
the campaign, parties and the campaign committees of other candidates from one’s party 
avail substantial resources to bank the campaign, and foot soldiers are unified in the 
effort to elect their party’s candidate. Perhaps most importantly, Senate candidates secure 
much coveted space in the electoral propaganda (santinhos, or electoral flyers) of their 
party/coalition’s gubernatorial candidate (Samuels, 2003). 
It is suggestive that the inclusion of electoral rules – dmag group, effective 
number of candidates, and quotas2, and district development (discussed below) hardly 
improved the model fit to the data (although it did reduce the district-level error term). 
Moreover, Wald tests of the joint significance of the interaction of female with dmag 
group and effective number of candidates after all three full models suggests that 
together, these predictors do not gain much traction in explaining the variation in 
electoral outcome. Yet, once I introduced the party characteristics of critical mass and 
PII, the model fit improves by one-third. This suggests that for women’s electoral 
prospects, these factors operate most significantly through their effects on political 
parties. In turn, party characteristics such as institutionalization and women in leadership 
positions have mediated their response to the incentives generated by electoral rules. Put 
simply, I find that supportive parties are pivotal to women’s electoral success. 
These findings demonstrate how party characteristics mediate institutional 
variables to influence women’s electoral prospects and therefore suggest that the generic 
application of quotas in high district magnitude PR elections is insufficient to enhance 
women’s electoral prospects. By holding constant the context in which these electoral 
rules operate, their assumed universal effects dissolved. These findings then deviate from 
those first generated from samples in Western Europe and later confirmed through 
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aggregate level cross-national analyses. Rather, this analysis demonstrates that the effects 
of electoral rules on women’s electoral prospects in Brazil are mediated by party 
characteristics, with important variation across political parties. It is critical then to 
consider interactions between these rules and the political and historical contexts in 
which they operate, with variation across parties, states, and women themselves 
explaining these disparities in findings. Indeed, as demonstrated with statistical analysis 
and corroborated in interviews, electoral rules exercise their effects on women’s 
representation in Brazil indirectly, through the incentives they generate for intraparty 
support or competition, and are mediated by party characteristics such as party 
institutionalization and the incorporation of women in party leadership. 
Voter Bias and Development (HDI) 
Interestingly, once the structure of candidates nested in districts is modeled, the 
effect of HDI (γ01) is actually negative on electoral outcome, across specifications and 
office. An analysis of the predictive margins demonstrates that district development has a 
negative effect on the electoral prospects of both male and female candidates. Holding all 
else constant (Model 4) the predicted mean probability of election for male and female 
candidates, respectively, is 0.25 and 0.18 in the low HDI group (average≤0.75), 0.18 and 
0.16 in the median HDI group (0.75<average<0.80), and 0.17 and 0.16 in the high HDI 
group (average≥0.80). As in Chapter 5, for candidates on the left HDI group gains a 
positive and significant, although not quite statistically gendered effect, with leftist men 
and women in the high HDI group 1.49 and 1.79 times more likely to win election than 
non-leftist men in the median HDI group. The positive effect is exercised when moving 
from a median to high HDI level. This finding lends weak support to Avelar (2001) and 
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Araújo’s (2005) conjecture that that the alleged positive effects of development on 
women’s political representation would be limited to women on the left. 
When the multilevel structure of the data is ignored, HDI attains a positive and 
significant effect on the electoral outcome of candidates overall, with a positive but 
insignificant boost for leftist women candidates in developed districts. It is perhaps the 
inferences generated at excessive levels of aggregation for individual candidates, and the 
unwarranted pooling of candidates across districts and general assumption of causal 
homogeneity across female candidates that have sustained this (mis)understanding. 
Although as Chapter 5 demonstrated, residual voter bias against women does persist in 
less developed contexts, it has not depressed the electoral performance of female 
candidates. In Chapter 7, I discuss how some women have come to thrive in Brazil’s less 
developed regions in no small part by crafting profiles (lutadoras and supermadres) that 
overcome or conform to machista voter attitudes. 
Candidate Quality Controls 
The combined Model 4 of the probability of election for candidates to the 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate affirms that traditional predictors of electoral success – 
incumbency and campaign finance – are indeed central to one’s electoral prospects. In 
various specifications, incumbent (β18j, γ180) and campaign finance (β19j, γ190) were always 
positive and statistically significant, usually with a substantively sizeable effect. Even 
after controlling for a range of competing factors, candidates running as incumbents are 
8.25 times more likely to win election than non-incumbents. As expected, the influence 
of incumbent is greater in the Chamber of Deputies than in the Senate. 
A factor-based differentiation of the possible interactions between incumbent, 
senate, and female suggests that the incumbency advantage is largest for women 
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candidates in the Chamber. Indeed, an analysis of the marginal effects demonstrates a 
proportionately bigger boost to the predicted probability of election for female Chamber 
candidates, with the likelihood increasing from 0.11 to 0.41 when running as an 
incumbent. Male candidates seeking reelection in the Chamber increase their odds of 
election from 0.14 as non-incumbents to 0.47 as incumbents.  Looking to the Senate, we 
see that female candidates’ odds of election are higher than that of male candidates. Non-
incumbent men and women, respectively, have in the Senate a predicted probability of 
success of 0.06 and 0.14, which increases to 0.25 and 0.36 for male and female 
incumbents.  
In all estimations, the effect of campaign finance was statistically significant, but 
very close to one. In terms of odds ratios, this means that an increase in one unit (reais) 
of campaign contributions maintains a 1:1 shot of election for candidates. This is due to 
the scale of the variable; when standardized as the ratio of a candidate’s contributions to 
the average candidate contributions in the state, the magnitude of the effect increases 
substantially and the significance remains. 
Education (β16j, γ160) and feeder occupation (β17j, γ170) were always positive and 
usually statistically significant, with issues with reporting and coding discussed above 
potentially undermining the explanatory value of this latter variable. Interestingly, the 
magnitude and significance of the effect of education was greater in estimations without 
campaign finance. Perhaps candidates with greater educational attainment are more likely 
to have access to the economic elite and their financial resources (Avelar, 2001; Smith, 
1979). Indeed, the correlation between corporate campaign contributions and educational 
attainment is positive and statistically significant. 
With several terms interacting with female in Table 6.7, it is difficult to perceive 
from the odds ratios their substantive effects. After running Models 3 and 4, I calculated 
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the average marginal effect of female, and its interaction with senate, finding that women 
in the Senate have a higher predicted probability of election (0.173) than either men in 
the Senate (0.105) or women in the Chamber (0.170), with male candidates to the 
Chamber having the highest predicted probability of success (0.199). While the 
difference between men and women in the Chamber favors men and is statistically 
significant, in the Senate, this difference favors women although it is not statistically 
significant (CI of difference: -0.049, 0.185). This means that when all other predictors, 
including differences in candidate quality, electoral rules, several party characteristics, 
and unobserved country-specific factors are taken into consideration (held at their 
observed values), women in the Chamber face a gendered disadvantage not shared by 
their female colleagues seeking a seat in the Senate. Note that although women’s odds of 
election are greater in the Senate than in the Chamber, the opposite is true for male 
candidates. 
Moreover, in a supplemental full model of Senate candidate vote share, I 
disaggregated the marginal effect of female, finding that the negative effect of being a 
woman on a candidate’s electoral prospects loses statistical significance. Although the 
greater prestige and higher electoral threshold should yield more difficult path for women 
to the Senate, the marginal effect on vote share of negative 3.29 (standard error of 8.19), 
and confidence interval of -19.34 to 12.76, is not statistically significant. In sum, as I 
expected, a candidate’s gender does not predict her electoral prospects in the Brazilian 
Senate. 
The principal finding that emerges is that, although the electoral rules of both 
chambers are less than ideal for women, female candidates to the more prestigious Senate 
actually face a less difficult campaign than do female candidates to the Chamber. Even 
after controlling for differences in candidate quality and a range of other factors, the 
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negative effect of being a woman we see in Chamber of Deputies elections is rendered 
null for Senate candidates. To illuminate this disparity further, I turn to my interview 
data. For these women, the most salient difference between their electoral prospects in 
the Senate and the Chamber is the former’s concentration of party support. Indeed, of the 
26 women senators who won election, 22 did so as their party’s sole candidate.  
Interview Findings on the Importance of Party Support 
My interviews with party officials and candidates throughout Brazil affirmed that 
candidates in majoritarian/plurality elections count on significantly more party support 
than candidates in proportional elections. Former Senator, Governor, Minster, and current 
Deputy Benedita da Silva (PT-Rio de Janeiro) stated, “the party has to invest in 
majoritarian campaigns, but in the proportional (campaigns) it does not pass (along) 
resources, it is your campaign” (Interview, June, 2009). Emília Fernandes (PT-Rio 
Grande do Sul) emphasized the issue of factional support in the PT, which is divided into 
“tendencies” or factions. “In majoritarian elections, it’s more about the party, but in 
proportional elections, only your party faction supports you,” with municipalities 
governed by a mayor of a faction other than your own being considered off-limits 
(Interview, April, 2009). In 2002, then State Deputy Serys Slhessarenko (PT-Mato 
Grosso) wanted to run for reelection, but “the party said Senate or nothing” (Interview, 
December, 2008).  
Parties acting strategically generally prevent their candidates from the same 
municipality and/or base from contesting the same proportional election (which would 
lead them to split the vote). The candidacies given the go-ahead are most often male, at 
times regardless of seniority. According to a PT state party official in São Paulo, this was 
the cause for former three-term city councilor and then two-term Deputy Iara Bernardi’s 
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defeat in her reelection campaign in 2006 – the party launched another candidate (from a 
different faction) in Sorocaba, her municipality (Interview, June, 2009). Former Governor 
Wilma de Faria (PSB – Rio Grande do Norte) echoed this sentiment – in 1986, she 
proposed to run for State Deputy, but her party denied her request, in an effort to 
consolidate votes for her (male) partisans. Presuming she had no chance, they allowed 
her an open spot on the party’s candidate list for federal deputy in the Constitutional 
Assembly; in the end, she was the most voted in her party (Interview, July, 2009). 
Former Senator Fátima Cleide (PT-Rondônia) indicated that in her two races for 
the Senate and one for governor, party support – including that of various party factions – 
was “importantíssimo” (Questionnaire, May, 2009).158 All but one of the 11 female 
candidates to both the Senate and Chamber included in this sample affirmed that the party 
played a fundamental role in their candidacy, with the majority pointing to a lack of party 
support as the most important barrier facing women in Brazilian politics. With difficulties 
obtaining financial resources as the second most frequently stated obstacle, and party 
support retaining at minimum an indirect role in the acquisition of resources, parties hold 
the key to enhancing women’s representation. 
Yet as many women attested, most of Brazil’s political parties remain machista. 
Recall from Chapter 5, several interviewees said they confronted far more gender bias in 
their parties and the Congress than in the electorate. When women acquire a space in 
party decision-making this overwhelming male dominance in leadership is mitigated, and 
they are able to “let the ladder down” to female political aspirants. Indeed, as verified 
above, female candidates are significantly more likely to win election when running with 
parties that have a critical mass of women in their leadership. The data also demonstrate 
                                                 
158 This questionnaire was answered before her failed reelection campaign in 2010. I am reaching out to 
her former assessor to try to get a follow-up that takes into account 2010. 
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that such women-friendly parties are more likely to comply with the quota in the 
Chamber elections and have higher female candidate success rates and more favorable 
success rate ratios than do parties lacking women leaders. In sum, parties that afford 
women a real voice in decision-making more effectively promote female political 
participation, and when the electoral rules incentivize party support, this potential is 
optimized. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter used the variation in electoral rules across Brazil’s legislative 
chambers as a natural laboratory to examine the interacting effects of electoral 
institutions and party support/competition on women’s electoral prospects. I found that 
the explanatory power of these electoral rules for the electoral successes and failures of 
female candidates is mediated by party characteristics. In spite of the Senate’s greater 
prestige and higher electoral threshold relative to the Chamber of Deputies, female 
candidates to the Senate have had higher probabilities of electoral success, even after 
controlling for a range of potentially confounding factors. The Senate’s low magnitude 
plurality elections with more restricted ballot access and multiple votes incentivize 
unified party support, while the Chamber of Deputies’ high magnitude OLPR elections 
induce intraparty competition.  
In both chambers, the presence of a critical mass of women in party leadership 
induces the will to support female candidates, but in the Chamber, this potential effect is 
contingent upon party institutionalization, which affords parties the capacity to overcome 
the incentives for intraparty competition. In contrast, the forthcoming party support in the 
Senate has a powerful effect on female candidates when women have a voice in party 
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decision-making, regardless of party institutionalization. In the end, the negative effect of 
being a woman on one’s chance of election is rendered null in the Senate. 
In conjunction with the multilevel models, interviews with women politicians 
who have run for both offices corroborate my findings. Based on that evidence, I contend 
that the greater successes of women in Senate elections despite an ostensibly difficult 
electoral context is attributable to the greater incentives for party support for Senate 
candidates, which motivates parties to rally behind their candidate(s). This is in stark 
contrast to the Chamber, where intraparty competition induces an internal struggle for 
organizational and material resources. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, women can still 
succeed in the context of intraparty competition, albeit at lower ratios of success, but 
require an institutionalized party – which enjoys the means to recruit and support 
candidates and to execute programmatic campaigns – and women in party leadership 
willing and able to extend resources to female contenders. In Chapter 7, I advance this 
argument with case studies of women who have worked with or around their parties to 
navigate the constraints of intraparty competition in the face of bias in the electorate 
and/or among party elites. 
The findings produced here have implications for proponents of an institutional 
design approach to resolving gender inequities. Countries do not adopt electoral 
institutions tabula rasa, but rather layer them upon layers of existing formal and informal 
institutions in a graduated process of change (Thelen, 1999). Ample consideration of the 
sociocultural, historical, and political contexts in which electoral rules are/will be 
embedded is imperative before invoking generic recipes for success. After all, these very 
electoral rules are often endogenous to social and historical legacies (Desposato, 2006). 
This is not to say, however, that electoral rules do not matter, but rather, that they 
do not act in a vacuum. The same formal institutions may function differently in distinct 
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contexts. Desposato drives home this point by contrasting the functioning of OLPR in 
Finland and Brazil, with the former having an institutionalized party system “while Brazil 
has been labeled the ‘anti-party system’” (2006, 1019). The factors thought to enhance 
women’s overall representation have not played out for female candidates in Brazil 
because of the particularities of the parties and party system to which these rules are 
endogenous. 
As other controlled comparison analyses of electoral rules in recently 
(re)democratized nations have shown (e.g., Moser, 2001b), the institutionalization of 
parties and the party system can have drastic effects on the operation and implications of 
electoral rules. While the inchoate character of most Brazilian parties has led many 
Brazilianists to discount the role of parties in elections, we must not simply footnote the 
exceptionally strong parties, but instead seek to explain variation among parties and the 
implications for political recruitment and representation. As demonstrated here, parties 
remain the primary gatekeeper to political office in Brazil, and have a central role to play 
in the empowerment of women.
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Chapter 7 – Lutadoras, Supermadres, and Technocrats: The Bounded 
Profiles of Brazil’s Female Politicians 
The findings of preceding chapters on the only recently emboldened gender quota, 
incentives for intraparty competition in the Chamber, importance of party support, 
preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties, and residual gender bias in Brazil beg 
the question of how women have attained even the measly 9.6% of the seats in Congress. 
In the current chapter, I explain how the relatively few women who have acquired elected 
office in Brazil have done so largely by following one of three pathways to power. The 
lutadora, supermadre, and technocrat profiles have enabled women to overcome women-
averse districts and/or parties and afforded female candidates improbable electoral 
success. Yet the bounding of potential profiles viable for Brazilian women limits their 
possibilities, constricting and conditioning their political aspirations, trajectories, and 
subsequent roles in government. This chapter explores these profiles, asking whether the 
country’s female politicians have progressed beyond simple extensions of traditional 
domestic roles (Chaney, 1979). 
I find that women seeking electoral success in inhospitable district and party 
contexts often do remain squarely in the mold of the supermadre, substantiating their 
political presence with feminine, maternal perspectives, and thus remaining narrowly 
confined to social issues in their political discourse and agenda. But when bulwarked by a 
supportive party, lutadoras have deviated from traditional gender norms still prevalent, 
particularly in lesser developed states. Working with their party to transform experiences 
in informal politics into the requisite political skillset while confronting voter bias, such 
women are enjoying electoral success while expanding the political possibilities for 
women. Another novel pathway to power is that of the technocrat, prominent in more 
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women-friendly districts absent the party support generally extended to the lutadora. 
Technocrats demonstrate professional competence, and thrive by converting area-specific 
expertise from the professional world into political capital. This helps technocrats to 
convince male party elites of their relevant skills and electability, overcoming the 
challenges of an unsupportive or deficient party organization. When women run in both 
parties and districts that are open to women, however, the bounding of profiles ceases and 
they are free to pursue any path to power. 
I draw on expectations from the literature on women’s representation discussed in 
Chapter 2, as well as aggregate cross-national data and descriptive evidence to advance a 
typology of the “women-friendliness” of statewide electoral districts and parties, thus 
exploiting the interstate and interparty variation discussed throughout the dissertation. I 
then deploy my typology to explain how anti-women biases among voters and party elites 
have constricted the profiles viable for female contenders. I apply the findings of the 
multilevel analyses from Chapters 5 and 6 and interviews with candidates and party elites 
to delineate three electorally viable profiles for women under the constraints of Brazilian 
politics – the lutadora, the supermadre, and the technocrat. Finally, I illustrate each 
profile with case studies of female political aspirants in Brazil. In illuminating these 
circumscribed paths to power, this chapter provides further evidence that parties are the 
gatekeepers that alone can mitigate Brazil’s persistent gender gap in formal political 
power by expanding the opportunities available for women. 
OBSTACLES TO WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
The explanations for women’s underrepresentation highlighted in the literature 
have long emphasized voter hostility, electoral institutions, and the “male conspiracy” 
(i.e. political parties dominated by male elites who act to maintain their own power) 
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(Duverger, 1955). Yet as discussed in the preceding chapters, while numerous cross-
national studies have analyzed the relative weight of such cultural, structural, and 
political factors in explaining women’s underrepresentation, findings on their predictive 
powers remain mixed (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Salmond, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008). The analysis in Chapter 5 and description of 
women’s profiles below explain the disparity in results by moving beyond the common 
assumption of a homogenous electoral experience for women and revealing the causal 
heterogeneity at work. I show how different profiles have enabled women to thrive not 
only in contexts the extant literature predicts to be women-friendly, but also in those that 
it has deemed disadvantageous for women (or “women-averse”). 
Although the preceding chapters demonstrate the insignificance of district 
development levels and associated machista voter bias for female candidates’ electoral 
prospects in Brazil,1 I contend that this does not mean these attitudes do not persist in 
Brazil, but rather that (some) women have found a way around them. Next, I use Brazil’s 
extensive variation in levels of state development, state party institutionalization, and 
proportion of women in state party leadership to identify the intersecting constraints 
confronted by female contenders. I advance a typology of women-friendly and women-
averse contexts, and then detail how women have crafted viable political profiles 
allowing them to thrive even in inhospitable conditions, before illuminating their 
experiences with case studies of lutadoras, supermadres, and technocrats. 
                                                 
1 Recall, 23.2% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement of male political superiority in 
2010 (down from 33.5% in 2008), an average proportion that obscures great variation – while only 6.7% of 
respondents in Mato Grosso agreed with the statement, 55% of those in Sergipe did (CESOP, 2010; 
LAPOP, 2008). So while machista voter bias has not predicted female candidates’ electoral prospects, it 
remains present. The current chapter explains this apparent anomaly. 
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Machista Voter Attitudes and State Development 
In line with the modernization hypothesis and the analysis of the covariates of 
machista voter bias in Chapter 5, I expect that Brazil’s less developed states will be less 
women-friendly than the more developed states. While machista voter bias has not 
predicted female candidates’ electoral prospects, the fact that less developed states rank 
the highest in perceived male political superiority (LAPOP, 2008; CESOP, 2010) 
suggests that women in such districts are somehow circumnavigating machista voter bias. 
Of the 27 statewide districts, 14 fall below the national average in HDI in at least one of 
the five election years under consideration, and are thus coded as less developed. As 
displayed in Figure 5.1, the correlation with development and region is perfect, with the 
less developed states found exclusively in the north and northeastern regions – where 
clientelistic politics have historically dominated in a predatory cycle of local political 
bosses (coronéis) enriching themselves at the expense of the impoverished masses 
(Hagopian, 1996; Montero, 2010). Women may then be doubly disadvantaged in such 
contexts, with an electorate harboring skepticism of their aptitude for politics and a 
largely male political and economic elite maintaining power among themselves. 
Party Elites and the “Good Ole Boys’ Club” 
As declared by Duverger decades ago, the “male conspiracy” poses an important 
obstacle to women seeking to enter politics (1955). In spite of the provocative term, 
Duverger’s argument is more rationalist than conspiratorial, contending that 
predominantly male party elites are hesitant to share their power and therefore resist 
newcomers who may dilute their influence. Although many deemphasize the power of 
most parties by contending that “the candidate nomination process is wide open and that 
candidates self-select” in Brazil’s candidate-centered legislative elections (Samuels, 
2008, 84), I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation that this “entrepreneurial” 
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system and gendered structural disadvantages together render the support of an 
institutionalized party critical for women. 
To connect parties with profiles, it is necessary first to summarize the relevance of 
institutionalization. To recall, previous research has shown that a party’s promotion of 
female political participation is essential in overcoming the gender gap in political 
ambition (e.g., Lawless and Fox, 2005). By providing opportunities for political training 
and offering party funds and campaign materials, parties can stimulate female 
candidacies. Further, whereas inchoate parties are prone to personalist campaigns, well-
institutionalized parties typically provide a coherent ideological platform, allowing 
women to deflect personal characteristics such as gender and focus the campaign instead 
on concrete policy proposals (Valdini, 2010). Such a collectivist endeavor is in general 
more palatable for women than the individualistic campaigns common to weaker parties 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). 
Regardless of a party’s capacity to promote women, however, without an earnest 
commitment, the women-averse exclusionary incentives discussed above prevail and 
women’s participation remains marginal. Based on arguments outlined in Chapters 2, 5, 
and 6, I contend that the parties least susceptible to exclusionary tendencies are those that 
have a critical mass of women in party leadership bodies (Duverger, 1955; Kittilson, 
2006). When women have a real voice in party leadership they are able to perform critical 
acts, lobbying for the promotion of women-friendly policies and providing the necessary 
opportunities to minimize a gender gap in political ambition (Kittilson, 2006). While the 
relationship is not determinative, women leaders are more likely than male leaders to 
possess the know-how and the will to cultivate viable female candidates, particularly 
once they supersede token status.  
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In determining which of Brazil’s many parties can be considered women-friendly 
or averse, I employ as the key predictors whether a party is (1) well-institutionalized2 and 
(2) the proportion of women in its state leadership is greater than or equal to 25 percent. 
According to these criteria (state party institutionalization and leadership composition), 
of the 607 state parties that advanced female candidates in the 2010 elections, only 105 –
17.3% – can be considered women-friendly. Across the 1998-2010 elections, the numbers 
fall, with 331 of the 2383 (13.9%) state parties participating in election rating as women-
friendly. The state parties most often enjoying a level of institutionalization and women 
in leadership that qualify them as women-friendly are the PC do B, the PMN, and the PT. 
Notably, less than five percent of the elections contested by four of the major five parties 
– PFL, PMDB, PP, and PSDB – were done so under conditions propitious for female 
contenders. This is suggestive of the difficult battle confronted by female political 
aspirants and illustrates why women remain so underrepresented in the formal political 
sphere. The puzzle thus becomes not why there is such extreme underrepresentation of 
women in Brazilian politics, but rather, how the few successful female politicians have 
defied the odds and acquired office. 
I incorporate the expectations from the women and politics literature regarding 
the obstacles to female political aspirants and the findings of preceding chapters to 
surmise that Brazil’s most “women-friendly” states will be those with a development 
level above the national average (where machista voter attitudes are less prevalent), while 
the most women-friendly parties will be those that are well institutionalized, and that 
have a critical mass of women in their leadership (whether through a quota or 
                                                 
2 As discussed in Chapter 5, I consider a state party to be “well-institutionalized” if it exceeds the mean 
(mean=1.9) level of state party institutionalization in Brazil. To recall, my 5-point scale of 
institutionalization incorporates each state party’s relative measures on electoral volatility, age, 
membership, funds, active municipal organizations, and propensity of leadership to alternate. 
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organically). After identifying the intersecting constraints confronted by women, I 
delineate particular profiles that have enabled (some) female candidates to overcome 
those obstacles. 
Figure 7.1. Percent of Women-Friendly Parties Contesting Chamber of Deputies 
Elections, by State (1998-2010) 
As Figure 7.1 depicts, women by and large confront very hostile contexts in their 
bid for political power. From 1998-2010, the percent of parties running in Chamber of 
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Deputies elections and qualifying as “women-friendly” across all the states averaged only 
11.7%, ranging from 1.3% in Alagoas to 24.4% in Piauí. This means that the vast 
majority of parties contesting the Chamber of Deputies elections are inchoate and/or top 
heavy with men. Nevertheless, as I explain in the following section, some women have 
managed to overcome seemingly formidable obstacles, gaining office not only in the rare 
contexts the literature expects to be women-friendly, but also in Brazil’s most 
conservative states and inchoate and male-led parties. 
CIRCUMVENTING THE OBSTACLES 
In spite of the barrage of women-averse contexts confronted by female political 
aspirants, several pioneers have blazed trails into the still male dominant arena of 
Brazilian politics. Of the 161 instances (2,052 possible) that women were elected to the 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies during the period from 1998-2010 (comprising 104 
women, with several gaining reelection), an astonishing 93.8% came from districts and/or 
parties predicted to be women-averse. Slightly less than one-fifth of the successful 
candidacies emerged from the ideal condition of a women-friendly party. This means that 
most of Brazil’s few female politicians have boldly confronted extremely difficult 
conditions, in turn illuminating the reluctance of many would-be candidates to throw 
their hat in the ring. The constraints confronting female candidates to the Chamber of 
Deputies are profound, with electoral rules that promote combative intraparty 
competition and expensive campaigns, weak parties lacking strong organizations and 
programmatic platforms and thus susceptible to personalist politics, male-dominant party 
leadership structures, and non-negligible levels of voter skepticism regarding women’s 
political role fabricating a formidable electoral climate. 
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The puzzle then shifts from why there is such an extreme underrepresentation of 
women in Brazil to how the few female politicians have been able to overcome electoral 
and party structures seemingly rigged against them. As I show, women have forged novel 
paths to power to achieve improbable electoral successes in Brazil. By crafting certain 
profiles, these pioneers have expanded the realm of possibilities for female political 
action by mitigating the impediments posed by biases and institutional arrangements. 
While these profiles are neither necessarily mutually exclusive nor consistently 
adopted by the women in each context, I delineate three ideal types (see Table 7.1) that 
are most likely to afford women electoral success in the face of these obstacles: (1) the 
lutadora profile is viable for women running with the support of a women-friendly party 
but in women-averse districts, (2) the supermadre profile affords women electoral 
success in women-averse parties and districts, and (3) the technocrat profile enables 
women who are lacking such party support to win in women-friendly districts. The 
“open” designation for women in women-friendly districts and parties means women in 
these contexts are open to pursue any (mix of) profiles. 
Table 7.1. Ideal Types of Viable Profiles in Women-Friendly and Averse Contexts 
The fact that the vast majority of Brazil’s numerous parties remain weakly 
institutionalized with few women leaders means that most female candidates have run 
without the support of a women-friendly party. Of the 2384 women seeking election to 
the Chamber of Deputies (1998-2010), 84.9% did so in inchoate and/or male-run parties. 
 Women-Averse Districts Women-Friendly Districts 
Women-Averse Parties SUPERMADRES TECHNOCRATS 
Women-Friendly Parties LUTADORAS OPEN 
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Interestingly, 17 of the 136 women running in a women-averse district but friendly party 
were elected for a success rate (n female elected / n female candidates) of 12.5 percent, 
which is 67% higher than the than women’s overall success rate (See Figure 7.2).3 As I 
discuss below, these women achieved such success as lutadoras, defying traditional 
gender norms and running collective, ideas-based campaigns. But the lutadora path is 
contingent on party support, so in order for the profile to prove viable for more 
contenders across Brazil, reforms must emphasize institutionalizing parties and 
incentivizing their active promotion of and support for female candidacies. The success 
of lutadoras provides yet another piece of evidence suggesting that the problem of 
women’s underrepresentation in Brazil is fundamentally political rather than societal. 
Figure 7.2. Profile Ideal Types by Success Rate (Percent Elected), 1998-2010 
                                                 
3 The drop in success rates in 2010 – when credible threats of enforcement of the gender quota 
strengthened in the 2009 mini-reform to Brazil’s electoral code prompted a widespread offering of 
candidatas laranjas (sacrificial lambs) by many parties (Wylie, 2011) – reveals the futility of mere 








1998 2002 2006 2010
Lutadoras Supermadres Technocrats Open TOTAL
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Table 7.2. Individual Characteristics of Women Running in Women-Friendly and 
Women-Averse Contexts  
 
Wmn-Averse District 
WF Party         WA Party  
Wmn-Friendly District 
WA Party          WF Party 
CANDIDATES      
Electoral Perf. 0.14 0.08 
 
0.06 0.05 
Pct Vote Share 1.53% 0.81% 
 
0.26% 0.35% 
Pct Elected 12.50% 8.36% 
 
5.89% 4.46% 
Education 3.64 3.55 
 
3.56 3.65 
Pct Feeder Occup. 64.62% 58.61% 
 
54.54% 54.02% 
Pct Incumbent 8.09% 6.35% 
 
5.19% 2.68% 
Pct Married 40.00% 46.57% 
 
45.23% 34.91% 
CF R$ 97,843 R$ 86,668 
 
R$ 78,667 R$ 87,502 
Pct CF from Corps 12.17% 14.32% 
 
14.21% 11.52% 
Pct CF from Ind 35.75% 36.39% 
 
31.22% 36.64% 
Pct CF from Party 32.41% 30.16% 
 
39.51% 31.81% 
Pct Left 69.12% 33.11% 
 
34.78% 85.27% 
Ideology 2.98 4.26 
 
4.14 2.86 
Pct Wmn Leaders 33.80% 15.59% 
 
12.98% 31.65% 
      
ELECTED      
Electoral Perf. 0.84 0.58 
 
0.59 0.81 
Pct Vote Share 9.54% 5.62% 
 
2.67% 5.50% 
Education 3.94 3.82 
 
3.79 3.60 
Pct Feeder Occup. 94.12% 87.76% 
 
83.13% 80.00% 
Pct Incumbent 52.94% 46.00% 
 
46.43% 40.00% 
Pct Married 52.94% 62.00% 
 
52.56% 30.00% 
CF R$ 336,542 R$ 381,939 
 
R$ 458,206 R$ 906,416 
Pct CF from Corps 29.37% 32.55% 
 
43.89% 40.96% 
Pct CF from Ind 24.83% 35.19% 
 
34.04% 33.14% 
Pct CF from Party 32.65% 17.87% 
 
11.52% 19.42% 
Pct Left 82.35% 26.00% 
 
45.24% 90.00% 
Ideology 2.93 4.47 
 
3.90 2.18 






Below, I discuss how the three profiles have afforded women political space in 
such inhospitable contexts. I draw upon my original database of several individual, party, 
and district-level characteristics of the 20,363 candidates to the Chamber of Deputies 
(1994-2010) and 73 interviews with both failed and elected women candidates as well as 
party staff and activists conducted in 11 states across Brazil. As discussed in Chapter 1, I 
selected these interview participants to ensure representation from each of the country’s 
five regions and seven major parties (DEM, PC do B, PMDB, PP, PSB, PSDB, PT), and 
variation on the women-friendliness of districts and parties. In the discussion below, I 
will refer to Table 7.2 – which includes the averages for several characteristics of women 
candidates and elected deputies across the women-friendly and women-averse contexts. 
First, to establish a baseline for comparison, I discuss the political trajectory of 
Judge Denise Frossard, an ambitious woman exemplary of the kind of self-promoting 
individual capable of thriving independently in Brazil’s entrepreneurial electoral system. 
Judge Frossard gained her entrée into electoral politics five years after convicting 14 
members of an organized crime ring involved in the Jogo do Bicho, a lottery of sorts that 
infamously launders money and has been implicated in a number of corruption scandals. 
Undeterred by death threats and determined to fight against corruption, Judge Frossard 
decided to join the Socialist People’s Party (PPS – a leftist but anti-PT party) and run for 
the Senate in 1998, obtaining fourth place with 635,415 votes. 
Judge Frossard was one of only two women I interviewed who said the decision 
to run for office was hers alone, with no party role (Interview, June, 2009). She ran again 
in 2002, that time with the PSDB, and earned the highest vote share of all 560 candidates 
in Rio de Janeiro, winning an impressive 5.21% of the valid vote (the average vote share 
was 0.18%). As Judge Frossard herself said, she was larger than either of her two parties, 
and did not need them to advance or sustain her candidacy (Interview, June, 2009). 
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Indeed, she received no campaign funds from the party for her Chamber candidacy. In 
2006, Judge Frossard ran a competitive campaign for governor, but was ultimately 
defeated by Sérgio Cabral in the second round of elections. 
Judge Frossard entered party politics with vast self-confidence, political interest 
and knowledge, and name recognition already under her belt. With fifteen years of 
experience in the state government magistrate, which Judge Frossard accredited as 
significantly more equitable than the machista parties and parliament (Interview, June, 
2009), she was able to thrive in the absence of any party support mobilized on her behalf. 
Judge Frossard launched her own candidacy, advanced her own already well-developed 
anti-corruption platform, raised her own funds, and depended upon her own cultivated 
base. This is indicative of the path to power pursued by entrepreneurial candidates with 
independent converted capital, and is unlikely for women who lack the intense ambition, 
independent fame, connections, and resources of Judge Frossard. Next, I discuss the 
profiles more commonly pursued by female contenders, and how they have navigated the 
constraints of women-averse contexts. 
Lutadoras 
Female candidates in less developed states often conform to traditional gender 
norms in their campaigns, as elaborated in the discussion of the supermadre profile 
below. But when bolstered by a supportive party, women contenders can deviate from the 
traditional notion of feminine embodied by the supermadre and still thrive in women-
averse states. To overcome (rather than conform to) the gender biases persistent in such 
states, women must be resilient and battle-proven, thus the designation lutadora—or 
female fighter. Lutadoras typically earn their stripes and demonstrate their political 
prowess through party militancy and activism in labor unions or popular social 
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movements. By actively participating in such arenas, lutadoras gain political and social 
capital and signal their viability to party leaders looking to recruit candidates for office. A 
women-friendly party – well institutionalized and with women in party leadership – is 
most likely to (at least attempt to) comply with the gender quota and has clear processes 
for the party to recruit and select its candidates. Lutadoras are thus well positioned for 
advancement, having proven their commitment to the party and broader social causes 
while demonstrating their base of support in the community. 
A deep connection to the community helps stimulate political ambition and often 
leads parties to recruit women for candidacy, but the ultimate decision to run is always 
personal and fraught with economic risk. Many of the women interviewed across seven 
women-averse states expressed their unwillingness to run a campaign in such a context if 
the party had no intention of supporting her, with one woman declaring she would not 
“take bread off the family table” to serve as a “candidata laranja” (sacrificial lamb).4  
When parties have the resources to allocate and the will to do so, however, 
lutadoras are well-prepared for the challenge. Institutionalized parties with a critical mass 
of women in their leadership prove helpful for female candidates seeking to solidify their 
platform because these parties are more likely to advance effective capacity-building 
programs. Such programs nurture women’s political ambition by solidifying their sense 
of preparedness. They teach female aspirants the scope of the office at stake as well as 
party positions on key issues, thus enabling them to run knowledgeable and 
ideologically-grounded campaigns. In weakly institutionalized parties, ideological roots 
are elusive, leaving women contenders with nothing collective to latch onto. 
                                                 
4 Recall the discussion in Chapter 3, in which officials and politicians from several parties revealed the 
disconcertingly common practice of parties including women on their candidate lists in a post-hoc manner 
to simply pay lip service to the gender quota, only noticing the void at the final hour (when lists are due to 
the electoral court) with little or no effort to actively recruit and support female candidacies. 
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A firmly rooted ideological platform that she can present to voters skeptical of her 
political aptitude is a critical component of the lutadora’s toolkit. Where voter bias 
against women exists, women’s representation will be lower in electoral systems that 
incentivize the personal vote (Valdini, 2010). The emphasis on policy positions rather 
than personal traits such as gender allows the lutadora to recast the campaign around 
policy debates rather than personal characteristics, in turn diminishing the elector’s 
prospect of employing gender stereotypes. When prompted in interviews for advice for 
less electorally fortunate women, successful female politicians often highlighted the 
importance of defining one’s “bandeiras” (central campaign themes) and related 
community activism (Interviews, November, 2008; March, 2009). 
Lutadoras have at their disposal extensive mobilizational resources such as 
footwork by party and movement militants that can overcome deficits in financial 
resources, another obstacle impeding most female political aspirants. This is particularly 
important given the growing expense of elections in Brazil; in 2010, the average in 
campaign contributions for winning candidates to the Chamber of Deputies was more 
than R$1.1 million, with the overall average jumping 106% from the 2006 average.5 
When party militants are encouraged and willing to mobilize on behalf of women and 
help to wage labor-intensive “corpo a corpo” (person to person) campaigns, the effects of 
campaign finance discrepancies between men and women and leftists and non-leftists can 
be mitigated, enabling female candidates to thrive even in women-averse states.6  
                                                 
5 These figures become even more striking when one considers the state-funded air time and compulsory 
voting law. Calculated by author using TSE data. 
6 As discussed further in the preceding chapters, in 2010, the averages in campaign contributions were 
R$273,595 for male candidates, R$126,323 for female candidates, R$264,950 for non-leftists, and 
R$227,089 for leftists. Simple difference in means tests show these differences to be statistically significant 
at the p<0.001 and p<0.05 levels respectively. 
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Candidates are increasingly relying on party funding for their campaigns, with 
48.3% of candidate funds coming from party organizations in 2010 Chamber of Deputies 
elections. Women draw even more of their funding from party organizations – 61.7% on 
average – reflecting gendered wage discrepancies in the workforce and the difficulty 
many women have in attaining funds from large donors. The average proportion of 
campaign funds from a party for successful lutadoras is 33 percent, nearly twice that as 
winning supermadre candidates and three times that of successful technocrat candidates. 
Whether in the currency of foot soldiers or finance, party support can level the playing 
field for any female candidate. 
Although this path is still significantly less pursued than that of the supermadre, 
many of Brazil’s most prominent female politicians – including Marina Silva and Heloísa 
Helena – are lutadoras. These pioneers from Brazil’s north (Acre) and northeastern 
(Alagoas) regions have represented their historically women-averse states as social 
movement and Workers’ Party7 militants, city councilwomen, state deputies, senators, 
minister (Silva), and presidential candidates, serving as role models for lutadoras to 
come. Moreover, the lutadoras exemplify a female insurgency in the male-dominant 
system; as shown in Table 7.2, women running with women-friendly parties in women-
averse districts have enjoyed the highest overall success rates and vote shares. 
Most of the 17 women elected in women-averse districts but women-friendly 
parties epitomize this lutadora profile. One woman has drawn heavily on familial 
political capital (Interview with Deputy Ana Arraes, March, 2009), and two women 
qualify as technocratic types, new to party life but effectively leveraging their 
                                                 
7 Both Helena and Silva were early members of the PT, but have since joined other parties (PSOL and the 
Green Party). Helena was expelled from the party in 2003 for voting against more than a dozen measures 
backed by the Lula administration, in particular the pension privatization. Silva left the party in 2009, 
disillusioned by the inadequate attention given by the Lula administration to issues of sustainable 
development. 
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professional experiences, but the others are long time party militants with an active union 
and  popular movement background. The late Francisca Trindade joined the PT at an 
early age, serving as two-term municipal councilor of the capital city of her northeastern 
state of Piauí, state deputy, and candidate for vice-mayor before winning a seat to the 
Chamber of Deputies. Perpetua Almeida and Vanessa Grazziotin have been members of 
the Communist Party of Brazil since the 1980s, both serving as municipal councilors 
before becoming federal deputies of their northern states in the Amazon region. In the 
case study that follows, I show how party support helped one lutadora to overcome bias 
in the electorate and climb her way to the Chamber of Deputies, twice winning the 
highest vote total for federal deputy in her state. 
Deputy Fátima Bezerra – The Essence of A Lutadora 
A woman of humble origins in northeastern Brazil (Rio Grande do Norte), Deputy 
Fátima Bezerra confirmed the critical role of her background in social movements in 
helping her to confront and transcend class and gender discrimination, pointing to 
movement and party militants as “shapers of opinion.” In contrast, local political elites 
had at first only impeded Bezerra’s political ambition, maintaining that the role of deputy 
was “predestined for the sons (and daughters) of traditional families.” Yet, a lifetime of 
precarious living conditions in the rural northeast coupled with her experiences fighting 
injustices at the helm of several social movements emboldened Bezerra to pursue and 
eventually, with the encouragement of her party, fulfill her political ambitions. 
Like so many other (often leftist) female politicians, Bezerra cultivated her 
political aptitudes during the student movement of the 1970s. She participated in the 
National Student Union’s (UNE) formative 1979 Congress in Salvador, where UNE was 
restructured in the wake of its weakened status during the military regime. Later drawing 
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on her experience in the student movement and as a public school teacher, Bezerra 
founded and presided over a prominent teacher’s union, served as the secretary general of 
another, and was a two-term president of yet another – the influential Union of Education 
Workers (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Educação). 
During that time Bezerra joined the then nascent Workers’ Party, which was 
closely aligned with union activity on behalf of education. When asked whether she got 
involved in party life in 1981 with an idea of being an elected official, she responded “I 
confess to you, this never even crossed my mind” (Interview with TV Seridó, 2009). But 
seeking to make headways in state and local politics, the PT tapped Bezerra’s 
considerable clout in the education community and encouraged her to run for the state 
assembly. Bezerra recalled that her candidacy for state deputy in 1994 “was a fruit of my 
involvement in the social movements and at the same time, a necessity of my party (PT) 
to advance candidacies in the state legislatures” (Interview, March, 2009). She 
recognized the fundamental role of the party in recruiting her into party politics and 
enabling her success, “The PT was certainly the most responsible for me having entered 
in party politics and also for me having arrived to this stage” (Interview with TV Seridó, 
2009).  
Bezerra served two terms as state deputy and leader of her state party delegation, 
in her first term winning awards for the Deputy of the Year in 1996 and Best Deputy of 
the Legislature (1995-1998). She gained ideological coherence, demonstrated her 
political skills, and shored up the good will of her fellow members, forming a support 
base that would enable her to thrive even in her less developed district.8 In 2002, the PT 
advanced Bezerra’s name for the Chamber of Deputies, and she won the most votes of all 
                                                 
8 As stated compellingly by President Lula at a 2008 rally for Bezerra’s mayoral bid, you need “character 
of force (to govern), and this lady here has that and more” (2008, September 19). 
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the 74 candidates in her state, 12.3% of the statewide vote. Bezerra won the honor again 
in 2010, when she competed against 59 other candidates and captured an impressive 
14.6% of the statewide vote, winning more than 15% in nearly one-fifth of her state’s 167 
municipalities and over 23% of the vote in the capital city. She just missed the second 
round of mayoral elections in 2008, winning 36.8% of the vote and losing to Green Party 
candidate Micarla de Sousa, who allied with several right wing parties (DEM, PP, PR, 
PTB) to win a narrow majority of votes in the first round. 
Bezerra’s roots in the social movements are enduring and have informed her 
legislative efforts. She remains involved with the education unions, was elected president 
of the Chamber’s Commission on Education and Culture, and is an active proponent of 
education issues such as establishing a minimum wage for public school teachers, 
protecting the right to strike, and improving access to quality education. Most of her more 
than 900 current legislative proposals relate to education, the rights of marginalized 
populations (primarily LGBT, women, indigenous, domestic workers, Afro-Brazilians, 
and the impoverished), and regional development (Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Bezerra 
also serves in the state and national leadership of the PT, and has most recently been 
active in the mayoral campaigns of her co-partisans throughout Rio Grande do Norte. 
The ability of Bezerra to thrive in Rio Grande do Norte, where 33.3% of survey 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that men make better politicians 
than do women (LAPOP, 2008), is quite remarkable given her deviation from the 
traditional feminine. As a never-married woman in her late 50’s who promotes the civil 
rights of marginalized populations – with an emphasis on LGBT issues9 – and a far 
reaching education agenda, Bezerra bucks the traditional perception of femininity in the 
                                                 
9 A Google Brasil search of – “Deputada Fátima Bezerra” LGBT – returned over 30,000 hits.  
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less developed northeast. Accordingly, she has been a “victim of hateful prejudice” 
(President Lula, quoted at a 2008 rally for Bezerra), with an alarming rejection rate of 
23% in the wake of the 2008 mayoral elections (Macedo, 2008). But campaigning on the 
issues for which she had earned great credibility, and relying on a strong party 
organization of militants, Bezerra has overcome such bias, and twice been the most voted 
deputy in her state. Running under the coveted “1313” campaign number, and receiving 
R$235,000 from the party organization (42.4% of the overall contributions from her 
extremely successful 2002 and 2010 campaigns), Bezerra benefited extensively from PT 
support.10 Alternately, as we see next, to achieve election without the support of a strong 
party, women politicians are often forced to embrace traditional gender roles. 
Supermadres 
Absent such party support to overcome bias in the electorate, female candidates in 
both districts and parties averse to women certainly confront the most restrictive 
situations. Yet, women confronting these constraints can and have for generations in 
countries around the world managed to chip away at the monolith of male political 
dominance. As elaborated in the fundamental text on women politicians in Latin 
America, the profile most likely to succeed in such a situation is that of the supermadre, 
whereby women politicians extend their role in the private sphere to the public sphere 
(Chaney, 1979).11 Given that the inegalitarian attitudes and resultant machista biases 
                                                 
10 It is telling that in the 2006 elections, when the party played a lesser role in Bezerra’s campaign – 
donating zero funds – she fell to 6
th
 place in the state (4
th
 in her coalition). This is in spite of raising overall 
nearly three times more funds than she raised in 2002, and only 36% less funds than she did in 2010.  
11 Although the term denotes a maternal association, supermadre was initially coined to suggest that 
women remained confined to an extension of their role in the home, not necessarily – but usually – as 
mother. In my reading of Cheney (1979), women are conceptualized as supermadres regardless of their 
actual maternal status but rather as their exemplification of the traditional feminine (which due to 
traditional gender roles, is associated with motherhood). In this sense, a more appropriate label would 
perhaps be “superfeminine,” but I stick to the term supermadre here to maintain consistency with Cheney’s 
concept. 
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persistent in less developed areas are generally associated with traditional beliefs 
regarding the societal roles of women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), supermadres can 
mitigate the effects of such biases by conforming to traditional gender norms.  
The primary emphasis on the role of familial connections in the extant literature 
on women politicians in Brazil (e.g., Araújo, 2001; Avelar, 2001; Haas, 2001) is 
reflective of the capacity of such connections to minimize the threat to traditional gender 
norms posed by female political aspirants. By running as the wife or daughter of a male 
politician, these privileged female candidates corroborate the patriarchal order found in 
women-averse contexts. Furthermore, the wives and daughters of male politicians can 
employ their family name and experience in politics to assuage biased voters’ and elites’ 
fears of the political ineptitude of women. Because they have already experienced a life 
of politics, male politicians’ wives and daughters may also be deemed more “fit” for 
politics than the average woman. If so, women candidates with familial connections may 
be relatively exempt from the persistent biases in women-averse districts and parties, 
therefore hastening their electoral success in such contexts. And even in the context of 
such biases, access to familial capital can catapult women to insider status through 
political endorsements, financial backing, and the family name.  
Of the 598 female candidates in women-averse states and parties, 50 women were 
(re)elected, 29 of whom are the wives or daughters of a male politician. The 
concentration of wives and daughters winning amidst those constraints has remained 
constant over time, at 56-58% of the women elected in women-averse districts and 
parties, which exceeds the proportions found in other contexts. Two interrelated factors 
explaining this pattern are the ability of familial capital to assuage and/or overcome voter 
bias against women, and the persistence of oligarchic clientelist politics dominated by a 
handful of political families in the less developed states, particularly the northeast. 
 294 
This is not to say that the fit between familial ties and the supermadre profile is 
perfect, as many women with connected family members develop their own political 
capital rather than simply inheriting it from their father or husband. For example, two 
influential female senators mentioned in Chapter 4 are the (ex-)wife of prominent male 
politicians, but these women (Marta Suplicy and Gleisi Hoffmann) cut their political 
teeth outright as activists in the student movement and eventually in party politics. While 
Suplicy’s fame as a televised sexologist propelled her directly to the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1994, Hoffmann worked her way up through the party ranks, serving as 
assessor, in several administrative and campaign roles, and as the state party presidency 
before entering electoral politics as a mayoral candidate in 2008. Whether their 
independent capital-building efforts will be supported is a product of their party and 
district constraints, with such independence perceived as a threat in inegalitarian 
contexts. Notably, Suplicy and Hoffman both come from more developed states (São 
Paulo and Santa Catarina) and at least a nationally supportive party (Workers’ Party). 
But women lacking familial ties can withstand gender inegalitarian electorates 
and elites by conforming to traditional gender norms through other means. Because 
traditional gender norms confine the areas of expertise of women to issues such as 
education, health care, and non-feminist women and children’s rights,12 voter and elite 
biases in women-averse states and parties may be attenuated for women with 
traditionalist prior careers in education, health, and social work. Of the 2,569 female 
candidacies from 1994-2010, at least 28.5% emerged from these professions.13 Another 
viable means of conforming to traditional gender norms is for women candidates to 
                                                 
12 For analyses on how gender norms have influenced committee and ministerial assignments, see Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005). 
13 The total of female candidates excludes candidates that did not report their occupation. Also included in 
this calculation are other occupations conforming to traditional gender roles, such as model, priest/nun, 
housewife, and receptionist. 
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employ their church connections (i.e., with the bancada evangélica or comunidades 
eclesiais de base). Indeed, among the 50 women elected (and re-elected) in women-
averse states and parties from 1998-2010, all but seven report such supermadre 
backgrounds. 
In interviews I conducted with women conforming to the supermadre trajectory, 
they consistently justified their political presence through the maternal, more humane 
perspective they felt they, as women, could bring to politics. The goal repeatedly 
expressed was to “cuidar” (care) for their constituents. Jusmari Oliveira, former deputy 
for the conservative PFL and current mayor of a town in the interior of Bahia, lacked 
political family connections but by working with her father’s agricultural association and 
through church involvement she managed to forge a constituency unthreatened by her 
political ambition. Reflective of her acceptance of traditional gender roles, Oliveira 
believed that women politicians should emphasize social issues, arguing “God gave us 
greater sensitivity, an understanding of the suffering of humanity” (Interview, November, 
2008), a stance illuminated by her prioritization of social issues while in the Chamber of 
Deputies as well as her mayoral administration’s slogan, “Governo Cidade Mãe” 
(Government Mother City). Next, I demonstrate how one deputy has had mixed results 
complying with traditional gender norms in her women-averse state and party. 
Bel Mesquita – A Proud Supermadre 
Building on the political capital of her ex-husband as well as her own developed 
while serving as municipal president of the Foundation of Social and Cultural Action14 
under his administration, Bel Mesquita followed her husband’s mayoral mandates with 
two of her own and subsequently served as federal deputy for the centrist PMDB in the 
                                                 
14 Such posts are extremely common for first ladies; in interviews, many former first ladies stated that their 
role in these positions served as a catalyst for the development of their own political aspirations. 
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northern state of Pará. She firmly believed in her responsibility to “cuidar” for her district 
and to humanize politics, enthusiastically affirming her role as the supermadre of her 
constituents (Interview, December, 2008). Mesquita’s sentiment was echoed in a recent 
interview – when asked about the appointment of ten women (including her) to President 
Dilma Rousseff’s cabinet, Mesquita declared, “I have conviction that women were born 
with the gift of management, organization, and administration. She takes care of the kids, 
[and] is able to provide for her family with what little resources she can have…she knows 
what to do” (Diário do Turismo, 2011). As a supermadre, Mesquita draws a direct 
parallel between overseeing a home and overseeing a federal government. 
In contrast to the movement and party-based path to power of the lutadora, 
Mesquita – a psychologist by training – inherited her capital from her husband only to 
cultivate it while serving in his Foundation of Social and Cultural Action (1989-92) and 
as the Municipal Secretary of Health (1992) under his administration. Unlike Bezerra 
who has been an active member of the PT for more than three decades, Mesquita has 
belonged to three different parties. Initially a member of the PSDB from 1995-1999, 
Mesquita soon joined the PTB, under which she served as municipal party president from 
1999-2004. She was first elected mayor with the PSDB in 1996 – in a municipality that 
she and her husband helped to create – and then gained reelection under the PTB. While 
party was central to Bezerra’s success, Mesquita succeeded in spite of only fleeting party 
ties. 
After completing her second mandate as mayor of Parauapebas, Pará, Mesquita 
left the PTB for the PMDB. Soon thereafter, she ran an ultimately successful campaign 
for federal deputy, earning over 44,000 votes, the 21
st
 in her state (of 137 candidates) and 
5
th
 (of 12) in her party, which ran without a coalition. Mesquita ran under the number 
1501, and won a majority of the vote in Parauapebas and more than 10% of the statewide 
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vote in five nearby municipalities. With nearly 70% of her campaign contributions 
originating from individuals, and only 12% from the party, Mesquita went it alone in the 
campaign. As shown in Table 7.2, women who have succeeded under the constraints of a 
women-averse district and party on average draw greater share of funds from individuals 
than do women in the other contexts. 
It must be noted, however, that much like Deputy Aline Corrêa (discussed in 
Chapter 5), Mesquita did benefit from running in the PMDB in Pará, which has long been 
dominated by the Barbalho family. Jader Barbalho alone won 1.7 times the electoral 
quotient (183,438), with his wife Elcione15 also winning election with over 114,000 votes 
of her own. As such, women who anticipate no party support are wise to run on party lists 
headed by such puxadoras da legenda, and thus squeeze some benefit yet from the 
unsupportive party. 
As Deputy, Mesquita served in the Commissions on Education and Culture, and 
Social Security and Family, as the president of a congressional inquiry on missing 
children, and as the Procuradora-Adjunta Especial da Mulher (Assistant Special 
Solicitor General of Women). She remained pinned to issues conforming to the 
traditional feminine, with the vast majority of her 132 proposed pieces of legislation 
concerned missing and exploited children (Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Although 
Mesquita herself embraced the supermadre role, it has not parlayed into more recent 
electoral success. While representing the interests of children is generally 
uncontroversial, it has left neither electors nor corporate backers with much (pork) to 
rally behind. 
                                                 
15 Elcione Barbalho ran under the highly sought “1515” number. 
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Mesquita ran for another mandate as mayor of Parauapebas in 2008, and with just 
over 40% of the valid vote was knocked out in the first round by the PT incumbent. The 
male incumbent, Darci Lermen, raised almost twice as much in campaign funds (more 
than R$3 million, much of this from corporate donors) as did Mesquita, who attained less 
than 15% of her campaign budget from the party and herself financed over 80 percent of 
her overall funds. In 2010, she ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the state legislature, 
earning 70
th
 place among 460 candidates (16
th
 of 40 on the PMDB list) seeking one of 40 
seats. Although she expressed interest in running again in the 2012 elections, and showed 
favorably in public opinion polls, her would-be campaign “lacks structure for this and for 
this reason the PMDB opted for an alliance with the PT” with Mesquita running in the 
vice-mayor position16 (Mesquita, quoted in Rodrigues, 2012). The alliance has surprised 
many of the parties’ rank-and-file, as the PMDB and PT have long been at odds in 
Parauapebas.17 The latest polls show the unlikely PT-PMDB pairing at a meager 9 
percent, a distant third from the front-runner, Valmir da Integral of the recently formed 
PSD (split off from the PFL/Democratas), who has 42% of the intended votes. In sum, 
Mesquita’s political ascendance appears to have been limited. 
While the supermadre path has increased (restricted) access, it maintains a 
“commitment to the eternal feminine” (Bourque and Grossholtz, 1998, 25), with 
motherhood rather than citizenship providing “the principal mobilizational referent for 
women’s participation” (Alvarez, 1990, 50).  The issues and political arenas perceived 
societally to be “appropriate” for women to engage are thus tied inextricably to 
                                                 
16 Mesquita left her prestigious position as National Secretary of Tourism, effective June 6, 2012, so she 
could contest the vice-mayoral post. 
17 Ideologically unsavory alliances are a norm in Brazil, as evidenced by the recent endorsement by the 
PT’s historical foe, Paulo Maluf (PP), of the PT ticket for mayor in São Paulo. Unable to stomach the 
thought, Luiza Erundina actually left her spot on the ticket as vice-mayor rather than share a stage with her 
longtime adversary (Studart, 2012, June 21). 
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motherhood, effectively preventing women’s unfettered participation in the formal 
sphere.18 Women are, however, no longer confined to the supermadre mold and have 
instead transcended the private-public dichotomy by concerning themselves with a 
diversity of issues, including the economy, foreign policy, and national and public 
security in addition to health care, education, and women’s and children’s rights 
(Schwindt-Bayer, 2006).19 Building on this finding, I contend that the supermadre 
pathway is but one of the available avenues of political ascension for women in Brazil. 
Next, I survey how women have used their expertise in the professional world to 
convince women-averse party elites of their political potential. 
Technocrats 
Among all female candidates, the most common predicament in which women 
candidates find themselves is that of a women-friendly district and a women-averse party 
(59.8% from 1998-2010). As stated by Manuela d’Ávila, popular federal deputy, former 
city councilwoman, and mayoral candidate for the PC do B in the developed southern 
region (Rio Grande do Sul), “society is evolving but the political structure still is not,” 
with the PC do B being one of the few parties in which traditional outsiders have a shot.20 
In order to thrive in this context, where hostilities from party elite have persisted in spite 
of an evolution in gender norms and women’s progress in society at large, women must 
convert their intellectual and experiential capital into political capital. By employing the 
knowledge and skills they are increasingly acquiring in the workplace, women 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of the resilience of these norms in Brazil, see Pinheiro (2007). 
19 While Schwindt-Bayer finds reported attitudes/preferences among male and female legislators to be 
similar, thus her conclusion that women are not “still supermadres” in Latin America, she also finds 
gendered patterns of bill initiation that she attributes to the marginalization of women by male legislators 
who perceive their powers to be threatened by the increasing presence of women (2006). 
20 Interview on blog Eleições 2010: Ascensão da Mulher na Política (2010). 
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technocrats demonstrate their area-specific expertise and can convince stubborn party 
elites of their capacity for politics. 
Technocrats may also enjoy a fundraising advantage. Candidates with higher than 
average educational attainment (i.e., those with university education) are in general more 
adept at forging connections with the predominantly male political and economic elite, 
and thereby more likely to be successful in attaining campaign contributions (Avelar, 
2001, 155). Indeed, as shown in Table 7.2, women succeeding under the constraints of a 
women-averse party in a women-friendly state received, on average, a significantly 
greater proportion of their campaign contributions from corporate donors (43.9%) than 
did women in the other contexts. An exceptional educational and vocational background 
is particularly helpful for female candidates that lack familial or party ties, with their 
knowledge and skills compensating for their politically-unconnected status. Although 
they will likely lack leadership experience in their male-dominant parties or may not be 
partisans at all, female political aspirants in women-friendly states can use skills acquired 
in the professional world to demonstrate competence and viability. 
While not all women running in women-friendly districts and averse parties do so 
as technocrats, and a few technocrats have found success in women-averse districts, the 
profile is more common in the context of developed states and inchoate and/or male-led 
parties. This is because women in such states are more likely to have developed 
professional skills, with a greater insertion into the paid workforce than women in less 
developed states. Moreover, women running in weak, male-dominant parties will have 
been unable to work their way up through the party ranks and thus have to convert their 
political capital from the professional arena. Alternatively, female candidates amidst such 
constraints will draw on familial political capital, which is more prevalent in but certainly 
not exclusive to the less developed northeast. Of the 84 women elected in women-
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friendly districts despite their women-averse parties, 31 (36.9%) are the wife or daughter 
of a male politician. This extent of women winning with family connections is less than 
the concentration found among women elected in women-averse parties and districts, but 
significantly higher than what we see for deputies from women-friendly parties. 
The overall success rate of women running in more developed states but inchoate 
and/or male-led parties is only 5.9 percent, which is significantly poorer than the success 
rate for female candidates in women-averse districts. Several factors help to explain this 
weak performance, including the overall competitiveness of many of the women-friendly 
districts, the fact that women’s insertion into the paid workforce and general societal 
progress is a relatively recent phenomenon, and most importantly, the absence of party 
support. Even though female candidates in more developed states enjoy an ostensibly less 
machista electorate, absent party support, they may be either unable or unwilling to 
navigate the contours of such a competitive electorate climate. Once again, we see that 
the problem of women’s representation in Brazil appears to be political rather than 
societal. Next, I discuss two female technocrats who have managed to convert their 
successes in the professional world into political capital. 
Tucana (PSDB) Technocrats Yeda Crusius and Raquel Teixeira 
The technocrat profile is particularly amenable to the PSDB, with its emphasis on 
“good governance” policymaking priorities such as administrative decentralization, 
economic growth, and the stemming of corruption. Although the party leadership at all 
levels remains dominated by men, with not a single state-level PSDB organization 
meeting the minimalist critical mass benchmark of only 25% women among their 
leadership, women have nonetheless begun to make inroads into the party by 
demonstrating technical prowess. Technocrat Yeda Crusius, former PSDB federal deputy 
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and governor of Rio Grande do Sul, exemplifies this profile. A Vanderbilt-trained 
economist and professor of economics, Crusius converted capital acquired in her roles as 
an academic and the federal Minister of Planning, Budget, and Management. She then 
successfully parlayed her experience in the federal government into electoral mandates as 
federal deputy and governor. 
Professor Raquel Teixeira, also of the centrist PSDB, similarly gained entry into 
the political sphere through her area of expertise (education) and educational background. 
Teixeira earned her Ph.D. in linguistics from Berkeley in 1986, and had a postdoctoral 
stint in Paris at the prestigious École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in 1988. She 
was the Vice-President and President of the Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Letras at the 
Federal University of Goiás (UFG) (1989-94), and in 1997 contested the position of Dean 
of the university (UFG), an elected post which had been almost exclusively occupied by 
men. She served in the leadership of several state and national education organizations, 
including CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and 
Capes (Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education). 
Her extensive experience eventually landed her an appointment as the Secretary of 
Education of Goiás under PSDB Governor Marconi Perillo.  
Typical of the technocrat experience, Teixeira was not a partisan, considering her 
work in the state bureaucracy to be “superpartidária” (above party lines), but was soon 
recruited by the governor to join the PSDB and run for office. While this invitation was 
perhaps intended solely to help the party image while gathering a few votes for the five 
male politicians running in her coalition list,21 Teixeira used her expertise to gain votes 
and in 2002 earned the third highest vote total in her state. She was reelected in 2006, 
                                                 
21 One such man proclaimed, “How great, you’ll help the legenda (party list)!” In the end, Teixeira won 
more votes than the male candidate making this comment. 
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falling to 12th place after questions of her ethics surfaced. Teixeira maintained her 
innocence throughout the scandal22 and claimed to have been betrayed by her party. 
Although Teixeira did win reelection, the affair left a bitter taste in her mouth, leading 
her to complain, “my party is very machista” and “party solidarity does not exist” (in the 
PSDB) (Interview, April, 2009). 
When prompted for advice to female aspirants lacking family connections and 
party support, she said you can thrive “if you can construct your own path, but you have 
to work harder” (Interview, April, 2009). Although she did not have the family 
connections of most other women politicians in her party, she did have her academic title, 
which she believes afforded her respect. By demonstrating her technical capacities and 
authority on her area expertise in academia and the state bureaucracy, Teixeira overcame 
party skepticism of her electoral viability. The small push from the gubernatorial 
candidate was all she needed to throw her hat in the ring. While she received only 31% of 
her 2002 campaign budget from the party, Teixeira ran a corpo-a-corpo (person-to-
person) campaign in neighborhood meetings and the homes of friends, using fundraisers 
and donations from individuals to finance her extremely successful 2002 campaign 
(Interview, April, 2009). In 2006, Teixeira received less than 13% of her budget from the 
PSDB, drawing instead on corporate donors. 
Teixeira’s slogan, “Uma vida pela educação” (A life for education), reflects the 
centrality of her area expertise for her mandate. Importantly, however, she was not 
                                                 
22 Teixeira was approached as part of the mensalão scandal, in which allies of the Lula Administration 
bribed individual members of congress in exchange for their support on the legislative floor. She was 
offered a monthly payment of R$50,000 and lump sum of R$1 million to switch to the PL, one of the 
parties in the government alliance. She immediately brought the information to Perilli, who instead of 
thanking Teixeira for her stand against corruption – a tenet of the PSDB – acted to make himself look good 
(now seemingly lost as his alleged connections to Carlos Cachoeira, a racketeer currently under trial, are 
exposed) and left Teixeira appearing guilty of non-disclosure. In the commission that voted on whether to 
expel Teixeira, two co-partisans actually voted against her, in an apparent pact to save Aécio Neves, the 
governor of Minas Gerais, to whom Perilli was somehow indebted. 
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limited to manifestations of the traditional feminine, with Teixeira serving not only in the 
Commissions on Education and Culture, but also Science and Technology and Tourism 
and Sports, and in the Council of Advanced Studies. Of the 280 pieces of legislation 
Texeira proposed, she considers those with the greatest potential to affect change to be 
her approved bill requiring children from age 6 to 9 enroll in school, and her proposed 
Law of Educational Responsibility (modeled after the Law of Fiscal Responsibility) 
(Chamber of Deputies, 2012b). Teixeira entered on a platform of education, and 
remained largely focused on this issue. A potential drawback of pursing a profile 
emphasizing one’s area expertise is the tendency to be confined to a single issue domain. 
But for Teixeira, who in June, 2011, withdrew from the PSDB to assume the position of 
Executive Director of the Jaime Câmara Foundation, education is, after all, her passion. 
In her new role, Teixeira will work through local initiatives to improve primary education 
in Brazil (Almeida, 2011). 
STILL SUPERMADRES? 
For District Deputy Eliana Pedrosa in the highly-developed Federal District, 
family ties initiated her political involvement. While at the helm of the small conservative 
Liberal Party (PL), Pedrosa’s brother suggested she help the party fill the 30% candidate 
quota, expecting her to garner 800 votes or so. Building on the name of her brother and 
husband at the time, Pedrosa won more than 11,000 votes in 2002, gaining reelection in 
2006 for the PFL, and subsequently serving in the Federal District bureaucracy. What 
helped her confront the “largest fortress of machismo” found in party politics, which she 
called a “clube de bolinha” (essentially, good ole’ boys’ club), was at least initially her 
family name (Interview, July, 2009). Indeed as mentioned above, family connections 
remain a viable means for thriving in the absence of party support even in a more 
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developed state, with 31 of the 84 women elected (and re-elected) in women-friendly 
districts but women-averse parties being wives or daughters of a male politician.  
Moreover, not all women in a context ripe for converting professional skills into 
political capital have pursued this path. Some women in women-averse parties, such as 
Deputy Lauriete (PSC) of the southeastern state of Espírito Santo, remain in the 
supermadre mold despite having independent capital and hailing from a women-friendly 
district. Lauriete is the wife of a male politician but is also a famous evangelical gospel 
singer with significant convertible capital of her own, yet she campaigned in a way very 
consistent with the supermadre profile outlined above, using her 25 seconds of HGPE to 
stand alongside her husband while emphasizing “defense of life, family values, women, 
children, and adolescents.” 
Although women such as Crusius and Teixeira have forged a new pathway for 
female aspirants lacking party support, demonstrating that women can nonetheless 
convert their professional experiences into political capital, the supermadre profile 
persists for women in both women-averse and friendly states. As the feminist movement 
marches on and the electorate’s perceptions of female politicians continue to improve, 
women should be more equipped to translate their professional gains into political 
presence. Parties that seek to capitalize on these changes (and follow the electoral law) 
would be wise to invest in developing viable female candidacies and expanding the paths 
to power available to women. 
The ideal context, after all, is one in which a woman contender can campaign 
without the threat of bias from either the electorate or party leadership. Under these 
conditions, women recognize and seize opportunities from within parties and society at 
large to develop their political capacities. The path to power pursued by Deputy Manuela 
d’Ávila represents the fruition of such forthcoming support. 
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Free to Succeed - Manuela d’Ávila 
D’Ávila is a journalist by training, who, like many of the women politicians who 
preceded her, cut her political teeth in the student movement. Yet d’Ávila matured 
politically in a Brazil very different from that lived by women like Gleisi Hoffmann, 
Fátima Bezerra, and President Dilma Rousseff herself, who risked imprisonment, torture, 
and exile in their struggles against the military dictatorship of the 1970s. Coming of age 
in democratized and developed Rio Grande do Sul in the 1990s, d’Ávila was free to 
confront the remaining injustices. The PC do B and the developed state of Rio Grande do 
Sul had both long been open to the idea of women in politics, and without having to 
convince party leaders or her constituents of a woman’s capacity for politics, d’Ávila 
quickly signaled her strength. 
At 18 years of age, d’Ávila joined the Union of Socialist Youth (UJS), one of the 
nation’s more influential student unions, and an affiliate of the PC do B. She officially 
became a member of the PC do B two years later, and soon acquired the requisite skillset 
of a political leader, immersing herself in politics. D’Ávila learned how to win elections, 
serving as a Councilor to the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, National Director 
and later State President of the UJS, and Vice-President of the National Union of 
Students (UNE). In 2004, at age 23, she was elected to the city council of Porto Alegre, 
winning the 8
th
 most votes in the (capital) city – in a contest of 439 candidates for 36 
seats – and becoming its youngest city councilor to date. 
When asked of her decision to run, d’Ávila said, “It was not my candidacy, I did 
not want to be a candidate – it was the party that selected me” (Interview, March 2009). 
D’Ávila reported that it was “the type of party” that the PC do B is which enabled her to 
thrive (Interview, March 2009). Its history of strong women’s involvement nationally and 
in her state rendered tangible the possibility of women in power. According to d’Ávila, 
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with greater internal democracy and a more just distribution of party resources, the PC do 
B enabled rather than impeded her political aspirations. Accordingly, her advice to 
unsuccessful female candidates was to commit to democratizing their party internally, 
which she considered the “decisive” factor in women’s underrepresentation (Interview, 
March 2009). 
In 2006, she ran a successful campaign for Federal Deputy. As the “priority 
candidate” of the PC do B, she had the full backing of the party, including ample time on 
the HGPE, assistance waging a free but intense internet campaign, and 43% of her 
campaign funds. Spending R$1.32 per vote won (more efficient than 66% of the 
candidates), d’Ávila and the PC do B ran an ideas-based, militant-driven campaign.  Her 
tenure as City Councilor and National Director of UNE gave her a strong base, and party 
support sustained the campaign logistics. D’Ávila was the most voted of all 279 
candidates in her statewide district, at 271,939 votes (almost 5 percent of candidate 
votes). 
In an unsuccessful campaign for mayor of her state’s capital and its most 
populous city, Porto Alegre, in 2008, d’Ávila competed against two other leftist women, 
Maria do Rosario (PT) and Luciana Genro (PSOL, former PT), ultimately knocking each 
other out of the race and enabling the reelection of the PMDB incumbent, José Fogaça. 
Undeterred, d’Ávila gained reelection with ease in 2010. She was once again the state’s 
most voted, as well as the most voted female deputy in Brazil, doubling her prior vote 
total and breaking state records for a total of 482,590 votes (8.5% of candidate votes 
among 270 candidates). Although d’Ávila commanded the lead in polls leading up to the 
October 2012 mayoral contest, she ultimately lost the election to the incumbent mayor.23 
                                                 
23 Fogaça renounced his post to run for governor, a race he lost. His vice-mayor José Fortunati (PDT) 
assumed the mayoral post in 2010, and defeated d’Ávila in the first round of the 2012 mayoral elections. 
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Emerging from partisan and electoral contexts that cultivated, rather than 
debilitated, her political acumen, d’Ávila was never confined to a single or secondary 
issue and has thrived in a range of prestigious posts. She served as the President of the 
Commission of Human Rights, the Vice-President of the Commission on Labor, 
Administration, and Public Service, and currently as Vice-President of the Commission 
on Foreign Relations and National Defense. Less constrained by politicized gender roles, 
d’Ávila has also ascended among her peers, serving as Vice-Leader for the governing 
coalition in Congress. She has been active on the freedom of information campaign, and 
rights for youth, the LGBT population, and other minorities. D’Ávila was honored with 
Congresso em Foco awards in 2009 and 2011, indicated as one of the 100 most 
influential members of Congress by DIAP (100 Cabeças do Congresso), and named by 
The Independent as one of the principal future world leaders. In sum, d’Ávila and the PC 
do B represent the great possibilities of the combination of encouraged political ambition, 
party support, and a receptive electorate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The recent wave of successful female presidential candidates throughout Latin 
America suggests that machista hostility to female political leaders is diminishing. 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil have all elected women presidents in recent 
years. In Brazil, survey data suggest the electorate to be extremely receptive to women in 
politics, with 83% saying that women’s presence in the political sphere would improve 
the quality of politics (Ibope, 2009). Yet despite such societal progress, hostilities among 
party elite persist. According to a report by the Feminist Center for Studies and Advisory 
Services (CFEMEA), Brazilian parliamentarians “seem disposed to perpetuate women’s 
parliamentary underrepresentation,” with the majority of deputies and senators surveyed 
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disagreeing with various proposals designed to enhance women’s legislative presence 
(2009, 39).  
In sharp contrast, a majority of Brazilians surveyed in a recent nationally 
representative poll indicated that in the short term (five years) parties should change their 
statutes to guarantee equal representation to women and the electoral law should increase 
the quota to 50 percent (Ibope, 2009). It is worth noting that respondents in the northeast 
reported the highest levels of support for these initiatives, thus calling into question any 
presumptions by party elite that voters in Brazil’s lesser developed areas remain 
unwilling to support female politicians. Moreover, women have, when bulwarked by 
party support, achieved their greatest success rates in Brazil’s less developed states. 
Parties wishing to capitalize on women’s potential and conform to the electoral law must 
actively work to reconcile the yawning gap between societal preferences for more women 
in politics and the woefully scarce proportion of women among candidates and elected 
deputies. 
Historically, in order to develop training opportunities for female political 
aspirants within parties, women have had to first acquire space in party decision-making 
organs. Yet, by mandating that parties devote funds to the promotion of women’s 
participation, the 2009 mini-reform has now incentivized all parties to implement such 
programs. Given that elite culture is particularly resistant to change, with women-averse 
parties therefore unlikely to open up without some kind of exogenous stimulus, the mini-
reform represents a promising first step toward the meaningful inclusion of women in 
Brazilian politics. Only by incentivizing parties to cultivate and support the political 
ambitions of women can future reforms reconcile the discrepancies between elector and 
elected in their support of women in politics, and thus improve the representativeness, 
quality of, and citizen satisfaction with Brazilian democracy. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
Beset by a crisis of representation, many third wave democracies remain 
undermined by weakly institutionalized political parties and the underrepresentation of 
marginalized groups. While the extant literature has engaged those dynamics only in 
isolation, this dissertation uses extensive variation across Brazilian parties to explain how 
the two are related, employing mixed methods to analyze the relationship. Deviating from 
previous findings, this work demonstrates that parties are the central gatekeepers of 
women’s political power in Brazil, sending a clear message: reforms that strengthen 
parties and incentivize their promotion of women’s participation present a powerful 
remedy for the representative deficits in Brazilian democracy and beyond. 
Chapter 1 introduces the empirical puzzle posed by the Brazilian case, the central 
research questions explored and argument advanced, along with the data, design, and 
methods used to investigate those questions. Despite substantial socioeconomic progress, 
an effective and dynamic women’s movement, an electorate increasingly receptive to 
female politicians, and a gender quota – factors that have furthered women’s 
representation across Latin America – women remain scarcely represented in Brazilian 
electoral politics. I marshal an extensive array of original qualitative and quantitative data 
to refute and recast the conventional explanations of women’s (under)representation, 
concluding that the poor compatibility of quotas and open-list PR elections, voter bias, 
and district magnitude cannot fully explain the variation in electoral prospects of women 
across Brazil. Those expectations of the literature emerge from aggregate-level findings 
that cannot be simply extended to the individual level. While such studies have 
contributed by exploring the conditions under which a country will elect more women – 
an aggregrate level question, they have done little to theorize the conditions under which 
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individual women will acquire election. The latter question is more conducive to a 
divergance from the assumption of causal homogeneity among women, and thus 
facilitates the explicit consideration of how gender interacts with individual, party, and 
district level factors to explain electoral prospects. The extant findings on voter bias and 
electoral rules also derive largely from Western Europe and the US, where parties tend to 
be far less inchoate and democracies more consolidated. My findings thus call into 
question the generalizability of such expectations for both the individual level and a 
recently (re)democratized and weakly institutionalized context. 
Due to gendered social psychological processes and structural disadvantages, 
women tend not to possess the factors comprising the traditional recipe for success in 
candidate-centered elections such as those to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies: (1) a 
psychological affinity for self-promotion and thus aptitude to be an entrepreneurial 
candidate who self-nominates, (2) political interest and knowledge and the ability and 
desire to use this to ascend within the party organization, or as is more often the case, to 
thrive independently in the absence of any real party organization, and (3) personal 
political (or otherwise converted) capital essential in personalist politics. Traditional 
gender socialization, the certain risk but uncertain reward of seeking election to an arena 
women perceive to be corrupt and ineffective, and increasing opportunities in the 
professional realm comprise part of an interconnected web of factors dissuading women 
from entering the formal political sphere. While Brazilianist studies of elections and 
representation have downplayed the importance of parties, I argue that political parties 
hold the key to enhancing the representation of traditionally marginalized groups such as 
women because they can mitigate the effects of those compounding factors of exclusion, 
providing outsiders with the psychological, organizational, and material support they 
need to thrive in Brazil’s entrepreneurial system. 
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In Chapter 2, I review the contributions and limitations of the orthodox 
explanations for understanding women’s electoral prospects in Brazil. While machista 
voter bias is a commonly employed explanation for the underrepresentation of women in 
Brazil’s historically patriarchal cultural context, the contemporary electorate exhibits 
relatively moderate levels of gender stereotypes that doubt women’s capacity for the 
political realm. Moreover, many countries with higher levels of gender bias – including 
other countries with candidate-centered voting – have more women in politics than 
Brazil. Furthermore, Brazilian voters have expressed increasing levels of support for 
women in politics, suggesting that such gender bias is diminishing. Eighty-three percent 
of respondents in a recent nationally representative poll agreed that women’s political 
presence improves the quality of politics, and three-quarters of respondents affirmed that 
true democracy exists only with the presence of women. Such postulated support for 
women in politics was corroborated in the October 2010 presidential elections, when 
Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva won more than 47.6 and 19.6 million votes, 
respectively, together earning 66% of just over 100 million total votes. In the second 
round, Rousseff increased her vote share to 56 percent, becoming Brazil’s first female 
president. Considering those recent developments, I surmise that Brazil’s relatively 
moderate levels of machista voter bias cannot explain its drastic underrepresentation of 
women. 
Electoral rules are another prominent explanation for women’s representation, 
with most studies emphasizing distinctions between plurality and proportional 
representation rules, and in particular, the candidate- and party-centered elections they 
entail. Yet the implications of such expectations for female candidates in Brazil’s 
Chamber of Deputies, which employs the open-list variant of PR elections, remain 
unclear. While increased numbers of candidacies and party seat share should make those 
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resources less scarce and therefore more accessible for outsider contenders, they also tend 
to generate heightened incentives for intraparty competition, the implications of which I 
explore in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Party ideology and women in party leadership are the final two explanations I 
consider from the literature on women’s representation. Again, Brazil’s sizeable presence 
of leftist parties in government – the principal indicator for ideology’s influence on 
women’s overall representation – is not congruent with the paucity of women in 
Congress. There is, however, a close parallel between the low proportion of women in the 
national leadership structures of Brazilian parties – an average of 12.99 percent – and in 
Congress (less than 10%). A disaggregation of those numbers by parties reveals 
considerable interparty variation, which I describe, model, and explain in the analyses of 
Chapters 4-7. 
After discussing several other limitations of the extant literature and the 
contributions offered in my candidate-level analysis, I advance and substantiate an 
alternate explanation for Brazil’s dearth of female politicians. I contend that it is the weak 
institutionalization and disproportionately male leadership of most Brazilian parties that 
has maintained women’s political marginalization, and emphasize four mechanisms 
through which the relationship operates. First, inchoate parties suffer from a lack of 
transparency and accountability, with no clear guidelines for ascendance within the party 
and thus no norm of compliance with internal rules. Such parties, particularly those that 
are male dominant, are less likely to comply with the gender quota. Second, the reliance 
on candidate self-nomination in weakly institutionalized parties exacerbates the 
socialized gender gap in formal political ambition. External nomination through an active 
and women-inclusive recruitment network is more conducive to women’s participation. 
Third, amorphous party organizations are ill-equipped to provide critical capacity-
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building opportunities for women. Finally, the rarity of programmatic appeals and 
dominance of personalist politics favor those with personal political and financial capital, 
which given gendered discrepancies in income, wealth, and status, and the connections 
such resources confer, and the underrepresentation of women in appointed and elected 
posts, tends to be men. 
The leadership of most Brazilian parties remains dominated by men, who even in 
well-institutionalized parties will be less likely than female party leaders to mobilize 
party support for women. Conversely, when women occupy a critical mass of leadership 
positions in institutionalized parties, they are afforded an effective voice in party 
decision-making. Space in party leadership enables female party leaders to carry out a 
range of “critical acts,” such as holding the party accountable to fulfilling the gender 
quota, recruiting female candidates, mentoring female political aspirants, hosting 
capacity-building opportunities, and helping female candidates acquire party resources. 
Although the relationship is not determinative, with women not always acting for other 
women, female party leaders are more likely than male leaders to understand how to level 
the playing field for women contenders and to levy the party for resources for female 
aspirants.  
As concluded in the development community and beyond, the effective mitigation 
of gender inequities necessitates an explicitly gendered frame of reference (Lovenduski, 
1998; Quinn, 2009), whereby we consider the implications of and for gender in structures 
and processes. Female party leaders can introduce a gendered frame of reference in party 
decision-making, forcing leadership to stop functioning as an exclusively male domain, 
while raising awareness of gender inequities and means to resolve them. In particular, 
women in the leadership of institutionalized parties can hold parties accountable to the 
quota provisions, recruit and train female candidates, lobby for and host capacity-
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building opportunities for women, and mobilize party resources on behalf of female 
aspirants and their campaigns. 
I thus integrate party institutionalization and the representation of women in party 
leadership and electoral politics to theorize that to effectively promote women’s 
participation in a context of intraparty competition, parties must have both the capacity 
to recruit and provide female political aspirants with the psychological, organizational, 
and material support (forthcoming in appropriately institutionalized parties) essential for 
overcoming the combative entrepreneurial electoral climate, and the will to do so 
(heralded by women in party leadership).  
I argue that it is capacity and will, rather than ideology per se, that substantiates 
leftist parties’ apparent superiority in accommodating female candidates. A mass and 
participatory character and historical emphasis on equality means that leftist parties are 
certainly more likely than non-leftist parties to be institutionalized and incorporate 
women in their leadership. Yet leftist ideology per se is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for women’s electoral success. Parties must have both the structural conditions that 
provide the capacity to help women overcome the tendencies toward combative 
intraparty competition in the Chamber of Deputies, and the critical mass of women 
leaders actualizing this potential on behalf of female contenders through a series of 
critical acts; parties must be willing and able to promote women’s participation. Thus 
women’s electoral representation is most effectively enhanced when a critical mass of 
female leaders ascend to the leadership of an institutionalized party. 
In Chapter 3, I complicate the characterization by many observers that Brazil’s 
extreme underrepresentation of women is easily dismissed by the poor fit of gender 
quotas for the open-list electoral context. While such a stance does offer some merit, I 
show that this is but one component of a more nuanced explanation. A singular focus on 
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electoral rules holds limited weight for explaining the variation within Brazil. Brazil’s 
open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral system does in fact dilute the 
potential of the gender quota to enhance women’s representation, but Brazil actually 
ranks the worst among countries with candidate-based list elections, and the 6
th
 lowest of 
the more than 60 countries with legislated gender quotas. Moreover, some Brazilian 
parties have had significantly greater success with quota compliance and the election of 
women than have others. Clearly then, there are other dynamics at play.  
I establish for the reader a baseline understanding of legislative elections and 
parties in Brazil, and then explain why the OLPR system poses an obstacle to women’s 
representation, focusing on the incentives it creates to cultivate a personal vote. I quickly 
review the historical role of women in Brazilian politics, the recent plateau in women’s 
gradually progressing political presence, and the pervasiveness of male dominance in 
Brazilian politics. Next, I survey the global use of gender quotas to fast-track women’s 
representation, and the process of quota implementation and reform in Brazil. 
Following the arguments developed in Chapters 1 and 2, my analysis of the 
inadequacies of the Brazilian quota law bridges party institutionalization and the 
underrepresentation of women. It points to the preponderance of weakly institutionalized 
and male-led parties – which continue to resist complying with the quota law despite a 
recent reform expanding its reach – to explain the variation in quota compliance across 
parties and the failure (thus far) of quotas to empower women politically in Brazil. In the 
context of weak institutions, formal institutional fixes are insufficient to induce real 
change and if the gender quota is to be effective, the lei que não pega (law on paper only) 
culture among party elites must be vanquished. This is best achieved by furthering party 
institutionalization and thus transparency, accountability, and a norm of compliance. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the intensive data collection process and construction of my 
multilevel database of all 21,478 candidacies to the Brazilian Congress (1994-2010). I 
introduce hierarchical modeling and its suitability for my research questions, and present 
theoretical, statistical, and empirical justifications for the models I estimate in Chapters 
Five and Six. I then review decisions on measurement and variation across the control 
and explanatory variables, and introduce my index of party institutionalization. Finally, I 
preview the extensive interparty and interstate variation in the variables of interest. 
In Chapter 5, I subject the conventional explanations for the underrepresentation 
of women to empirical testing at the candidate level, in a context that is recently 
(re)democratized, has open-list elections, and a still inadequately institutionalized party 
system replete with inchoate parties. I integrate public opinion data with my multilevel 
database of candidacies to the Chamber of Deputies to assess the relative explanatory 
power of the rival explanations for women’s underrepresentation – voter bias and 
development, electoral rules (district and party magnitude), and ideology – along with my 
argument that (a lack of) party institutionalization and women in party leadership are the 
key predictors of women’s electoral prospects in Brazil. 
 I use descriptive analyses of women’s legislative presence and success rates 
throughout Brazil, public opinion data, multivariate analyses of candidate vote share, 
interviews, and documentary research to demonstrate that while residual machista voter 
bias does persist in less developed areas, it has not depressed women’s electoral 
performance in the Chamber of Deputies. Rather, with the lone exception of male leftists, 
candidates actually have a higher predicted vote share in the less developed states than in 
the more developed states. I also find that the effects of district and party magnitude are 
not gendered, with the former exercising a negative effect and the latter a positive effect 
on candidate vote share overall but interactions with female consistently insignificant. So 
 318 
contrary to the expectations of the rival hypotheses, even when controlling for electoral 
competitiveness and a range of other factors, men and women running in more developed 
states with more seats up for grabs actually perform worse than those running in less 
developed and smaller states, with no gendered effects for those variables. 
Employing descriptive analyses of party variation in quota compliance, female 
candidate success rates, and election of women, along with multivariate analyses of 
candidate vote share, interviews, and documentary research, I find strong support for my 
argument that women’s electoral prospects are heightened in well-institutionalized parties 
with a critical mass of female leaders. It is not leftist ideology per se that improves the 
electoral prospects of women contenders, but rather the combination of a structure 
favorable to outsiders and the presence of actors willing to mobilize resources for female 
candidates. I use the experiences of two of Brazil’s largest parties – the PMDB and PT – 
to illuminate the critical acts performed by women in party leadership. Women leaders 
are more likely to understand that it is insufficient to simply reserve candidate slots for 
women and allow them to go unfulfilled, and are more likely to then pressure other party 
leaders to provide conditions favorable to women’s candidacies that will in turn facilitate 
compliance with the gender quota. By availing psychological, organizational, and 
material support to female political aspirants, women in the leadership of institutionalized 
parties can level the playing field for female contenders. 
Chapter 6 uses variation in electoral rules across Brazil’s bicameral legislature 
and the incentives for party support or intraparty competition the differing rules generate 
to illuminate the interacting role of electoral rules and parties in explaining women’s 
limited electoral presence in Brazil. The controlled comparison analysis provides a potent 
opportunity for testing the relative explanatory power of my central argument, as it 
allows me to control for a barrage of potentially confounding cultural and historical 
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factors, while analyzing variation in electoral rules, incentives for party support or 
intraparty competition, and party characteristics. If party support is in fact critical for the 
development of viable female candidacies, the Senate’s heightened incentives for such 
support should lead women congressional contenders to confront a more level playing 
field in the upper rather than lower house. 
Indeed, in the last five elections, a consistently greater proportion of women have 
been elected to the more powerful and prestigious Senate than to the Chamber of 
Deputies. I advance background information on the varying electoral rules and incentives 
generated, descriptive analyses of interparty variation in the proportion of women they 
nominate and elect, cross-chamber multivariate analyses of candidates’ chance of 
election, and interview data and documentary research to explain how the Senate’s low 
magnitude, multi-vote plurality elections yield an electoral climate significantly more 
propitious to female contenders than do the Chamber of Deputies’ high-magnitude OLPR 
elections. While the Senate rules generate incentives for unified party support, the 
electoral rules of the Chamber incentivize combative intraparty competition.  
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, well-institutionalized parties are capable of 
overcoming those tendencies, but the potential is much more likely to be mobilized when 
a party has incorporated women in its decision-making structures. While party 
institutionalization is less important for women in the Senate due to the existing 
incentives for party support, the scarcity of Senate candidacy and restrictive ballot access 
mean that those benefits of unified party support are unlikely to be mobilized on behalf of 
female contenders without women in party leadership. When women do have an effective 
voice in party decision-making structures, however, the Senate incentives for party 
support amplify the positive effects of critical acts performed by women leaders. So 
although the upper house is more prestigious and poses a higher electoral hurdle than 
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does the lower house, incentives for unified party support in the Senate have been able – 
when mobilized by women in party leadership – to nullify the negative effect of gender 
on electoral outcome that persists in elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In sum, the 
conditions most favorable for the election of women are electoral rules that incentivize 
unified party support, and party leadership that carries out critical acts to cultivate viable 
female candidacies. 
Given the importance of party support, incentives for intraparty competition in the 
Chamber, the preponderance of inchoate and male-led parties, and residual gender bias in 
Brazil, it is impressive that even the few female deputies were able to win election. In 
Chapter Seven, I explain how, even under conditions of machista bias in the electorate 
and/or in party leadership, some women have cultivated particular profiles enabling them 
to overcome prejudices and attain office. By working with supportive parties to transform 
their experiences in informal politics into the requisite political capital and run a 
collective ideas-based campaign, or by conforming to the traditional gender norms 
prevalent in some areas and therefore minimizing their perceived threat to the established 
order, lutadoras and supermadres have managed to win election in less developed states, 
with supermadres doing so without the benefit of a supportive party. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, women are not afforded any electoral advantage 
in developed districts. The scenario is particularly dire when such women run with parties 
that are, by virtue of their weak institutionalization and/or lack of female party leaders, 
women-averse. Women running as technocrats have nonetheless succeeded under such 
constraints by converting their area-specific expertise acquired in the professional world 
into political capital and thus convincing resistant male party elites of their electoral 
viability. Chapter 7 tells the stories of women elected under those intersecting constraints, 
elucidating their paths to power and how they have managed to overcome the obstacles 
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and gain election. These circumscribed profiles represent successful strategies in 
women’s struggle to gain power in Brazil but come at the cost of constraining and 
conditioning their political participation, often reinforcing gender roles and limiting the 
scope of women’s power once in office. Unfortunately, the inchoate character and/or 
male-dominant leadership of so many Brazilian parties means that the most women-
friendly context of a supportive party and developed district persists as the least common 
among elected female deputies. Once this path becomes more viable through the 
strengthening of parties and incorporation of women in party decision-making, I am 
confident we will see a great boost in women’s political participation. 
While societal progress and public opinion data suggest an electorate increasingly 
receptive to female politicians, the largely male party elite have been unable or unwiliing 
to adapt to shifting demands from the electorate. Male party leaders in part are rationally 
hesitant to dilute their own influence, but are also often unaware of how they can 
incentivize and support viable female candidacies. For those in inchoate parties, their 
party simply lacks the structure to effectively marshal such support. 
Bridging the women’s representation literature, which affirms the critical 
gatekeeping role of parties, with the Brazilianist literature’s underestimation of such a 
role due to the amorphous character of most Brazilian parties, I move parties to the center 
of the analysis and confirm that they are the key arbiters of women’s political 
empowerment in Brazil. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the image of a minimal or non-
existent gatekeeping role so often painted for Brazilian parties, every single female 
candidate I interviewed underscored the importance of party support. Within an 
entrepreneurial electoral context, weakly institutionalized and male-led parties exacerbate 
the gender gap in formal political ambition and impede women’s political prospects, 
while circumscribing their pathways to power. Well-institutionalized parties, however, 
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provide an organizational structure and programmatic orientation capable of overcoming 
the tendencies toward intraparty competition, and women in party leadership are able to 
incorporate gender considerations in party decision-making and mobilize party resources 
on behalf of female political aspirants. 
If development, electoral rules, and ideology were the most important factors for 
women’s electoral prospects, we would need to accelerate economic growth in order to 
stimulate modernization, while also implementing a top-down quota or other requirement 
on non-left parties which are, the story goes, ideologically opposed to the incorporation 
of women. Indeed, that has been the approach of most advocates for enhancing women’s 
representation in Brazil. The analyses advanced here suggest that such an approach is 
misguided. Rather, gender-friendly reformists must align their interests with those 
seeking to enrich the quality of Brazilian democracy in other ways. Foremost are reforms 
that strengthen political parties. 
Even when faced with an unfavorable entrepreneurial electoral system, Brazil’s 
few female politicians have proven themselves capable of electoral success. Women’s 
shared history of structural disadvantages, the societal weight of traditional gender 
socialization, and an affinity for the collective leave female contenders wary of self-
promotion, good ole’ boy networking, and personalist politics. Yet those traits describe 
precisely the political status quo maintained by Brazil’s predominantly inchoate parties. 
When provided the opportunity to acquire political skillsets, bulwarked by a solid party 
organization, and able to run an ideas-based campaign, women’s success in the political 
realm increases. In the absence of those conditions of party support, however, (some) 
women have enjoyed success by converting capital acquired elsewhere into sufficient 
political capital. 
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In sum, residual gender bias, a faulty electoral quota, and the plethora of non-left 
parties cannot fully explain Brazil’s woefully scarce female political presence, nor can it 
explain variation among Brazilian parties in furthering women’s participation. Rather, it 
is the rarity of institutionalized parties and prevalence of male-dominance in party 
leadership that has sustained women’s marginalization in the legislature. Therefore, only 
by strengthening parties and incentivizing their active promotion of women’s 
participation can Brazil (and other countries facing similar crises of representation) 
expect to even the biased playing field and enhance women’s self-perceived and actual 
electoral prospects. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The approach and findings of this dissertation speak to some of political science’s 
most enduring questions. We remain engaged in debate on the form representation should 
take; for example, must representatives mirror their constituents (descriptive 
representation) to represent their interests’ adequately? The point of departure of this 
dissertation is that representation does indeed entail descriptive representation, which in 
turn engenders a powerful socializing effect through symbolic representation. Brazil’s 
2010 election of its first female president has ruptured any vision of political power as 
exclusively masculine, but an electorate that is majority female is still “represented” by a 
Congress that remains more than 90% male. This dissertation helps to illuminate the 
conditions under which male dominance of political institutions can be assuaged. 
A greater perception of representativeness may increase citizen satisfaction with 
democracy (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). If so, enhanced representativeness might increase 
the currently dire levels of trust and confidence in political parties and parliament in 
Brazil and beyond. Indeed, three-quarters of Brazilian respondents in a recent nationwide 
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poll agreed that there is only true democracy with the presence of women in spaces of 
power and decision-making, with 80% agreeing that half of the candidates on party lists 
should be women (Ibope, 2009). While the Brazilian electorate has exhibited itself to be 
open to electing women, both in public opinion polls and in elections, political parties 
have resisted. How can political parties be compelled to respond to evolving societal 
preferences in a context where the party label is of dubious significance? 
This dissertation bridges two critical challenges confronting Latin American 
democracies – the weak institutionalization of parties and party systems and the 
underrepresentation of marginalized groups – and demonstrates that reforms aimed at 
strengthening parties can go a long way toward resolving both manifestations of the crisis 
of representation. My analysis suggests that stronger parties would enhance both 
accountability and representativeness, two virtues of democratic governance historically 
considered to exist as tradeoffs. 
Another fundamental question engaged in this dissertation is the power of 
institutions to induce change. The implementation and reform of Brazil’s quota law was a 
clear instance of graduated change, where power holders sought to nominally 
accommodate societal demands for change while maintaining their power (Thelen, 1999). 
The gender quota represents just one layer of several formal and informal layers of 
institutions, and has been unable to reach a new equilibrium in Brazil’s inchoate and 
male-led political parties. In the more rule-bound context of Brazil’s few well-
institutionalized parties, however, the introduction of new actors – a critical mass of 
women leaders – has induced a genuine shift in party decision-making, which has in turn 
had important implications for women’s electoral prospects. This suggests the difficulty 
of institutionally-driven change in the context of weak institutions. Reformers must seek 
to trigger a new equilibrium by not only changing the formal institutions, but also 
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introducing new actors capable of generating a sufficient shock to break from the 
multiple layers of informal institutions. Given the resistance by many parties to 
incorporate women in their leadership, national, state, and municipal level bureaucratic 
organs for women’s affairs should launch a coordinated campaign on the inequalities 
faced by women, the potential electoral gains at stake, and precisely what parties can do 
to level the playing field and thus capitalize on the evolving electorate’s postulated 
support for women. 
The crux of this dissertation and so many other social science analyses is that 
structures and actors interact to produce outcomes, and that we are remiss to consider 
those fundamental pieces in isolation. I demonstrate that neither electoral rules nor party 
institutionalization have proven independently capable of empowering women, but rather 
must be mobilized by willing party leaders. Electoral rules do not function in a vacuum, 
but are endogenous to and interact with the actors that created and sustain them. Future 
reform efforts must therefore consider not only electoral rules but also the political 
parties that will mediate the effects of these rules. 
REFORMS TO ENHANCE BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY 
Proposals for electoral and various political reforms have been at the forefront of 
the legislative agenda – in rhetoric if not action – since the return to democracy in the 
1980s. Indeed, David Fleischer has often characterized the ongoing reform attempts as a 
“never-ending story” (2011a, 2011b). While the 1987-88 Constitutional Assembly 
achieved substantial gains (Fleischer, 2011b), the outcome left standing three critical 
challenges for the Brazilian party system and resultant quality of democracy: party 
(in)fidelity, campaign finance, and the open-list format of proportional elections. Most of 
the rules governing those issues are resolved through the Electoral and Party Legislation, 
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continually updated by the Congress (Power, 2000). It is hardly surprising then that 
elected officials have not voted to change the laws under which they themselves were 
elected. Civil society groups have, however, mobilized under a “Platform for Reform to 
the Political System,” gathering signatures and pressuring elected officials to undertake a 
series of reforms. A similar collaborative civil society effort, which drew on 1.3 million 
signatures and mass mobilization, resulted in the significant accomplishment of the 
approval in 2010 and judicial declaration of constitutionality in 2012 of Ficha Limpa, an 
anti-corruption law.1 Such success suggests that reform is possible, but requires 
substantial collaboration among civil society and with the various branches of 
government. 
As discussed by Power, the fact that party fidelity measures had been imposed by 
the authoritarian regime spelled their undoing – the Brazilian Congress swiftly abolished 
party fidelity statutes after the return to democracy in 1985 (Power, 2000, 118). Some 
progress toward reform was subsequently made by the Cardoso Administration, which 
attempted to reengineer electoral institutions so as to strengthen parties, not only 
imposing stricter standards for party fidelity but also adopting a threshold for 
representation that works against fragmentation, barring coalitions in proportional 
elections, and advocating greater transparency in campaign contributions (Mulholland 
and Rennó, 2008).2 Most of those measures were rejected, however, and it was not until a 
series of judicial rulings in 2007 that enhanced standards for party fidelity enjoyed the 
force of law. The Supreme Electoral Court ruled in March, 2007 that federal and state 
deputies and municipal councilors (later expanded to include those elected to majoritarian 
                                                 
1 For more information, see the campaign’s website, www.fichalimpa.org.br.   
2 Two important and successful Cardoso-era reforms not discussed here are the reelection provision for 
executive posts and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Mulholland and Rennó, 2008). 
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posts) switching parties after election would forgo their mandate. So-called “party 
migrations” decreased substantially in the wake of the court decisions – 51 in 2007 and 
just 1 in 2008 – and a few switchers unable to prove just cause3 for jumping ship actually 
did lose their mandate (Cunow, 2010). 
With progress on party fidelity underway, much of the current reform effort is 
focused on instituting public financing of campaigns. As documented throughout this 
dissertation, Brazilian electoral campaigns are expensive, draw on significant corporate 
funding, and serve to reproduce societal inequities resulting from gendered and racialized 
disparities in wealth and status. In sum, (most) non-white and/or female candidates do not 
confront a level playing field, a fact that deters many would-be political aspirants from 
throwing their hat in the ring. Such an imbalance, which confines allegedly representative 
spaces to the privileged few, could be rectified through the mechanism of public 
campaign financing. Although the use of public funds for campaigning would be a 
significant investment of state resources, in the words of one former deputy and mayor, 
who had recently changed her mind on the proposal, “the democratic process is the 
biggest public works project of all” (Interview with Former Deputy Jusmari Oliveira, 
November, 2008). 
While a great distrust of political parties has provoked skepticism in the electorate 
of the reform agenda, public financing enjoys greater support than does the proposal to 
shift to closed lists (discussed below). Of 1073 recent callers to the Chamber of Deputies 
hotline,4 37% were in favor of and 57% opposed to public financing of campaigns 
                                                 
3 If the politician can prove that the party with which (s)he won election substantially changed its platform 
or s(he) faced personal discrimination, switching can be deemed justifiable by the electoral court (Cunow, 
2010). 
4 “Disque-Câmara” is a service created in 2003 facilitating constituent communication with deputies. They 
receive hundreds of thousands of calls and emails each year with solicitations, complaints, denouncements, 
and compliments. The hotline is staffed Monday through Friday, 8am to 8pm (Agência Câmara de 
Notícias, 2008). 
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(Agência Câmara de Notícias, 2011b). Although Fleischer’s prediction is that such a 
proposal would not be adopted (2011), it actually enjoys significant support within the 
Congress, with 58.7% of parliamentarians surveyed in a more representative sample in 
favor of exclusive public financing of campaigns and only 15.3% supporting the current 
system (Inesc, 2009). The PT’s Rapporteur on Political Reform, Deputy Henrique 
Fontana stated, “Exclusive public financing, through the reduction of the prices of 
campaigns, which each time are more expensive and unattainable for most of the 
population, is one of the measures with the greatest impact in fighting corruption, in 
addition to guaranteeing more autonomy for the governments” (Quoted in Agência 
Câmara de Notícias, 2011b). 
As with the proposal for public financing, constituents’ profound distrust of 
politicians and their parties has substantially undermined support for closing candidate 
lists and giving parties the ultimate say on the ordering of lists. Although closing the lists 
would strengthen parties and enable them to enforce the gender quota, many fear that in 
the interim, weak parties dominated by personalist leaders would simply elect their 
cronies, thus depriving the electorate of the ability to ‘disturb the lists.’ Moreover, as 
discussed above, in the absence of placement mandates party leaders tend to cluster 
female candidates at the bottom of party lists. In sum, the closing of party lists, if 
accomplished, must be done so judiciously, requiring transparency in party selection of 
candidates and guidelines for establishing representative lists. In any case, there is scant 
support for such a proposal in the electorate and the Congress, and despite propositions 
from Deputy Fontana and the PT, we are unlikely to see such a wholesale shift in the 
electoral system any time soon.  
The fact that open lists are here to stay for the time being, and that any eventual 
shift to a closed-list system would entail a rather shaky transition if executed by weak 
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parties, means that reform efforts should focus on other means to strengthen parties. The 
party fidelity measures discussed above represent a promising first step. Party members 
and citizens in general must also demand accountability of party leaders. As Deputy 
Fontana and countless others have argued, the public financing of campaigns is one such 
way to enhance accountability to constituents by removing the need for candidates to 
curry favor with corporations and wealthy individuals in order to run a viable campaign. 
Public financing of campaigns would also reign in ever-growing campaign budgets, thus 
counteracting another troubling side effect of open-list elections. 
While the adoption of public financing of campaigns and closed list elections 
remain a tough sell to the electorate, there already exists broad societal support for 
reforms requiring parties to enforce the gender quota. According to a nationally 
representative survey in Feburary, 2009, 8 in 10 Brazilians support the adoption of 
legislative measures for political gender equality, 75% support the quota law, and 55% 
agree completely (and another 25% in part) that candidate lists should have equal 
numbers of men and women. A striking 86% think that parties that do not comply with 
the quota stipulated by the electoral law should be punished. Such support exists across 
Brazil’s five regions, and is only slightly lower for male respondents (Ipobe, 2009). But 
when asking parliamentarians similar questions, support plummets (Cfemea, 2009), yet 
another demonstration of the fact that the problem of women’s extreme representation in 
Brazil is fundamentally political rather than societal. Politicians are aware that changing 
the rules by which they were elected, and requiring more accountability with the gender 
quota, could fundamentally restructure political power, and are likely reluctant of change 
that may ultimately spell their undoing. 
The 2009 mini-reform and subsequent decisions by the electoral courts in 2010 
and 2012 to enforce the quota provisions represent substantial progress in the battle for 
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women’s representation in Brazil. But as I have argued throughout this dissertation, it is 
not enough to change the formal rules of the game; reformers must also target informal 
tendencies among party elite. Deputy Luiza Erundina’s 2002 proposal (6216/2002) 
addresses precisely this concern by requiring parties to devote: (1) 30% of their federally-
allocated funds for party organization to the promotion of women’s participation and (2) 
30% of their publically-funded television and radio propaganda time to women. The 
accomplishments of the 2009 mini-reform were more limited, however, devoting only 
5% of party organization funds and 10% of propaganda time to the promotion of 
women’s participation.  
Future reforms must achieve more – they must change the incentive structure 
adequately so as to make it irrational for parties to not invest in cultivating viable female 
candidacies, forcing their hands to promote women’s political empowerment. The 
electorate appears poised to respond favorably to party advancement of quality female 
candidacies, but most party elites remain slow to adapt. Reforms along the lines of 
Deputy Erundina’s proposal would help to jumpstart party change, thus diminishing the 
yawning gap between electorate expectations and party elites, and improving the quality 
of Brazilian democracy. 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
The ability of institutionalized parties with women in party leadership to further 
women’s empowerment even in Brazil’s entrepreneurial OLPR elections is encouraging. 
But does this story of capacity and will have broader applicability? Can such a 
combination of structure and agency also further the representation of other marginalized 
groups? Does it apply beyond Brazil? If so, institutionalized parties with women in party 
leadership should prove capable of and willing to facilitate women’s political 
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participation. In line with the argument of Chapter 6, where there are fewer incentives for 
intraparty competition, such as in the Brazilian Senate and even more so in closed-list PR 
elections, women in party leadership rather than party institutionalization should be most 
salient for predicting women’s electoral prospects. 
In Peru’s open-list PR elections, women have enjoyed unanticipated successes, 
winning 28% of the congressional seats in the 2011 elections. Schmidt explains that 
success in part by pointing to constraints on intra-list competition by party leaders and the 
fact that voters can cast two ballots5 (Schmidt, 2003), which both help to mitigate 
intraparty competition and make the campaign less of a zero-sum endeavor in spite of the 
open-list electoral rules. Another important consideration is the 2004 provision of the 
Law of Political Parties, Article 26, which requires parties to include at least 30% women 
not only in their candidate lists but also in party leadership (Apra, 2012). In the 2006 
elections, the participation of women in the executive commission, among candidacies, 
and elected deputies for the “major” parties – Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), Cambio 
90, and the Nationalist Party6 – were, respectively: 26.7 / 28.6 / 42.9 percent women in 
their national executive commissions, 36.2 / 36.9 / 42.9 percent women among their 
congressional candidates, and 22.2 / 38.5 / 33.3 percent women among their elected 
deputies (IDB, 2009).  
In contrast, Panama, which also employs a variant of open-list PR elections for its 
multimember districts (it has an additional tier elected through single member districts), 
the proportion of women is even lower than that of Brazil, currently at 8.5 percent (IPU, 
2012). In the 2009 elections, the participation of women in the executive commission, 
                                                 
5 Feminist non-governmental organizations advocated, “Of your two preferential votes, cast one for a 
woman” (Schmidt, 2003). 
6 The Aprista party has been around since 1924 but suffered serious setbacks in recent years. Cambio 90 
was formed as an electoral vehicle for Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and shows increasing signs of staying 
power. The Nationalist Party, the party of President Ollanta Humala, is a new leftist party formed in 2005. 
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among candidacies, and elected deputies for the top three parties (together winning 87% 
of the seats) – the Partido Revolucionario Democrático, Partido Político Panameñista, 
and Cambio Democrático – were, respectively: 11.1 / 6.7 / 20.0 percent women in their 
national executive commissions, 14.3 / 2.9 / 12.3 percent women among their 
congressional candidacies, and 7.7 / 0 / 16.7 percent women among their elected deputies 
(IDB, 2009).  
Two tentative patterns emerge from the above data points from Panama and Peru 
– first, there is substantial interparty variation within Panama, with the party with the 
highest proportion of women leaders (Cambio Democrático – a right wing party) 
performing significantly better in terms of women’s participation than its coalition 
partner, the Partido Político Panameñista, which had only minimal women in its 
leadership and an ultimately all-male congressional delegation. Second, the contrast with 
the Peruvian case is stark – Panama has significantly fewer women in party leadership 
and in Congress than does Peru despite sharing the open-list electoral context. A key 
distinction, brought into focus by considering interparty variation within Panama, and 
comparing Panama and Peru overall, is the proportion of women in party leadership. 
Moreover, as discussed by Schmidt (2003), the excesses of intraparty competition in the 
Peruvian system are mitigated by party leaders and the dual vote. 
Another candidate for comparison with women’s performance in Brazil’s open-
list elections is Chile, where candidates to the Chamber of Deputies also run in 
preferential list elections. Chile’s binomial system, a relic of Pinochet’s authoritarian 
regime instituted in the transition to democracy to over-represent the right, complicates 
any analysis of congressional candidacies, but a few points merit discussion. First, 
despite having no gender quota, Chile outperforms Brazil in its female legislative 
presence, ranking 89
th




) (IPU, 2012). In spite of Chile’s preferential voting system, the country’s party 
system is significantly more programmatic than the Brazilian party system, with stronger 
party organizations and stable patterns of electoral competition (Jones, 2005). In the 2009 
elections, the participation of women in the executive commission, among candidacies, 
and elected deputies for the top three parties – the Socialist Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party, and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) – were, respectively: 
10.0 / 18.2 / 15.4 percent women in their national executive commissions, 28.6 / 22.2 / 
11.1 percent women among their congressional candidacies, and 20.0 / 10.0 / 12.1 
percent women among their elected deputies (IDB, 2009). 
At the municipal level, the conservative party UDI performs exceptionally well in 
electing women – 26.3% of its municipal councilors elected for the 2008-12 mandate 
were female (IDB, 2009).7 Magda Hinojosa credits the UDI’s success to its exclusive-
centralized candidate selection process, which helps to mitigate the problems discussed in 
the preceding chapters regarding self-nomination and local power monopolies. Hinojosa 
applies her framework of candidate selection to several other cases, finding that even in 
the context of candidate-centered elections, parties that actively recruit candidates can 
counteract the constructed gender gap in formal political ambition, and an exclusive 
process allows national party elites working to expand the party’s overall electoral 
fortunes to sideline largely male local power monopolies seeking merely to preserve their 
individual influence (Hinojosa, 2009). 
                                                 
7 The UDI’s superior female presence at the municipal level relative to the national level is likely a product 
of its traditional gender role orientation, espoused in party platforms and party elites, which “especially 
values the virtues and proper functions of women as carriers of life, nuclei of the family, and the principle 
transmitters of values, morals, and traditions. Consequently, Unión Demócrata Independiente will work so 
that women’s work in society can be compatible with their proper functions, especially those related to 
maternity, child-rearing, and caring for their families” (UDI, 2007, Quoted in Hinojosa, 2009, 394). 
Municipal politics are widely considered more accessible to women due to lesser competitiveness, cost, 
greater proximity to family, and a more ‘natural’ extension of the private sphere (Chaney, 1979; Hinojosa, 
2009). 
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The above discussions of women’s political presence in in Peruvian, Panamanian, 
and Chilean parties lend broader support to my finding that women in the leadership of 
institutionalized parties can overcome the problems posed by intraparty competition and 
improve the situation for female candidates. In my cross-chamber comparison of 
women’s performance in Brazil, I found that the combination of women in party 
leadership and incentives for unified party support offer a context particularly conducive 
to the election of women. A quick glance at women’s representation in Nicaragua’s 
closed list elections affirms the relevance of women in party leadership in such a context. 
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) adopted a parity statute in all 
instances of party leadership and candidacies in February 2011 (Radio Primerisima, 
2011). In November 2011, the FSLN elected a record 33 women deputies – 53% of its 62 
member delegation, catapulting Nicaragua to 40.2% women in the legislature (up from 
21.6% in 2006), 9
th
 in global rankings and in the entire hemisphere second only to Cuba 
(IPU, 2012). For a point of comparison, in the 2006 elections, Nicaragua’s Independent 
Liberal Party (an offshoot of the Constitutional Liberal Party, which suffered a dramatic 
defeat in the 2011 elections) had 14.3% women in its national executive committee and 
elected only 9.1% women of its 22 member delegation. In sum, preliminary evidence 
from several Latin American countries provides tentative support for the central findings 
of this dissertation: (1) parties mediate the effects of electoral rules and are thus the key 
gatekeepers of women’s political power in Brazil and beyond, and (2) reforms that 
strengthen parties and incentivize their active promotion of women’s political 
participation offer the most effective tools for remedying the democratic deficits 
confronting many countries of the third wave. 
In a recent report on political parties and gender equity, the IDB issued several 
recommendations of how parties can facilitate the participation of women, drawing on 
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successful examples from throughout the hemisphere. These can be considered “critical 
acts” (Dahlerup, 1988), most likely performed by women in party leadership, which help 
to introduce a gendered frame of reference to the party. In Costa Rica, the electoral court 
itself “established that parties should include in their statutes mechanisms that assure 
principles of gender equality and non-discrimination and also parity in all party structures 
(at all levels), and signaled that that it will not register or renew the registration of parties 
not in compliance with these principles” (Llanos and Sample, 2008, 71). Note that gender 
parity in party leadership is a critical component of that apparent formula for success. 
Most of the recommendations echo the findings of this dissertation. The report 
states that parties should bring women’s voice to the decision-making table, with the 
remaining recommendations far more likely to come to fruition after opening up the 
space to women in leadership. In line with the critical acts discussed in this dissertation, 
the IDB recommends that parties seeking to enhance women’s representation incorporate 
a gendered frame of reference in party statutes and programs of government, require 
party leadership to endorse those policies, and be aware of the electoral utility of reaching 
out to women (Llanos and Sample, 2008, 29). As argued by Kittilson, women leaders can 
introduce “new frames of meaning” to party leadership emphasizing the strategic value of 
reaching out to women (Kittilson, 2006). Other critical acts entail increasing 
accountability by monitoring the distribution of public resources such as electoral 
propaganda time and party funds, and devoting a party organ to monitoring party 
compliance with an electoral quota if applicable. Finally, the IDB report suggests that 
parties mobilize resources for women’s participation and recruit local leaders (Llanos and 
Sample, 2008, 29). Those recommendations for Latin America and the Caribbean are 
precisely the kinds of critical acts I outlined in the discussions above. Yet, many of these 
critical acts presume a viable party infrastructure, which is not addressed. In future 
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research, I will collaborate with country experts throughout Latin America to investigate 
variations in party capacity for executing the critical acts advocated above, the role of 
party institutionalization in enhancing such capacity, and the implications thereof for 
women’s representation. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the most pressing questions that emerges from the core findings of this 
dissertation is why male party elites remain so reluctant to promote women’s 
participation despite an apparently evolving electorate. Why have they not responded to 
changing societal demands? The standard response I received in several interviews with 
male party leaders was that women were not interested in participating; yet that line was 
resolutely rejected by the same parties’ female leaders and activists. Rather, women are 
often unwilling to run a campaign that their party has no intention of supporting. In future 
research, I will investigate the issue further to expose the roots of party elites’ persistent 
resistance to opening the door to women. Recent institutional reforms provide an ideal 
context to observe and contrast party adaptation to changing institutional constraints and 
societal prferences.  
While this dissertation has illuminated the conditions under which women 
can(not) acquire political power in the context of candidate-centered elections, a critical 
research question for future consideration is how political barriers impeding women 
affect other outsider groups, such as Brazil’s marginalized Afro-Brazilian majority. An 
extensive body of literature on intersectionality attests that gender and race cannot be 
understood independently, making such a consideration of race a pertinent extension of 
this research agenda. Many of the findings center on outsider status and thus should also 
apply to other marginalized groups, but explicit consideration is warranted. In a study of 
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race, gender, and political ambition in the US, Moore found that men and women of color 
were significantly more likely to report political ambition than white respondents (Moore, 
2005). How might the various factors constraining and cultivating women’s political 
ambition discussed above be racialized? Moreover, Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar’s 
analysis of ethnic parties’ tendency to elect fewer women (2010), and Hughes’ cross-
national analysis of quotas and minority women’s political representation remind us that 
parties and electoral institutions often affect majority women, minority women, and 
minority men differently (2011). In future work, I will examine how various dimensions 
of marginality intersect and the implications for representation. 
Another question raised by the findings of this research is – how do women’s 
bounded paths to power affect their policymaking latitude once in office? Scholars at the 
vanguard of women’s representation are investigating the connections between 
descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. To understand how women’s 
limited presence in formal politics, and the struggles to remedy their exclusion affect the 
quality of democracy, we must integrate explanations of how women get elected with the 
policies they promote in office and the effects their presence have on constituents. With a 
better understanding of how the salient questions of women’s representation intersect and 
interrelate, we can formulate stronger mechanisms facilitating their effective participation 
in the formal political sphere. 
Women’s representation remains limited in Brazil not because of a lack of 
political interest among women, but rather due to the weakness of its political 
institutions. With stronger institutions, Brazil’s strong women can challenge the crisis of 
representation and enhance the quality of democracy.
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